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Abstract
This thesis analyses the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system, especially in the context 
of disputes involving questions concerning environmental protection. It argues that since the early 
1990s, such disputes have posed important challenges to the legitimacy o f the WTO. From the legal 
point of view, they have fuelled a lively doctrinal debate on fragmentation o f international law and 
the role o f non-WTO norms in the WTO dispute resolution mechanism.
The thesis conceives legitimacy as a notion consisting of various interlinked components, including 
social, substantive, formal and procedural ones, and analyses the operation of the WTO dispute 
settlement system in light o f these criteria. It shows that the compulsory but materially restricted 
jurisdiction o f the WTO dispute settlement limits its ability to solve disputes involving non-trade 
interests and legal norms. The dissertation argues, however, that some o f the ensuing problems 
could be remedied if the WTO dispute settlement system approached international environmental 
law in a more constructive, consistent and transparent manner.
Turning to the formal and procedural elements o f legitimacy, the thesis conceives the situation of 
the WTO dispute settlement system as a dilemma between the pressure to improve substantive 
legitimacy by considering environmental norms and interests, and the need to observe the limits of 
its judicial function. It explores tensions at the boundary between the WTO and its Member States, 
arguing that only limited potential exists to enhance the authority of the WTO dispute settlement 
through ‘importing’ substantive legitimacy.
Finally, the dissertation highlights institutional and systemic problems arising from fragmentation of 
international law. Using the relationship between the WTO and the international climate change 
regime as an example, it concludes that the WTO dispute settlement system’s legitimacy challenge 
involves two dimensions. Certain unexploited potential exists to improve the situation through the 
judicial techniques at the disposal o f the WTO dispute settlement system. However, the more 
profound and systemic problems are incapable o f solution by the WTO dispute settlement system 
or even by WTO negotiators alone. Instead, they would require broader international efforts.
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The WTO Dispute Settlement System and the Challenge of 
Environment and Legitimacy -  an Introduction
The dispute settlement process is perhaps the single most controversial component 
o f the WTO system... For some WTO critics, it is a question of legitimacy: the 
panels do not reflect any direct democratic representation, and they seem not to be 
accountable to any checks and balances. For others, it is an issue o f transparency, 
openness and access: the panel reviews are not public, and only governments 
involved in the dispute are allowed to submit testimony. For yet others, the issue is 
ideological: the panel rulings have in some cases declared environmentally based 
trade provisions to be inconsistent with WTO obligations.1
The dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was not designed to 
resolve challenges related to trade and environment, legitimacy and globalization that form the core 
of this study. While debates related to these issues were already at full swing at the time of its 
inception in 1995, the focus of those negotiating the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
was on creating an improved forum for settling international trade disputes. And judging from that 
narrow perspective, they succeeded. The WTO dispute settlement system has fruitfully solved a 
considerable number o f ‘traditional’ trade disputes. That it would also become entangled in 
controversies related to globalisation, legitimacy, democracy and environmental protection could 
perhaps be predicted at the time of its creation - but there were no realistic prospects for solving 
the ensuing problems at that point in time. Such challenges are, however, very much a part of the 
reality in which the WTO dispute setdement system currendy operates: They might not form the 
core of its functions, but they are an important and extremely demanding part of it.
Regardless of the more modest ambitions of its creators, the WTO Appellate Body has been 
characterised as “the most powerful court in the world.”2 This reputation is based on certain unique 
features of the WTO dispute setdement system. Its jurisdiction is compulsory for all WTO Member 
States and it is the supreme authority on WTO law. Due to its competence to authorise trade 
sanctions against Member States violating WTO rules, the WTO dispute resolution mechanism can 
also have important economic and political implications. It therefore stands out from the growing 
number o f other international courts and tribunals. The WTO was also born into an international 
reality undergoing several important changes. The end of the Cold War and globalisation both 
highlighted the role o f international law and organizations, prompting paradigm changes 
concerning their legitimacy. Around the same time, international environmental consciousness was 
expanding rapidly, bringing to the fore tensions between trade and environmental protection. All
1 K. Jones, Who's Afraid o f  the WTO? (OUP, 2004), 81.
2 P. Sands, Lawless World. America and the Making and Breaking o f  Global Rules. (Penguin Books, 2005), 99.
these factors have inspired some fundamental questions concerning the W TO dispute setdement 
system. What is its role in solving conflicts between international trade and non-trade policy 
objectives? Given that it is a trade body with limited jurisdiction, can it reach satisfactory decisions 
in such disputes? To what extent can it rely on such rules o f international law that are not contained 
in the WTO Agreements? What is, for instance, the role of international environmental law in the 
WTO dispute setdement system? How can the system respond to tensions resulting from 
fragmentation o f international law into various specialised legal regimes?
The focus of this study is on the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system especially in the 
context o f disputes involving environmental and health issues. There have been several such cases 
in the GATT/W TO system. In the beginning of the 1990s, two G A TT  panels condemned an 
import prohibition by the U.S. on tuna caught by fishing techniques that resulted in incidental 
killings o f dolphins. The Tma-Dolphin decisions caused a remarkable backlash against the worid 
trading system, which became labelled as the dolphin-eating GLTTTzilla monster. The new WTO 
dispute setdement system thus inherited the challenge o f responding to the fierce environmentalist 
critique and attempting to ‘balance’ trade and environmental protection without jeopardizing the 
position that the WTO “is not an environmental protection agency and does not aspire to be one.”3 
Some of the most famous cases in the WTO era have involved a trade ban on shrimp by the U.S. to 
protect sea turtles, as well as a prohibition by France on asbestos. In  the autumn o f 2006, the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruled on the Rioted) dispute concerning the de facto moratorium on 
genetically modified products by the European Union (EU). In 2007, dispute setdement reports 
were adopted concerning an import ban on retreated tyres by Brazil based on their adverse health 
and environmental impacts. In March 2008, yet another panel report was circulated in the 
prolonged trans-Adantic dispute concerning the prohibition by the EU on meat produced with the 
aid of growth hormones.
Several potential new disputes are already looming around the comer. In the autumn of 2007, first 
steps were taken in a dispute concerning a prohibition on seal products by Belgium and the 
Netherlands. According to Canada, the trade ban violates WTO rules and has important 
implications on the livelihood o f indigenous people. Numerous trade-related policies and measures 
are also being contemplated and implemented to mitigate climate change. The EU, for instance, has 
set an ambitious ten per cent target for biofuels in the transport sector by 2020. To address 
environmental concerns associated with biofuels, such as deforestation, loss o f biodiversity and 
their modest impact on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the EU is contemplating strict 
sustainability standards for both domestically produced and imported biofuels. Various climate
3 D. Abdel Motaal, "Trade and Environment in the World Trade Organization: Dispelling the Misconceptions," 
RECIEL 8(3) (1999), 330 at 330.
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change related initiatives are also mushrooming in the U.S. Congress. Some of the most prominent 
include a proposal for a Low Carbon Economy Act, which would launch a federal cap and trade 
system for carbon dioxide emissions. Importers from countries that have not adopted comparable 
measures to mitigate climate change would be required to purchase emission allowances to 
compensate for the loss of competitiveness. It is easy to see how such measures could be 
challenged in the WTO dispute settlement system.
All this goes to show that the WTO dispute settlement system has become the most significant 
judicial forum to tackle international conflicts between economic interests and environmental 
protection. This has not occurred without significant political controversies and doctrinal debates. 
One o f the main themes in this work concerns the role o f international environmental law in the 
WTO dispute settlement system. The contours of that complex question will be discussed 
throughout the study. Certainly, the lack of consideration for relevant legal norms is bound to have 
a negative impact on the legitimacy of a judicial body. The prevailing view is, however, that as a 
trade body, the competence of the WTO dispute settlement system to consider international 
environmental norms is limited. Furthermore, any stretching o f the boundaries of the trade regime 
by the WTO dispute settlement system risks irritating WTO Member States and jeopardising their 
faith in the world trading system. The importance of the WTO respecting its mandate has also been 
underlined through several public protests against it. In the eyes o f many protestors, the W TO is an 
institution that has undemocratic decision-making structures, promotes hard-line neoliberal 
globalization and steals power from the local level to the supranational one where its use is not 
subject to adequate checks and balances. Although the protests have often taken extreme 
manifestations, underlying are valid concerns over the lack of democratic accountability and 
possibilities for public participation in decision-making that concerns subject matters o f a great 
public interest.
Such are the broad themes that form the focus of this research. What is common to these topics is 
that they can be linked to the question o f legitimacy. Legitimacy is a complex notion lacking an 
unequivocal definition but it is essentially about justified and acceptable authority. It is commonly 
associated with a combination of factors, including compliance with formal legal requirements, 
adherence to just procedures, the social acceptance o f an institution and its ability to advance 
commonly shared policy objectives. Conceived in this way, legitimacy offers a useful conceptual 
tool for analysing the role and functioning of the WTO dispute setdement system. Its flexibility 
makes it possible to draw together the various questions, concerns and criticisms relating to the 
WTO dispute setdement and assess them against a broader theoretical umbrella. The distinction 
between formal and substantive legitimacy also provides a helpful way o f categorising some o f the
12
problems commonly associated with the WTO dispute resolution mechanism and understanding 
their interrelations.
While the approach and methods o f this research are legal, its focus on the legitimacy o f the WTO 
dispute setdement system and the environmental linkage means that its substance is intimately 
connected to several broader interdisciplinary debates. The question concerning the legitimacy o f 
the WTO dispute setdement system builds on an intense debate about the need to rethink the 
legitimacy o f international law and organizations. The focus on WTO disputes where 
environmental issues play a dominant role brings to the fore tensions between trade and 
environment, the two elements that are essential to the notion of sustainable development but that 
are not always easy to combine. When considering the potential to solve such ‘linkage’ disputes 
through the WTO dispute setdement system, one soon comes across the problematique related to 
fragmentation of international law. Indeed, many of the problems discussed in this study draw their 
origins from the increasingly specialised nature of international law and its dissolution into relatively 
isolated sub-systems, such as international trade law and international environmental law. While the 
uncoordinated nature of international regimes and potential conflicts and tensions in their shared 
territory are problematic in their own right, limits to the jurisdiction o f the WTO dispute setdement 
system add an additional layer of complexity to the analysis. Finally, the subject matter o f many of 
the existing and potential linkage disputes brings to the fore questions concerning the interaction 
between law, science and policy and the problem of striking appropriate balances between scientific 
uncertainty, risk, precautionary action, economic interests.
In the legal language, these problems are translated into questions such as the competence of the 
WTO dispute setdement system to apply such norms of international law that are not contained in 
the WTO Agreements, the potential of such norms to influence the interpretation of WTO law 
even if they cannot be direcdy applied and the substantive conclusions to be drawn from such 
norms. The focus on the legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system also draws attention to 
such formal and procedural issues as the distinction between law-application and law-making 
functions, standard o f review and justifiability of the WTO dispute setdement procedures in terms 
of their transparency, access to information and possibilities for public participation. Certainly, it is 
also relevant to ask how international law, its practitioners and institutions responsible for making 
and applying international norms should respond to the challenges posed by the increased 
specialisation, indeed, fragmentation of international life and where is the point in which the legal 
techniques at the disposal of the WTO dispute setdement system have exhausted their potential.
Structurally, this study consists of two parts, with three Chapters in each. The first part lays down 
the theoretical and legal background necessary to analyse the legitimacy of the WTO dispute
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settlement system. It reviews the ongoing debate about the legitimacy of international law and 
institutions, most notably the WTO. It describes how the WTO dispute setdement system operates, 
how its scope and competence have been drawn and how its substantive limits have resulted in 
challenges to the legitimacy of the WTO. It also outlines the ‘linkage’ debate concerning the 
appropriate limits o f the WTO system, with a special emphasis on environmental questions. 
Chapter 1 begins with the story of how a new international organization, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), was born into an international reality undergoing some important changes, 
and how it immediately became the prime target for critical voices highlighting the need to rethink 
the legitimacy of international law and institutions. The aim of Chapter 1 is to develop the 
conceptual and theoretical tools used in this study and demonstrate the increasing relevance of 
legitimacy in the field of international law. While Chapter 1 focuses on the unifying forces 
associated with globalisation, Chapter 2 points to the increasing fragmentation of international life 
and the dissolution of international law into highly specialised and relatively autonomous spheres. It 
shows how the legitimacy of the GATT/W TO system and international trade law to deal with 
‘linkage’ disputes first came under fierce attack as a result o f the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle 
panel reports. Chapter 2 then outlines the key institutional features o f the WTO dispute settlement 
system, with a special emphasis on its limited mandate to consider non-WTO norms of 
international law. Chapter 3 reviews the key policy and legal developments relevant to 
understanding the problems that ‘linkage’ disputes have caused at the WTO and it also overviews 
the main facts and legal arguments in the key environmental and health disputes at the WTO.
The second part focuses directly on the legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system with an 
emphasis on the relevant case law. It is structured on the basis o f the key components o f legitimacy, 
namely substantive/social and procedural/formal legitimacy, which offers a useful tool for 
categorising the most pressing legitimacy challenges at the WTO dispute setdement system. 
Chapter 4 questions whether the scope o f the WTO dispute setdement system has resulted in a bias 
towards trade and economic interest thereby challenging its substantive/social legitimacy. It also 
puts forward some proposals on how the WTO dispute setdement system could improve its 
legitimacy while respecting the limits o f its mandate. Chapter 5 highlights the formal and procedural 
dimensions o f legitimacy. It examines the institutional limits o f the WTO dispute setdement system 
through the fundamental doctrine concerning the separation of powers and distinction between 
adjudicative and legislative functions. It also discusses the relationship between the W TO dispute 
setdement system and national authorities o f the WTO Member States, both institutionally and 
through the standard of review by the W TO dispute setdement system. Finally, it considers 
questions concerning WTO dispute setdement procedures and their legitimacy in terms of 
transparency, access to information and public participation. Chapter 6 focuses to the phenomenon 
known as fragmentation of international law. It analyses the volatile relationship between the WTO
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and the international legal regime on climate change with the aim of justifying the conclusion that 
both the WTO dispute settlement system and WTO negotiators are incapable of responding to all 
the legitimacy challenges facing the WTO dispute setdement system. Chapter 7 puts forward the 
key conclusions from this study, stressing the need to strike appropriate balances not only between 
trade and environment, but also the different components of legitimacy.
As indicated earlier, this study has a legalistic focus. Parts o f it also come up with proposals for 
improving the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system through the available judicial 
techniques. Such techniques are as complex as they are intriguing and it is easy to get lost in the 
legal detail. However, what should not be forgotten when reading this work is the broader legal and 
institutional framework in which the WTO dispute setdement system is situated. A thread that runs 
through the storyline, sometimes implicidy but very explicidy towards the end, is thus the question 
whether something more than the WTO dispute setdement system is needed to respond to the 
challenges discussed here. In other words, when reading this study, it is essential to distinguish 
between two questions. The first one, forming the main focus o f this study, is how the legitimacy of 
the WTO dispute setdement system has been challenged by linkage disputes and how it could be 
improved. The second, much broader and more profound question is whether the challenges o f 
trade, environment, globalisation and legitimacy can be ultimately answered through the WTO 
dispute setdement system. Concerning the second question the conclusion o f this study is, 
ultimately, negative. This may sound self-evident to some, but certainly not for everyone and 
should be kept in mind when reading this work. To put it differendy: From the perspective o f the 
WTO dispute setdement system, the answer to linkage problems could be in striking and 
maintaining a balance between the different components o f legitimacy, developing a consistent, 
transparent and legally sound relationship with international environmental law and improving the 
transparency of the operating procedures. But for linkage problems themselves, this is not an 
adequate solution. By “greening the GATT” and “GATTing the greens”* important improvements 
can and have been achieved. But when the push comes to shove, the present WTO norms and the 
present mandate o f the dispute resolution mechanism are not equipped for the task at hand.
4 Expression borrowed D.C. Esty, Greening the GATT (Institute for International Economics, 1994); and D.C.Esty,
“GATTing the Greens. Not Just Greening the GATT,” Foreign Affairs, November/December (1993), 32.
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1. The WTO, Legitimacy and N ew  Trends in
International Law
This democratic deficit is inherent in all modern international law-making but is 
especially pronounced in the field of trade. I f  it is not addressed, serious 
consequences will ensue.5
This Chapter argues that international law and its institutions are undergoing a profound change 
and that the WTO and its dispute setdement mechanism are in the forefront of this change. While 
one may still assert with some credibility that legitimacy is not a concern in the international sphere, 
the persuasiveness of this argument is decreasing rapidly. For the most part, this work aims to look 
forward and begin visualizing legitimacy criteria applicable to international judicial bodies such as 
the WTO dispute setdement system. This Chapter, however, is best understood in light o f  the 
traditional visions on the legitimacy o f international law and organizations that perhaps still 
dominate the scholarly imagination. To justify the need to assess the legitimacy of the WTO dispute 
setdement system, it emphasizes factual and intellectual shifts influenced by the end of the Cold 
War and globalization that are increasingly challenging the dominant views on the legitimacy of 
international law and organizations.
Section 1.1. describes the broader factual and political context in which the WTO dispute 
resolution mechanism operates and reviews the lively debate concerning the legitimacy and alleged 
democratic deficit o f the WTO. Section 1.2 describes the image that this Chapter seeks to shatter, 
explaining the conventional views on the legitimacy o f international law and organizations. It takes 
an in depth look at the notion o f legitimacy and its key definitions, including the distinction 
between formal/procedural and substantive/social legitimacy reflected in the structure of this work. 
It also outlines the main understandings and debates about legitimacy in the field o f international 
legal theory. Section 1.3. analyses in more detail the reasons why the conventional understandings 
of legitimacy and international law are being challenged. It outlines the key forces at work, namely 
globalization and the intellectual atmosphere produced by the end o f the Cold War. It also 
describes how the recent scholarly debates on the need to reconsider the legitimacy of international 
law and organizations have manifested in the WTO context. In short, the aim here is to set the 
stage for focusing on the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system in the rest o f this work.
5 Sands, Lawless World, 103.
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1.1 Debating the Legitimacy of the WTO
The WTO was established in 1995, shortly after the end o f the Cold War and fundamental 
economic and political changes in the former communist countries inspired the argument that 
capitalism and liberal democracy had now proved their supremacy over rival ideologies. The period 
was also characterised by an intense focus on globalisation, ranging from academic analysis to 
massive street protests against international organizations, most notably the WTO, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed, nearly a decade later, it is difficult to discuss 
the WTO without mentioning the estimated tens o f thousands o f anti-globalisation protesters who 
took to the streets of Seattle at the end of 1999 with the aim of preventing the launch o f a new 
round of international trade negotiations.6 Against this background, it is easy to see that the WTO 
was born to an international reality undergoing some significant changes and it is hardly surprising 
that it has been subject to a lively debate, questioning its legitimacy, democratic credentials and role 
in the international arena.
Arguments in the debate about the WTO have ranged from the dismissal o f any serious legitimacy
problems to claims that a profound legitimacy crisis is threatening to destroy the world trading
system. Those advocating the traditional, state centred understanding of the legitimacy of
intergovernmental organizations do not see any significant problems with the WTO system. The
following quote from Henderson captures the essence o f their argument:
Now as in the past international agencies derive their legitimacy from their member 
governments; and in the case of the WTO, the fact that it is today more subject to 
attack, by NGOs especially, does not establish a genuine legitimacy crisis.’7
Or as expressed more elaborately by Bacchus:
The several hundreds of us who work for ‘the W TO’ do not work for ourselves, or 
some expansive global entity that is accountable and answerable only to itself. In all 
we do every day, we work exclusively for the 147 Members o f the WTO. We work 
only for what they work for. We do only what they agree we should d o ... The source 
of ‘legitimacy’ of the WTO is the Members o f the WTO. The legitimacy’ o f the 
WTO is a ‘legitimacy’ that derives from, and is inseparable from, the individual 
legitimacy of each of the individual ‘nation states’ that, together, comprise the WTO.8 
(Emphasis in original, KK)
My argument is, however, that this view has come to face some important challenges and its 
plausibility can no longer be taken for granted. During the past couple of decades, international 
cooperation has both intensified and expanded into new areas. The body o f international law has
6 The estimates o f the number o f protesters vary. These are from Jones, W ho’s Afraid o f  the WTO?, 19.
7 D. Henderson, ”WTO 2002: Imaginary Crisis, Real Problems,” World Trade Review 1(3) (2002), 227 at 294.
8 J. Bacchus, “A Few Thoughts on Legitimacy, Democracy and the WTO,” in E.-U. Petersmann & J. Harrison, eds., 
Reforming the World Trading System. Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance (OUP, 2005), 427 at 431.
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evolved rapidly and the number of international actors, such as international organizations, non­
governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations, has increased exponentially. 
All this means that it is difficult to defend the logic that sovereign states are the only relevant 
constituency for assessing the legitimacy of international organizations, and that as long as 
government representatives are satisfied with their conduct, international organizations must be 
regarded as perfecdy legitimate.9 In contrast, my argument is that the views o f the growing number 
of non-state actors direcdy affected by decisions and actions by international organizations, in other 
words, the opinions o f the broader ‘global society,’10 are increasingly relevant for their legitimacy.
For the WTO, reactions by the broader global society have constituted some important challenges. 
As Esty indicates:
.. .the public acceptance of the authority and decisions that emerge from the World
Trade Organization can no longer be taken for granted in many countries.11
He emphasizes that in the past, the international trade regime benefited from a perception that 
trade policy was a narrow and technical field best left to qualified experts12 However, as linkages 
between international trade policy and other political objectives have grown more evident, the 
economic expertise o f trade bureaucrats have started to appear as a manifesdy inadequate 
foundation for the legitimacy of the WTO.13 The economic objectives o f the WTO and the 
desirability o f international trade liberalisation have also been put to question at a more profound 
level. The question has been raised whether free trade truly results in economic development and 
poverty reduction in developing countries and whether something could be done to the unequal 
distribution o f its benefits. Furthermore, a growing number o f authors are drawing attention to 
institutional problems at the WTO, identifying a ‘democratic deficit’, the lack o f transparency and 
possibilities for public participation as the most notable shortcomings.14 For the purposes of this 
general introduction arguments challenging the legitimacy of the WTO have been divided into two 
rough categories: criticism relating to international trade liberalization and criticism related to 
institutional aspects of the WTO. Both categories will be discussed in more detail below followed 
by a brief analysis of their implications.
9 G. C. A. Junne, “International Organizations in a New Period o f Globalization: New (Problems of) Legitimacy,” in 
J.-M. Coicaud & V. Heiskanen, eds., The Legitimacy o f  International Organizations (United Nations University 
Press, 2001), 189-220 at 192.
10 Ibid.
11 D. C. Esty, ’’The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis,” World Trade Review 1(1) (2002), 7-22 at 9.
12 Ibid., 10.
13 Ibid., 13.
14 See, for example, R. Howse, "The Legitimacy o f the World Trade Organization," in Coicaud &Heiskanen (2001), 
355; and E.-U. Petersmann, ’’Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century: The Need to 
Clarify Their Interrelationship,” Journal o f  International Economic Law 4(1) (2001), 3-39.
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1.1.2 Challenging the Objectives of the GATT/WTO System
Since the negotiation o f the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, international 
trade has grown significandy. Thus, during the past sixty years, the effects o f trade liberalisation 
have become more evident —including the negative ones. Furthermore, until late 1980s, the Cold 
War left its mark on international trade cooperation and communism presented a politically 
compelling rival vision to the ideology underlying the liberal economic order.15 In that sense, the 
pre-WTO era can hardly be characterised as one of ideological harmony. However, countries that 
did belong to the G A T T  club were fewer and less diverse than the current WTO membership. 
They also tended to see the international trade pact linking market economies as a bulwark against 
communism.16 The substantive scope of the GATT system was also narrower than that o f the 
current WTO regime, and its organizational structure was considerably weaker. The manner in 
which the GATT regime operated has been characterised as deliberately low profile, a closed and 
secretive club run by a small group of international trade experts.17 This situation met with no 
serious criticism as international trade policy was largely conceived as a ‘technical’ field requiring 
bureaucratic expertise rather than the balancing of conflicting policy objectives.
Some criticism was, however, voiced against the operation o f the international trade regime already 
during the pre-WTO era. The 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of the movement o f non-aligned 
countries, which argued that the ideological divide between the communist East and capitalist West 
hid from the view “a harsher and more obvious reality,” namely a “major contradiction” between 
the rich countries in the North and the poor countries in the South.18 This criticism by the newly 
independent developing countries was harnessed into proposals for a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) as an alternative way of organising international economic relations. During the 
1970s and 1980s, free trade provoked some criticism also in the W est/N orth but this criticism was 
mild and modest in comparison with the ftnti-globalisation backlash a couple o f decades later. In 
the U.S., for instance, it focused on painting threatening images of competition from Japan rather 
than attacking the multilateral trading system as a whole.19 It was only after the collapse of 
communism in the early 1990s that a widespread political movement began to emerge in the 
Western countries questioning the desirability of international trade liberalisation and economic 
globalisation.
15 R. Sally, “Globalisation, Governance and Trade Policy: The WTO in Perspective,” Research Paper for the Global 
Dimensions Research Programme at the London School o f Economics and Political Science (February 2002). 
Available at: <www.lse.ac.uk/collections/globalDimensions/research/globalisationGovemance>.
16 Jones, Who's Afraid o f  the WTO, 38.
17 Esty, ’’The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis,” 11.
18 M. Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979), 34.
19 P. R. Krugman & M. Obstfeld, International Economics. Theory and Policy (6th edition, Adison-Wesley, 2003), 
284.
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Part of this criticism was caused by the rise in manufactured exports from low-wage developing 
countries as both the Americans and Europeans started getting anxious about their impacts on the 
domestic labour markets.20 The rapidly emerging anti-globalisation movement started blaming free 
trade for low wages and poor working conditions in developing countries,21 thus highlighting the 
connection between free trade, human rights and labour standards. In the early 1990s, the trade and 
environment controversy exploded as the Tuna-Dolphin panels condemned the U.S. import 
prohibition on non-dolphin-friendly tuna (see Chapter 2). All these developments blurred the 
boundaries between trade and other policy fields and made their tensions more manifest than ever 
before.22 Arguments that economic globalisation was rapidly leading to cultural homogenisation23 
(in other words, Americanisation or Westernisation) fuelled anxiety over the loss of sovereignty and 
control over domestic affairs.24
Thus, in contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, much o f the recent criticism against free trade originates 
from developed countries.25 Bhagwati has labelled this as “an ironic reversal” of the situation.26 The 
participation of developing countries in the trade regime has increased in comparison with the 
G ATT, especially in terms o f their membership but also in terms o f their trade share.27 It has 
therefore been argued that it is precisely developing countries that stand to loose the most if the 
ongoing Doha Development Round of trade negotiations fails.28 On the other hand, controversies 
concerning the impact o f trade liberalisation on economic development and poverty reduction are 
far from setded and arguments critical of free trade continue to influence perceptions o f the 
legitimacy of the international trade regime. Below I shall first present the most common arguments 
supporting free trade followed by an overview of the main critiques voiced against international 
trade liberalisation.
20 Krugman & Obstfeld, International Economics, 284.
21 Ibid.
22 J. McDonald, “It’s Not Easy Being Green: Trade and Environment Linkages beyond Doha,” in R. P. Buckley, ed., 
The WTO and the Doha Round. The Changing Face o f  the World Trade (Kluwer Law International, 2003), 145-167 
at 145.
23 N. Klein, No Logo (Flamingo, 2001).
24 Jones, Who’s Afraid o f  the WTO, 23.
25 It has been noted that the resistance to the WTO is not generated by Northern NGOs alone, but has the support o f 
millions o f people in developing countries. B. Rajagopal, “Taking Seattle Resistance Seriously,” The Hindu, 11 
September 1999.
26 J. Bhagwati, In Defense o f  Globalization (OUP, 2004), 8.
27 M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum & P. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization, Law, Practice and Policy (2nd 
edition, OUP, 2006), 763-65.The trade share o f developing countries was almost unchanged between 1980 (27.4 per 
cent) and 1999 (28.2 per cent), while in 2004 it had risen to 31 per cent.
28 B. Rajagopal, ”A Floundering WTO, Part II,” Yale Global Online, 23 March 2006. Available at:
< http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=7164>.
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1 . 1 .2.1 Theory of Free Trade and Its Critiques
The ideas underlying the international trade liberalisation system can be traced to the Wealth of 
Nations published by Adam Smith in 1776 and the theory o f comparative advantage explained by 
David Ricardo in The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, published in 1817. The basic 
argument is that free trade promotes the efficient allocation of resources and leads to higher living 
standards for everyone.29 This is based on the assumption that countries concentrate on products 
where they have comparative advantage, which then leads to maximum international productivity.30 
There are also other arguments favouring free, including that protected markets lead to 
fragmentation of production, while free trade involves gains from the economics o f scale and 
benefits small economies.31 It is also argued that because free trade provides incentives to seek new 
ways to export or compete with imports, it provides more opportunities for innovation and 
learning.32
Arguments in favour o f international trade liberalisation often reach beyond economic theory. In
addition to such economic benefits as lower cost o f living, more choice for consumers, higher
incomes, stimulation o f economic growth and more efficiency, the WTO website lists peace,
constructive dispute settlement, shielding governments from lobbying and good governance as the
benefits of the international trading system.33 Free trade thus forms a part o f a more comprehensive
liberal agenda, the gist of which is captured in the following quote by Petersmann:
Wherever freedom and property rights are protected, individuals start investing, 
producing and exchanging goods, services and income. Personal self-development 
and enjoyment of human rights require the use o f dispersed information and 
economic resources that can be supplied most efficiendy, and most democratically, 
through the division o f labour among free citi2ens and through liberal trade 
promoting economic welfare, the freedom of choice and the free flow of scarce 
goods, services and information across frontiers in response to supply and demand 
by citizens.34
There have always been critiques o f liberalism and free trade. Smith and Ricardo developed their 
theories against the backdrop o f the mercantilist philosophy according to which exports should be 
maximised and imports minimised to maximise the flow of silver and gold into the national 
economy. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Marx and his followers came forward with fundamental 
critiques of capitalism and liberalism. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and most other
29 Krugman & Obstfeld, International Economics, 218-222.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 The World Trade Organization, “The 10 Benefits o f the WTO” listed at: 
<http://www.wto.Org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/l 0ben_e/l 0b00_e.htm.>
34 E.-U. Petersmann, ’’Time for a United Nations ’Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law o f  
Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration,” European Journal o f  International Law  13(3) 
(2002), 621-650 at 629.
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communist regimes, arguments opposing capitalism, markets and the liberal economic order 
became somewhat marginalised. Anti-capitalist and neo-Marxist movements still exist but they can 
be characterised as either extremist and/or rather small.35 They are, however, a part o f the anti­
globalisation movement that has been criticising the WTO and the overall international economic 
architecture.36
There are also several economic theoretical debates concerning the benefits of free trade.37 Many
of those critical of the WTO are not opposing the idea of free trade as such,38 but their focus is on
what they see as faults in the current regime. The critique originates from several different sources,
including developed and developing countries. As we saw, during the 1960s and 1970s, an
influential critique of the international economic order emerged from the Third World perspective.
Accordingly, the system created by the former imperial powers ‘locked in’ the newly independent
developing countries, rich with raw materials, to serve the world market and slowed down their
economic development:
The Third World country is obliged to deliver a constantly growing quantity of the 
energy or raw materials it produces to obtain the same product from industrialized 
countries. Furthermore, that product is manufactured with its own raw materials, its 
own energy, and sometimes with its own emigrant manpower and ‘grey matter,’ that 
of its technicians trained in the prosperous countries and remaining there... This is 
the new form o f slavery o f modern times... the Third World pays for the rest and 
leisure o f the inhabitants o f the developed world with the additional labour it puts 
in.39
This system, captured by the image of a ‘centre’ dominating and exploiting the ‘periphery’ was so
unequal that it had to be replaced by a New International Economic Order. 40 Those advocating the
N IEO  thus proposed several trade, debt and financing related reforms in favour of the Third
World, including stabilising and raising commodity prices. They also envisaged changes to the
international institutional structure, including the creation of a trading institution devoted “to
problems of development by finding solutions to them and not by perpetuating them.”41 However,
The new organization could not be effective if it was in competition with the 
GATT. From the moment of its foundation, UNCTAD seemed destined to become 
‘anti-GATT.’ The oligarchical and conservative character o f the latter institution 
does not need to be demonstrated, and the co-existence between a renewed 
UNCTAD and a G A TT  set in its ways no longer seems conceivable. 42
35 For a recent example o f Marxist views in the field o f international law, see C. Mieville, Between Equal Rights. A 
Marxist Theory o f  International Law (Haymarket Books, 2005).
36 Bhagwati, In Defense o f  Globalization, 14.
37 Krugman & Obstfeld, International Economics, 224. For large countries, the concept o f optimum tariff shows that 
the marginal gain from improved terms o f trade equals the marginal efficiency loss from production and consumption 
distortion.
38 Jones, Who’s Afraid o f  the WTO, 33.
39 Bedjaoui, New International Economic Order, 36.
40 Ibid., 24.
41 Ibid., 209.
42 Ibid., 209.
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The N IEO  achieved some concrete results. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) was established in 1964 and advocated preferential tariff rates for 
developing countries.43 The G A TT  Contracting Parties subsequendy adopted the Part IV of the 
G A T T  entided “Trade and Development” to demonstrate a new interest in developing country 
concerns.44 The system was further developed in 1971 through a waiver from the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) principle enshrined in G A TT  Article. In 1979, the Contracting Parties adopted the 
Enabling Clause,45 which forms the legal basis for the current Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) whereby several developed countries offer non-reciprocal trade preferences for developing 
countries. It also created the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) with the possibility for 
developing countries to exchange trade concessions among themselves.46
While N IEO  has vanished from the current debate, a part of its legacy is still alive, sometimes in a 
slighdy modified form. For instance, arguments critical o f the power of multinational corporations 
and their influence on developing countries were formulated already by those supporting the 
NIEO:
... private companies keep a tight hand on the ‘independent sovereign’ State by 
methods that are as varied as they are effective, enabling them to control and recast 
its general policy at will.47
Such sentiments against multinational corporations are still very much part o f the criticism against 
the WTO, the international economic architecture and economic globalisation. Indeed, one o f 
inspirations for the anti-globalisation movement was No Logo by Klein, a book that fiercely attacks 
the power and influence of multinational corporations in developing countries, also arguing that the 
corporations and their brands are rapidly invading previously non-commercial spaces in the 
society.48 Many anti-globalisation critiques also emphasise the gap between the rich and the poor 
countries and the responsibility of the Northern countries to address this problem.
On o f the arguments by the anti-globalisation movement is thus that that economic liberalisation 
primarily advances the interests of the already rich and powerful nations, multinational corporations 
and individuals in a way that “makes the rich relatively richer, and the poor relatively poorer and the 
gap between the two absolutely wider at an accelerating, compound rate.”49 They have challenged 
the argument that what is good for the business, in other words, less regulation, more mobility and
43 For a brief history, see the UNCTAD website, available at:< 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=l>.
44 M. Matsushita & al., The World Trade Organization. Law Practice and Policy (2nd edition, OUP, 2006), 766.
45 GA TT  Contracting Parties, Decision o f November 28, 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation o f Developing Countries, BISD  S26/203.
46 Ibid.
47 Bedjaoui, New International Economic Order, 35.
48 Klein, No Logo, 32.
49 D. Ransom, No-Nonsense Guide to Fair Trade (New Intemationalist&Verso, 2002), 20.
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more access, will ‘trickle down’ into benefits for everybody else.50 Or, in the words of Pauwelyn,
even if free trade “creates some losers, eventually, the rising tide lifts all boats and overall welfare is
increased.”51 According to Klein, however:
...international trade law must be understood not only as taking down selective 
barriers to trade but more accurately as a process that systematically puts up new 
barriers — around knowledge, technology and newly privatised resources.52
And indeed, concerns related to the widening gap between the rich and the poor and the North and
the South carry an important weight in a world characterised as:
... a planet in whose northern hemisphere there is a small archipelago of wealthy 
nation-states, surrounded by the majority of mankind. The latter comprises o f more 
than 130 poor, or extremely poor, quasi-nation states, where the government does 
not control economic life, where the state is totally absent from entire provinces, 
where the urban population is exploding and the majority lives in the informal 
sector, where life is tumultuous and difficult, and where emigration is the only way 
out for the youth.53
While the alarming problems in the South originate from a much more complex set of factors, the 
WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, together with multinational corporations, have been the 
favourite targets o f the anti-globalisation criticism.
When it comes to the WTO, the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 marked in many ways a 
turning point in the history of the international trade regime. It established the World Trade 
Organization and created an unprecedented, compulsory judicial mechanism for settling 
international trade disputes, thus significandy strengthening the institutional structure o f the system. 
The Uruguay Round also expanded the regime into new substantive areas, including trade in 
services, trade-related investment measures, product standards, intellectual property and food 
safety. Especially services and intellectual property were difficult topics and their incorporation into 
the system was far from uncontroversial. N ot surprisingly, the newly established WTO became the 
prime target of this criticism. The following quote illustrates the strong criticism that the anti­
globalisation movement has voiced against the WTO:
Whereas GATT dealt only with trade in tangible products such as bananas, cotton 
or steel, the WTO's remit is far broader; its powers extend over investment policy, 
patent law and the provision of services like healthcare and education — services that 
have traditionally been seen as the responsibility of national governments. Unlike 
the governments whose responsibilities it has assumed, however, the W TO is 
unelected, global in reach and run totally by and for the benefit of multinational 
corporations.54
50 N. Klein, Fences and Windows. Dispatches from  the Front Lines o f  the Globalisation Debate (Flamingo, 2002), 4.
51 J. Pauwelyn, “The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and 
Reforming the WTO,” Journal o f  International Economic Law 8(2) (2005), 329 at 330.
52 Klein, Fences and Windows, xxi.
53 O. de Rivero, The Myth o f  Development. The Non-viable Economies o f  the 21st Century (Zed Books & al., 2001), 
24.
54 "World Sold, Special report on Global Trade,” The Ecologist Magazine, June 2003.
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While the anti-globalisation movement has been severe in its critique, many academics, politicians, 
international civil servants and N G O  representatives are supporting a more modest and relatively 
mainstream critique o f free trade in the form of what has been characterised as ‘globalisation and 
social democracy.’55 While accepting the market economy, international economic integration and 
many of its advantages, this line o f thinking rejects the comprehensive agenda for economic 
liberalisation underlying the Washington Consensus56 and advocates a proactive intervention with 
markets to create a more inclusive and redistributive system.57 This line o f thinking argues that 
trade liberalisation is not a panacea but attention needs to be given to how and when liberalisation 
is conducted, and to other policies, including investment in health care, education and 
infrastructure. In other words, the supporters of this view would like to introduce regulation and 
other mechanisms to address market failures and promote ‘fair trade.’ Linking this to the legitimacy 
debate, the argument has been made that international institutions lack legitimacy “to the extent 
that they bias policy-making in a neoliberal direction and fail to promote the necessary social 
protection to offset the expansion of markets and the concentration o f wealth.”58 These ideas form 
very much the essence o f the linkage debate that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
As the above discussion illustrates, the debate about free trade is lively and complex, sometimes 
driven by different political preferences, and sometimes motivated by more scientific differences 
over economic analysis concerning the timing and impacts o f trade liberalisation. The main 
objective o f this overview was to emphasise the link between the debate about trade liberalisation 
and the legitimacy of the WTO. As we will see below, most definitions associate legitimacy at least 
partly with empirically determined social acceptance and the ability o f an institution to advance 
commonly accepted policy objectives. Thus, if the overall objectives of the regime are not widely 
accepted, or if the WTO does not seem to be efficient in delivering them, its claim to social 
legitimacy can only be a weak one. On the other hand, those who believe in the benefits of free 
trade and the WTO system may well be willing to overlook some of the institutional questions that 
will be discussed in the next paragraph.
1.1.3 Challenging Institutional Aspects o f the WTO
Another stream of scholarly debate has been focusing on questions concerning legitimacy, 
democratic deficit and constitutionalisation of the WTO. In other words, a growing number of
55 Sally, “Globalisation, Governance and Trade Policy,” 1-3.
56 The term “Washington Consensus” refers to economic policies and reforms promoted in the early 1990s by the 
IMF, the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury Department in countries facing economic crisis. The policies focus, inter 
alia, on fiscal policy discipline, redirection o f public spending, tax reform, trade liberalisation, promoting foreign 
direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and legal security o f property rights.
57 Sally, “Globalisation, Governance and Trade Policy,” 1-2.
58 A. Moravcsik, “Is There a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis,” Government and  
Opposition 39(2) (2004), 337-363 at 341. Here he refers to arguments made by Karl Polanyi and Fritz Scharpf.
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scholars is identifying legitimacy problems at the WTO without contesting the underlying theory of 
free trade or the overall economic mission of the WTO to liberalise international trade. Instead, 
such academics are highlighting institutional questions, asking, for instance, whether the system is 
adequately transparent and representative. The following quote from Petersmann captures the key 
concerns:
How to deal with the ‘democratic deficit’ of international organisations which 
allocate one vote to each state regardless o f its population and do not afford citizens 
adequate possibilities for ‘democratic participation’ in, and democratic control of, 
secretive international negotiations on collective international rule-making?59
The critique related to ‘democratic deficit’ — well immersed in the debate about the European 
Union — has thus found its way to the global level and seems to be gaining ground in the WTO 
context.
Howse has analysed the claim that the WTO is suffering from a ‘democratic deficit.’60 Focusing on
the model o f representative democracy, he examines the question whether the W TO rules are
sufficiendy underpinned by democratic consent. He explains that under representative democracy,
the problem of ‘democratic deficit’ is essentially a problem of agency costs.61 He indicates that
agency costs in the W TO context are unsustainably high. This is because the agents, namely the
experts involved in WTO negotiations, can be said to have interests and goals which are not
necessarily shared by their principals, such as a personal commitment to free trade and international
cooperation.62 Howse also highlights “very severe” information asymmetries relating to
GATT/W TO law, resulting from the fact that there is generally “very little understanding about
trade rules and how they function.”63 He then argues that the existing institutional mechanisms
focusing on the ex  post legislative approval o f trade agreements may not be sufficient for managing
such agency costs. Here he draws attention to the fact that in all jurisdictions apart from the U.S.,
the legislative scrutiny o f the Uruguay Agreements was “largely perfunctory,” and their implications
and the extent to which they engaged competing or contested public values was not well
understood.64 Other authors have also identified similar concerns. Describing the follow-up to the
Uruguay Round negotiations Petersmann notes that:
.. .between the signing of the agreements in April 1994 and their entry into force on 
January 1, 1995, there remained so little time for translating the 25,000 pages of 
treaty text that some national parliaments (e.g. Germany) had to discuss the 
agreements without complete translation ... and this within only a few days which
59 Petersmann, “Human Rights, Cosmopolitan Democracy and WTO Law,” 94.
60 R. Howse, “How to Begin to Think About the "Democratic Deficit" at the WTO,” 5. Available at Howse's website
at <http://faculty. law. umich.edu/rhowse/>.
61 Ibid., 5.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid
64 Ib id , 6-8.
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did not enable parliaments to really understand, evaluate, discuss or criticise such 
complex and important ‘international legislation.65
It is easy to agree with the concerns voiced by Howse and Petersmann. In most national 
jurisdictions, the means available for parliamentarians to obtain information and influence 
international trade negotiations while they are still ongoing remain inadequate. Constitutional 
procedures for the approval of the already finalized agreements leave no real possibilities for 
national parliaments to influence their contents. However, the political pressure to accept and 
implement the outcome of international trade negotiations is strong. Hence the practical influence 
and choices left for national democratic institutions are negligible. Clearly, there seems to be ground 
for the argument that the WTO system is suffering from a degree of democratic deficit.
A related challenge to the legitimacy o f the WTO concerns the closed and secretive nature of 
international trade negotiations. It has been said that the way that the WTO negotiations are 
conducted makes it difficult for national legislators, the general public and even delegates from 
smaller WTO member states to be adequately informed o f what is going on. In their book “Behind 
the Scenes at the WTO” Jawara and Kwa criticise several practices associated with international trade 
negotiations, including mini-ministerial meetings that are held between the formal W TO Ministerial 
Conferences and the so-called informal or “green room” meetings where selected W TO Member 
States meet in an unofficial atmosphere to discuss issues on the negotiation agenda.66 They 
characterise such practices as “totally non-transparent” as attendance is by invitation only and 
uninvited members often find it difficult to follow what consultations are taking place, between 
which members and on which issues.67 It seems evident that such procedures make it difficult for 
even state representatives to stay adequately informed of the substance o f the negotiations.
Also Howse has criticised the lack o f transparency of the WTO in analyzing the question as to 
whether actors in the WTO system practice democratic political ethics and adhere to the key values 
of inclusiveness, transparency and value pluralism.68 According to Howse, the multilateral trade 
system “fails miserably” measured by such criteria.69 This is because the W TO endorses secrecy, is 
reluctant to let other intergovernmental organizations participate as observers in its processes, and 
“even defends secrecy in dispute settlement proceedings, whereas secret trials have long been 
discredited as inconsistent with liberal democratic values essentially elsewhere.”70 Also several 
NGOs have voiced sharp criticism against the lack o f transparency in the WTO:
65 Petersmann, “Human Rights, Cosmopolitan Democracy and WTO Law,” 95.
66 F. Jawara & A. Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO. The Real World o f  International Trade Negotiations (Zed 
Books, 2003), 15-18.
67 Ibid, 18.
68 Howse, “Democratic Deficit,” 19.
69 Ibid
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Half the point o f the World Trade Organization is that hardly anybody understands 
it. Its founding documents are hundreds o f pages long, its committees and 
subcommittees proliferate endlessly, its language is obtuse, and the end result is that 
anyone who doesn't work there, study it for a living or have several years of hard 
graft as a trade lawyer behind them has a lot of trouble working out what the hell is 
going on.71
These questions will be reviewed in detail in Chapter 5 of this work, which also highlights the 
length and complexity o f the reports issued by WTO dispute setdement panels as an additional 
legitimacy challenge.
Esty associates some of these transparency problems with what he calls the “Club Model” through
which the international trade regime functioned for a long period of time:
A clique of committed economists and diplomats and a small Secretariat in Geneva 
toiled quiedy in pursuit of a vision o f open markets and deeper economic 
integration... The closed and secretive nature o f the regime isolated — and insulated 
— the trade policymaking process from day-to-day politics, keeping at bay the 
protectionists interest that are active in many countries.72
However, according to Esty, times have changed and the secrecy that lies at the heart o f the Club 
Model is no longer workable. 73 Here we return to the arguments already discussed above, namely 
that the scope of the WTO regime has expanded and that its decisions inescapably involve trade­
offs with other policy goals and “broadly affect other realms and cleariy require value 
judgements.”74 Therefore, decision-making based on bureaucratic rationality seems no longer 
acceptable.75
The critiques challenging the democratic legitimacy and transparency o f the WTO have been 
defended by arguments building on the traditional doctrines o f international law. Accordingly, the 
WTO Agreements have been negotiated, approved and ratified by all Member States.76 In most 
WTO Member States, national ratification procedures involve democratically representative 
national parliaments that must have voted in favour of joining the WTO and accepted the 
agreement package resulting from the Uruguay Round.77 Thus, while the WTO Agreements affect 
the sovereignty of its Member States, they can also be seen as an exercise of sovereignty whereby 
Member States have deemed the benefits of international trade liberalisation to outweigh its costs.78 
Furthermore, all WTO Member States have the possibility o f withdrawing from the organization on
71 "Cancun: Why You Should Care, Special report on Global Trade,” The Ecologist Magazine, June 2003.
72 Esty, ’’The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis,” 11.
73 Ibid, 12.
74 Ibid, 13-14.
75 Ibid, 13.
76 These replies to democratic criticism are found at the WTO’s website at: <
http://www.wto.Org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/book_e/stak_e_6.htm#unrepresentative>.
11 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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six months’ notice. 79 Without a doubt, these arguments retain some persuasiveness. Nevertheless, 
they seem inadequate for coming to grips with all the challenges described above. While all WTO 
Member States formally participate in the negotiation o f new agreements, in reality, many are 
sidelined in the substantive discussions. In most Member States, national parliaments are involved 
in the ratification process -  but even in prosperous countries like Germany, the ratification o f the 
Uruguay Round single undertaking took place without complete translation and informed debate. 
And while the option of withdrawing from the WTO remains on the table, offering that as a cure 
for the legitimacy defects at the WTO represents an unnecessarily rigid and pessimistic view on the 
ability of international law to rise to meet the new challenges.
Finally, the legitimacy of the WTO system has been questioned based on the inequalities amongst
its Member States. It is true, o f course, that the principle o f sovereign equality, one o f the most
fundamental doctrines of international law expressed in Article 2(1) o f the Charter of the United
Nations, has always been detached from political realities. According to the convincing theoretical
account by Simpson, the idea of juridical sovereignty has never been straightforward.80 Instead of
sovereign equality, the international legal order has been characterised by the legalised hegemony of
Great Powers,81 antiplurahst tendencies to classify certain states as the ‘enemies’ and the imposition
of separate legal regimes on ‘irresponsible and repressive’ oudaw states.82 The idea o f sovereign
equality has therefore “risen and fallen” depending on the needs o f statecraft, international lawyers
and various institutional projects in international law and diplomacy.83 However, even if sovereign
equality has never accurately described the international reality, questions concerning power and
politics, insiders and outsiders are very much relevant in the context of the international trade
regime. The 153 Members o f the WTO are remarkably unequal in terms of size, population as well
economic and political weight. According to Zampetti, such inequality:
...translates into an asymmetry in the ability to participate in decision-making 
processes, as such democratically suspect if not illegitimate, which has the potential 
to perpetuate if not reinforce an uneven distribution of benefits and burdens in the 
world economy.84
In addition, many smaller developing countries also lack the capacity and human resources to 
participate efficiently in the WTO processes. The Geneva missions o f the most influential WTO 
Members, such as Canada, the European Community, Japan and the U.S. have well over ten
79 Ibid.
80 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States. Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (CUP, 2004), ix- 
x.
81 Ibid., 325.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 12.
84 A. B. Zampetti, “Democratic Legitimacy in the World Trade Organization: The Justice Dimension,” Journal o f  
World Trade 37(1) (2003), 105-126 at 109-110.
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professionals dealing exclusively with WTO issues.85 In contrast, developing country diplomats 
tend to represent their countries also in numerous other international agencies and not all 
developing country Members even have permanent missions in Geneva.86 This makes it difficult, if 
not impossible for such countries to participate effectively in the functioning of the WTO or to 
keep their national constituencies adequately informed. This problem is naturally not one confined 
to the WTO. Attempts are also being made to build the capacity of developing countries to 
participate in the functioning of the WTO and its dispute settlement procedures. Such efforts 
include various training activities and technical cooperation,87 as well as the establishment o f the 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law, where developing countries can receive legal assistance free of 
charge concerning existing or potential WTO disputes. Some NGOs have also provided legal 
advice to developing country delegates during WTO negotiations. However, such initiatives have 
not been able to address comprehensively the lack of expertise and resources in many developing 
countries and therefore many important problems remain.
1.1.4 A Striking Image o f the Legitimacy o f the WTO
For those supporting the liberal international economic order, the establishment o f the WTO 
meant that nearly half a century of unfulfilled desires could finally be satisfied. The Cold War had 
ended, and the threat of communism had been avoided. A new organization had been created to 
promote free trade. Many o f those supporting it firmly believed that the regime would serve as a 
platform for spreading economic prosperity, political stability, individual freedoms and good 
governance. It is therefore somewhat ironic that a fierce attack was almost immediately launched 
against both the substantive objectives and institutional functions o f the newly established World 
Trade Organization. Certainly, the image that emerges from the debate concerning the legitimacy of 
the WTO is striking. Many significant questionmarks remain concerning the benefits and 
downsides of trade liberalisation, most notably its contribution to the economic development in the 
developing world and the global distribution o f its benefits. Even more importandy for the subject 
of this study, the argument that the legitimacy o f an international organization derives exclusively 
from its member states and government representatives seems manifesdy inadequate to come to 
grips with the contemporary situation and powers o f international organizations such as the WTO. 
The W TO dispute settiement system is but one piece in this complex puzzle. Yet it offers several 
fruitful opportunities to examine and analyse in detail the problems that the new focus on the 
legitimacy o f international law and institutions has generated. However, before discussing the 
legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system in detail, the next two sections elaborate on the 
theoretical basis o f this study. They focus on the key definitions and understandings o f legitimacy,
85 Jawara & Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO, 21-22.
86 Ibid.
87 For detailed description o f such activities, see the WTO’s website at: 
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and try to explain the reasons for its increasing relevance in the context of international law and 
institutions.
1.2. What is Legitimacy?
This Chapter began by stating that the WTO and its dispute resolution mechanism are in the 
forefront o f a conceptual shift, provoked by globalization and the end of the Cold War, that is 
taking place concerning the legitimacy of international law and organizations. What, then, are the 
traditional views on the legitimacy of international law and organizations facing the challenge? Until 
World War II, the substantive scope of international law was mosdy confined to foreign policy and 
consular issues, and it was made and applied in a limited domain occupied mainly by diplomats and 
foreign policy experts. At the beginning o f the 20th century, the situation could thus be described in 
the following terms:
... nowhere, whether in universities or wider intellectual circles, was there organized 
study of current international affairs. War was still regarded mainly as the business 
of soldiers: and the corollary of this was that international politics were the business 
of diplomats. There was no general desire to take the conduct o f international affairs 
out o f the hands of the professionals or even to pay serious and systematic attention 
to what they were doing.88
While even today diplomats meet in secluded settings to discuss international security and foreign 
relations, far more colour and substance has been added to the portrait. The new icon could well be 
the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seatde at the end o f November 1999, with tens of thousands of 
demonstrators from all over the world gathering on the streets and coordinating their plans to 
influence the meeting using the latest communication technologies. It is clear that such radical 
changes must have implications at the doctrinal level —and vice versa.
1.2.1 Legitimacy o f International Law and Organizations
While occupying a prominent space in modern political philosophy, the idea of legitimacy has been
largely discarded in the international context.89 When publishing his seminal work on legitimacy of
international law in the 1980s, Franck thus lamented the lack o f interest in such teleological
questions and indicated that:
The internationalist ought to feel both comfortable with, and stimulated by, this 
notion o f legitimacy as the non-coercive factor, or a bundle of factors, predisposing 
toward voluntary obedience.90
88 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 (2nd edition, Palgrave, 2001), 3.
89 V. Heiskanen, “Introduction,” in Coicaud & Heiskanen (2001), 1 at 2.
90 T. M. Franck, The Power o f  Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP, 1990), 16.
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One explanation for the lack o f interest in international legitimacy issues relates to rigid doctrinal 
boundaries drawn between the domestic and international spheres, and the classification of 
international law as a discipline concerned with the international society narrowly defined, in other 
words, a society consisting solely of sovereign states and intergovernmental organizations. 
Therefore, the conceptual framework employed by both the Continental and Anglo-American 
liberal traditions has struggled, and it still does, to think o f the legitimacy o f international 
organizations as a relevant problem.91 The main reason is the close connection o f the idea of 
legitimacy with the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. This relationship is commonly 
conceived as the connection between the state and the people; or the government and the 
individual.92 Individuals and international organizations, in turn, have been understood to affiliate 
only indirectly through the Member States of an international organization, therefore lacking such a 
relationship in which the question of legitimacy could meaningfully arise.93
Kumm has identified also other reasons for the lack of interest in the legitimacy of international law 
and organizations. He explains that during the period between World War II and the end of the 
Cold War, international law was commonly seen as “ineffective and unreliable as a guarantor o f 
international peace and security.”94 Furthermore, for the citizens of Western democracies, 
international law was a social force affecting the lives o f other people, namely those living in 
developing countries.95 This was largely because international law had few contributions to make to 
the post-war domestic struggles in the West.96 Areas where effective rules of international law 
existed tended to be highly specialised, covering the field of foreign affairs narrowly conceived and 
addressing issues such as diplomatic and consular relations or mail delivery.97 Even if some 
ambitious treaties existed, the absence of compulsory dispute resolution made it possible for states 
to interpret international law for themselves, which provided “further guarantees that ultimately 
international law would not impede constitutional self-government.”98
However, today the situation is quite different. At the political level, developments related to 
globalization, in other words, the intensifying and expanding international cooperation and 
interdependence have highlighted the role of international law and organizations. In the doctrinal 
sphere, the ideological climate inspired by the end of the Cold War resulted in an increased focus 
on democracy at both national and the international levels. While there are strong reasons for
91 Heiskanen, “Introduction,” 6.
92 Ibid., 2-4 explaining the differences between the Continental Enlightenment and the Anglo-American Liberalism.
93 Ibid.
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questioning the view that we are witnessing an era where the human ideological development has 
found its culmination in liberal democracy, as Fukuyama has famously contended," it is difficult to 
override the argument that democracy as a form of governance is now more widespread than ever 
before. In short, many of the traditional reasons for ignoring the legitimacy considerations in the 
context of international law and organizations have been weakened by recent developments. But 
before discussing these developments in more detail, I shall spend some time in considering the 
meaning of ‘legitimacy’ both in general social theory and in the field o f international law.
1.2.2 Definitions and Theories of Legitimacy
Essentially, the notion of legitimacy relates to rightful, acceptable authority, thereby touching upon 
questions o f political representation, consent and obedience. The following quotes attempt to 
capture the essential meaning o f legitimacy. The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics describes 
legitimacy as:
The property that a regime's procedures for making and enforcing laws are 
acceptable to its subjects... Legitimacy involves the capacity of the [political] system 
to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the 
most appropriate ones for the society.11X1
Franck, the author of one the leading studies on legitimacy in the field o f international law, defines 
legitimacy as:
.. .a property of a rule or a rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards 
compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that 
the rule has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted 
principles of right process.101
Koskenniemi has characterised legitimacy in the following terms:
To say that a decision, rule or institution is ‘legitimate’ is to say that one should 
accept it as authoritative... More particularly, it is to say that any norm produced by 
such decision, rule or institution should count as good reason -even a good 
exclusionary reason- for deferring to i t . . .It (legitimacy, KK) is about standards that 
override our own, actual preferences, about acceptable paternalism.102
Legitimacy can thus be understood as a belief in the rightfulness o f a decision or the system 
through which authority is exercised. There are different theories on the origins o f legitimacy. 
Traditionally, the legitimacy of political power has been seen as deriving from divine sanction, 
dynastic succession, charismatic authority of a strong leader or the force o f history as presented by
99 F. Fukuyama, “The End o f History,” The National Interest, Summer (1989).
1001. McLean, Oxford Concise Dictionary o f  Politics (OUP, 1996), 281. The last sentence is a quote from S.M 
Lipsef s study Political Man.
101 Franck, The Power o f  Legitimacy, supra n. 99, 24.
102 M. Koskenniemi, “Legitimacy, Rights and Ideology. Notes Toward a Critique o f New Moral Internationalism” 
Associations 7(2) (2003), 349 at 353.
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the ruler.103 This is, in fact, still the case in many countries but in modem democratic societies the 
picture is more complex. Or, as Franck has succincdy indicated, legitimacy “is really a bracketing of 
many integral factors, which are related but different.”104 The ingredients commonly associated 
with legitimacy include formal legality, fair procedures and empirically determined subjective 
acceptance. Many scholars also associate legitimacy with justice-related issues, the substantive 
quality of the outcomes and the effectiveness of an institution or a system in delivering them.105 A 
difference is in fact often made between input legitimacy and output legitimacy. It has also been 
stated that legitimacy could be based on technocratic expertise, which was arguably the case with 
the international trade regime during the GATT era.106 Overall, legitimacy is far from being an 
unequivocal notion but “legal theory and sociology have long grappled with the difficulty of 
defining and m easuring  the term, as has international legal literature.”107 This section reviews three 
main groups of legitimacy theories and contains an in depth analysis o f legitimacy by prominent 
international legal scholars.
Looking back, the most influential theories on legitimacy have been developed by Weber and 
Habermas. Both depart from the legal positivist association of legitimacy with formal validity108 but 
can be placed in separate categories. For Weber, the emphasis is in the subjectivist element, in other 
words, he argued that legitimate power is power that is believed to be legitimate.109 Seeking to 
describe why men obey, Weber identified three different types o f legitimate authority: the 
traditional, the charismatic and the legal-rational.110 According to Weber, belief in legality is the 
characteristic form of authority in the modern society; it derives from “the readiness to conform 
with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedure.”111 This view 
on legitimacy is therefore largely procedural. The second category, similar to the one endorsed in 
this study, conceives legitimacy as a mixture of substance and process. The most notable proponent 
on this view is Habermas whose theory has attempted to give equal weight to the pubic and private 
autonomy.112 In Habermas’s theory, the legitimacy of modern law is based neither on the legal form 
alone, nor on the conformity of law with an extralegal set of natural rights or natural law. Instead 
of being a completely functional entity, modern law necessitates a moral justification in terms of a
103 K. Annan, “Democracy as an International Issue” Global Governance 8 (2002), 135 at 137.
104 Franck, The Power o f  Legitimacy, 17.
105 Zampetti, “Democratic Legitimacy in the World Trade Organization,” 120.
106 Esty, “The WTO’s Legitimacy Crisis,” 10 et seq.
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in the International Trading System (OUP, 2005), 45.
108 Luhmann, for instance, has argued that law is an autopoetic system that functions through the binary code o f 
lawfulness/unlawfulness and does not need a moral justification to secure its internal functionality. M. Deflem, “Law 
in Habermas’s Theory o f Communicative Action,” in M. Deflem, ed., Habermas, Modernity and Law (Sage 
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109 M. Weber, The Theory o f  Social and Economic Organisation. A translation by T. Parsons o f  Volume 1, Part 1 of 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1947), 132. Extracts available at: <http://www.mdx.ac.uk/www/study/xWeb.htm>.
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practical discourse on the rightness of norms.113 Habermas’s theory o f legitimacy can thus been
associated with a combination o f legal validity, subjective acceptance and discursive validation. Also
other contemporary descriptions divide legitimacy into two or more components. One o f such
distinctions is one between formal (legal) legitimacy and social (empirical) legitimacy. According to
Weiler, formal legitimacy:
.. .implies that all requirements of law are observed in the creation o f the institution 
or system. This concept is akin to the juridical concept o f formal validity.114
Weiler also draws attention to the close proximity o f legitimacy and democracy in Western political
systems, indicating that in the context o f Western institutions or systems, “formal legitimacy is
legality understood in the sense that democratic institutions and processes created the law on which
it is based.”115As to social legitimacy, Weiler defines it as:
...a  broad, empirically determined societal acceptance o f the system. Social 
legitimacy may have an additional substantive component legitimacy occurs when the 
government process displays a commitment to, and actively guarantees, values that 
are part o f the general political culture, such as justice, freedom and general 
welfare.116 [Emphasis added, KK]
In sum, legitimacy theories can be categorised into three groups.117 The first group includes Weber 
and other theories that conceive legitimacy as a process. In other words, legitimacy is “perceived as 
adhering to the authority issuing an order as opposed to the qualities o f legitimacy that inhere in an 
order itself.”118 The second group regards legitimacy as a mixture o f process and substance, and 
includes Habermas. This understanding o f legitimacy “is interested not only in how a ruler and rule 
were chosen, but also in whether the rules made, and commands given, were considered in light of 
all relevant data, both objective and attitudinal.”119 The third group focuses on outcomes and 
consists primarily of neo-Marxist theories. According to Franck, these arguments hold that “a 
system seeking to validate itself must be defensible in terms o f equality, fairness, justice and 
freedom.120 The understanding of legitimacy used in this study comes close to the second category. 
The components of legitimacy analysed in this study include formal and procedural criteria and 
social acceptance, influenced by substantive issues. To explain this choice, I shall now review the 
key understandings of legitimacy in international legal theory.
113 Deflem, “Law in Habermas’s Theory o f Communicative Action,” 134, 9.
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1.2.3. Legitimacy in International Legal Theory
As explained above, legitimacy issues have hardly been in the forefront o f international legal theory.
Nevertheless, some interesting exchanges on the meaning and relevance of legitimacy under
theoretical questions relating to the notion of legitimacy, many of which can be understood by
rule or institution that exerts ‘a compliance pull’ towards the addresses and explains why 
international rules are obeyed in the absence of coercive power. He has identified four criteria for 
measuring legitimacy, namely determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence. Franck 
argues that when all these criteria are present, then the compliance pull of an international rule is 
strong - if not, the rule is easier to ignore.122 O f the four criteria, determinacy relates to the clarity, 
transparency, and specificity of a legal rule.123 The more determinate the standard, the more difficult 
it is to justify non-compliance.124 Thus, “rules which have a readily accessible meaning and which 
say what they expect o f those who are addressed are more likely to have a real impact on 
conduct.”125 Symbolic validation, in turn, consists of cues, such as ritual and pedigree, signalling 
that a rule should be obeyed.126 Symbolic validation is therefore the cultural and anthropological 
dimension of legitimacy, encompassing symbolic ways of communicating authority.127 Coherence 
means “the generality o f the principles which the rules apply.”128 In other words, “a rule is coherent 
when its application treats like cases alike and when the rule relates in a principled fashion to other 
rules of the same system.”129 The fourth criteria, adherence, refers to the embedding o f (primary) 
rules in a set o f rules about rules (i.e. secondary rules). The legitimacy o f each primary rule depends
international law have taken place between Franck and Koskenniemi, who respectively represent 
the more mainstream liberal tradition of international legal theory and its critical new approach. 
Introducing some of the details from that debate is useful in shedding light to certain profound
reference to the underlying divide between positivist and naturalist legal theories identified by 
Koskenniemi.
1.2.3.1 Franck: Legitimacy and Justice Are Separate
One of the key works on legitimacy in the field o f international law is The Power of Tegitimag A.mong 
Nations by Franck. Its focus is on one o f the perennial questions o f international legal theory 
seeking to explain the puzzle that in the international system, “rules usually are not enforced yet 
they are mostly obeyed.”121 As we saw above, Franck has defined legitimacy as the property o f  a
121 Ibid., 3.
122 Ibid., 16 etseq.
10 7  _ -
126 Ibid, 34. Franck mentions the United Nations flag and stamp as symbols that validate the institution and 
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in part on its relation (adherence) to secondary rules of process, which govern the creation,
interpretation, and application o f primary rules:
Rules are better able to pull towards compliance if they are demonstrably supported 
by the procedural and institutional framework within which the community 
organi2es itself, culminating in the community’s ultimate rule, or canon o f rules, of 
recognition.130
One o f the defining but problematic features about Franck’s definition of legitimacy is that he sees
legitimacy as a procedural quality and makes a clear distinction between legitimacy and any
substantive notions o f justice. In The Pornr of legitimacy Amongst Nations Franck elaborates at length
his reasons for not including justice among the factors making for legitimacy. First, Franck makes
the case against blind legal formalism:
.. .it is surely true that compliance with rules is not the sole or ultimate goal of any 
decent social structure, including the global one. If, as may happen in any society, 
the rules are unjust, reflecting the society’s imperfect social values, there may even 
be a good case for non-compliance.131
Franck then distinguishes between legitimacy and naturalist theories of justice. First, Franck argues
that the fact that “justice can only be said to be done to persons, not such collective entities as
states” forms a barrier to assessing the justice of the international rule system.132 Second, he asserts
that legitimacy and justice are “related but conceptually distinct.”133 Even though both legitimacy
and justice tend to pull toward non-coerced compliance, and frequendy interact synergisdcally,
“neither is a dependent variable of the other.” 134 To illustrate his point, Franck makes a distinction
between secular and moral communities. Using the principle o f pacta sunt servanda as an example, he
argues that while justice-based claims supporting the norm derive from a belief in shared moral
values (i.e. fairness of honouring obligations),135 legitimacy-based claims derive from a community’s
preference for (and dependence on) order and predictability.136 Franck emphasizes that in Western
nations, citizens may have different views on a rule’s legitimacy and justice137 and states that:
... the survival of a secular community depends upon the willingness o f those who 
think a rule unjust nevertheless to recognize provisionally the validating power of its 
legitimacy, even while the moral factions dispute its justice.138
Franck thus indicates that while justice can be said to promise the same ultimate prize of 
compliance as legitimacy does, the secular order and the moral order are still “two separate systems:
u 0 Ibid.
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with different rules, validations, loyalty systems, and pulls to compliance.”139 Furthermore, justice
and legitimacy are never dependent on each other: legitimate rules can pull toward compliance even
when they are not just.140 This gives legitimacy “a claim to priority which justice does not have.” 141
Franck thus concludes that:
...it remains rather idealistic to expect justice o f the rules and institutions that 
operate among states. It is perfecdy realistic, however, to demand of them a high 
degree of legitimacy.142
In Franck’s subsequent work that focuses on the fairness o f international law the element of 
distributive justice plays a defining role along with legitimacy. According to Franck, the fairness o f 
international law is:
.. .judged, first by the degree to which the rules satisfy the participants’ expectations 
of justifiable distribution o f costs and benefits, and secondly by the extent to which 
the rules are made and applied in accordance with what the participants perceive as 
a right process.143
Legitimacy and distributive justice are thus two aspects o f the concept o f fairness; one (legitimacy)
has a primarily procedural and the other (justice) has a primarily moral perspective.144 Echoing his
views in the Power of legitimacy Amongst Nations, Franck notes that the two aspects of fairness may
not always pull in the same direction because the one (justice) favours change and the other
(legitimacy) stability and order.145 In other words:
The fairness claim advanced from the perspective of legitimacy may clash with a 
fairness claim based on distributive justice. The two are independent variables in the 
concept of fairness.146
In sum, in his influential work on legitimacy and fairness in international law, Franck defines 
legitimacy as a compliance pull that can be measured through four factors: determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence and adherence. All these criteria are procedural rather than substantive and 
Franck therefore makes a clear distinction between legitimacy and any substantive notions of 
justice. This focus on procedures has also invited criticism that deserves to be considered in more 
detail. Indeed, the understanding o f legitimacy put forward in this work comes closer to Franck’s 
definition o f fairness than his reductive understanding o legitimacy as a process. In order to paint a 
more colourful picture of the notion of legitimacy and the underlying contradictions, I shall
139 Ibid,, 240.
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141 Ibid, 246.
142 Ibid.
143 Franck, Fairness in International Law, 7.
144 Ibid., 8-9. Franck thus calls legitimacy as “process fairness” and distributive justice as “moral fairness.”
145 Ibid., 7.
U6 Ibid., 23.
38
therefore now introduce a more critical view on the growing use o f legitimacy and Franck’s theory 
presented by Koskenniemi.
1.2.3.2_______Koskenniemi: Legitimacy as a Strategic Tool
Koskenniemi sees the increased focus on legitimacy o f international law as an attempt to escape a
theoretical deadlock. Accordingly, legitimacy is being used as:
.. .an intermediate concept whose very imprecision makes it available to avoid the 
attacks routinely mounted against the formal (but too abstract) idea of legal validity 
and the substantive (but too controversial) notion o f justness.147
Legitimacy is thus a concept that is opposed to both legal positivism and naturalism and therefore
seems to offer an escape route from the dilemma between the two theories:148
Containing (unlike law) no commitment to particular institutional forms and (unlike 
morality) no implication of transcendental standards, as well as unburdened by the 
negative connotations linked to words such as legalism’ and ‘moralism’, the notion 
of ‘legitimacy’ rediscribes the international world in terms o f categories whose 
beneficiality seems self-evident: lawfulness, fundamental values and human rights.149
Koskenniemi argues, however, that Franck’s analysis o f legitimacy escapes the vicious circle of 
positivism versus naturalism only by “a silent but significant” association of legitimacy with 
contextual justice and with pragmatic legal validity.150 The consequence is a kind of ‘soft law’ that 
has very loose formal conditions of validity,151 in other words, legitimacy is not ‘hard’ enough to 
be real law and not constraining enough to satisfy moral demands.152 Koskenniemi acknowledges 
that Franck has attempted to cope with these problems by using fairness as a procedural criterion 
for legitimacy.153 However, this again leads to problems as there is no agreement even about the 
fundamentals of the right process, including who should participate.154 Furthermore, if process is all 
that there is, then there is “nothing against its arbitrary or manipulative uses by elites or technical 
experts.”155
To demonstrate how the increasingly popular legitimacy discourse renders both formal legality and 
morality irrelevant, Koskenniemi refers to those who argue that humanitarian intervention without 
the authorisation by the UN Security Council could be regarded as legitimate even in cases where it
147 M. Koskenniemi, ’’Book Review: The Power o f Legitimacy Among Nations by Thomas M. Franck” American 
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can be characterised as unlawful and its moral status may be uncertain.156 According to
Koskenniemi, the problem is that when legitimacy is understood in this way — as “a kind o f feeling”
of legitimacy - power becomes authority that is answerable neither in terms o f law or morality.157
Instead, authority is “a psychological fact that is indifferent to the conditions of its existence: fear,
manipulation, prejudice, whatever.”158 Koskenniemi thus argues that:
By saying legitimacy’ as often as possible in connection with as many and as 
controversial political actions as possible, actions that cannot be seriously discussed 
in terms o f their lawfulness or moral substance, receive a sense o f acceptability and 
naturalness that is precisely the function of ideology to attain.159
According to Koskenniemi, however, legitimacy adds nothing to what legal validity or moral-
political appropriateness may have offered — deference to action agreed by others “is a good
exclusionary reason only if it is justifiable in terms of law or morality.”160 If, on the other hand,
neither law nor morality is present, “then the added value results simply from power.”161
Koskenniemi thus sees legitimacy as a strategic tool, involving “the manipulation o f normative
perceptions, treated as empirical feelings.”162 In other words, legitimacy:
.. .is not a standard external to power, against which power might by assessed but a 
vocabulary produced and reproduced by power itself through its institutionalised 
mechanisms o f self-validation.163
In a related critique elsewhere Koskenniemi has contrasted the ‘culture o f formalism’ with the
‘culture of dynamism’ or American anti-formalism that he would probably associated with Franck’s
work. The culture of formalism focuses on valid law164 — which is something that refers to social
facts and moral ideas, but cannot be reduced to them.165 According to Koskenniemi,
Even if formalism may no longer be open as jurisprudential doctrine o f the black 
and white of legal validity... nothing has undermined formalism as a culture of 
resistance to power, a social practice of accountability, openness and equality whose status cannot be 
reduced to the political positions of any of the parties whose claim are treated within it. As such, 
it makes a claim for universality that may be able to resist the pull towards 
imperialism.166 (Emphasis added, KK)
In other words, this is a culture that emphasises the limits to the exercise o f power, the 
accountability o f those in positions of strength, the right o f the weak to be heard and protected and 
“a community overriding particular alliances and preferences and allowing a meaningful distinction
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between lawful constraint and the application of naked power.”167 For this reason Koskenniemi’s 
image, ultimately, has more appeal than Franck’s sociologically oriented account of legitimacy. 
While it has been phrased in different theoretical terms, in practice, Koskenniemi’s idea of a culture 
that respects the legal form, is based on accountability and openness and takes into account the 
right o f the weak to be heard and protected comes close to the ideal endorsed in this study on how 
the WTO dispute settlement system should operate in order to be considered legitimate.
To summarise, the exchange between Franck and Koskenniemi illustrates that the notion of 
legitimacy is increasingly discussed in the field o f international legal theory. On the one hand, 
legitimacy is used as a sociological factor that explains why international norms are often obeyed in 
the absence of coercive power. Legitimacy is thus characterised as something that acts as a 
compliance pull that promotes voluntary compliance with international law. O n the other hand, 
Franck’s view has been criticised for rendering both formal legality and morality irrelevant - by 
ultimately leading to the question as to whether “a kind o f feeling” legitimates a certain act 
regardless o f its legal and moral credentials. It is clear that the debate between Franck and 
Koskenniemi retains much of the traditional focus o f international legal theory given that many of 
their arguments can be traced back to perennial questions such as whether international law is really 
law in the absence of coercive power. Their analysis is, however, extremely useful in shedding light 
into some profound theoretical questions underpinning the notion o f legitimacy thus explaining 
why legitimacy is often divided into different components. In other words, the underlying divide 
between naturalists and positivists that Koskenniemi highlighted seems to clarify why it is difficult 
to conceive legitimacy exclusively either in terms of social acceptance, or by reference to purely 
formal and procedural criteria.
Indeed, for this study, here lies the value of legitimacy as an analytical tool to assess the WTO 
dispute settlement system. The argument here is that social acceptance as well as formal and 
procedural criteria are all relevant to the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system and none 
is sufficient in itself.168 For the purposes o f this study, the added value of legitimacy as a conceptual 
tool is that it links all the necessary elements together and explains why they all depend on each 
other. For the WTO dispute settlement system, my argument is thus that its legitimacy is connected 
with formal and procedural guarantees as well as the social acceptability o f the outcomes, which, in 
turn, depend on their substantive quality and the process through which they have been reached. 
For a comprehensive picture o f the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system, it is
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168 Similarly P. Nanz, “Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutionalization o f Transnational Trade Governance: A 
View from Political Theory,” in C. Joerges & E-U Petersmann, eds., Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance 
and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2006), 59 at 60. She laments that while one source is often overstated, “it is 
important to emphasise that the legitimacy o f transnational governance depends on the ‘right’ balance of the three 
sources.”
41
necessary to discuss all these elements. O n the other hand, this study admits that legitimacy remains 
a somewhat elusive as a notion, and it would be impossible to identify the exact mix o f factors that 
make a regime or institution legitimate. Here, legitimacy is used as an umbrella covering a host of 
factors that are necessary to endow the W TO dispute settlement system with an aura o f justified 
authority. Thus, while Chapter 4 of criticises the legitimacy o f the W TO dispute setdement system 
mainly from the point o f view o f social acceptance and the related substantive component, Chapter 
5 lays a great deal o f importance on the formal and procedural dimensions o f  legitimacy. The 
arguments put forward in Chapter 5 highlight the importance o f a ‘culture of formalism’ in contrast 
to arguments that the legitimacy o f the W TO dispute setdement system could be improved simply 
by ‘importing substantive legitimacy’ and more openly balancing environmental and other issues to 
reach what would be perceived by the decision-makers as a more socially acceptable outcome in 
linkage disputes. Chapters 6 and 7, in turn, are concerned with the need to strike appropriate 
balances between the various components o f legitimacy — all the while ultimately posing the 
question whether the fragmentation o f international law and the isolated evolution o f legal norms 
applicable to international trade and environmental protections has already lead to such legitimacy 
challenges that reach beyond the W TO dispute setdement system and threaten the legitimacy o f 
international law as a whole.
1.2.3.3 Kumm: The Constitutional Model
Concerning the view endorsed here of legitimacy as a combination o f several interdependent 
elements, Kumm has also highlighted legitimacy as a sum of several factors resembling those that 
will be covered and discussed in this study. He has approached legitimacy from a perspective that 
resembles the debate in the context o f national legal and political systems or in the European 
Union. Identifying striking structural similarities between contemporary international law and 
European law “that go right to the legitimacy issue,”169 Kumm proposes “a constitutionalist model” 
for conceiving the legitimacy o f international law .170 At the heart o f this model are four principles: 
the formal principle of international legality; the jurisdictional principle o f subsidiarity; the 
procedural principle o f adequate participation and accountability; and the substantive principle of 
achieving outcomes that do not violate fundamental rights and are reasonable.171 In this sense, 
Kumm’s analytical framework incorporates the most important components o f legitimacy described 
above, and also covers the elements analysed in this study.
Elaborating on the four constitutional principles, Kumm indicates that the principle of international 
legality establishes a presumption in favour o f the authority o f international law: international law is
169 Kumm, “The Legitimacy o f  International Law,” 916.
170 Ibid., 917.
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prima facie legitimate “simply by virtue o f being the law of the international community.”172 There is 
thus a moral obligation to comply with norms even if one disagrees with the content o f a specific 
rule.173 However, this presumption can be rebutted based on the three other principles in instances 
where norms of international law “constitute sufficiently serious violations o f countervailing 
normative principles relating to jurisdiction, procedure or outcomes.”174 The second principle, the 
principle of jurisdictional legitimacy or subsidiarity is familiar to European lawyers. Kumm argues 
that the subsidiarity principle is relevant also under international law and is even “in the process o f 
replacing the unhelpful concept o f ‘sovereignty’ as the core idea that serves to demarcate the 
respective spheres of the national and international.”175 Essentially, the principle o f subsidiarity is 
concerned with the locus of decision-making and it requires that there are good reasons justifying 
any infringements o f local autonomy by pre-emptive norms enacted on the higher level.176 
According to Kumm, only collective action problems and the protection of minimal standards of 
human rights count as such good reasons.177 Even then, these “have to be o f sufficient weight to 
override any disadvantages connected to the pre-emption o f more decentralised rule-making.”178 
However, there are some areas where subsidiarity strengthens rather than weakens the comparative 
legitimacy of international law, in other words, there are good reasons for deciding certain issues on 
the international level, such as actions necessary to mitigate climate change.179
The third principle in Kumm’s model is the principle o f adequate participation and accountability. 
Kumm cites arguments challenging the legitimacy of international law on the grounds that at the 
national level, core decisions are made by legislative bodies constituted by directly elected 
representatives180 and that there are no such democratic institutions at the international level.181 He 
highlights, however, that the emergence of ‘the administrative state’ has eroded the role of national 
parliaments as the traditional legislative forum, and involved “significant delegation of regulatory 
authority to administrative institutions o f various kinds.”182 He also indicates that the establishment 
of constitutional courts has had a similar influence of diminishing the role o f the national political 
process.183 Kumm therefore states that:
...much of international law that is in potential conflict with outcomes o f the
national political process competes with national rules determined either by
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administrative agencies or constitutional courts, suggesting that the argument for 
democracy has less bite at least in such cases.184
However, even if electoral accountability may not be the tight test to apply at the international level, 
“that does not mean that there are no standards of procedural adequacy.” 185 Instead, the relevant 
questions here are whether the procedures are “sufficiently transparent and participatory and 
whether accountability mechanisms exist to ensure that decision-makers are in fact responsive to 
constituents’ concerns.”186 This argument comes close to the critique o f the WTO dispute 
setdement system in Chapter 5 on grounds of transparency and procedures. The fourth and last 
principle is one that relates to outcomes. While noting that bad outcomes tend to undermine the 
legitimacy o f the decision-maker, Kumm cautions that this principle “has only a very limited role to 
play in assessing the legitimacy o f any law.” 187 This is because “it is generally not the task of 
addressees o f norms to re-evaluate decisions already established and legally binding on them.” 188 In 
other words, “there is a strong presumption that a national community’s assessment o f the 
substantive outcome is an inappropriate ground for questioning the legitimacy of international 
law.”189 The principle is therefore reserved to international rules that cross “a high threshold of 
injustice or bear a cosdy inefficiency.”190 Finally, Kumm makes some general observations about his 
model. According to him, the analytical framework “helps to ask the right questions and deal with 
the right problems.” 191 Furthermore, it aims to “build a bridge between national and transnational 
constitutional discourse.”192 It is committed “not to an international constitutional law but to 
constitutionalism beyond the state.” 193
The merit of Kumm’s model is that it directs the focus to questions that are relevant in assessing 
the legitimacy of international law. While his model has not been used as a theoretical basis for this 
study, his four concerns and principles capture the key elements employed in this work to assess 
the formal, procedural and social legitimacy concerns related to the WTO dispute setdement 
system. However, his constitutionalist mindset seems to be either premature or in the need for 
profound assessment to be applicable in the international context. For instance, the principle of 
subsidiarity seems to translate to the international level only with difficulty: unlike in the EU, there 
are no such strong international institutions as the European Commission vested with powers to 
put forward legislative proposals, or bodies such as the European Parliament or the Council 
mandated to approve regulations that may have direct effect in national legal systems. States thus
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seem to be in a better position to control the subject matter o f international law than the Member 
States o f the EU thereby decreasing the significance of the subsidiarity principle. Furthermore, 
Kumm does not go into the details of what he means by sufficiendy transparent and participatory 
procedures or accountability mechanisms. As Koskenniemi pointed out in his critique o f Franck, 
defining exacdy what transparency and participation mean in the international context seems to be 
one o f the most important contemporary challenges. Finally, invoking “costly inefficiency” of 
outcomes to justify non-compliance with international law also seems rather problematic. How 
would such ‘costly inefficiency’ be measured? Would it mean, for example, that President Bush’s 
characterisation o f the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as 
‘fatally flawed’ due to its perceived negative impacts on the U.S. economy would qualify as “costiy 
inefficiency” justifying non-compliance? Having ratified the Kyoto Protocol, could Canada justify 
its likely non-compliance with its Kyoto target invoking a similar argument? Or how would the 
“costiy inefficiency” be measured? Cutting greenhouse gas emissions might be costiy for the 
Canada or the U.S., but on the other hand, the economic and social costs o f unmitigated climate 
change are particularly high for small island developing states, certain African countries and the 
millions of people living in the Asian megadeltas projected to suffer from flooding and sea-level 
rise. Given Kumm’s argument that climate change is clearly one of the areas where decision-making 
should be global rather than local, this is probably not what he had in mind when formulating the 
fourth principle. Nevertheless, identifying such areas o f international law where non-compliance 
could be justified based on undesirable outcomes would be difficult and controversial in practice. 
Despite its flaws, Kumm’s model is useful for the subsequent analysis in highlighting the key 
elements analysed in this study, namely formal and procedural legitimacy criteria, as well as social 
and substantive legitimacy.
1.3 Why Is Legitim acy Relevant in  the International Context?
What, then, explains the current focus on the legitimacy o f international law and international 
organizations? Several factors have contributed to this. The international institutional and legal 
architecture have gone through some remarkable changes. The number o f international 
agreements194 and international organizations195 has multiplied manifold since the end o f World 
War II. The past couple of decades have also been characterised by the rapid proliferation o f 
international courts and tribunals, including the WTO dispute settlement system, the International
194 M. Ziim, "Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems," in Government and Opposition 39(2) (2004), 260 at 
267. According to him, the number o f international agreements grew from 15,000 in 1960 to 55,00 in 1997.
195 Held, Models o f  Democracy, 346. According to Held, in 1909 there were 37 intergovernmental organizations and 
176 international NGOs, while in 1989 the respective numbers were nearly 300 and 4,642.
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Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Criminal Court, two ad hoc international
criminal tribunals for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda, the UN
Compensation Commission, the World Bank Inspection Panel, its counterparts in Asian and Inter-
American Development Banks, and the North American Free Trade Agreement.196 In addition to
the quantitative shift, international cooperation also seems to be experiencing what has been
described as a qualitative shift. As Kumm observes:
.. .the subject matter of international law has expanded significandy. Today there is a 
significant overlap between the kind o f questions that traditionally have been 
addressed by liberal democracies as domestic concerns and the kind o f questions 
that international law addresses.197
In a similar vein, Ziirn argues that international organizations have become more intrusive: while 
they were traditionally mosdy concerned with states, today it is often other societal actors such as 
consumers and businesses that are the ultimate addressees of international regulation. 198 In other 
words, international law and international organizations currendy seem to penetrate areas that were 
previously left to national governments. The enforcement of international obligations also seems 
more efficient, especially in the context of the WTO where the new dispute setdement system may 
authorise trade sanctions against non-complying states.
1.3.1 The Globalisation Argument
Arguments invoking increase in, and intensification of international cooperation are closely linked
with the globalisation debate, which is premised on the idea o f profound and unprecedented
changes in international interconnections. Globalisation has, o f course, been a highly controversial
notion with several different definitions, explanations and critiques having been put forward199 and
the justifiability of the whole notion questioned.200 It has been characterised as “the process of
increasing interconnectedness between societies so that events in one part o f the world more and
more have effects on peoples and societies far away.”201 In other words, it is:
increasingly difficult for people to live in any place isolated from the wider world” 
for the reason that “developments at the local level — whether economic, social or 
environmental — can acquire almost instantaneous global consequences, and vice 
versa.202
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Globalisation is said to be affecting at least the political, economic, cultural and social spheres. A 
global economic system reaching beyond the control o f any single state is often mentioned as 
evidence of globalisation.203 Globalisation is also seen as being fuelled by the emergence of global 
problems such as global warming or international terrorism and the growth in transnational 
networks, which all seem to be challenging the once intimate nexus between location and politics 
and transforming the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality and political power. 204 It has 
also been associated with cultural homogenisation 205 and revolutionary changes in communications 
that are challenging old ideas of geographical space and chronological time.206
Controversial as the notion o f globalisation is, it is widely accepted that it has blurred the 
distinction between the national and the international, and affected the role, functions and powers 
of sovereign states, on one hand, and global actors, such as international organizations or 
transnational networks, on the other hand. In posing the question whether globalisation has only 
affected state autonomy207 or whether the modern state has actually lost some of its sovereignty,208 
Held has examined various “disjunctures” in order to map processes altering the range and nature 
of choices open to democratic decision-makers.209 He concludes that “the evidence that 
international and transnational relations have altered the powers o f modern sovereign state is 
certainly strong” as the “disjunctures” reveal:
... a set o f forces which combine to restrict the freedom of action o f governments 
and states by blurring the boundaries o f domestic politics, transforming the 
conditions of political decision-making, changing the institutional and organizational 
context of national polities, altering the legal framework, and administrative 
practices o f governments and obscuring the lines of responsibility and accountability 
of national states themselves.210
In other words, these developments undermine any conception o f sovereignty “as an illimitable and
indivisible form of public power.” 211 According to Bauman, in turn:
The deepest meaning conveyed by the idea o f globalisation is the indeterminate, 
unruly and self-propelled character of world affairs; the absence o f centre; of 
controlling desk.. .212
Embedded in the globalisation debate is thus the idea that power is leaking from national 
governments to the international level where there are no effective checks and balances to constrain
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its use. Instead, public power is exercised by small sectors o f governments and experts working
with international issues. It is exacdy these kinds o f observations that have sparked the interest in
the legitimacy o f international law and organizations. The expanded subject matter of international
law, new procedures for its creation and the diminished role o f states in interpreting and enforcing
international law have lead Kumm to argue that:
... it is no longer apparent what structurally distinguishes international law from 
national law, except, of course, one central point: international law is not generated 
within the institutional framework of liberal constitutional democracy and does not 
allow for a central role for electoral supervision. In this sense it lacks democratic 
pedigree.213
Also Sands indicates that:
The emergence of a new body o f international law — more extensive rules, more 
detail, greater enforceability — has a profound impact for democratic governance 
and accountability 214
Similar observations have been made regarding international organizations. As Heiskanen indicates,
when international organizations are seen as playing a role in international affairs independendy
from states and governments, and as performing functions that states and governments alone are
incapable o f performing, they “have to be understood as players that not only have to be taken into
account, but also have to be made accountable.”215 Echoing such sentiments, many authors have
expressed critical views regarding the legitimacy and accountability o f international organizations.
According to Zurn, international organizations:
.. .indeed are mostly accountable to their national governments one way or another, 
but at the same time quite remote and inaccessible for the nationally enclosed 
addressees o f the regulation in question... At best... (they, KK) are answerable to a 
few governments, but not to all the societies into which they intrude, and certainly 
not to a transnational society.216
Moravcsik thus argues that the question as to whether the structure of international institutions is
democratically legitimate seems to be “emerging as one of the central questions — perhaps the
central question — in contemporary world politics.”217 This argument has several dimensions. First
is the question o f democracy at the inter-state level. Calls have been made, for instance, to
democratise the United Nations by expanding the membership of the Security Council. However,
according to Kofi Annan, the focus should be broader than that:
Many important decisions, with profound effects on the fives o f billions o f human 
beings, are made in the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade 
Organization, Group o f 8, and the boardrooms of multinational corporations. We
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would live in a better, fairer world -  indeed a more democratic world — if in all those
places, greater weight were given to the views and interests of the poor.218
Second, there is the question of membership in international organizations. Here the crucial
question is whether non-democratic states should be accepted as members.219 In 1948, the
International Court o f Justice indicated in the Admissions Case that in light o f Article 2(7) of the 
Charter of the United Nations, a state’s internal affairs should remain untouched by the United Nations 
apart from the Security Council acting based on its powers defined in Chapter VII o f the Charter.220 
What this meant was that Members of the United Nations could not make the admission of new 
Members dependent on conditions not expressly mentioned in Article 4(1) of the Charter. However, 
in the 2000s, the ideological climate had changed to allow Annan, then the Secretary General of the 
UN, to highlight a decision by the Organization of African Unity not to admit at its summit 
meetings leaders having come to power by unconstitutional means, and indicate that he looks 
forward “to the day when the General Assembly follows this example.”221 Third, then, is the 
question o f democratic accountability of international and regional organizations themselves. As 
with the WTO, the argument has also been made that the ability of international organizations to 
produce effective solutions and achieve good results is no longer sufficient to guarantee but 
“governance must also fulfil certain procedural requirements in order to be rated as good.”222
1.3.2 Post-Cold War Influences in International Legal Theory
Arguments put forward in the globalisation debate seem to relate and partly overlap with certain 
developments in international legal theory. Especially the ideological climate inspired by the end of 
the Cold War has produced theories that are also challenging traditional views on the legitimacy of 
international law and international organizations. The changes o f political regime that took place in 
Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-90 were widely celebrated as signs o f progress, and capitalism 
was proclaimed the only viable economic system.223 Fukuyama made the argument that the 
mankind had now reached the end o f its ideological evolution, and that Western liberal democracy 
was the sole remaining credible political philosophy.224 Fascism and communism, the chief rival 
ideologies, had either failed or were failing; and Islam or nationalism were only partial or 
incomplete ideologies.225 Therefore, only liberal democracy combined with market economy count 
as developments of “truly world historical significance.”226 Fukuyama’s arguments entail several 
problems and he has been criticised, for instance, for discarding the distinctive liberal traditions
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associated with Locke, Bentham and Mill227 and for overlooking possible tensions or contradictions 
between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘democratic,’ in other words, the liberal emphasis on individual rights 
and the democratic focus on regulation of the individual, collective action and public 
accountability.228 In addition, Fukuyama has been attacked for endorsing a laisse^Jaire liberalism that 
is based on problematic assumptions about the self-equilibrating and clear nature of markets.229 He 
has also failed to consider whether and how inequalities o f wealth and ownership could spark 
ideological conflicts both within the West and between the West and the developing world.230 
Furthermore, the novelty o f the entire post-Cold War shift in diplomatic and academic 
vocabularies, has been questioned and critically classified as “a return to the application o f domestic 
categories to international affairs, advocated by the liberal legal cosmopolitanism that emerged in 
Europe in the 1870s and was institutionalised in and around the League of Nations.”231 While they 
are thus not without a controversy, these ideological developments have left their mark on 
international legal theory and challenged traditional understandings of the role of the individual, 
human rights, and democracy in international law. They have highlighted the relevance of states’ 
internal governance and increased interest in democratic accountability and legitimacy of 
international institutions.
Regarding the relevance of states internal governance in international law, Simpson has highlighted 
the rise of what he calls democratic liberalism or liberal anti-pluralism. He explains that classical 
liberalism (or legalism) relies on domestic parallels and substitutes the individual by the state as the 
free and equal object and subject o f international law.232 Internal governance is irrelevant to a state’s 
status in the international community, and states are prohibited from intervening in internal affairs 
of other states.233 However, classical liberalism has been criticised for several reasons, including that 
states have either pooled their sovereignty to international organizations or lost it to sub-state 
groups or transnational markets. Classical liberalism has also been attacked with the moral 
argument that states are morally indefensible as a foundation for the international society because 
of forms o f intra-state violence and human rights abuses.234 In contrast, what Simpson calls 
democratic liberalism(or liberal anti-pluralism) seems to be gaining ground.235 It draws inspiration 
from Kant and American constitutionalism236 in that the individual assumes the place of a primary
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actor in international law. 237 Consent is required at two levels o f international law-making: state
consent remains primary and vital, but individuals must also give consent to governments in order
for them to possess formal credentials o f statehood. 238 According to Simpson, representatives of
democratic liberalism include Teson, Franck, Rawls and Slaughter.239 In Franck’s own words:
Increasingly, governments recognize that their legitimacy depends on meeting 
normative expectation of the community o f states. Democracy is thus on the way of
becoming a global entitlement, one which may be promoted and protected by 
collective international processes.240
According to Franck, there is also a connection between the legitimacy of national governments
and the legitimacy of international institutions:
As global and regional institutions assume powers which were once the sole 
preserve of sovereign states ... it is very much to the advantage of such institutional 
endeavours that their initiatives be perceived as legitimate and fair. This cannot be 
achieved if any significant number of the participants in the decision-making 
process are palpably unresponsive to the views and values o f their own people. In the 
legitimacy of national regimes resides the legitimacy of the international regime.241 (Emphasis 
added, KK)
It is interesting to note that while arguments highlighting states’ internal governance and the 
emerging right to democratic governance are gaining ground, at the same time it is realised that 
national democratic institutions have lost some o f their relevance. Describing this paradox Marks 
indicates that “commitment to democracy has never been more widespread. On the other hand, 
awareness o f the limitations o f jus particular national arrangements, but of all forms o f national 
democracy, has rarely been more acute.”242 In other words, the conception o f democracy as the
working out of democratic principles for national polities starts to appear dramatically
inadequate.243 In a similar vein, Held notes that the principle o f majority rule has it limits when 
many of the decisions taken by the ‘majority’ also affect citizens in other communities, including a 
decision to build a nuclear power station near the border of a neighbouring country or to permit 
the ‘harvesting’ of rainforests.244 The previously central ideas that consent legitimates government 
and that the ballot box is the mechanism whereby individuals express their political preferences 
have thus been challenged by globalisation.245
This, then, leads to the second trend that has emerged in international legal theory, namely the 
increased interest in the accountability and legitimacy o f international institutions. Here we again
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run into arguments similar to those already discussed above in the context of the general
globalisation debate. Thus, the new challenge is to “extend the range of democratic concern beyond
national political processes” and include within its scope non-national political arenas, such as
international organi2ations.246 Marks notes that according to most authors, globalisation will not
result in the disappearance of the state as a structure, but the process is not without consequences
either.247 Also Held has argued that:
.. .the meaning of democracy, and the model of democratic autonomy in particular, 
has to be rethought in relation to a series of overlapping local, regional and global 
structures and processes.248
He has then proposed a cosmopolitan model o f democracy, which would coexist with the system 
of states but override it and “seek to entrench and develop democratic institutions at regional and 
global levels as a necessary complement to those at the level of the nation-state.”249 The model 
would entail the establishment o f regional parliaments; recognising them as independent sources of 
regional and international regulation; accepting the possibility o f general referenda cutting across 
nations and nation-states; as well as “opening international governmental organizations to public 
scrutiny and the democratisation of international ‘functional’ bodies.250 Finally, “the formation of 
an authoritative assembly o f all democratic states and societies — a re-formed UN or a complement 
to it — would be an objective.” 251
International scholars are, of course, far from unanimous on the need for new models o f 
democracy or new institutional arrangements. Slaughter, for instance, has argued that the answer 
lies not in the democratisation of international organisations but in informal transgovernmental 
networking.252 Since such networking is not based on a formal transfer o f powers and only involves 
the enforcement of laws enacted through national processes, transgovernmental networking carries 
the legitimacy of national processes to the international level 253 Citizens retain the possibility o f 
holding accountable their governments for both national decisions and those made in 
transgovernmental networks. One of the obvious difficulties with Slaughter's theory is the lack o f 
ability of those affected by the decisions to hold the decision-makers accountable: while citizens 
may be able to hold their own governments accountable in connection with transgovernmental 
activities, “democratic legitimacy depends on accountability to those affected by such activities.”254
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Furthermore, it overlooks the reality that international organisations already exercise powers that 
affect the functioning of national institutions and does nothing to remedy the ensuing problems.
Another legal theoretical response to globalisation has been the idea of global legal pluralism,
according to which globalisation is governed by:
...the totality of strategically determined, situationally specific and often episodic 
conjunctions of a multiplicity of institutional, normative and processual sites 
throughout the world.255
The perspective of global legal pluralism is sometimes described as sociological rather than 
normative.256 It highlights the ways in which global economic networks are governed by multiple 
systems of law257 and the ensuing need to “revise many of our basic ideas about the shape o f the 
global legal order.”258 In contrast to the traditional focus on normative systems, global legal 
pluralism starts from ‘sites/ from social and economic relations, and ask how they are organised 
and governed.259 It would first examine global commodity chains (i.e. networks of labour and 
production processes whose end result is a finished commodity), then analyse the social 
organisation of their constituent elements, and finally focus on identifying which institutions, 
norms and dispute resolution processes are relevant to the social organisation o f each segment in 
the commodity chain.260 Thus, in the domain o f this study, research endorsing global legal pluralism 
would also take into consideration other normative systems that govern the global economy, 
including ones that result from (private) norm generation by trade associations, professional and 
technical organizations, commercial arbitrators, multinational enterprises and so on.261 For the 
purposes o f the present study, the aim is not to go into the details of these interesting debates but 
to justify the focus of this work on the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system. Clearly, 
the debate inspired by globalisation, the end of the Cold War and the changing reality in which 
international law and institutions currendy operate, has demonstrated the relevance o f such an 
inquiry.
1.3.3 Petersmann and the “New Theoretical Trends” in the WTO Context
It is interesting to conclude this overview by focusing on arguments concerning the legitimacy and 
constitutionalisation o f the WTO by Petersmann who has published several works emphasising the 
rights-based nature of WTO law, urging a “human rights approach” to W TO rules, criticising
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public international law as too state centred, calling for democratic reforms in the WTO and 
highlighting the European integration process as a model for global development. However, these 
arguments have been highly controversial and they have inspired some strong criticism. To 
illustrate why it may be difficult to apply some of the new theoretical insights to the WTO, it 
therefore seems appropriate to conclude this section by introducing Petersmann’s main arguments, 
as well as some of strong key critiques that they have inspired.
Echoing the views of democratic liberalism, Petersmann has criticised classical public international
law for being too state-centred and power-oriented a system262 According to him, far reaching
reforms are needed to make the individual rather than the state the central actor in international
law. The underlying philosophical justification is that:
If values can be derived only from individuals and from their human rights, and if 
the end of states and of international law is to serve individuals by protecting their 
human rights, then individuals and their human rights - rather than states, “nations” 
or “people” (demos) whose collective rights are merely derivative of human rights of 
their citizens - should be recognised as primary normative units also in international 
law and international organisations. 263
According to Petersmann, human rights should thus play a central role in international law:
The progressive development and extension o f human rights law in all fields of 
national and international law remains a permanent legal and political challenge for
satisfying basic human needs, protecting ‘democratic peace’ and for promoting self-
government and self-development of all human beings.264
What this means is that the WTO, together with other international organizations, should integrate 
human rights into their law and practice.265 In other words, Petersmann proposes a human rights 
approach to WTO law.266 WTO law should be interpreted “in conformity with the human rights 
requirement that individual freedom and non-discrimination may be restricted only to the extent 
necessary for protecting other human rights.”267 According to Cass, the motivating factor for 
Petersmann seems to be that such an approach would enable W TO law to exploit the legitimacy of 
human rights, respond to the claims of the anti-WTO protest movement and insert free trade deep 
into domestic legal arrangements.268
The emphasis on human rights also leads to one of Petersmann’s main theses, namely the 
constitutionalisation argument. According to him, the recognition o f human rights requires
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constitutionalisation also at the international level.269 This is because national constitutional 
guarantees remain ineffective “without complementary international constitutional guarantees of 
rule of law among states and cosmopolitan human rights protecting individual freedom” 270 
Furthermore, history demonstrates that liberty, democracy, welfare-increasing market competition 
and social justice are not “gifts o f nature” but constitutional tasks.271 To Petersmann, the European 
integration process confirms these insights.272 However, the European example has also illustrated 
that integration is not possible without comprehensive package deals.273 Given the expanding 
agenda of the WTO and the protests against it, Petersmann suggests that it should be examined 
whether the European ‘integration paradigm’ should become accepted at the worldwide level “in 
order to promote a new kind of global integration law based on human rights and the solidary 
sharing o f the benefits and social adjustment costs of global integration.”274
The WTO plays an important role in the international constitutionalisation process. According to 
Petersmann, international trade law restrains government action and the agreements contain several 
rights that attach to individuals rather than just states.275 Thus, “the WTO guarantees o f freedom, 
non-discrimination and the rule of law” reach beyond national constitutional guarantees in many 
countries, and subject discretionary foreign policy powers to additional legal and judicial restraints 
ratified by domestic parliaments.276 For this reason WTO law serves “constitutional functions for 
rendering human rights and the corresponding obligations o f governments more effective in the 
trade policy area.” 277 Due to its unique compulsory dispute settlement and appellate review system, 
and its complementary guarantees to domestic courts, WTO law also seems to protect the rule of 
law “more effectively than any other worldwide treaty” 278
However, Petersmann has also criticised the present WTO system and identified the need for 
improvements. According to him, the rule-making that often takes place behind closed doors and 
without effective parliamentary control, “hardly complies with the human rights requirement of 
transparent, democratic rule-making maximmng human rights.”279 O n the contrary, the 
“appropriate balancing o f human rights” would require transparent democratic discussions and
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adequate representation of all interests involved.280 Thus, Petersmann calls for democratic reforms
of WTO law and its ‘constitutional infrastructure. -81 In more concrete terms,
The universal recognition of human rights, and the move from ‘negative integration’ 
to ‘positive integration and to worldwide rule-making in the WTO, call for further 
‘constitutionalisation’ o f the WTO by means of more transparent rule-making 
procedures in the WTO, stricter parliamentary review, and the legal and judicial 
protection of human rights in the trade policy area.282
Given the rather radical nature of some of Petersmann’s arguments, his views have provoked 
strong criticism and his theory has been classified as “highly controversial.”283 According to Cass, 
one of key problems is that implicit in Petersmann’s rights-based approach are some radical 
consequences; it would ultimately seem to lead to a situation where WTO law would have a direct 
effect in national legal systems.284 This would, of course, be a fundamental consequence in most 
national jurisdictions, which have adopted a dualist approach to international law. Petersmann has 
attempted to address this problem by arguing that even if WTO law does not necessarily have 
direct effect, it should be used as an interpretative guideline in domestic systems.285 Nevertheless, 
his approach is “at odds with the classical international law position as well as with the majority of 
WTO scholars.”286
The second key critique against Petersmann relates to his approach to human rights and Kantian 
philosophy. Alston, for instance, has argued that Petersmann’s approach is “at best difficult to 
reconcile with international human rights law and at worst it would undermine it dramatically”287 
According to Alston, the references that Petersmann makes to Kant to justify his underlying 
philosophy ignore the complexity of Kant’s writings.288 Petersmann’s arguments are also vague 
from the perspective o f international human rights law: he does not offer detailed legal 
justifications for his claims that WTO law establishes worldwide guarantees of economic 
freedom.289 According to human rights lawyers, what Petersmann calls as “the WTO guarantees of 
freedom, non-discrimination and property rights” are in fact not individual rights conferred to 
individuals in the sense of human rights and “cannot reasonably be equated to human rights in any 
broad sense familiar to the traditions o f international human rights law.”290 Petersmann has also 
been accused of being politically naive in arguing that the WTO could play a significant role in
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promoting human rights. In other words, he has not been able to explain why “the very same
governments acting within the framework o f the WTO would take a dramatically different attitude
to the proposal purporting to achieve the result which they have adamandy opposed in the human
rights setting.”291 Furthermore, the WTO, “its institutional structure, its processes and the
outcomes it sanctions are far from what would be required o f a body to which significant human
rights authority could be entrusted.”292 Questions have also been raised concerning the social aspect
of human rights and contradictions deriving from the economic focus o f Petersmann’s model.
According to Howse, Petersmann seems to be proposing a clear hierarchy o f human rights:
Social and other positive human rights can only be pursued by governments to the 
extent to which they can be shown as ‘necessary’ limits on market freedoms. But 
why not the reverse? Why not subject free trade rules to stricter scrutiny under a 
necessity test, where these rules make it more difficult for governments to engage in 
interventionist policies to protect social rights?293
In a similar vein, Alston argues that Petersmann’s vision would lead to a situation where human 
rights would “become detached from their foundations in human dignity and would instead be 
viewed primarily as instrumental means for the achievement o f economic policy objectives.”294
Finally, Petersmann can be criticised for being too Eurocentric and idealist about the potential of 
the European Union to serve as a model for Svorldwide integration law.’ According to Alston, 
Petersmann presents also some unjustifiable arguments regarding the role o f human rights in the 
European integration process: there has been no grand vision on human rights and individual 
liberties motivating the incorporation o f human rights into European law but this was rather an 
“afterthought” and made in response “to various efforts by Community institutions which were 
seen as a threat to the national legal orders.”295 Furthermore, individuals and citizens did not 
originally play a role in the European process, but the move away from the “functionalist elite- 
driven model” only began during the last decade. 296 It is also true that the global community does 
not seem to be committed to an integration process along the lines of the European Union and that 
similar integration would also be incredibly difficult to achieve given the global economic, political, 
cultural, institutional and legal differences and bearing in mind that even within the EU, its 
enlargement and especially the pending membership o f Turkey have been highly controversial 
issues. Regardless of the host o f convincing criticism against Petersmann’s views, his writings have 
also been useful in provoking debate about the fundamentals of the WTO system and the direction
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that it should be taking in the future. Certainly, the debate justifies the focus on the legitimacy of 
the WTO dispute settlement system in this study.
1.4 Conclusions
Having situated the study in a broader context, elaborated on its theoretical basis and developed the 
necessary conceptual tools, the focus can now be directed to the legitimacy of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. As we have seen, legitimacy reflects the idea of justified and accepted authority. 
It has been characterised as a compliance pull or an aura o f authority convincing the relevant 
constituencies to accept an institution or a decision that may override their particular preferences. 
Given the underlying contradictions, namely the tension between naturalist and positivist theories, 
there is no unequivocal definition for legitimacy. Most definitions of legitimacy contain both formal 
and consensual elements. Formal legitimacy links with legal validity, and correct procedures. Social 
legitimacy can be associated with subjective preferences and the acceptance by those whose 
behaviour an institution or a decision seeks to govern. Furthermore, social acceptance links 
legitimacy with substantive issues and the ability of an institution to manifest political preferences 
and advance generally shared goals and preferences.
The structure o f this study reflects the distinction between formal and social/substantive legitimacy. 
I shall first describe in Chapter 4 how ‘trade and’ disputes, especially those involving a conflict 
between trade and environmental protection, have challenged the social/substantive legitimacy of 
the WTO and its dispute settlement system. In Chapter 5, I shall approach questions associated 
with formal legitimacy, including questions of procedure, transparency, accountability and the 
relationship between the WTO dispute settlement system and other international and national 
institutions. It is true, of course, that problems I have chosen to discuss in Chapter 5 as challenges 
to the formal/procedural legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement can and do have a negative 
impact on the social/substantive legitimacy o f the system: The lack of transparency and possibilities 
for public participations may decrease the authority and social acceptance o f an institution. An 
intrusive standard of review second-guessing a politically sensitive law adopted by a democratic 
national parliament could also have a similar effect. On the other hand, the best way to address 
some of the problems that have challenged the social/substantive legitimacy o f the W TO dispute 
settlement system seems to be procedural. As it will be proposed in Chapter 4, decisions in disputes 
involving conflicting policy objectives might be more readily accepted if the WTO dispute 
settlement system took a more consistent and coherent interpretative approach to non-WTO 
norms and was more sensitive to other international and national institutions. For such reasons the 
distinction between formal and social legitimacy reflected in the structure of this work should rather 
be seen as a rough guide towards categorising legitimacy challenges facing the W TO dispute 
settlement mechanism than a definite labelling o f the various issues discussed. Each o f the
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individual Chapters attempts to take into account such complexities and engage in a more nuanced 
analysis o f the problems.
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2. Legitimacy and the WTO Dispute Settlement System
This Chapter argues the WTO dispute settlement system is confronted with considerable legitimacy 
challenges. The legitimacy of dispute resolution in the context of international trade institutions was 
first seriously contested towards the end o f the GATT era when environmentalists fiercely attacked 
two unadopted panel reports in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute arguing that they pointed towards a 
substantive bias and institutional discrepancy in favour o f free trade. The establishment o f the 
institutionally much stronger W TO dispute settlement system in 1995 highlighted the relevance of 
these challenges. In contrast to the largely diplomatic and policy-oriented dispute resolution during 
the GATT era, the new dispute settlement mechanism came to be characterised as a quasi-judicial 
forum with a compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction in the field of WTO law and a mandate to 
authorise trade sanctions against non-complying states. The new W TO dispute settlement system 
also proved highly popular and since its creation, it has been utilised with an unprecedented 
frequency.
These reforms lifted the profile o f international trade law and strengthened its status in relation to 
other specialised areas o f international law. They also came to act as one o f the drivers for a 
broader doctrinal debate concerning the fragmentation of international law.297 Thus, while we saw 
in the previous Chapter that one important implication of globalisation has been an expanding and 
intensifying international cooperation, bringing to the fore questions such as the legitimacy of 
international law and organizations, this Chapter highlights the somewhat paradoxical consequence 
that globalisation has also lead to increasing fragmentation, functional differentiation and the 
emergence of specialised and relatively autonomous social spheres.298 The challenge is to figure out 
how the highly specialised functional components of the international regime could coexist in 
harmony and interact in a way that does justice to their valid but not necessarily fully compatible 
claims o f authority. In the context o f the WTO dispute settlement system, one o f the key problems 
is that while it has compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction in the field of WTO law, most scholars 
argue that it is not competent to apply other rules o f international law. However, especially in 
linkage disputes norms such as those developed under international environmental law would often 
be relevant to the facts o f this dispute. This has sparked a lively, albeit somewhat technical debate 
concerning the role o f non-WTO rules of international law in the WTO dispute settlement. O n the 
other hand, disputes such as the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle have also prompted scholars to
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consider the rationale of involving the WTO dispute settlement system in such disputes from a 
broader and more institutionally oriented perspective. These are the main themes discussed in this 
Chapter, which has been structured as follows. Section 2.1 explains how legitimacy problems have 
emerged during G A TT  and WTO dispute settlement procedures. Section 2.2 outlines the key 
institutional features o f the WTO dispute setdement system. Section 2.3 focuses on the substantive 
competence and limits of the WTO dispute settlement system and reviews the key scholarly 
positions concerning its competence to consider and apply such rules of international law that are 
not included in the WTO Agreements. Section 2.4 outlines the scholarly debate concerning the 
question as to how the WTO dispute settlement system should address linkage disputes.
2.1. Legitim acy Problems in the G A TT/W TO  D ispute Settlement
This section focuses on the fam iliar story of how the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle panels 
challenged the legitimacy of the GATT/W TO dispute settlement and how the Appellate Body 
turned a new page by its landmark decision in the Shrimp-Turtle case. While the story has been told 
numerous times, I believe that there are some overlooked twists to the plot. I wish to challenge two 
popular perceptions, first that the Tuna-Dolphin decision was completely unjustified from the 
environmental point of view, and second that the Appellate Body’s Shrimp-Turtle decision marked a 
completely new era in the trade-environment jurisprudence by the GATT/W TO dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Instead, I shall argue that while the legal analysis by the Tuna-Dolphin panel exposes a 
trade-oriented bias, the conclusion seems justified bearing in mind the several flaws in the design of 
the U.S. trade embargo. More importantly, I shall also argue that the famous Shrimp-Turtle decision 
by the Appellate Body in no way marked the beginning of a consistent environmental-friendly 
pattern in the GATT/W TO dispute settlement. The validity o f the second argument will be 
evident from the discussion in Chapter 4, including the recent decision concerning the by the Biotech 
panel to completely deny the relevance of international environmental law in the interpretation of 
WTO law in a dispute concerning genetically modified organisms. The key objective here, however, 
is to focus on uncovering the reasons as to why the legitimacy o f the GATT/W TO system has 
been challenged, and identify the key constituents o f the legitimacy challenge in light o f the 
theoretical scrutiny undertaken in the previous Chapter.
In the early 1990s, a G A TT  dispute focusing on tuna fishing and the American desire to protect 
dolphins infuriated environmentalists299 and turned them against the GATT/W TO dispute
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settlement system. At the heart of the controversy was an import prohibition imposed by the U.S. 
on tuna that had been caught by fishing technologies resulting in the incidental killing o f dolphins. 
Two G A T T  panels issued reports indicating that the trade ban violated the G A T T  and that the U.S 
could not impose the dolphin friendly requirement on its tuna imports. Environmentalists tend to 
regard these reports as seriously flawed and many WTO scholars are keen to argue that they belong 
to the ‘old era,’ in other words, the epoch before the Appellate Body’s landmark Shrimp-Turtle ruling 
opened the borders for more constructive and balanced interaction between trade and 
environment. There are problems, however, with both o f these popular perceptions.
The Tuna-Dolphin controversy focused on the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act that prohibited
imports o f yellowfin tuna caught by using purse seine nets that resulted in incidental and ‘excessive’
killing of dolphins. The trade ban affected Mexico’s tuna exports to the U.S., as well as the
secondary exports o f Mexican tuna to the U.S. through Europe. Mexico thus requested a GATT
dispute settlement panel in 1991 and argued that the U.S. import prohibition violated its trading
rights under the GATT. One of Mexico’s key arguments in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute was that it was
not possible to discriminate between domestic and imported products based on the production
method300 and the U.S. measure therefore violated the national treatment principle enshrined in
G A TT  Article III. The panels accepted this, indicating that imports of a product, namely tuna,
could not be restricted solely by reference to the production technique. More specifically, the 1991
GATT panel stated that:
... Article 111:4 calls for a comparison o f the treatment o f imported tuna as a product. 
Regulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the taking o f tuna could 
not possibly affect tuna as a product.301 (Emphasis in the original).
The panel also found that the ban violated Article XI: 1 o f the G A T T  prohibiting quantitative trade 
restrictions and was not justified under the exceptions clause in Article XX(b) because the Article 
did not permit extra-jurisdictional protection o f life and health. According to the panel, accepting a 
broad interpretation o f the environmental exceptions would lead to G A T T  Contracting Parties 
unilaterally determining the environmental policies “from which other contracting parties could not 
deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement.”302 Moreover, the 
prohibition was not “necessary” as the U.S. had not:
...exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection 
objectives through measures consistent with the General Agreement, in particular 
through the negotiation of international cooperative agreements, which would seem
300 D. Murphy, “The Tuna-Dolphin Wars,” Journal o f  World Trade 40(4) (2006), 597-617 at 598 and 610-611.
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Unadopted.
302 Ibid., para. 5.22.
62
to be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters o f many states and 
the high seas.303
While many G A TT  Contracting Parties argued in favour of adopting the panel report, the U.S. and 
Mexico postponed the resolution of the dispute and the panel report was never formally adopted.304 
This was not, however, the end o f the controversy. The Marine Mammal Protection Act also 
authorised a secondary embargo against imports o f Mexican tuna from other countries, including 
Europe.305 This resulted in the establishment of a second Tuna-Dolphin panel in 1992 to consider a 
complaint by the European Community that the intermediary protection affected its member 
states.306 Also the second Tuna-Dolphin panel found the U.S. trade ban to be inconsistent with 
Article XI o f the G A TT  and not allowed by the general exceptions listed under Article XX.
The findings in the Tuna-Dolphin reports lead to extensive academic debates concerning the status
of processes and production methods (PPMs) under the GATT/W TO regime and the justifiability
of unilateral and extraterritorial environmental measures. At the same time, they highlighted
linkages between international trade and other policy fields in an unprecedented manner:
Traditionally, the GATT demonstrated respect for regulatory diversity and 
progressive government. But after Tuna-Dolphin, environmentalists — and others with 
concerns about how the trading system balances competing values — saw the GATT 
as a regime dedicated to the triumph of free trade over all other human concerns.307
When looking closely, the outcome of the Tuna-Dolphin dispute seems to have much more merit 
than it is usually given. In contrast to sea turtles, dolphins were not classified as endangered under 
international environmental law. The situation is thus markedly different from the Shrimp-Turtle 
dispute where the Appellate Body was able to rely on a number of international environmental 
instruments recognizing the necessity of protecting sea turtles from extinction. For dolphins, 
however, many felt that the desire to protect them was rooted in American popular sympathy with 
these intelligent marine mammals308 and the cruelty o f the ‘encirclement’ fishing method that took 
advantage of the tendency o f yellowfin tuna to travel beneath dolphin pods. On the other hand, the 
dolphin-friendly fishing method was not the ideal alternative from the ecological perspective. 
Experience showed that it had dramatic consequences on other marine species: one report, for 
instance, indicated that saving 29 dolphins would kill 2,000 sharks, between 38 and 75 billfish
303 GATT panel report, US-Restrictions on Imports o f  Tuna, GATT  document DS29/R,11 October 1994, para. 5.27. 
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(including swordfish) and five sea turtles.309 Eventually even environmental NGOs such as the 
Greenpeace started questioning its desirability and finally concluded that dolphin-setting was less 
disturbing ecologically than the alternative o f log-setting.310
As to the motivation of the trade ban, the U.S. dolphin-safe policy was heavily influenced by such 
large American companies as Heinz, which had voluntarily adopted a dolphin-safe tuna policy but 
was disappointed with the economic results of the green marketing strategy.311 To make the 
marketing of dolphin-friendly tuna more profitable, Heinz supported compulsory regulation and 
thus gained from the U.S. import ban, while small canners and fishers suffered losses.312 Prior to 
imposing its trade ban, the U.S. made no efforts to cooperate with Mexico on the protection of 
dolphins. However, as the Tuna-Dolphin dispute coincided with the negotiations for the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) where fears of a “race to the bottom” played a 
prominent role, Mexico chose not to press for the adoption o f the panel report.313 Eventually, 
Mexico and the U.S. signed a treaty on international dolphin protection, and the trade ban was 
replaced by eco-labelling requirements.314 Interestingly, the Tuna-Dolphin saga also testifies to the 
power of the media and the civil society to influence popular opinion in the U.S -  and the ability of 
the U.S. popular opinion to influence the rest o f the world. After the GATT panel reports, 
American NGOs launched massive campaigns against the GATTzilla monster, poised to destroy 
both the American sovereignty and the global environment. Slogans like “the GATTzilla just ate 
Flipper” also took advantage of the Flipper dolphin made famous by a popular TV series.315 These 
developments had an important role in the increase in writings by mosdy American scholars and 
NGOs on the legitimacy o f the GATT/W TO system.
Regardless o f the less-than-perfect environmental and political credentials of the U.S. trade 
embargo, the Tuna-Dolphin panel reports provoked a strong and furious environmentalist reaction 
and lead many environmentalists to believe that the GATT/W TO regime was dedicatedly and 
irrevocably biased in favour o f free trade. In fact, some of the key legal findings by the Tuna-Dolphin 
panel gave rise to what have been characterised as environmental “myths” that more than a decade 
later “keep haunting the WTO.”316 That they had such a profound impact is all the more impressive 
given that the panel reports were never formally adopted, meaning that “officially, those panel
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rulings are not even public documents.”317 How to explain this? In my view, an in-depth analysis of 
this situation is key to understanding why the legitimacy of the GATT/W TO dispute settlement 
system has been put into question and what factors influence the legitimacy of an international 
adjudicative body. In other words, the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases provide a stimulating 
opportunity to build on the theoretical insights from the previous Chapter.
Given their disappointment with the Tuna-Dolphin rulings, environmentalists were alarmed when a 
dispute pertaining to a very similar set o f facts was brought to the recently established WTO 
dispute settlement system in 1996. This time it was a group o f Asian developing countries that 
challenged the U.S. prohibition on shrimps caught by harvesting methods that resulted in the 
incidental drowning of endangered species of sea turtles. Environmental NGO s struggled to 
participate in the closed and confidential WTO dispute settlement proceedings and failed to secure 
a permission from the Shrimp-Turtle panel to submit amicus curiae briefs.318 The international 
environmental community was thus far from delighted when in the spring of 1998 “the three 
faceless bureaucrats hidden somewhere in Geneva”319 ruled that the U.S. measure violated G A T T  
Article XI and could not be justified under Article XX on the grounds that unilateral environmental 
measures were incompatible with the objectives of the international trade liberalisation system. In 
other words, W TO members were only allowed “to derogate from G A T T  provisions so long as, in 
doing so, they do not undermine the WTO multilateral trading system.”320 Many interpreted this 
statement as a confirmation that there was no space for environmental or other non-trade values 
within the WTO system. Environmentalists thus reacted strongly, arguing that the decision had “no 
economic, scientific or legal justification,”321 and that the report marked “a new low-point in WTO 
dispute settlement.”322 They also stressed the need to find “an alternative way to solve trade 
disputes involving environmental and social objectives.”323
2.1.1 An Institutional Bias in Favour of Free Trade?
It is clear that the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle panel reports challenged the legitimacy o f the 
GATT/W TO dispute settlement system, and as we saw in Chapter 1, did so in a way that had 
important implications for the legitimacy o f the international trade regime as a whole. But why did
317 Ibid., 585.
318 Panel report, US-Import Prohibition o f  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, 15 May 1998, paras.
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this happen? In a diverse and pluralist world it is quite inevitable that authorities make decisions 
that are not acceptable for everyone. When the WTO dispute settlement system gives a ruling that 
violates some political convictions, environmental or otherwise, this should not, as such, seriously 
challenge its legitimacy. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 1, the idea o f ‘acceptable paternalism’ and the 
willingness to obey decisions that go against own, actual preferences forms the very essence o f the 
idea o f legitimacy.324 In other words, if most people believe that the institution making the decision 
has been created and operates in accordance with formally correct and fair procedures, and if they 
trust that its overall objectives are acceptable, then they should be willing to accept its authority to 
reach a conclusion in an individual case that is contrary to their personal views. However, it seems 
that this was not the case in the context o f the GATT/W TO dispute settlement. In my view, a 
serious legitimacy crisis was caused by the fact that many saw the Shrimp-Turtle and Tuna-Dolphin 
decisions as symptoms of some more fundamental problems with the GATT/W TO dispute 
settlement. Having been made by a trade organi2ation without any environmental or democratic 
credentials, they exposed a trade-oriented focus — even a bias — that seemed to systematically 
undermine legitimate policy objectives endorsed in other fora. They thus brought to the fore 
fundamental challenges questioning the institutional integrity o f the WTO dispute settlement 
system and its ability to take a balanced approach to linkage issues.
Thus, for many environmentalists criticising the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle decisions the crucial
problem was the general approach to environmental interests and norms that the panels employed
rather than the mere conclusion that a particular environmental trade restriction was contrary to the
G A TT Agreement. The GATT/W TO dispute settlement procedures seemed to operate in a way that
made it nearly impossible for environmentalist to conceive them as legitimate: environmental policy
objectives were consistently rejected without engaging in a sound and convincing analysis o f the
underlying legal arguments. As Sands has indicated,
The real problem was with the reasoning o f the ("Tuna-Dolphin, KK) decision. It went 
too far in promoting free trade... The panel’s language seemed to exclude the 
possibility that there might be any circumstances in which one country could ban 
imports to protect the environment o f the producing state, or o f the international 
community as a whole.325
Environmentalists, however, were not the only ones finding defects in the decision by the Shrimp- 
Turtle panel. Also the Appellate Body used some strong wordings when overturning the panel’s key 
findings. It criticised the panel for not following the international customary rules on treaty 
interpretation and resorting instead to a broad standard and a test that found “no basis” in the 
treaty language.326 The Appellate Body thus emphasised the importance of the customary rules of
324 Section 1.2. The quotes are from Koskenniemi, “Legitimacy, Rights and Ideology,” 353.
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treaty interpretation327 and demonstrated that it was serious when indicating in the US-Gasoline 
report that WTO law was not “in clinical isolation of public international law.”328 The AB then 
cited a number of treaties and other instruments of international environmental law to support its 
interpretation of the GATT. Whether its understanding and approach to international 
environmental norms was accurate in all respects will be questioned in Chapter 4. Yet, at the time, it 
was a remarkable development that the Appellate Body should refer to international environmental 
norms and explicitly acknowledge their relevance to the interpretation of WTO law.
What the Appellate Body concluded was that the U.S. import prohibition was in fact provisionally 
justified under the subparagraph (g) o f Article XX (which allows measures “relating to the 
conservation o f exhaustible natural resources”) and only failed because its application amounted to 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination prohibited by the chapeau of Article XX. The implications 
of the Appellate Body’s legal analysis were partly lost, however, in the fact that the outcome of the 
appeal was still that the U.S. import prohibition violated the G ATT. The significance o f these 
findings became apparent only in 2001, when a panel and the Appellate Body ruled on the 
implementation of the Shrimp-Turtle decision by the U.S. under D SU  Article 21.5. After attempting 
to reach a multilaterally negotiated solution to the problem and remedying other defects relating to 
the implementation o f its measure, the U.S was now able to legally prohibit imports o f shrimps 
from countries that did not take adequate precautions to prevent endangered species o f sea turtles 
from drowning in shrimp nets.
It seems justified to argue that the Appellate Body succeeded in responding to some of the 
challenges to the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement. It did so by employing legal techniques 
that addressed some o f the most immediate systemic problems. Its legal arguments and analytical 
approach to Article XX of the G A TT  seemed far better justified than the panel’s interpretation 
building on the general economic objectives o f the multilateral trade regime. It displayed a 
commitment to more transparent and systematic treaty interpretation based on customary rules 
that also takes into consideration other relevant norms of public international law. Taking 
advantage o f Franck’s definition o f legitimacy discussed in the previous Chapter, in the Shrimp- 
Turtle case the Appellate Body improved coherence by sending a message that it will interpret all WTO 
norms alike no matter what the underlying political interests: its interpretation will start from the 
treaty language and the context and proceed in accordance with accepted interpretative standards. 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body also improved adherence by showing that its interpretation o f the 
primary norms (i.e. the GATT) was supported by secondary norms (i.e. the customary rules o f 
interpretation codified in the Vienna Convention on the Taw of Treaties). The key message here was that
327 Ibid, para.l 14.
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the Appellate Body’s approach was embedded in a broader procedural and institutional framework 
and not driven by a blind commitment to international trade liberalisation.
Having illustrated through concrete examples how the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism was originally put into question and how some o f the problems have been addressed 
through legal techniques I shall now focus on explaining how the system functions as an institution 
and how it relates to non-WTO norms of international law. As it will be seen, it is in particular the 
limited mandate of the WTO dispute settlement system that continues to challenge its legitimacy.
2.2 Institutional Parameters o f the WTO D ispute Settlement System
As a result o f the Uruguay Round, the system for settling international trade disputes went through 
an important transformation. During the GATT era, the methods for settling trade disputes 
evolved from the first ruling given by the chairman in 1948, through the consideration o f disputes 
by working parties to three- or five-member panels giving expert opinions.329 As the GATT system 
operated on a basis o f a consensus rule, the losing party could block the adoption of an adverse 
report.330 While in most cases it eventually accepted the result, ‘blocking’ remained a problem and 
“seemed to be occurring with increasing frequency in the 1980s.” 331 In a marked contrast, under 
the new WTO dispute settlement system, the adoption o f panel and Appellate Body reports can 
only be prevented by a consensus. The move to the negative consensus rule was one o f the most 
significant changes making the WTO dispute settlement system the exceptionally powerful 
international judicial body that it is today, in other words, “in all probability, the most effective area 
o f adjudicative dispute setdement in the entire field o f public international law.” 332
The WTO dispute settlement system is regulated by the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). According to Article 111:2 of the WTO A.greement the D SU  
is “an integral part of this Agreement, binding on all Members.” What this means is that the 
jurisdiction o f the WTO dispute settlement system is compulsory for all WTO Members. This is 
naturally remarkable under international law where states have traditionally been reluctant to agree 
to a compulsory judicial-type dispute setdement. The jurisdiction o f the WTO dispute setdement
329 D. Palmeter and P.C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization. Practice and Procedure 
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system is also exclusive in the sense that WTO-related disputes can only be litigated before WTO 
adjudicating bodies, and only WTO adjudicating bodies can decide if WTO violations exist.333
Institutionally, the WTO dispute settlement system is made up o f ad hoc panels, a permanent 
Appellate Body and the Dispute Setdement Body (DSB). New and distinct panels are established 
for each individual case and they are composed o f three experts selected from a roster. 334 In 
principle, it is the parties to a dispute that designate the panellists. However, in practice the WTO 
Secretariat selects the panellists in consultation with the parties. 335 If  this process does not lead to 
an agreement, the WTO Director General appoints the panel.336 The Appellate Body, in turn, is a 
permanent body with seven members appointed for a term of four years. Their term can be 
renewed once. The new rules guaranteeing the quasi-automatic adoption of panel reports was one 
of the key reasons for the introduction o f the appellate procedure. It has been argued that the 
negotiators were not fully aware of the groundbreaking implications of the new procedure that they 
had created:
When they agreed to the establishment o f a standing Appellate Body to which 
parties could appeal panel reports, the ambitions o f most, if not all, participants in 
the negotiations were, however, quite modest. They certainly did not intend to 
create a strong, international court at the apex o f the new dispute settlement system. 
On the contrary, they only wanted to ensure that their biggest innovation, namely 
the quasi-automatic adoption of panel reports by the DSB, would not have 
undesirable side effects. ..The choice o f the unappealing, technical, non-descriptive 
term ... as the name of this new institution is telling of the aspirations o f the 
negotiators. It is no coincidence that the new institution was not called the World 
(or International) Trade (Appeals) Court.. .337
The Dispute Settlement Body consists o f representatives of all WTO Member States. It normally 
meets every month to establish dispute settlement panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, 
monitor their implementation and to authorise the suspension of concessions and other 
obligations.338 In theory, WTO Members thus retain political oversight over the dispute settlement 
system. However, as indicated above, the DSB makes decisions on the basis o f a negative 
consensus rule. In practice this means that it always adopts the reports by the panels and the 
Appellate Body - and the power o f the DSB not to establish a panel or adopt a report is “more 
illusory than real.”339 The main function of the DSB is thus that is servers as a forum where 
matters o f dispute are discussed.340
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In terms of procedures and timelines, the WTO dispute setdement proceedings consist o f four 
stages: mandatory consultation stage; a panel stage; an appellate stage; and an
implementation/compliance stage.341 During the consultation stage, the parties attempt to solve 
their differences through political negotiation. If  attempts to find a negotiated solution prove 
unsuccessful, either party may request the establishment o f a dispute setdement panel. The DSB 
will grant this request unless there is negative consensus to reject it. After it has been established, 
the panel first receives written submissions from the disputing parties.342 It then convenes the first 
meeting during which both the complaining and defending parties orally present their arguments.343 
Also third parties — in other words, WTO Members with “substantial interest” in the dispute -  are 
usually invited to the first meeting and given the opportunity to present their views orally.344 Parties 
then file their written rebuttals, followed by their second meeting with the panel.345 Third parties are 
not usually invited to this meeting, where the defending party often takes the floor first, followed by 
the complaining party.346 Usually four weeks after the second meeting, the panel will issue the draft 
descriptive part o f the report, to which parties are invited to make comments within two weeks.347 
The panel will then modify the descriptive part and issue an interim panel report with interim 
findings and conclusions.348 Again, parties are invited to comment on the report.349 They can also 
request to have a third meeting with the panel, but in practice they usually forego this right in 
exchange for the opportunity to submit a second set of written comments on the interim report in 
order to respond to the written comments by the other party.350 After this, the final panel report 
will be issued, translated and circulated. 351 Once the panel report has been issued, either party may 
appeal the report or any part of it to the AB. If  the panel report is not appealed, it is formally 
adopted by the DSB within 60 days of its circulation unless there is a consensus to the contrary.
In case the panel report is appealed, the AB will consider the case. The AB has seven permanent 
members, but according to Article 17.1 o f the DSU, only three of them will hear and make 
decisions concerning an individual case. According to the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, the 
members of the AB constituting the division are selected on the basis o f a non-disclosed rotation 
“intended to ensure random selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all members to serve 
regardless of their national origin.”352 The proceedings before the AB are initiated by a written
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notice o f appeal, followed by the appellant’s written submission.353 The appellee then has the right 
to respond in writing to the arguments raised in the appellant’s written submission.354 In each case, 
also an oral hearing will be held. The written and oral proceedings before the Appellate Body are 
confidential,355 but any third parties before the panel can participate also during the appellate phase. 
According to DSU  Article 17.5, the appeal proceedings “shall in no case exceed 90 days.” 
Importandy, the competence o f the AB is limited to questions of law — it cannot reassess questions 
of fact.356 Also reports by the AB must be formally adopted by the DSB, on the basis o f the 
negative consensus rule.
The fourth possible stage o f the WTO dispute setdement proceedings relates to the 
implementation of the findings by the panels and the AB. In their conclusions, the panels and the 
AB recommend the party to bring its measures into conformity with its WTO obligations.357 The 
party is given ‘a reasonable period of time’ to do this. The length o f this period can be agreed by the 
parties or determined through arbitration under DSU  Article 21.3. These proceedings are confined 
to defining when implementation must take place, but they are not intended to consider what 
constitutes implementation.358 The complaining party can also challenge the measures taken by the 
defending party to comply with the panel or AB recommendations, and request a panel consisting 
of the original panel members to determine under D SU  Article 21.5 whether the steps taken to 
comply with the decision are compatible with WTO obligations.359 The case remains under the 
surveillance o f the DSB until compliance has been achieved. 360 If  the respondent fails to comply 
with the ruling, the complaining party is entitled to remedies, namely ‘compensation’ or ‘suspension 
of concessions or other obligations.’ Typically, compensation takes the form of a reduction in 
tariffs or other bound trade barriers, and ‘suspension o f concessions’ means the imposition of 
tariffs or other trade barriers.361 If parties disagree, the appropriate level of retaliation can be 
determined through arbitration by the original panel members.362 In real life, the sanctions applied 
by the WTO dispute settlement system can sometimes be quite significant. In the dispute 
concerning tax exemptions for US-Foreign Sales Corporations, for instance, the EU was authorised to 
retaliate on exports worth o f US dollars 4.043 billion from the United States.
The WTO dispute settlement proceedings are often characterized as ‘quasi-judicial.’ This is because 
especially during the panel stage, many features distinguish the WTO proceedings from the
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functioning o f an ordinary court, and are more reminiscent o f arbitration.363 The parties agree on
the panels’ ‘terms o f reference,’ which are crucial in determining the matters over which the panel
has a jurisdiction.364 Furthermore, the disputing parties are given the opportunity to comment on
the initial panel report, which is clearly not the case in ordinary court proceedings.365 Also the fact
that the Member States play an important role in selecting the ad hoc panellists is relevant: in courts
the disputing parties do not have the same degree o f control over the appointment of judges.366 The
appellate stage is, however, remarkably different.367 First, the Appellate Body is a standing body
with permanent membership. Second, the AB can only examine the points of law, while points of
fact are not appealable.368 It has been argued that:
...the Appellate Body has a kind of supreme court jurisdiction to control the 
interpretation and application o f law. Here we are in the presence of not only o f a 
judicial system, but very developed judicial system of judicial control of legality. The 
procedure is that o f a judicial body.369
In practical terms, the Appellate Body has the final say in a dispute setdement process:
Even if the Appellate Body makes a mistake, there is no mechanism to correct it. In 
a domestic jurisdiction, if the Supreme Court makes a mistake, the legislature can 
enact a law to correct it. However, in the WTO process the political branch (the 
General Council and the Ministerial Conference) does not commonly exercise this 
power. This means that there are no effective ‘checks and balances’ operating within 
the WTO.370
These are the key institutional features that have made the WTO dispute setdement system an 
exceptionally strong institution measured by international standards. It is also one that has been 
used frequendy. During its first decade from 1995 to 2005, some 324 cases were addressed through 
the WTO dispute setdement system, amounting to an average o f 30 new cases a year.371 About half 
of the complaints (159) resulted in the establishment of 129 panels by the DSB.372 The DSB 
adopted 83 panel reports, 56 Appellate Body reports, 12 implementation review panel reports, 8 
implementation review Appellate Body reports, and circulated 16 arbitration reports regarding 
retaliation.373 What this means in comparison with other international courts and tribunals is that 
the WTO dispute setdement is exceptionally popular. The case list o f the International Court of 
Justice, for example, has contained 136 cases between May 1947 and October 2007. Furthermore, 
many o f those cases never reached the merits phase due to the failure by the complainant to
363 G. Abi-Saab, “The WTO Dispute Settlement and General International Law,” in Yerxa & Wilson (2005), 7 at 9.
364 Marceau, “Consultations and the Panel Process in the WTO dispute settlement system,” 32.
365 Decision o f the European Ombudsman o f 11 July 2006 on complaint 
582/2005/PB against the European Commission.
366 Ibid.
367 Abi-Saab, “The WTO Dispute Settlement and General International Law,” 9-10.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
370 Matsushita & al., The World Trade Organization (2nd.ed), 43.
371 Wilson, “The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Operation,” 20.
372 Ibid.
373 R. Yerxa, “The Power of the WTO Dispute Settlement System” in Yerxa & Wilson (2005), 3 at 5.
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establish the jurisdiction o f the Court. While they were undoubtedly beneficial for the evolution of 
the international trade regime, the institutional strength of the WTO dispute setdement system and 
its compulsory jurisdiction have also brought to the fore many significant challenges. One of the 
most pressing ones relates to the substantive scope of the system and its competence to consider 
and apply such rules of international law that have not included in the WTO Agreements. As it was 
already seen above, these questions are particular relevant to the politically sensitive linkage disputes 
and they thus have important implications on the legitimacy of the W TO dispute settlement system.
2.3 Substantive Limits o f the WTO D ispute Settlement System
WTO law is one of the most prominent examples of new and special systems o f international law
that aim to respond to special technical and functional requirements and act as drivers for the
fragmentation of international law.374 What once appeared to be the domain of ‘general
international law’ has now dissolved into highly specialised systems such as ‘trade law,’ ‘human
rights law,’ ‘environmental law,’ ‘law of the sea,’ and even ‘international refugee law,’ and
‘investment law.’375 These developments have posed some serious challenges for the unity of
international law, and the relationship and interaction between its specialised fragments. As the
International Law Commission has indicated,
Each rule-complex or ‘regime’ comes with its own principles, its own form of 
expertise and its own ‘ethos,’ not necessarily identical to the ethos of neighbouring 
specialization. Trade law’ and ‘environmental law,’ for example, have highly specific 
objectives and rely on principles that may often point in different directions.376
International trade law and the WTO dispute settlement system have both become deeply 
entangled in this problematique. During the GATT era it was often argued that the G A T T  was a 
completely separate legal regime, “in some way insulated from the general body of international 
law.”377 Currently the picture is quite different. In the Gasoline case the Appellate Body famously 
emphasised that the G A TT  “is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.”378 
In the Sbrimp-Turtle dispute, the AB gave this statement a more concrete expression and generously 
referred to a number of international environmental instruments. As a result, the argument that the 
WTO system forms a closed system is no longer plausible but WTO law is now commonly 
considered as a lex spedalis system, in other words, a specific subsystem of international law.379 This
374 ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law, 14.
375 Ibid, 11.
376 Ibid., 14.
377 J. H. Jackson, "Dispute Settlement and the WTO. Emerging Problems," Journal o f  International Economic Law 
(1998), 329 at 341.
378 Appellate Body report, US-Gasoline, 18.
379 G. Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” European Journal o f  International Law 14(4)
(2002), 753 at 755.
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system has been characterised as largely, but not entirely, self-contained.380 Thus, W TO law is “an 
important part of the larger system of public international law”381 that must “evolve and be 
interpreted consistendy with international law.”382
When examining relationship between WTO law and other rules of international law, it must be 
borne in mind that there are in fact two separate issues at stake. First is the relationship between 
WTO law and general international law in the abstract, in other words, independent o f the 
jurisdiction o f any international court or tribunal. Second is the question o f the substantive scope 
and competence o f the WTO dispute setdement system. It is the second question that is the central 
theme in this Chapter. How does one define the substantive scope and competence o f the WTO 
dispute setdement system? The answer can be searched by examining a set o f related questions: 
What is the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the WTO dispute setdement system? What is the 
applicable law in the WTO dispute setdement proceedings? When answering these questions, the 
relevant provisions o f the D SU  are naturally an important starting point.
According to Article 1(1) of DSU, its provisions apply to disputes “brought pursuant to the 
consultation and dispute setdement provisions o f the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this 
Understanding,” in other words, disputes concerning the “covered agreements.” The reference to 
“covered agreements” is repeated in Articles 7(2) and 11 o f the DSU. According to Article 7(2), 
panels "shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the 
parties to the dispute. Article 11 of the DSU  indicates that the panels:
...should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity 
with the relevant covered agreements, and to make such other findings as will assist 
the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the 
covered agreements.383
Also Article 3.2 of the DSU  is important in defining the scope of the WTO dispute setdement 
system:
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.
380 Matsushita & al., The World Trade Organization (2nd ed), 76.
381 Ibid  They argue that this is reflected by the use o f interpretative principles o f  public international law, and also by 
increasing recourse to the other traditional sources o f public international law.
382 Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” 755.
383 The last sentence o f ADSU article 11 o f DSU  has, however, also been interpreted as an “implied powers” 
provision “so that the panels and Appellate Body can decide all aspects o f a dispute.” T. J. Schoenbaum, "WTO 
Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47(2000), 
647 at 653.
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In light of the DSU  it seems clear that the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the WTO dispute
settlement system is limited to the covered agreements.384 What this means is that WTO
adjudicative bodies do not have jurisdiction to consider claims relating to rules o f international law
other than those contained in the covered agreements. Even though the DSU  does not contain an
explicit provision concerning the latter, most scholars are of the view that it also limits the law
applicable by the WTO dispute settlement system:
The provisions on the limited jurisdiction o f panels mirror those on the applicable 
law between WTO Members.385
The consequence of this is that there can be a gap between the rights and obligations of a WTO 
Member State that are within the competence o f the WTO dispute settlement system, and the 
rights and obligations of that state existing outside the scope o f the WTO system. Scholars have 
been eager to point that this does not “reduce the obligations o f WTO Members to comply at all 
times with their other international law obligations.”386 Other scholars, such as Pauwelyn, argue that 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body can apply non-WTO norms of international law. In other 
words,
The WTO treaty must be construed and applied in the context o f all other 
international law. This other law may fill gaps or provide interpretative material. But 
it may also overrule WTO norms. WTO law must thus be united with other public 
international law... There is no need to expand the mandate of the WTO as an 
international organization for the WTO to take into account o f other non-trade 
concerns (including those going beyond the exceptions provided for in, for example, 
G A TT  Art. XX). The fact that the WTO is part of international law should 
suffice.387
Scholarly opinion is thus divided over this important question. What it is clear that WTO law is not
“in clinical isolation.” General international law does play a role in the WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. Indeed, as the International Law Commission has pointed out,
Even if it is clear that the competence of WTO bodies is limited to consideration of 
claims under the covered agreements (and not, for example, under environmental or 
human rights treaties), when elucidating the content o f the relevant rights and 
obligations, WTO bodies must situate those rights and obligations within the overall 
context of general international law (including the relevant environmental and 
human rights treaties).388
I will now introduce the main views put forward in the doctrinal debate.
384 J. Pauwelyn, Conflict o f  Norms in Public International Law. How WTO Law Relates to other Rules o f  
International Law (CUP, 2003), 441.
385 Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” 766-767. She defines applicable law as “the law that can 
be given (direct) effect between WTO Members... and which can be enforced by WTO adjudicating bodies.”
™  Ibid., 773.
387 Pauwelyn, Conflict o f  Norms, 492.
388 ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law, 90-91.
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2.3.1 International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement System
International law is commonly divided into two categories based on its role in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. The first and clearest category has been labelled as ‘the incorporated 
international law.’ The second, more contentious one, encompasses general principles of law, 
customary international law as well as international treaties not explicitly referred to in the WTO 
Agreement. For the purposes o f this study, this category will be referred to as “non-WTO norms” 
or “non-WTO law.” The first category consists of rules o f international law that have been 
incorporated into the WTO system by explicit reference. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) assimilating provisions o f the international intellectual property 
conventions, namely the Berne Convention of 1971, the Paris Convention o f 1967 and the Rome 
Conventions is an obvious and important example.389 Also the customary rules o f treaty 
interpretation have been incorporated into the body of WTO law through Article 3.2 of the DSU. 
These rules have been codified in the Vienna Convention on Taw of Treaties (VCLT), which has also 
been frequently referred to in the WTO jurisprudence. It is undisputed that WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body are competent to apply any incorporated international rules if a dispute requires 
them to do so. Such norms have effectively become a part o f “the corpus o f WTO law and thus 
serve as a direct source of law in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.”390 What is less clear is 
whether the incorporated rules are only those in force at the time of the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement, or whether the WTO incorporated rules also change as the actual agreements 
change.391
The relationship between the second category o f international law and the competence of the WTO 
dispute settlement system is far more complicated. In theory, non-WTO norms of international law 
could play a role in the WTO dispute settlement system in three different ways: through direct 
application, as a source of interpretative material, or as factual evidence. The following two 
paragraphs will address each o f these three possibilities. By the way of a short summary o f the main 
arguments, WTO scholars have given markedly different answers the question as to whether the 
WTO dispute settlement system may directly apply non-WTO norms.392 Influential scholars such as 
Marceau and Trachtman interpret the substantive competence o f the WTO dispute settlement 
system in a restrictive manner. In their view, the applicable law in the WTO dispute settlement is 
restricted to the covered agreements and incorporated international law. Non-WTO norms of
389 TRJPS Agreement Articles 3, 9, 15, 21 and 35.
390 M. Oesch, Standards o f  Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (OUP, 2003), 210.
391 Matsushita & al., The World Trade Organization (2nd ed.), 68. They argue that at least in the case o f the TRIPS 
Agreement, any changes to the incorporated intellectual property conventions would not be sources o f WTO law.
392 For an overview, see also A. Lindroos & M. Mehling, “Dispelling the Chimera o f ‘Self-Contained’ Regimes,” 
European Journal o f  International Law 16(5) (2006), 857.
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international law cannot be directly applied. Others, such as Pauwelyn, are advocating a more 
interactive and flexible approach to the boundaries between the WTO system and other norms of 
international law. The relevant WTO dispute settlement practice has been invoked to support both 
of the different views and the situation thus seems far from clear.393 The aim here is to give an 
overview o f the relevant scholarly debate. Given that many of the legitimacy problems forming the 
core of this study can be traced to the substantive scope and boundaries of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, the role of international environmental law in the WTO dispute resolution will 
be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 6. As it will be seen, this rather technical debate has some 
important implications for the legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system. Essentially, it 
highlights the dilemma in which the WTO dispute setdement system is caught in between the 
different components o f legitimacy: direcdy applying non-WTO norms o f international law would 
sometimes be necessary to reach a satisfactory substantive outcome, especially in linkage disputes. 
Yet, the formal competence of the WTO dispute setdement system to engage in such an exercise is 
far from clear — and venturing too far into the grey area would almost certainly irritate WTO 
Member States and surface critique based on the formal aspects of legitimacy.
2.3.2 Direct Application o f Non-WTO Rules?
A group o f influential scholars interprets the references to “covered agreements” in Articles 1.1, 7.2 
and 11 o f the DSU  as well as the wording “cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements” in DSU  Article 3.2 as clear limits to the law applicable by the 
WTO dispute setdement system. According to Marceau,
... the application (or direct effect) o f non-WTO law provisions into the WTO legal
system will always lead to an addition to or diminution o f the covered agreements.394
She thus argues that WTO adjudicating bodies are not competent either to reach any formal 
conclusions on the violation o f non-WTO norms or to require any positive action pursuant to 
them.395 In a similar vein, Trachtman argues that “the mandate to the WTO dispute resolution 
panels, to the Appellate Body, and to the Dispute Setdement Body is clear: apply (direcdy) only 
WTO law.”396 In his view, the language used in the DSU  “would be absurd if rights and obligations 
arising from other international law could be applied by the DSB.”397 What may perhaps be seen as 
the prevailing view on the relationship between the WTO system and other norms of international 
law can thus be summarised as follows:
393 Compare J. P. Trachtman, “The Domain o f the WTO Dispute Resolution,” Harvard International Law Journal, 
Spring (1999), 333 at 343; and Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” with Pauwelyn, “The Role 
o f Public International Law in the WTO,” American Journal o f  International Law 95(3) (2005), 568 et seq.
394 Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” 777.
395 Ibid., 756.
396 Trachtman, “The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution,” 342.
397 Ibid.
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WTO adjudicating bodies cannot formally interpret other treaties and customs and 
thus cannot apply or enforce other treaties or customs or determine the legal 
consequences of rights and obligations that W TO Members may have under other 
treaties or by custom; these may be examined only when necessary for the 
interpretation of WTO law and/or as a factual determination.398
There are, however, other interpretations. One of the leading WTO law textbooks explains that 
Article 11 o f the DSU  stating that panels should make such other findings as will assist the DSB in 
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements 
grants them the authority:
...to  consider all aspects o f a dispute, including those involving legal issues not 
strictly arising under a covered agreement.399
Furthermore, the textbook argues that the covered agreements do not exhaust the sources of 
relevant law but all sources mentioned in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
“are potential sources of law in WTO dispute setdement.”400 This is because the terms of this 
provision “are effectively brought into the WTO dispute setdement by Articles 3.2 and 7 o f the 
DSU.” 401 In case o f a conflict that cannot be solved through interpretation, the situation should be 
resolved using “recognized public international law interpretative tools to break the conflict.”402
In a similar vein, Pauwelyn argues that unless an international treaty by an explicit wording 
contracts out of general international law, general international law automatically applies to the 
regime created and fills gaps left by the treaty.403 He indicates that since the WTO Agreement 
contains no such “contracting out” provision, it is unnecessary for the DSU  to explicidy refer to 
general international law as a source of law: the WTO system is automatically part o f general 
international law.404 Furthermore, the last paragraph of D SU  Article 3.2 does not limit the 
competence o f the WTO dispute setdement system in terms of applicable law.405 Instead, it 
constrains the interpretative powers of the WTO dispute setdement system by setting out the limits 
of the judicial function.406 What follows is that the WTO dispute setdement system can apply but not 
enforce non-WTO rules.407 Pauwelyn makes three important points in this regard: Firsdy, the 
interplay with WTO rules and other rules o f international law will not ultimately be solved through
398 Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 753.
399 M. Matsushita & aL, The World Trade Organization. Law Practice and Policy (Ist edition, OUP, 2003), 24.
400 Ibid., 54.
401 Ibid.
402 Ib id , 74-75.
403 J. Pauwelyn, “How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-World Trade Organization Law: 
Questions o f Jurisdiction and Merits,” Journal o f  World Trade 37(6) (2003), 997 at 1001-1002.
404 Ibid.
405 Pauwelyn, “The Role o f Public International Law in the WTO,” 561. For a contrary interpretation, see Marceau, 
“WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” 771.
406 Pauwelyn, “How to Win a WTO Dispute Based on Non-WTO Law,”7003.
407 Pauwelyn, “The Role o f Public International Law in the WTO,”566.
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interpretation, but through having recourse to conflict norms such as lex posterior and lex specialis. 408 
These apply where a WTO rule interpreted in light of general international law cannot be 
reconciled with the non-WTO rule.409 Second, to apply a WTO rule in a situation where non-WTO 
rule actually prevails in accordance with conflict rules would effectively be “adding or diminishing 
obligations” prohibited by Article 3.2 of the DSU.410 In affirming the non-WTO rule the panel is 
not creating law but it is giving effect to law applicable between the WTO Members created 
elsewhere. Third, WTO rules may apply differently to different WTO members depending on 
whether they have accepted other non-WTO rules. This may complicate things but it is an 
“unavoidable consequence of not having a centralised legislator in international law.”411
There is thus a clear difference of opinion between what can perhaps be seen as the majority of 
scholars such as Marceau and Trachtman on the one hand and Pauwelyn on the other. Trachtman 
and Marceau argue that the competence o f the WTO dispute resolution system is limited to the 
covered agreements.412 Consequently, non-WTO rules of international law can only be considered 
by the WTO adjudicative bodies as interpretative material when applying W TO law, or as factual 
evidence. They emphasise that states are free to limit the WTO system this way in the material 
sense. Any ensuing problems must be dealt with through political and not judicial means. Pauwelyn, 
in turn, accepts that the jurisdiction o f the WTO dispute settlement system is limited ratione materiae 
as is its competence to enforce non-WTO rules. He also accepts that states could, in theory, 
contract out of general international law, but they have not done so in the case o f the WTO. Thus, 
the WTO was automatically bom  into the system of international law. Both the covered agreements 
and the WTO dispute settlement system are integral parts o f public international law, not closed, 
self-contained regimes.413 The WTO dispute settlement system is therefore competent to apply 
non-WTO rules where these prevail over WTO rules in accordance with conflict norms.
What, then, are the differences between the approach by Trachtman/Marceau and Pauwelyn in 
concrete terms? They all seem to agree that a genuine conflict only arises where a WTO rule, 
interpreted in light of other rules o f international law, cannot be reconciled with a non-WTO rule. 
Following Pauwelyn’s approach would mean having recourse to conflict norms. “The worst case 
scenario” in such situations would be a finding by the WTO dispute settlement system that a non-
408 Pauwelyn, Conflict o f  Norms, 327 et seq, identifying several conflict norms: 1) Lex Posterior 2) Lex Specialis
3) Particular international law prevails over general international law 4) Later custom prevails earlier treaty unless it 
can be shown that the treaty is lex specialis 5) Treaties and custom prevail over general principles o f law 6) Special 
custom prevails over general custom. 7) In some very specific circumstances it is possible that no conflict norm 
solves the situation. In such cases the adjudicator may have to pronounce a non liquet.
409 Pauwelyn, “The Role o f Public International Law in the WTO,” 577.
410 Ibid., 566.
411 Ibid., 567.
412 Answering to Pauwelyn’s argument Marceau indicates that: “The covered agreements are explicitly listed, and it 
cannot be presumed that members wanted to provide the WTO remedial system to enforce obligations and rights 
other than those listed in the WTO treaty.” Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” 777-778.
4,3 Pauwelyn, “The Role o f Public International Law in the WTO,”566.
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WTO rule prevails but that it cannot enforce such norm.414 Marceau in turn argues that where 
interpretation cannot resolve the conflict, WTO adjudicative bodies are not competent to make a 
formal finding concerning a non-WTO norm.415 According to Marceau, one of the problems with 
Pauwelyn’s approach is exacdy that it would require WTO adjudicating bodies to interpret the non- 
WTO norm to decide on its compliance or violation.416 As a court of limited jurisdiction “they 
cannot interpret and apply all treaties involving WTO Members as states.”417 As will be explained in 
Chapters 4 and 6, I am more inclined to lean towards Pauwelyn as his approach would mean 
placing international environmental law on a more equal footing with WTO norms, thereby 
acknowledging the competing claims to legitimacy by these two specialised fragments of 
international law. Yet, also Pauwelyn’s approach is somewhat challenged by the systemic 
discrepancies between WTO law and international environmental law. As it will also be seen in 
Chapter 4, the existence and contents of potentially conflicting environmental norms may not 
always be easy to define. Furthermore — as Pauwelyn righdy emphasises - even where the existence 
of valid non-WTO norms is clear, their relevance in a particular WTO dispute is questionable as 
they may apply differendy to different W TO Members depending on whether they have ratified a 
particular international agreement. To highlight the ensuing challenges to the legitimacy o f the 
WTO dispute setdement system, Chapter 6 focuses on the fragmentation o f international law and 
makes a contribution to this debate through analysing various conflict scenarios between WTO law 
and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Finally, it useful to note that the situation regarding the use of non-WTO norms is different when it 
comes to procedural rules and standards from general international law. It is widely accepted that in 
light of the D SU  and especially its Article 11, the WTO dispute setdement system is competent to 
“adopt practices and follow judicial principles to ensure that the application o f the covered 
agreements and the administration o f the dispute setdement process are done objectively.”418 It has 
also done so regarding, inter alia, the use o f private lawyers in the W TO proceedings (Bananas ZZ2),419 
in introducing the concept of burden o f proof (US-Shirts and Blousesf20 and referring to “due 
process” (Brazil-Desiccated Coconut).421 Furthermore, the WTO dispute setdement system has 
occasionally referred to scholarly writings - a source of international law mentioned in Article 38 of
414 Ibid., 565.
415 Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” 795.
416 Ibid., 111.
417 Ibid.
4,8 Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” 765. Pauwelyn specifies that international courts have 
“certain implied jurisdictional power,” to decide all matters linked to the exercise o f their substantive jurisdiction. 
Pauwelyn, Conflicts o f  Norms, 447-448.
419 Appellate Body report, EC-Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 
September 1997, para. 10. (EC-Bananas III).
420 Appellate Body report, US-Measures Affecting Imports o f  Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from  India, 
WT7DS33/AB/R, 25 April 1997, para. 14.
421 Appellate Body report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, 20 March 1997, para. 
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the Statute of the ICJ but not in the DSU.422 To my mind, this reinforces the argument that the WTO 
cannot “live outside its legal environment.”423
2.3.3 Non-WTO Rules in W TO Jurisprudence
As stated above, the W TO dispute setdement practice concerning substantive non-WTO norms 
has been cited both as supporting the narrow view on its substantive limits as well as the opposite 
conclusion. According to Oesch, “panels and the Appellate Body have not yet developed a 
consistent practice in this respect.”424 This paragraph reviews the existing case law. It briefly refers 
to the linkage cases where relevant and discusses some of the “non-linkage” cases in more detail. 
The subsequent Chapters contain a detailed analysis of the way in which WTO dispute setdement 
system has approached customary law, general principles of law as well as international agreements, 
when solving linkage disputes, most notably the Shrimp-Turtle, Hormones and Biotech cases.
In the Argentina -  Footwear dispute the question was whether a three percent statistical tax that had 
been found to violate the G A T T  could be justified by reference to a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between Argentina and the IMF. The MoU stated that Argentina should 
adopt fiscal measures such as increases in import duties, including a temporary three per cent 
surcharge on imports. The Appellate Body found that it was not possible to determine the “precise 
legal nature of this Memorandum” and also that “Argentina did not show an irreconcilable conflict 
between the provisions of its Memorandum o f Understanding with the IMF and the provisions of 
Article VIII o f the G A T T  1994.”425 Therefore, the purported agreement between Argentina and the 
IMF did not modify Argentina's WTO obligations.426
For Pauwelyn, the Appellate Body applied here a conflict rule, namely that on the basis o f the
Declaration on the Relationship of the WTO with the IMF, their relationship is governed by the GATT.
For this reason, only exceptions provided in the G A TT 1947 could be used to justify violations,
and not independent IMF rules such as the Argentinean MoU. Pauwelyn thus stresses that:
If  the Appellate Body had thought the IMF memorandum could not possibly cure 
the violation o f G A T T  Article VIII simply because the memorandum is not part of 
WTO covered agreements, it could have said so. But it did not. Rather, it assessed 
whether the IM F memorandum conflicts with G A TT  rules and considered which of the two rules 
should prevail in case a conflict arises." 427
422 On this, see e.g. Matsushita & al., The World Trade Organization. Law Practice and Policy, (1st ed.), 66.
423 Abi-Saab, “The WTO Dispute Settlement and General International Law,” 10.
424 Oesch, Standards o f  Review, 218.
425 Appellate Body report, Argentina -  Measures Affecting Imports o f  Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, 
WT/DS56/AB/R, 27 March 1998, para. 69.
426 Ibid, para. 72.
427 Pauwelyn, “The Role o f Public International Law in the WTO,” 568-69. Emphasis added. For comparison, see 
Trachtman, “The Domain o f the WTO Dispute Resolution,” 343.
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Another example o f a WTO dispute where a non-WTO treaty has been relevant is the E C  —Poultry.
The Oilseed Agreement had been concluded between the European Communities and Brazil in the
context of renegotiations under Article XXVIII of the G ATT.428 Brazil, as the claimant, invoked
this bilateral treaty arguing that it applied to the dispute. When discussing the legal relevance of the
Oilseed Agreement, the AB examined its status in relation to the covered agreements, concluding that
it was not one of them.429 It then stated that:
... the Oilseeds Agreement may serve as supplementary means o f interpretation of 
Schedule LXXX pursuant to Article 32 o f the Vienna Convention as it is part o f the 
historical background o f the concessions of the European Communities for frozen 
poultry meat." 430
The AB then added that:
... it is not necessary to have recourse to Article 59.1 or Article 30.3 o f the Vienna 
Convention, because the text o f the WTO Agreement and the legal arrangements 
governing the legal transition from the G A T T  1947 to the WTO resolve the issue of 
the relationship between Schedule LXXX and the Oilseeds Agreement in this 
case”431
It is thus clear that the Appellate Body did not apply the Oilseeds Agreement itself as law, a point that 
has been stressed by Trachtman as evidencing the limited scope o f the WTO dispute settlement 
system.432 However, Pauwelyn argues that the outcome may have been different had the Oilseed 
Agreement been invoked as a defence, rather than as a claim, and had the relationship between the 
Agreement and the relevant G A TT  rules not been addressed in the WTO Agreement itself.433
In the EC-Bananas III case the question arose concerning the scope o f the Lome Waiver that
permitted the EU to derogate from the most-favoured nation principle by granting preferential
treatment to goods originating from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The
substantive question concerned the meaning o f the Lame Convention, in other words, whether the
EU’s preferential treatment of bananas originating from ACP countries was required by the Lome
Convention. The panel indicated, and the Appellate Body affirmed, that since reference to the Lome
Convention was incorporated into the Lome waiver,
...the meaning of the Lome Convention became a GATT/W TO issue, at least to 
that extent. Thus, we have no alternative but to examine the provisions of the Lome 
Convention ourselves in so far as it is necessary to interpret the Lome waiver."434
428 Appellate Body report, European Communities -  Measures Affecting the Importation o f  Certain Poultry Products, 
WT/DS69/AB/R, 13 July 1998, para. 83. Emphasis in the original.
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The expression “we have no alternative” seems to imply a restrained attitude towards the 
application of instruments of international law other than the covered agreements. However, as it 
will be discussed in much more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, in its Shrimp-Turtle decision the AB 
referred to several international environmental instruments but their exact legal relevance remains 
somewhat unclear. The Biotech panel then elaborated on these questions and the most plausible 
conclusion is that environmental norms have not been directly applied in the WTO dispute 
setdement. Yet, as it will be seen in the next paragraph, the question remains whether they were 
relevant as legal norms or as factual evidence.
The previous cases have dealt with non-WTO treaty norms. In addition, there is some practice
relating to other sources of public international law, focusing mainly on customary law and general
principles of law. As it was seen above, these sources have not been mentioned in the DSU.
However, the WTO jurisprudence indicates that such sources have some relevance in the WTO
system. The WTO panels as well as the Appellate Body have sometimes referred to, and applied,
general principles o f international law.435 The Appellate Body has also referred to also such articles
of the V C LT  that have not been explicidy referred to in the covered agreements.436 Presumably,
their application has thus been based on their status as either general principles o f law or customary
law.437 Also the statement by the panel in the Korea-Govemment Procurement dispute seemed to
indicate that customary international law is relevance in the W TO system:
We take note that Article 3.2 of the D SU  requires that we seek within the context o f 
a particular dispute to clarify the existing provisions o f the WTO agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation o f public international law. 
However, the relationship o f the WTO Agreements to customary international law 
is broader than this. Customary international law applies generally to economic
relations between the WTO Members. Such international law applies to the extent
that the WTO treaty agreements do not 'contract out' from it. To put it another way, 
to the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered 
WTO agreement that implies differendy, we are o f the view that customary rules of 
international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process o f treaty formation 
under the WTO. 438
In fact, the Biotech panel explicidy confirmed the relevance o f customary law and general principles 
of law in the WTO dispute setdement. These questions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
4. To fully grasp the problematique, we will now consider the two other possibilities for non-WTO 
rules to be considered during WTO proceedings.
435 Oesch, Standards o f  Review, 216. According to Oesch, these include the principle o f lex specialis, presumption 
against conflicts, the rule o f non-retroactive application o f a provisions and the principle o f good faith.
436 Ib id , 218-219.
437 Ibid
438 Panel report on Korea -  Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS/163/R, 1 May 2000, para. 7.96.
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2.3.4 Non-WTO Rules in Interpretation and as Factual Evidence
What is readily accepted by the WTO scholarship is that non-WTO rules of international law play a 
role in the WTO dispute settlement system through interpretation. This is in conformity with the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation and more specifically Article 31.3(c) of the V C L T  providing 
that:
There shall be taken into account, together with the context... any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.439
For Marceau, this provisions servers to attain a degree o f coherence in international law and helps
to remedy some of the problems arising out o f the limited substantive applicability o f non-WTO
law in the dispute settlement system:
The WTO Agreement, as with any other treaty, should be interpreted taking into 
account other relevant and applicable rules o f international law, including human 
rights law. In this context, it should be generally be possible to interpret WTO 
provisions in a way that allows and encourages WTO Members to respect all their 
international law obligations.440
Some scholars have also advocated interpretations of WTO law that take into account international
law norms pertaining, for instance, human rights and the environment. While attractive, there are
some important problems concerning this approach. The key stumbling block with this otherwise
promising approach is that while there seems to be consensus that relevant rules o f international
law must be taken into account in the interpretation o f WTO law, it is far less clear what constitutes
such “relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”441 Are they
only such rules that are binding on all WTO Member States? Or are they rules that are binding on
the parties to a particular dispute? The first interpretation would mean that the practical relevance
of this option is very limited:
.. .the more WTO members we have, the less relevant rules we can refer to. Because 
there are more WTO members, there will be less ‘other rules’ that are binding on all 
WTO members.442
A third possibility for non-WTO rules to play a role in the WTO dispute setdement system is for 
them to be used as facts or evidence in the WTO proceedings. This option also enjoys considerable 
scholarly support, but there is no clear answer to the question as to when non-WTO rules of 
international law count as ‘relevant rules’ of international law, and when they should be considered 
as factual evidence. Legally speaking there is an important difference between the two approaches.
439 According to Marceau, Article 31 o f the VCLT thus sometimes requires the panels and the AB to take into 
account outside legal materials. G. Marceau, “A Call for Coherence in International Law: Praises for the Prohibition 
Against ‘Clinical Isolation’ in WTO Dispute Settlement System,” Journal o f  World Trade 33(5) (1999), 87 at 108.
440 Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” 785-86.
441 For discussion see, ibid., 780-783; and Matsushita & al., The World Trade Organization. Law Practice and Policy 
(1st ed.), 71 etseq.
442 J. Pauwelyn, “Speech Delivered at the Fourth Annual WTO Conference,” in M. Andeas & F. Ortino, eds., WTO 
Law and Process (BIICL, 2005), 494.at 496.
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When a non-WTO norm is being invoked as factual evidence and not as a legal right or an 
obligation, it means that the evidence can also be overturned by more convincing materials 
presented by the other party.443 Oesch has attempted to create a basic distinction that:
.. .systematically irrelevant bilateral treaties should be dealt with as questions o f fact 
whereas systematically significant multilateral treaties, as well as general international 
law, should be treated as questions of law.444
According to Pauwelyn, a classic example would be a situation where all parties to a WTO dispute 
were not parties to the same multilateral environmental agreement, but the provisions o f the 
environmental agreement could be considered as factual evidence.445 A practical example from the 
WTO jurisprudence is from the Shrimp-Turtle case, where the Appellate Body noted the reference by 
the Article 21.5 panel to the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles as 
follows:
The panel righdy used the Inter-American Convention as a factual reference in this 
exercise o f comparison446
However, the WTO dispute setdement practice again leaves some questionmarks, many of which
will be addressed in detail in Chapters 4 and 6. There is no question that panels and the AB have
referred to several non-WTO norms and instruments in various cases such as The EC-Poultry,
Argentina-Footivear and Bananas III. However, it is not clear whether they direcdy applied such
norms, used them as ‘relevant rules’ to guide the interpretation o f WTO law or merely referred
them as factual evidence. Also in the EC-Certain Computer Equipment the Appellate Body criticised
the panel for not having considered the Harmonised Commodity and Coding System to properly interpret
the relevant Schedule, even though the parties had not invoked the Harmonised System.447 In Korean
Beef the panel examined various bilateral agreements between Korea and the disputing parties.44* It
did so not in order to enforce the content o f these bilateral agreements, but to interpret an
ambiguous WTO provision, i.e. an entry into Korea’s Schedule.449 In US-Cotton Safeguard rules on
state responsibility - binding upon WTO members to the extent that they are customary law - were
referred to as a relevant benchmark for the interpretation o f WTO law.450 The AB indicated that:
Our view is supported further by the rules o f general international law on state 
responsibility, which require the countermeasure in response to breaches by states 
of their international obligations be commensurate with the injury suffered.451
443 Pauwelyn, Conflict o f  Norms, 463-464.
444 Oesch, Standards o f  Review, 225 et seq.
445 Pauwelyn, Conflict o f  Norms, 463.
446 Appellate Body report, US-Import Prohibition o f  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 
o f  the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, 22 October 2001, para. 122.
447 Appellate Body report, European Communities -Custom Classification o f  Certain Computer Equipment, 
WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, 5 June 1998, paras. 74-99.
448 Panel report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports o f  Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS61/R, WT/DS69/R, 
10 January 2001, paras. 539 et seq.
449 Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,” l ib .
450 Ibid., 774-775
451 Appellate Body report, United State Transnational Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from  Pakistan, 
WT/DS192/AB7R, 5 November 2001, para. 120.
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Not surprisingly, the question of interpreting WTO law in light o f other relevant rules of
international law has also come up in the key linkage disputes. In the Shrimp-Turtle case, one of the
most notable features o f the Appellate Body’s decision was the way in which it referred to both
international environmental agreements as well as general principles o f international law when
interpreting G A TT  Article XX. But, as it will be seen in Chapter 4, some of these references are
confusing and bring to the fore important questionmarks. For instance, the Appellate Body referred
to the Convention on biological Diversity to which the U.S. is not a party. Similarly, in the GSP case the
AB referred to drug conventions without checking whether they were binding on the parties to the
dispute.452 Pauwelyn admits that this practice o f circumventing the consensus risks “upsetting the
sovereignty o f states” 453 but:
.. .advantage o f what the Appellate Body is doing is that it avoids the strictures of 
the consent rule. This may be positive in certain way, e.g. it permits a ‘living’, 
adaptable WTO treaty, it permits panels to interpret WTO rules with reference to 
other agreements more like some kind o f a public law entity where you refer to 
societal values you interpret.454
Given the prevailing scholarly opinion that non-WTO rules cannot be directly applied in the WTO 
dispute settlement system, and the hopes that interpretation could provide consistency, we will 
revisit this question several times in Chapter 4. Related problems will also be addressed in Chapter 
6 when reflecting the findings o f this study in light of prospective conflicts between the WTO 
regime and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The analysis 
carried out so far has demonstrated the key substantive limits to the WTO dispute setdement 
system. First, according to the mainstream scholarly view, it cannot direcdy apply non-WTO norms 
of international law. Second, while it is clear that it should take such norms into account when 
interpreting WTO law if they are relevant, it is not clear when non-WTO rules o f international law 
are to be considered relevant.
2.4 Linkage D isputes and Limits o f the WTO D ispute Settlem ent System
In the scholarly debate, a range of opinions has been put forward concerning the role of WTO 
dispute setdement system in solving linkage disputes. At one extreme, Dunoff has suggested that 
the WTO adjudicating bodies should refuse decide any such disputes. In his view, such disputes are 
too political and therefore incapable of judicial resolution at the WTO. The more moderate stance 
taken by scholars such as Jackson and Marceau highlights the limits o f the WTO dispute setdement 
system, arguing that while it cannot achieve ambitious results in fields not covered by WTO law, it
452 Pauwelyn, “Fourth Annual WTO Conference,” 497.
453 Ibid.
454 Ibid., 498.
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must consider such disputes and evolve and apply WTO law in conformity with other norms of 
international law. Finally, scholars such as Petersmann have raised ideas that would seem to have 
the practical effect o f expanding the scope o f the WTO dispute setdement to fields such as human 
rights law.
2.4.1 Main Views in the Scholarly Debate
One of the most provocative arguments limiting the role and scope o f the WTO dispute setdement 
system in linkage disputes has been put forward by Dunoff. Relying strongly on the distinction 
between legal and political questions as well as the corresponding divide between legislative and 
adjudicative functions, D unoff argues that the WTO dispute setdement system should refuse to 
decide linkage dispute. He argues that linkage disputes are political in a fundamental sense. This is 
because they challenge the traditional rationale of the world trade liberafcation system.455 Linkage 
problems, such as the relationship between trade and environmental protection are contested in a 
very profound way, effectively moving them from the legal domain and placing them “squarely in 
the political domain.”456 The WTO dispute setdement system is ill-equipped as an institution to deal 
with linkage problems and therefore, it is not appropriate for the WTO dispute setdement organs 
to weigh and balance the relevant interests involved. 457 Doing so would seriously undermine the 
legitimacy o f the WTO dispute resolution system.458 The case for judicial caution is even more 
compelling in the WTO than in the domestic courts because of the acute lack o f democratic 
legitimacy in the WTO dispute setdement system.459 Also, due to the depth o f the controversy 
applying any nuanced tests in a consistent manner would not be possible. 460 D unoff argues that 
linkage problems are such that:
...they cannot be solved by more artful treaty language, or better reasoned panel 
reports -  indeed these sorts o f 'trade and' conflicts persist even where there is 
specific treaty language apparendy resolving the issue.461
In his view, “it would be politically naive to urge WTO panels to 'struggle openly' with the value 
conflicts raised by 'trade and' issues.”462 The WTO dispute setdement system “should not be 
expected to ignore the political costs that accompany the unsatisfactory resolution o f 'trade and' 
disputes.”463 For these reasons, the WTO dispute setdement system should, according to Dunoff,
455 J. L. Dunoff, “The Death o f the Trade Regime,” European Journal o f  International Law (10)4 (1999), 733 at 733- 
734.
456 Ibid., 754-755.
457 Ibid., 754.
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid.,'758.
460 Ibid., 755.
461 Ibid., 756.
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid., 761.
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adopt a highly constrained role and resort to the “passive virtues o f judicial function” deferring 
linkage questions to be decided by other means. 464
At the other end, there are proposals that would seem to have the practical effect of expanding the
role and scope of the WTO dispute setdement system. As we have seen in Chapter 1, Petersmann
has put forward ideas concerning the role of the WTO in creating “woddwide integration law” that
takes after the European Union; sets up a constitutional regime along the lines of Kantian ideals;
and promotes human rights as well as solidarity sharing of the benefits and social adjustment costs
of global integration.465 According to Petersmann, the UN human rights law and WTO rules offer
“mutually beneficial synergies for rendering human rights law and the social functions and
democratic legitimacy of the emerging global integration law more effective.”466 He points to the
fact that all 189 UN member states have committed themselves to inalienable human rights as part
of general international law.467 Even though the DSU  does not explicidy refer to human rights, they
form part of the “context” for the interpretation of the law of worldwide organizations and may
thus be important in interpreting the general exceptions under Article XX of G A TT  as well as other
provisions relating to guarantees o f freedom, non-discrimination, property rights, individual access
to courts and 'necessity' requirements for safeguarding measures to protect 'public interests' and
human rights.468 In other words,
The universal recognition o f human rights requires us to construe the numerous 
public interest clauses in WTO law in conformity with the human rights 
requirement that individual freedom and non-discrimination may be restricted only 
to the extent necessary for protecting other human rights. The non-discrimination 
and 'necessity' requirements in the 'general exceptions' of WTO law (e.g. in Article 
XX of GATT and Article XTV of GATS) reflect these human rights principles. 
WTO law gives clear priority to the sovereign tight to restrict trade if this is 
necessary for the protection o f human rights.469
Petersmann has also mentioned the W TO Ministerial Declaration according to which the TRIPS 
Agreement should be interpreted in a manner that supports the WTO members' right to protect 
public health. 470 Moreover, to Petersmann, the Shrimp-Turtle decision “confirmed that import 
restrictions may be justifiable under WTO law for protecting human rights not only inside the 
importing country but also in other countries on the high seas.”471
464 Ibid.,757. Dunoff has also suggested that trade-environment issues should be moved to a forum expressly designed 
to address them. Arguing that trade-environment issues are on the whole ill-suited for adjudication, Dunoff has also 
been in favour o f a facilitative approach, mediation and negotiations. See J. L. Dunoff, “Institutional Misfits: the 
GATT, the ICJ and Trade-Environment Disputes,” Michigan Journal o f  International Law ” 15 (1994), 1043 at 1107 
et seq.
465 Petersmann, “Time for United Nations 'Global Compact,” 623.
456 Ibid., 632.
467 Ibid., 633.
468 Ibid.
469 Ibid., 645.
470 Ibid. See also WTO Ministerial Declaration, 4 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, para. 4.
471 Petersmann, “Time for United Nations 'Global Compact,” 645.
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However, Petersmann’s recent writings seem to be taking a more moderate stance. Referring to
reports by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights calling for a human approach to free
trade and emphasising the relevance human rights in the interpretation o f international economic
agreements, Petersmann notes that:
Due to their limited trade policy mandate, WTO bodies have, hitherto, not 
responded to UN proposals for a ‘human rights approach to trade.’ As national 
human rights, democratic and constitutional traditions differ legitimately among 
states, and as long as UN human rights conventions refrain from protecting welfare- 
creation through freedom o f profession and trade it appears unrealistic to expect 
WTO members to reach agreement on the complex inter-relationship between 
human rights and WTO rules.472
Also many other scholars have taken a position the can be seen as more moderate than the two
extremes described above. Legal arguments by scholars such as Marceau and Trachtman were
discussed in detail in Section 2.3. Reflecting a similar ethos, Jackson points to the:
...delicate interplay between the Dispute Settlement process on the one hand, and 
the possibilities or difficulties o f negotiating new treaty texts or making decisions by 
the organization that are authorized by the Uruguay Round text on the other 
hand.473
He indicates that there are a number o f checks and balances built into the WTO system during the 
Uruguay Round, such as Article IX of the WTO ^Agreement on decision-making and Article X on 
amendment as well as provisions concerning decisions, waivers, and formal interpretations.474 
Given the constraints on the use o f these instruments, Jackson sees a temptation to try to use the 
dispute settlement system to clarify ambiguous treaty provisions and fill gaps.475 In his view, 
however,
...there are indications that the Dispute Settlement system cannot and should not 
carry much o f the weight of formulating either by way o f filling gaps in the existing 
agreements, or by setting forth norms which carry the organization into totally new 
territory such as competition policy or labour standards.476
One solution envisaged by Jackson regarding linkage issues such as investment, competition policy 
or environmental protection, could be the use o f optional plurilateral agreements (WTO Annex 4) - 
although even these could be blocked by the consensus rule required for their adoption’477 
However, it would be better to look for ways out o f the consensus problem rather than attempt to
472 E.-U. Petersmann, “Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism,” in Joerges 
& Petersmann (2006), 5 at 22.
473 Jackson, “Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems,” 345.
474 Ibid., 345-346.
475 Ibid., 346.
476 Ibid., 347.
477 Ibid., 348.
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solve linkage problems through the WTO dispute settlement system.478 Jackson hopes that some of 
his detailed practical suggestions would achieve the goal of:
... allowing measures to go forward short o f unanimity or total consensus, but at 
the same time protecting some sort o f ultimate and 'vital sense' the right and power 
of every member o f the WTO to object in (hopefully) only those very few cases 
where it felt it was so strongly important to its vital national interests that it would 
refrain from blocking the consensus.479
In other words, the temptation to use adjudication should be avoided in favour of deference to 
national governments while at the same time developing practical means for overcoming the 
problems of the WTO legislative process.
The picture that emerges from the scholarly debate is that a wide range of views exists on the 
potential to solve linkage dispute through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In this regard, a 
connection probably exists between the ambitiousness o f the proposed mandate for the WTO 
dispute settlement system and the scholars’ views on free trade and the WTO in general. For 
Dunoff, who is arguably more oriented towards environmental issues than free trade, the WTO 
dispute setdement system is not the appropriate forum for deciding linkage disputes. Those very 
much ‘inside’ the trade circles, such as Marceau and Jackson, seem to have faith in the ability o f the 
WTO dispute setdement system to deal with politically sensitive issues as such, but want to avoid a 
situation where such questions hamper the overall functioning of the trade regime. Petersmann, in 
turn, is known for his rather ambitious proposals concerning the ‘human right to free trade’ and the 
connection that he sees between Kantian philosophy, individual freedom and the international 
trade regime. For him, the question is therefore how the WTO dispute setdement system could be 
used to advance such ideals.
The argument here is that the debate about the limits of the WTO dispute setdement system points 
to a dilemma caused by the political pressure to consider non-trade values and interests on one 
hand, and to respect the substantive and formal boundaries o f the WTO dispute setdement system 
on the other. The discussion in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 shows that what most scholars conceive as 
limits o f the WTO dispute setdement system derive from two key sources. First, its jurisdiction 
ratione materiae is limited and it cannot entertain claims made based on non-WTO norms. For many 
scholars, also its competence to apply non-WTO norms is restricted: the WTO dispute setdement 
system can only take non-WTO norms into account through the customary rules o f treaty 
interpretation, in other words, by interpreting WTO law in light o f ‘other relevant rules’ or by 
referring to them as factual evidence. Second, D SU  Article 3.2 contains a provision that points to
478 Ibid., 349. Here Jackson suggests that it might be feasible to develop certain practices about consensus that would 
lead WTO members to restrain themselves from blocking a consensus in certain circumstances.
479 Ibid., 351.
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the limits of the judicial function to apply the law as opposed to making the law. It indicates that 
the WTO dispute settlement bodies cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations contained 
in the covered agreements. However, as it will be seen in Chapter 3 and 4, the growing awareness 
of the link between international trade liberalisation and other policy fields has increased pressures 
on the WTO dispute settlement bodies to “import substantive legitimacy,”480 in other words, to 
increasingly consider non-trade values and such rules o f international law that give expression to 
such values. The ensuing dilemma is closely related to the limits to the scope of the WTO dispute 
settlement system and the questions o f social/ substantive and formal/procedural legitimacy that are 
central to this study. From that perspective, it is important to note that the visions neither Dunoff 
or Petersmann are cost-free: the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system will be 
challenged whether it refuses to decide linkage disputes, as proposed by Dunoff, or chooses to 
advocate a human rights approach to free trade or an ambitious global integration agenda. In fact, it 
appears that the legitimacy dilemma facing the WTO dispute setdement system looks like a two- 
headed dragon: any attempts to tame the substantive legitimacy challenges immediately alerts the 
second head, which guards the formal dimension of legitimacy. These questions will be discussed 
in depth in the second part o f the study.
480 This expression was used by professor F. Snyder when commenting on my work at the LSE Law Department’s 
Ph.D. seminar.
3. The WTO, Environment and the Problem of 
‘Linkages’
This Chapter argues that the increasing specialisation o f international law underlies many o f the 
WTO dispute settlement system’s legitimacy challenges. Since World War II, international law has 
evolved significandy. The number o f international agreements has multiplied and many o f them 
focus on a specific topic, such as trade, environment, human rights, law of the sea or humanitarian 
law. All this has resulted in the functional fragmentation of international law and the birth o f 
specialised legal regimes.481 Without a doubt, the international trade regime is amongst the strongest 
and most advanced international legal regimes. This Chapter describes briefly how the regime has 
evolved since the 1940s and shifted especially after the Uruguay Round from its original focus on 
trade barriers towards the idea o f harmonisation. This has blurred the boundaries between 
international trade and other policy fields, highlighting that there are no “natural” or “inherent” 
limits to the WTO system. The previous Chapter described how the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle 
disputes challenged the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system. This Chapter expands 
this image, showing how they also prompted a policy debate concerning the scope and function of 
the WTO regime, and its “linkages” with non-trade objectives. The question is essentially whether 
the WTO should focus on fair trade and harmonisation in areas such as environmental protection 
and labour standards, or embrace regulatory diversity as an essential element o f free trade. These 
questions were debated especially before launching the Doha Development Round of negotiations, 
which excludes, however, most linkage issues, apart from a limited mandate on environmental 
issues.
Especially since the 1970s, international environmental law has evolved rapidly in parallel with 
international trade law. Even if the prominent notion of sustainable development links their subject 
matters together, the two spheres of international law have existed largely in isolation of each other. 
There are also important differences. Especially in terms of institutions and enforcement 
mechanisms, the trade regime is more developed than the environmental one. Most notably for the 
topic of this study, there are no corresponding dispute settlement mechanisms like the WTO 
dispute settlement system in the field of international environmental. The argument here is that 
such institutional features are partly responsible for the legitimacy challenges that form the focus o f 
this study. The W TO dispute settlement system is often the only judicial forum available for settling 
disputes involving linkages between trade and environmental protections. Its role in solving
481ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law, 10 et seq.
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sensitive conflicts is further highlighted by the slow progress in the political track and the narrow 
mandate by WTO negotiators to solve these issues during the Doha Round.
3.1. From Free Trade to Fair Trade?
The origins o f the international trade regime lie in the Bretton Woods Conference, held in July 
1944 in New Hampshire where the allied powers met to create a new institutional framework for 
international economic relations and reconstruction after the World War II. They agreed to 
establish the IMF to administer international financial flows, and the World Bank (in other words, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) to provide funding for post-war 
reconstruction and developing countries. The Bretton Woods conference also contemplated the 
creation o f a third institution, namely the International Trade Organization (ITO). The proposed 
agenda of the ITO was ambitious and covered issues such as employment and economic policy, 
economic development and post-war reconstruction, as well as trade in commodities. However, the 
ITO failed to materialise due to opposition from the U.S. As Barfield describes, President Truman 
first held back the ITO Charter and then withdrew it from congressional consideration in 1950.482 
An international system was nevertheless created for liberalising trade in goods through the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The G A TT  was negotiated in 1947 as an interim arrangement and 
provisionally applied pending the adoption of the ITO Charter.483 This period o f ‘provisional 
application’ came to last for nearly half a century, until the WTO was finally created in the 
beginning o f 1995.
Initially, the international trading system focused on the removal o f tariff barriers. The G A TT 1947 
consisted o f a number of general clauses drawn mainly from the draft ITO Charter; including key 
principles such as the Most Favoured Nation principle (Article I) and national treatment 
requirement for imported products (Article III). It also contained schedules with thousands of 
reciprocal tariff commitments.484 The regime evolved through eight rounds o f trade negotiations. 
The first round in 1947 involved only 23 countries, while the second in 1949 had 49 participants. 
By the time the Uruguay Round was launched in 1986, the number o f G A TT  Contracting Parties 
had increased to 103, and in 1994, the WTO Agreement was ratified by 128 countries. As o f the 
summer o f 2008, the number of WTO Members had increased to 153. Prior to the Uruguay Round, 
the most important talks included the Kennedy Round (1963-67) and the Tokyo Round (1973-79). 
The Kennedy Round was significant in that it employed a linear, across-the-board approach to 
tariff reductions instead o f the previous line-by-line approach.485 It also addressed non-tariff
482 C. E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy (AEI Press, 2001), 21.
m Ibid.
™ Ibid.
485 Jones, Who's Afraid o f  the WTO, 69.
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barriers through the anti-dumping code, and introduced trade preferences for developing 
countries.486 The Tokyo Round continued to apply the across-the-board tariff approach, and 
broadened the agenda both in terms of non-tariff issues and developing country preferences.487 
However, given the growing membership and expanding agenda, the Tokyo Round resulted in 
fragmentation and numerous codes on subsidies, product standards, government procurement, 
custom valuation and so on. 488 Countries could then adhere formally to the core G A T T  and 
participate in the codes a la carte. 489
The Uruguay Round marked an important turning point. It resulted in a ‘single undertaking,’ 
established the W TO and strengthened the dispute resolution mechanism. It also expanded the 
substantive reach of the system. Increasing attention was now given to non-tariff barriers and 
matters of domestic regulation, such as trade remedies, agricultural subsidies and intellectual 
property.490 The outcome thus included agreements on trade in services {General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, GATS), trade-related investment measures (Trade-Related Investment Measures, TRIMs) and 
intellectual property (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPS). Their 
inclusion into the GATT/W TO regime was not without controversy.491 This is particularly true for 
intellectual property rights, which has been critici2ed as a subject matter that should not have been 
dealt with under the umbrella o f the WTO but which ended there due to intensive lobbying by the 
American pharmaceutical and entertainment industries.492 The Uruguay Round outcome also 
included the TBT  and SPS Agreements, which also focus on non-discriminatory trade barriers. Thus, 
the argument has been made that as a result of these developments, the regulatory philosophy 
underlying the international trade regime experienced a fundamental shift from the elimination of 
discrimination towards the far more ambitious idea of harmonization.493
In the aftermath o f the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, environmental groups took an interest in the final 
moments of the Uruguay Round negotiations and had some influence on outcome. The preamble 
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO Agreement) recognized the 
relevance of environmental protection and provided that WTO Members would pursue their 
various economic objectives:
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.. .while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the 
objective o f sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment an to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with 
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.
In addition, the Uruguay Round Decision of 14 April 1994 refers to environmental protection 
indicating that,
...there should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction between upholding 
and safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading 
system on the one hand, and acting for the protection of the environment, and the 
promotion of sustainable development on the other.
To make the Uruguay Round results operational, the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment
(CTE) was established in January 1995.494 The CTE has addressed a host o f topics relevant to the
trade and environment dilemma. These have included eco-taxes, product standards, processes and
production standards, eco-labelling schemes, packaging regulations, handling requirements,
economic policy instruments, safeguard measures as well as multilateral environmental
agreements.495 It has been argued that the CTE:
.. .has provided a valuable forum for discussions on reconciling environmental and 
WTO treaty obligations and other crossover issues. However, it has not produced 
concrete proposals for trade policy reform to enforce or promote environmental 
goals because it has no institutional mandate to do so. 496
In sum, the incorporation o f new subject matters, such as intellectual property, and the recognition 
of the relevance of certain non-trade policies, such as environmental protection, had very important 
implications on the WTO. It blurred the boundaries between trade and other policy areas, and 
made the tension between trade and some other policy goals is more explicit than ever before.497 
Thus, while the new WTO regime seemed relatively well-equipped to handle questions concerning 
international trade - how about its relationship with questions such as environment, human health, 
labour rights and so on?
3.1.1 The Linkage Debate
Already during the post-World War II era it was contemplated that some compatibly problems 
could arise between international trade liberalisation and other policy objectives. Article XX of the 
G ATT, entitled "General Exceptions," thus justifies derogations inter alia, where “necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health”498 or to implement measures relating to the
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conservation o f exhaustible natural resources.”499 However, in the 1940s it was certainly not 
foreseen that the link between trade liberalisation and other policy fields would once play such a 
prominent role as it currendy does.
The dilemma known as the “linkage problem” or the “trade and” question embraces policy fields
such as environmental protection, human rights, labour standards, competition policy and
investment rules.500 The academic foundations o f the linkage debate are contained in the two
volumes of Fair Trade and Harmonization. Prerequisites for Free Trade? edited by Bhagwati and Hudec in
the mid-1990s. Their focus is on:
.. .areas in which differences in national domestic policies seem to be causing the 
most significant problems in international trade relations — environmental policy, 
labor policy, and competition (or antitrust) policy. In each of these areas, some 
governments have adopted rigorous regulation o f private behaviour, while others 
impose only weak or nonexistent regulation. The policy differences that exist in 
these three areas have become a major point o f friction in the trade relations 
between developed and developing countries, although they also create certain 
problems between developed countries as well.501
These books thus examine various arguments calling for the international harmonisation of 
standards in the name of fair trade. Several factors can be identified as having motivated such 
demands. In the case o f labour standards, both moral concerns over the well-being o f employees in 
poor developing countries and fears for lower salaries and unemployment in industrialised countries 
motivate such initiatives. Also environmentalists have been anxious about a “race to the bottom,” 
namely the lowering o f environmental standards in industrialised countries as a result of 
competition, as well as about global and local environmental problems caused by low or non­
existent standards in developing countries. However, many o f the papers contained in the 
Bhagwati and Hudec books are critical of the idea of harmonization and support the argument that 
the diversity of standards is legitimate as it reflects differences in fundamentals across countries.502 
Others, however, argue that the inclusion of environmental and social issues, such as labour 
standards, is the inevitable next step in the journey that began with tariffs and continued to services 
and intellectual property.503 Thus:
Once it is agreed that the harmonization of technical regulations and sanitary 
measures and more effective global protection o f intellectual property are necessary 
to create an orderly market, there is no objective reason not to extend the 
harmonization effort, in the long term at least, to other market-related areas such as
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competition policy, public procurement, foreign investment, labour standards, 
environmental protection and consumer protection.504
Some insist that the WTO should focus on core issues of international trade liberali2ation. Yet 
others question any implicit or explicit assumptions about the “true nature” of the WTO or its 
“inherent limits,” arguing that there are no “natural borders” for the WTO but it is necessary to 
consider political realities ask which linkages would work in practice.505 There is thus no evident 
consensus on the subject matters that should be dealt with by the WTO and on ones that should 
remain outside its realm. In the aftermath o f the Seattle demonstrations where linkage issues played 
an important role, the American Society of International Law organised a symposium on the 
boundaries o f the WTO inviting contributions from leading W TO scholars. To illustrate the key 
elements o f the linkage debate the following summarises the key positions.
According to Jackson, the linkage problem is one o f the key challenges to the WTO. One o f the 
reasons is that there are no inherent or logical limits to GATT/W TO system.506 Even if the G A T T  
originally focused on tariffs, by the 1970s, it was already turning to “non-tariff barriers,” that were 
addressed, for instance, during the Tokyo Round through the Subsidies Code and the Technical 
Barriers Code.507 For Jackson, the ultimate question is therefore about sovereignty and subsidiarity, 
in other words, “the tough question o f allocation of power.”508 Where should the decisions be 
made? In the WTO, at the national level or in some other inter-governmental organi2ation? 
Through negotiations or by a judicial body?509 Using competition policy as an example, Jackson 
offers a list o f further questions to assist in finding the answer: Does something need to be done? 
Can it be done by national governments? If not, is there already an international institution in 
existence? What are the dangers and costs o f handling the issues, for instance, in terms o f fairness 
and democracy?510 He suggests that issues such as competition policy could also be addressed by 
setting up a forum independent of the WTO and more open to the civil society.511 Overall, Jackson 
suggests that analysis should start from a specific problem and identifying the need for action, 
moving down to institutional questions.512
Bhagwati, in turn, is critical o f Northern lobbies that try to impose their own agendas on the WTO 
by adding the words “trade-related” in front of the subject matter.513 In his view, the TRIPS was
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already a step too far, essentially legitimising the use of the WTO “to extract royalty payments.”514 
It also demonstrated to the Northern labour, environmental and other lobbies that they could try to 
do the same, leaving developing countries to protest the best they can.515 Bhagwati analysis focuses 
on labour standards, arguing against their inclusion in the WTO system.516 He refers to empirical 
evidence showing that the adverse effects of trade on salaries in rich countries is small, and there is 
no convincing evidence of “race to the bottom” in terms o f labour standards.517 Furthermore, he 
argues that the WTO does not even begin to qualify as an institution capable o f managing complex 
issues such as the right to unionise and the absence o f gender discrimination.518 Finally, Bhagwati 
defends the Tuna-Dolphin panel’s approach of rejecting value-related production and process 
methods.519 He states that the Shrimp-Turtle case should not have changed this approaches, criticises 
the AB for referring to the obscure notion of sustainable development and identifies the need for 
political negotiations on Article XX.520 Bhagwati concludes that the linkage question involves an 
important North-South dimension that should be taken seriously.521
For Alvarez, the WTO has become a “linkage machine” mainly because of its institutional 
features.522 In other words, he argues that centralized, quasi-autonomous institutions can be 
effective in promoting international cooperation,523 and notes that “boundaries” of international 
organizations have always been fluid.524 However, even if international organizations can be 
effective for dealing with a variety o f issues, there is no guarantee that a particular linkage will be 
successful.525 For deciding which linkages have the potential to succeed under the WTO, Alvarez 
proposes comparative analysis, and cooperation between organizations.526 Like Jackson, he regards 
the linkage question as an inquiry into “what works” in international law.527 In his view it would be 
necessary to study comparative organization, feasibility and wisdom of cooperative ventures 
between organizations528 Alvaraez concludes that the linkage debate reveals a wide consensus 
among trade experts that the problem o f linkages is not a new one, the mandate o f the 
GATT/W TO system has evolved significandy during its relatively short history and the boundaries
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of the regime are not fixed.529 He stresses, however, the need to extending the conversation beyond 
trade experts.530
3.1.2 Linkage Issues in the WTO and Doha Round
Linkage issues have also influenced political developments at the WTO. They played an important
role in attracting thousands of demonstrators to the streets of Seatde, and failing the attempts to
launch a new round of trade negotiations in 1999. Given the criticism in the U.S. against sweatshop
labour, child labour and poor working conditions in developing countries, the Clinton
Administration had promised to raise labour standards as a trade issue at the WTO.531 During the
Seattle Ministerial Meeting, he thus expressed sympathy for the demonstrators and indicated that
the W TO should establish:
...a  working group on labor... and then that working group should develop those 
core labor standards and they ought to be part of every trade agreement.532
This demand was highly controversial for developing countries and played an important rol in the 
failure o f the Seatde meeting.533 Developing countries tend to regard strict labour standards as a 
protectionist tool, and some also feared private lawsuits against foreign companies in countries like 
the U.S.534 Japan and the EU also proposed that the new round o f trade negotiations should 
consider the so-called “Singapore issues” of investment, competition policy, transparency in 
government procurement and trade facilitation. For developing countries, in turn, trade in 
agricultural products and textiles were a high priority. As we have seen, delegates ultimately failed to 
reach an agreement and launch a new negotiation round in Seatde.
After the Seatde failure, the WTO Secretariat and various W TO Members pooled their efforts and 
carefully prepared for the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001.535 Despite persisting differences in 
areas such as agriculture, environment, investment and competition, the WTO Members agreed to 
launch a new “Development Round” o f trade negotiations. As a part o f the compromise, 
negotiations on the controversial Singapore issues were deferred until after the Fifth WTO 
Ministerial Conference in 2003 and subsequendy all but trade facilitation have been dropped from 
the Doha Agenda. The relationship between trade and environment did find its way to the Doha
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Round. However, the mandate is limited and the issue has not been given a high priority in the 
negotiations.536
The Doha Round negotiations were officially launched in January 2002 with a work programme 
listing 21 subjects. The two key groups are the Non-agricultural Market Access (NAMA) 
negotiating group and the Agricultural negotiating group. The negotiations have experienced 
several difficulties. The original deadline for completing the Doha Round was in January 2005. This 
deadline was missed. The new deadline at the end o f 2006, agreed at the Sixth Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong, was also missed. The negotiations broke down in the summer o f 2006 
but resumed in the beginning of 2007. By the spring of 2008, some progress has been reported on 
agriculture and NAMA, and delegates are now aiming to conclude the round by the end o f 2008. 
However, the U.S. President’s Fast-Track Trade Negotiation Authority for Trade Agreements 
expired in the summer o f 2007, meaning that the Doha outcome must be approved by the U.S. 
Congress. Given that in 2008, the U.S. is facing both presidential elections and an economic 
recession, the conclusion of the Doha Round in 2008 looks rather unlikely.
One o f the most difficult subjects in the Doha Round concerns trade in agricultural products. 
Notwithstanding that agriculture has been covered by international trade rules since the original 
G A TT 1947, international trade in agricultural products suffers from severe distortions caused by 
trade barriers and heavy subsidies by the EU, U.S. and others. The Uruguay Round resulted in the 
Agreement on Agriculture to improve market access and limit domestic support and export subsidies. 
Still, the situation is far from ideal. One of the most controversial issues stalling the Doha 
agricultural negotiations has concerned cotton, which is heavily subsidised especially by the U.S..537 
West African cotton producing countries have therefore proposed to eliminate all domestic support 
and export subsidies for cotton.538 Developing countries have flagged cotton subsidies as a question 
that is crucially important for their poor populations and crystallises problems caused by trade- 
distorting agricultural subsidies by rich industrialised countries.539 The U.S. cotton subsidies were 
also subject to a legal challenge by Brazil, with both the panel and the Appellate Body concluding 
that they violated WTO rules.540 In a similar vein, the EU ’s regime for sugar export subsidies was 
challenged in the dispute setdement system and found to violate the Agreement on Agriculture.541 It is 
clear that decisions by the WTO dispute setdement system finding that the EU and the U.S., two
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key players in the Doha agricultural negotiations, are violating existing WTO rules do affect the 
negotiations.542 As Sumner argues, “any reasonable negotiating strategy has to take into account the 
results achieved under the cotton dispute brought by Brazil against the U.S. highland cotton
programs.”543 At the same time, such strategic use of the dispute settlement system is hardly
conducive for its legitimacy.
The ongoing negotiations on environmental issues are based on paragraph 31(i) of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration, which lists specific topics to be covered, namely: links between the WTO
rules and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs); exchange o f information between the
WTO and MEA secretariats; and the reduction of trade barriers from environmental goods and
services.544 The Doha Declaration further instructs the CTE to “give particular attention” to the
effect of trade measures on market access, the relevant provisions of the TIRPS Agreement as well as
environmental labelling requirements.545 According to McDonald,
These topics are conservative, in that they are restricted to issues where substantive
entidements are unlikely to be altered or where there is an opportunity for
environmental gains from trade. The Doha Declaration is nonetheless the first time 
that environmental issues have been included in the formal negotiating agenda and 
form part of the single undertaking to be concluded by 2005.546
The lack o f meaningful progress during the Doha Round also applies to the environmental 
negotiations, which have been characterised as “divisive and aimless.”547 For this study, the most 
relevant topic is clearly the relationship between WTO rules and MEAs. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the relationship between WTO law and other rules o f international law has emerged as one o f the 
key challenges to the legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system. However, the prospects for 
finding a lasting solution to the problem through the Doha negotiations are dim: the Doha mandate 
only covers questions involving MEA Parties and excludes the far more difficult question o f non- 
Parties (see Chapters 4 and 6).548 It also precludes an outcome that would change WTO rules.549 
Thus,
There is no opportunity under this mandate to discuss the full range o f issues 
relevant to the WTO-MEA relationship in a meaningful way that involves all 
relevant actors.550
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In sum, the question o f linkages is politically sensitive and negotiated outcomes are difficult to 
reach. The Doha mandate on linkage issues is limited and the new round will not solve any o f the 
principled debates analysed in this Chapter. At the same time, long-standing divergences over 
questions such as trade in agricultural products are responsible for long delays in completing the 
Doha Round. The argument here is that all this highlights the role of the WTO dispute settlement 
system in deciding politically sensitive disputes.
3.2 Trade and the Em ergent Environmental R egim e
As we saw in Chapter 1, for several decades, international trade was conceived as a technical field 
and left largely to trade specialists. Moreover, environmental issues were not a major concern when 
the G A T T  1947 was negotiated and the agreement makes no explicit reference to “the 
environment.”551 A widespread environmental movement only began to emerge in the 1960s and 
1970s, and the first large international conference dedicated to environmental issues was held in 
Stockholm in 1972. In the 1980s, the international community stressed need to reconcile economic 
development and environmental protection, and launched the idea o f “sustainable development.”552 
Still, the body of rules and instruments currendy known as “international environmental law” 
remained insulated from the G A TT  legal regime. In the early 1990s, however, the Tuna-Dolphin 
disputes threw the trade and environment linkage to the centre o f public attention. Since then, the 
relationship between the two international legal regimes has continued to preoccupy international 
trade and environmental experts alike. The aim of this section is to highlight my argument that the 
years of insulation and fragmented development of international law are responsible for many of 
the current legitimacy challenges at the WTO dispute setdement system.
The roots of modern environmentalism reach beyond the political movement that began to emerge 
in the 1960s and 1970s.553 It has been argued that European attitudes to nature were first modified 
by experiences in the colonies: the myth of the garden o f Eden was revived through travellers’ tails 
of ‘wild’ and ‘unaffected’ landscapes in India, Africa and America.554 On the other, hand, the 
damaging effects o f commercial exploitation o f the nature were also becoming apparent.555 It was 
not, however, until the early 1990s that the world saw a significant rise in global interest in 
environmental issues.556 Several factors have been identified as drivers for this trend, including: 
rising wealth and a sense in the North that people can afford higher environmental standards;
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better scientific understanding o f environmental problems; and visible impacts o f ecological 
problems such as air pollution, fisheries depletion, deforestation and land degradation.557
For the development o f international environmental law, the United Nations Environmental 
Conference, held in Stockholm in June 1972, was an important threshold. One o f its concrete 
achievements included establishment of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) to coordinate 
international cooperation in the field. Subsequent milestones included the finalisation o f the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1973, the 
Convention on the Conservation of Minatory Species of Wild Animals (CMS) in 1979, and the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Orpne Payer in 1985. From the start, international environmental 
cooperation involved an important North-South dimension. The newly independent developing 
countries insisted that asking them to forgo development options or divert their limited resources 
to environmental protection was unjustified, especially since many of the problems drew their 
origins from colonialisation and industrialisation in the North.558 At the same time, however, 
scientific evidence on global environmental problems such as global warming, desertification and 
the loss o f biodiversity highlighted the need to address tensions between economic development 
and environmental protection.
In 1983, the UN General Assembly convened the World Commission on Environment and
Development (commonly known as the Brundtland Commission).559 The famous outcome of the
Commission’s work was the formulation of the notion of ‘sustainable development.’ Accordingly,
Environment and development are not separate challenges; they are inexorably 
linked. Development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental resource 
base; the environment cannot be protected when growth leaves out of account the 
costs of environmental destruction. These problems cannot be treated separately by 
fragmented institutions and policies. They are linked in a complex system of cause 
and effect.560
The Brunddand Commission thus identified the need for ‘sustainable development,’ in other 
words, “development that seeks to meet the needs and aspirations o f the present without 
compromising the ability o f those of the future.”561 While the idea o f “sustainable development” 
links trade and environmental protection together, international cooperation on these issues 
continued on two largely separate tracks.
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The end o f the Cold War and dreams of “a new world order” gave an important boost to the 
evolution of international environmental law.562 Around the same time as trade negotiators were 
attempting to conclude the Uruguay Round, also international environmental law made significant 
advances. As an illustration o f fragmented international law-making, there was hardly any 
coordination between the processes. The UN Conference on Environment and Development, held 
in Rio de Janeiro, Bra2il, in 1992, witnessed the launch o f three groundbreaking multilateral 
environmental agreements. These so-called ‘Rio Conventions’ were the U N  Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC'), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the U N  Convention to 
Combat Desertification. All of them embraced a proceduralist idea whereby their Parties would 
convene annually to consider implementation, and craft protocols and other instruments in 
response to new scientific information. The UNFCCC was complemented in 1997 by the Kyoto 
Protocol that lays down binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for industrialised 
countries. In 2000, Parties to the CBD adopted the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to regulate 
transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms. In the field o f customary 
international law, the International Court of Justice confirmed the customary law status of Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration in its advisory opinion on the legality o f nuclear weapons in 
1996.563 Also the precautionary principle was invoked in several disputes before the ICJ, the WTO 
dispute settlement system and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.564 On the whole, 
the discipline that is now commonly referred to as “international environmental law” emerged 
rapidly, and it is now commonly accepted that like international trade law, international 
environmental law forms part o f general international law but possesses several distinctive 
features.565 As it will be shown in this study, the emergence of specialised regimes o f international 
law is responsible for many of the challenges to the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement 
system.
The evolution of international environmental law has also been heavily influenced by non­
governmental actors, who argued for reforming the state-centred international regime and called for 
transparent and participatory international processes and institutions. The “Earth Summit” in Rio 
brought together thousands of environmental groups who began forming global networks and 
disseminating information on international environmental issues through the rapidly developing 
communication technologies.566 Non-governmental actors also got involved in the actual 
negotiations by providing advice to smaller delegations and even representing some small
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developing countries.567 While also the WTO system has increasingly opened doors for NGO s and 
other non-state actors, the participatory culture in the environmental field initially stood in stark 
contrast to the GATT “club model.” Writing at the height of the Tuna-Dolphin controversy, Esty 
indicated that:
At least some o f the GATT’s problems stem from the fact that its structure reflects 
the nation-state focus o f the post-World War II international order. This translates 
into rules and procedures that do not easily accommodate nongovernment actors 
and that become a source o f tension in the handling o f environmental matters.. .568
Most o f the other tensions between the international trade and environmental regimes were also
known in the early 1990s. Esty argued that:
In contrast to the international trade regime... the management o f international 
environmental affairs has little structure and is marked by policy gaps, confusion, 
duplication and incoherence. A do2en different UN agencies, the secretariats to a 
number of environmental treaties and conventions, the World Bank, regional 
political groups, and the world's 190 countries acting individually try to cope with 
the planet's environmental problems.569
These problems also extended to the legal realm The strict stance on environmentally motivated 
trade measures by the Tuna-Dolphin panels:
...leaves in GATT limbo such important international environmental agreements as 
the Montreal Protocol phasing out CFCs (chlorofluorcarbons, KK) and other 
chemicals that destroy the ozone layer, the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species o f Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Basel Convention on 
the export of hazardous waste.570
In sum, this overview demonstrates the lack of coordination between the two spheres of 
international law and some of the ensuing problems. It also shows that the two regimes have 
traditionally adopted very different approaches to transparency and participation by non­
governmental actors. Importandy for the topic o f this study, it explains why the question of 
“linkages” acquired such a prominent role in the WTO in the late 1990s, both politically and in the 
context of the WTO dispute settlement system.
3.3 Environmental D isputes in the GATT/WTO System
The WTO dispute setdement system has dealt with environmental disputes more frequendy than 
any other international court or tribunal. One of the explanations is that the close connection 
between trade and environmental protection makes it impossible to prevent linkage disputes such
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as Shrimp-Turtle, Hormones or Biotech from being brought up in the WTO dispute settlement system.
The second reason relates to institutional discrepancies between the trade and environmental
spheres. In contrast to the compulsory jurisdiction by the WTO dispute settlement system, the
most prominent MEAs do not contain any provisions for legally binding dispute resolution.
Instead, agreements such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the O^one Layer, the CITES,
the Kyoto Protocol and the Cartagena Protocol have created non-compliance systems, which typically
focus on gathering information, monitoring and inspection, and the legally binding nature of their
decisions is questionable. Under most MEAS, implementation has thus been characterised as:
..a technical or financial problem, to be dealt with through advice and assistance, 
instead of normative problem, raising disputes about blameworthiness and 
sanction.571
For this reason, the WTO dispute settlement system is usually the only judicial forum available for 
considering disputes that bring to the fore linkages between the trade and environment regimes.572 
To provide the necessary background information for analysing their legitimacy implications for the 
WTO dispute setdement system, this section introduces the key linkages cases under the GATT, 
the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement.
3.3.1 Linkage disputes under the G A TT
In the 1980s and early 1990s, several cases relating to the relationship between trade and 
environmental protection were brought before G A TT  panels.573 They centered on Article XX, 
which allows States to derogate from their obligations, for instance, by implementing measures that 
are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health'*574 or relate to “the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption.”575 Some of the first disputes emerged between the U.S. 
and Canada on an import prohibition by the U.S. on Canadian tuna,576 and on Canada’s export 
restrictions on herring and salmon.577 Both panels found that the measures failed to fulfil the
571M. Koskenniemi, “New Institutions and Procedures for Implementation Control and Reaction” in J. Werksman, 
Greening International Institutions (Field/Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1996), 236 at 247.
572 Note, however the dispute on access to Chilean ports by European fishing vessels that was brought to the WTO in 
2000 by the EU, and taken to the ITLOS by Chile. Both proceedings were halted after a bilateral solution was 
reached. Request for consultations by the EC on Chile - Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation o f  Swordfish, 
WT/DS193/1, 26 April 2001; and ITLOS: Case on Conservation ofSwordfish-Stocks between the European 
Community and Chile in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean.
573 Disputes not mentioned in the text included the “Superfund” case on tax treatment in the U.S. on domestic 
petroleum and petroleum-based products. GA TT panel report, US - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported 
Substances, L /6175,17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136. For discussion on three other cases, see Esty, Greening the GATT, 
269-270.
574 GATT  Article XX(b).
575 GATT Article XX(g).
576 GATT panel report, US-Prohibition o f  Imports o f  Tuna and Tuna Products from  Canada, L /5198, 22 February 
1983, BISD 29S/91.
577 GATT panel report, Canada-Measures Affecting Exports o f  Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, L/6268, 22 March 
1988, BISD, 35S/98.
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requirements of Article XX(g), inter alia, because they were not “primarily aimed at” environmental 
protection.578 In the Thailand Cigarettes, the U.S. challenged Thailand’s trade restrictions on imported 
cigarettes, and the justification that the measures were designed to protect the health of Thai 
citizens.579 The panel found that the measures were not “necessary” to protect health under Article 
XX(b) o f the G A T T  since there were less £L4TT-inconsistent measures available to achieve the 
same policy objective.580 This ruling was followed by the two Tuna-Dolphin cases that have been 
discussed in detail in Section 2.1 In general, G A TT  panels tended to interpret the scope of 
legitimate exceptions narrowly and never accepted a defence based on Article XX. The WTO 
dispute setdement system thus inherited the challenge of responding to the fierce criticism caused 
in particular by the TunaDolphin disputes.
From early on, the WTO dispute settlement system had several opportunities to address the trade 
and environment linkage. One of the first WTO disputes was the Gasoline case brought against the 
U.S. by Brazil and Venezuela, arguing that the programme for reformulated gasoline and baseline 
establishment rules under the U.S. Clean Air Act favoured domestic refineries. Both the panel and 
the Appellate Body found that the U.S. measure violated the national treatment requirement under 
Article III o f the G A T T  by discriminating imported gasoline. Both also ruled that the measure was 
not justified under Article X X  The AB accepted that the measure was one “related to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources” consistent with Article XX(g), but found that it 
violated the requirement that such measures may not constitute “unjustifiable discrimination” or 
“disguised restriction on international trade” under the chapeau o f Article X X 581 In doing so, it 
stressed that WTO law did not exist “in clinical isolation” from public international law.582 The AB 
also noted that while the ‘primarily aimed at’ test applied by G A T T  panels and the Gasoline panel 
had not been disputed, it was not based on treaty language and “was not designed as simple litmus 
test for inclusion or exclusion from Article XX(g).”583 All o f these were important developments, 
and ones the were further elaborated in the subsequent Shrimp-Turtle dispute.
3.3.1.2_______ The Shrimp-Turtle Case
The Shrimp-Turtle case is the most significant linkage dispute in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
It originated from an import prohibition by the U.S. on shrimp and shrimp products caught by 
fishing technologies that may adversely affect sea turtles. As we saw in Chapter 2, the Tuna-Dolphin 
panels rejected the argument that goods could be differentiated based on processes and production
578 Esty, Greening the GATT, 266-267.
579 GATT panel report, Thailand - Restrictions on Importation o f  and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R, 7 
November 1990, BISD 37S/200.
580 Esty, Greening the GATT, 268.
581 Appellate Body report, US-Gasoline, 22, 29.
5n Ibid., 17.
583 Ibid., 18-19.
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methods. This approach has a long tradition in the GATT/W TO system584 and the Shrimp-Turtle 
decision, implying that such differentiation is sometimes possible, was therefore a remarkable 
milestone. This section introduces the main facts and legal arguments in the dispute. Chapter 4 will 
argue that while welcome, the recognition by the AB of the relevance of international 
environmental law also introduced several important questionmarks. These relate, in particular, to 
references to MEAs such as the CBD (to which the U.S. is not a Party) and reliance on soft-law 
concepts such as Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration. Overall, Chapter 4 argues that contrary to what 
some influential scholars contend, the Shrimp-Turtle decision did not mark the beginning of a clear 
and consistent trend towards the more careful consideration o f environmental issues by the WTO 
dispute settlement system.
3.3.2.1.1 Decisions by the Panel and Appellate Body
Shrimp trawling has been identified as one o f the leading causes o f sea turtle deaths and a serious 
threat to the survival o f sea turtles.585 The U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service developed a 
technology called Turtle Excluder Device (TED), essentially a trapdoor enabling sea turtles to 
escape from trawling nets. TEDs have been estimated to reduce turtle casualties by 97 per cent.586 
After its voluntary programmes failed to produce the desired result, the U.S. first required all 
domestic shrimp trawlers to use TEDs in areas where incidental catches o f sea turtles were likely. In 
1989, also imports o f shrimps were limited and no shrimp could be imported to the U.S. unless it 
was certified that the harvesting nation either had a regulatory programme to protect sea turtles and 
an incidental take rate comparable to that o f the U.S., or did not pose a threat to sea turtles.587 
India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Thailand jointly challenged this in 1996.
The U.S. did not to contest the argument that its shrimp embargo violated the prohibition on 
quantitative import restrictions under G A TT  Article XI.588 The Shrimp-Turtle panel thus focused on 
whether the violation could be justified by under Article XX. The panel proceeded immediately to 
apply the chapeau of Article XX, contending that WTO Members were only permitted to derogate 
from their trading obligations “so long as, in doing so, they do not undermine the WTO 
multilateral trading system.”589 The panel elaborated that:
...when considering a measure under Article XX, we must determine no only
whether the measure on its own undermines the WTO multilateral trading system, but
584 Bhagwati, “Afterword: the Question of Linkage,” 133.
585 D.E. Kaczka, "A Primer on the Shrimp-Sea Turtle Controversy," RECIEL 6(2) (1997), 171 at 173.
586 B. Plus, "The Murky Waters o f International Environmental Jurisprudence: A Critique o f Recent WTO Holdings 
in the Shrimp/Turtle Controversy," Minnesota Journal o f  Global Trade, Summer (1999), 343 at 346.
587 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 161.
588 Howse, “A New Legal Baseline,” 495.
589 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, para.7.44
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also whether such type of measure, if it were to be adopted by other Members 
would threaten the security and predictability o f the multilateral trading system.590
This test seems to leave very litde room for justifying exceptions under Article XX. It also places a 
lot o f emphasis on the integrity of the multilateral trading system in comparison to the other 
legitimate policy objectives listed under Article XX. This bias made the report an easy and popular 
target for critiques. Also the AB criticized the panel for not following the customary rules o f treaty 
interpretation and examining the ordinary meaning of the words o f Article XX.591 Instead, the 
panel:
...formulated a broad standard and a test for appraising measures sought to be 
justified under the chapeau; it is a standard or a test that finds no basis either in the 
text of the chapeau or in that of either of the two specific exceptions claimed by the 
United States.592
The AB stressed that application of Article XX consisted o f a two-tired analysis and concluded that
the U.S. import prohibition was provisionally justified under Article XX(g) that allows measures
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible national resources.” The AB highlighted that the G A TT
had to be interpreted “in the light of contemporary environmental concerns” and that its language
was “by definition, evolutionary.”593 Thus, also living natural resources such as sea turtles fell under
the definition o f “exhaustible natural resources.”594 As will be shown in Chapter 4, in a significant
move, the AB referred to several MEAs and other environmental instruments to support its
interpretation o f Article XX(g). Furthermore, instead of the “primarily aimed at” test applied by the
Tuna-Dolphin panel, the AB simply determined that the U.S. measure was designed to conserve sea
turtles.595 Importandy to the debate concerning the acceptability o f extraterritorial trade measures,
the AB stated that unilaterally conditioning market access may “to some degree be a common
aspect” o f measures under Article XX and:
It is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting countries compliance 
with or adoption of, certain policies... prescribed by the importing country, renders 
a measure a priori incapable of justification under Article XX.596
Turning to the chapeau test, the AB also made several environmentally conscious statements. It 
discussed the language used in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, which demonstrated “a 
recognition by the WTO negotiators that optimal use of the world’s resources should be made in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development” — a fact that must “add colour, texture
590 Ibid, para.7.44
591 Ibid, paras. 114-115.
592 Ibid, para.121.
593 Ibid., paras. 129-130
594 Ibid, para.131.
595 T.J. Schoenbaum, "The Decision in the Shrimp-Turtle Case,” Yearbook o f  International Environmental Law 
(1998), 36 at 38.
596 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 133.
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and shading” to the interpretation of Article XX.597 The AB also emphasised the establishment of 
the CTE as an example o f other developments “which help to elucidate the objectives of WTO 
members with respect to the relationship between trade and environment.”598
However, when examining the three specific criteria contained in the chapeau, namely the 
requirement that the measure must not constitute “unjustifiable discrimination,” “arbitrary 
discrimination” or “disguised restriction to trade” the AB found several defects in the U.S. measure. 
It indicated that the measure had been implemented in a way whereby other possible measures to 
conserve sea turtle were not taken into account, and this amounted to “unjustifiable 
discrimination.”599 As only shrimp originating from certified waters could be imported meant that 
shrimp caught with methods identical to those used by the U.S had been excluded from the 
market.600 Furthermore, the failure of the U.S to engage in serious and good faith negotiations to 
conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with the relevant countries to protect sea turtles was 
an aspect that bore “heavily in any appraisal o f unjustifiable discrimination.”601 As it will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the AB invoked several instruments of international environmental 
law to show that a multilateral approach was preferable to unilateralism, including Principle 12 of 
the Rio Declaration. The AB also noted that the U.S. had negotiated one regional agreement on the 
protection o f sea turtles, namely the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles,602 showing that a reasonable alternative would have been available.603 Negotiating with some 
but not with other WTO members also had an unjustifiable and discriminatory effect.604 The AB 
also found that the application of the Section 609 constituted "arbitrary discrimination" due to the 
inflexible manner it had been applied..605 For these reasons, also the AB concluded that the import 
prohibition on shrimp was not justified under G A TT  Article XX.
3.3.2.1.2 Implementation Proceedings under DSU Article 21.5
The Shrimp-Turtle proceedings continued in October 2000. After the AB’s ruling, the U.S. only 
changed the way in which the measure was implemented, while Malaysia argued that the U.S. was 
not entitled to impose any prohibition on the imports o f shrimps in the absence o f an international 
environmental agreement.606 The outcome of the implementation phase was remarkable in that
591 Ibid., para. 152.
598 Ibid, para.153.
599 Ibid, para. 163.
600 Ibid, para 165. Emphasis omitted.
601 Ibid, para. 165.
602 Ibid, para. 169.
603 Ibid, para. 171.
604 Ibid, para. 172.
605 Ibid, paras. 177-180.
606 Panel report, US-lmport Prohibition o f  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. Recourse to Article 21.5 o f  the DSU
by Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW, 15 June 2001, para. 5.24.
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both the panel and the AB found that Revised Guidelines on the implementation of the shrimp 
embargo fulfilled the requirements of Article XX and was compatible with the G ATT.
One of the reasons why the U.S. measure no longer regarded as arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination was that all shrimp harvesting nations were no longer required to use the same 
protection measure, that is, TEDs.607 Instead, a nation could be certified to export shrimps to the 
U.S. if it was enforcing a comparably effective regulatory program to protect sea turdes without the 
use o f TEDs.608 This gave “sufficient latitude” to exporting countries and also allowed the U.S. 
authorities to consider the specific conditions in both shrimp production and sea turtle protection 
in each individual country. 609 The second improvement were good faith efforts by the U.S. to 
negotiate a regional agreement concerning the conservation o f sea turtles with the relevant states of 
the Indian Ocean. According to the 21.5 panel, what was needed were negotiations, not necessarily 
the conclusion of an agreement.610 The AB confirmed this. In its view the U.S. “would be expected 
to make good faith efforts to reach international agreements that are comparable from one forum 
of negotiation to the other.”611 However, requiring the U.S. to conclude an agreement would give any 
country participating in the negotiations effectively a veto as to whether the U.S. could comply with 
its WTO obligations.612 As the U.S. had taken several steps to negotiate an agreement on sea turtle 
conservation with the complaining states, it could not be held to have engaged in “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination” only “because one international negotiation resulted in an agreement 
while another did not.”613 The outcome was thus that the U.S. measure was justified as long as 
these conditions and “in particular the ongoing serious good faith efforts to reach a multilateral 
agreement” remained satisfied.614 This was an important milestone in the GATT/W TO linkage 
jurisprudence, but as it will be shown in Chapter 4, it did not signify the beginning o f a new, 
consistently environmentally conscious era -and after closer examination, the Shrimp-Turtle decisions 
also created several important questionmarks.
3.3.1.3 The French Ban on Asbestos
The Asbestos arose concerning a prohibition by France on asbestos and asbestos-containing 
products. Canada challenged the French legislation to the extent it concerned chrysotile asbestos 
arguing that scientific evidence concerning health risks of chrysotile asbestos was insufficient to
609 Article 21.5 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, paras. 144 -148.
610 Article 21.5 panel report, Shrimp-Turtle, para 5.64.
6,1 Article 21.5 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 122.
612 Ibid, para. 123.
613 Ibid.
614 Article 21.5 panel report, Shrimp-Turtle, para 6.10.
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warrant its comprehensive prohibition.615 Both the panel and the AB disagreed. The panel was 
convinced by the necessity of banning asbestos to protect public health under Article XX(b). The 
AB went even further, concluding that the ban was consistent with G A TT  Article 111:4. An 
individual opinion by an AB member stressed the relevance of health risks in analysing the 
“likeness” o f asbestos and asbestos-containing products under G A T T  Article 111:4, illustrating how 
linkage disputes challenge the economic focus o f the WTO regime. Chapter 5 will also use the facts 
o f the French asbestos prohibition to show how the competence of the WTO dispute settlement 
system affects the domain o f national democratic processes. It also discusses the impact o f the 
Asbestos case on the debate about amicus curiae briefs in the WTO.
3.3.1.3.1 The Asbestos Panel Report
The panel agreed with Canada that the French prohibition on asbestos violated the national 
treatment requirement under G A TT  Article 111:4. The panel analysed the “likeness” o f chrysotile 
asbestos imported from Canada in relation to PVC, cellulose and glass fibres produced by France. 
It relied on the four criteria developed by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, namely: 
products’ physical properties; their end-uses; consumers’ tastes and habits; and tariff classifications. 
The panel emphasised that the assessment o f the physical properties was an economic analysis rather 
than a scientific one.616 The fact that asbestos fibres and the substituting fibres had some 
overlapping end-uses indicated that from the economic perspective, they were physically “like.”617 
In this analysis, it was not possible to consider the health risks relating to chrysotile asbestos.618 
Stressing “the economy of the G ATT,” the panel argued that considering health risks o f asbestos 
under Article III would nullify the effect o f Article XX(b).619 It also ruled that consumer 
preferences were too difficult a criteria to be examined in this context.620
Panel accepted, however, that the French asbestos ban was justified under Article XX(b). It stated 
that it had been presented with sufficient scientific evidence on the health risks o f chrysotile 
asbestos.621 It also explained that determining whether a measure was “necessary” under Article 
XX(b) involved assessing the desired level o f protection, and whether alternative, less trade 
restrictive measures would be available.622 It stressed that WTO Members had the right to set the 
desired level o f protection.623 As the objective of France had been to obtain a high level of
615 Panel report, EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R, 18 September 
2000, para. 3.12. (Asbestos)
616 Ibid., para. 8.122. Emphasis added.
617 Ibid. Emphasis added.
618 Ibid., para. 8.129 et seq.
6]9 Ib id , 8.129-139.
620 Ib id , paras. 8 .1 3 9 - 140.
621 Ibid., paras. 8.188-8.195.
622 Ib id , para. 8.175.
623 Ibid., para. 8.171.
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protection, this could only be achieved with a comprehensive ban.624 Therefore, no less trade 
restrictive alternative was available and the requirements o f Article XX(b) were satisfied.625 As 
Canada had not even argued that the ban violated the chapeau of Article XX, the panel concluded 
that the French measure was consistent with the GATT.
3.3.1.3.2 The Appellate Body's Asbestos Report
The Appellate Body modified the panel's interpretation of likeness o f products under Article 111:4
in an important way. It emphasized that:
.. .in examining the ‘likeness’ o f products, panels must evaluate all o f the relevant 
evidence. We are very much of the view that evidence relating to the health risks
associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination of ‘likeness’ under
Article 111:4 of the G ATT . 626
The AB explained that health risks were not a separate criterion but could be considered “under the 
existing criteria of physical properties, and o f consumers' tastes and habits.”627 This would not 
nullify the effect o f Article XX(b) given that Articles III and XX were distinct and independent 
provisions to be interpreted on their own.628 The AB also criticized the panel for declining to 
examine consumers’ tastes and habits.629
In its own likeness analysis, the AB emphasized that chrysotile asbestos fibres have been 
internationally recognized as a carcinogen since 1977.630 Carcinogenity, or toxicity, was “a defining 
aspect o f the physical properties of chrysotile asbestos fibres,”631 meaning that “physically, 
chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibres are very different.”632 This placed a high burden for the 
complainant to demonstrate the ‘likeness’ of asbestos and substituting fibres.633 The AB also found 
that although asbestos and PCG fibres had some overlapping end-uses, it was not known what 
proportion of all end-uses overlapped.634 It was therefore not possible to determine the significance 
o f the overlapping end-uses.635 As there was no evidence o f the consumers’ taste and habits, there 
was no basis, bearing in mind their physical properties, for concluding that the products were 
‘like.’636 The evidence taken together thus lead the AB to reverse the panel's finding that chrysotile
624 Ibid., para. 8.204 et seq.
625 Ibid., para. 8.222.
626 Appellate Body report, EC- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R, 12 
March 2001, para. 113.
627 v i  ■ i621 Ibid.
628 Ibid., para. 115.
629 Ib id , para. 120.
630 Ibid., para. 135.
63’ Ib id , para. 114.
632 Ib id , para. 136.
m Ibid
634 Ibid., para. 138.
635 Ibid.
636 Ibid., para. 139.
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asbestos fibres were ‘like’ PCG fibres under Article 111:4 of G ATT. It reached the same conclusion
regarding such products respectively emphasizing that:
In terms o f composition, the physical properties o f the different cement-based 
products appear to be relatively similar. Yet, there is one principal and significant 
difference between these products: one set o f cement-based products contains a 
known carcinogenic fibre, while the other does not.637
The implication o f the AB’ finding was that the French asbestos was consistent with G A TT  Article 
111:4. For this reason, there was no need for recourse to Article XX.
The AB upheld, however, the panel's findings concerning Article XX. In discussing the necessity 
test and the availability of less trade restrictive alternative measures to the French asbestos degree 
under subparagraph(b) o f Article XX, the AB referred to its report on Korean Beef. It indicated that 
one element in “the weighing and balancing process” to determine whether a WTO-consistent 
alternative measure was reasonably available was the extent to which such alternative measures 
contributed to the realization of the end pursued.638 In the Asbestos case the AB found that the 
objective pursued, the preservation of human life and health, was “both vital and important in the 
highest degree.”639 Alternative measures, such as controlled use o f asbestos as suggested by Canada, 
“would not allow France to achieve its chosen level o f health protection by halting the spread of 
asbestos-related health risks”640 The AB thus upheld the panel's finding that the French legislation 
was necessary to protect human life or health under Article XX(b). The legitimacy implications of 
the AB’s “necessity” test that seeks to balance the relative importance o f the values protected will 
be criticised in section 5.1.
The analysis o f “likeness” in the Asbestos illustrates the difficulty of sustaining an economic 
perspective when applying the GATT. The panel's approach o f not considering carcinogenic 
properties o f asbestos in its “likeness” analysis received well-deserved criticism: it would have 
placed “on any regulator wishing to distinguish between hazardous and non-hazardous... products, 
the burden of meeting the G A T T s narrowly drawn exceptions.”641 The AB’s decision was 
therefore a welcome development. It was accompanied with a concurring statement by a member 
of the AB, stressing “overwhelming” scientific evidence on the carcinogenity of chrysotile 
asbestos642 and expressing preparedness to go further than the Appellate Body and conclude that 
chrysotile asbestos fibres were not “like” PCG fibres even in the absence o f evidence on end-uses
637 Ibid, para. 142.
638 Ibid., para. 172.
639 Ibid.
640 Ibid., para. 174.
641 A. Palmer & J. Werksman, “Case Note: World Trade Organization, European Communities -  Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, Panel Report,” RECIEL 10(1) (2001), 125 at 126-127.
642 Appellate Body report, Asbestos, para. 151.
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and consumers' tastes and habits.643 The statement indicated that it was difficult to imagine what
kind o f evidence could “outweigh and set naught the undisputed deadly nature of chrysotile
asbestos fibres.”644 Furthermore,
... the necessity or appropriateness o f adopting a “fundamentally” economic 
interpretation o f the “likeness” o f products under Article 111:4 o f the G A TT  does 
not appear to me to be free from substantial doubt. Moreover, in future contexts, 
the line between a 'fundamentally' and 'exclusively' economic view o f 'like products' 
under Article 111:4 may well prove very difficult, as a practical matter, to identify.645
This clearly illustrates the potential of linkage issues to challenge the limits o f the WTO regime, as 
well as the application o f fairly established and seemingly economic concepts such as “like” 
products. Overall, the AB’s Asbestos decision was welcomed by many as providing “clearer and 
perhaps more ample assurances to regulators that non-protectionist domestic regulations for 
important policy purposes will not be significandy constrained by WTO law.”646
3.3.1.4 EC-Preferences. US-Gambling and Brazilian Tyres
The WTO dispute setdement system has considered also some other linkage disputes under the 
GATT. In the EC-Preferences, India challenged EU’s scheme for generalised tariff preferences (GSP) 
for developing countries to the extent it concerned benefits granted to countries controlling drug 
production and trafficking.647 The panel concluded that the EU’s Special Arrangements to Combat 
Drug Production and Trafficking, available to only 12 countries, violated the Most Favoured 
Nation principle as well as the Enabling Clause, which requires benefits to be provided on a non- 
discriminatory basis.648 According to the panel, the term “non-discriminator/’ required identical 
tariff preferences for #//developing countries.649 The panel also rejected the argument that the 
European GSP system could be justified under Article XX(b) as it was not necessary to protect 
human life or health in the EU and also violated the chapeau o f Article XX.650 The Article XX 
aspect of the decision was not appealed. Concerning the Enabling Clause, however, the AB ruled 
that granting “non-discriminatory” preferences meant that all similarly situated beneficiaries had to be 
granted identical tariff preferences.651 This did not mean identical treatment o f all developing
645 Ibid., para. 154.
646 R. Howse & E. Tuerk, “The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations, A Case Study o f the Canada-EC Asbestos 
Dispute, “ in . G. de Burca & J. Scott, eds., The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Hart Publishing, 
2001), 283 at 327.
647 For an overview, see M.Irish, “GSP Tariffs and Conditionality: A Comment on EC-Preferences,” Journal o f  
World Trade 41(4) (2007), 683.
648 Panel report, EC-Conditions fo r  Granting Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R, 1 December 
2003, paras. 7.134-7.147. (EC-Preferencesj.
649 Ibid, para. 7.161.
650 Ibid., para. 7.210.
651 Appellate Body report, EC-Conditions fo r  Granting Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 
WT/DS246/AB/R, 20 April 2004, para. 154.
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countries but additional preferences could be granted for countries with particular needs.652 The AB 
found, however, that the EU’s GSP scheme violated these requirements as the EU had not 
demonstrated that its Drug Arrangement was available to all countries similarly affected by the 
problem of drug trade.653 While the outcome thus remained the same, the AB’s decision was 
important in accepting a degree of conditionality and differentiation.
The U.S. Gambling dispute concerned the question whether the U.S. could prevent the cross-border 
supply of online gambling and betting services under the general exceptions o f the GATS. Antigua 
and Barbuda challenged the U.S. prohibition, while the U.S. argued that online gambling brought to 
the fore concerns related to organized crime, money laundering, fraud, underage gambling and 
public health. The panel ruled that the U.S. measure violated G ATS  Articles VI: 1 and VI:3, and 
were not justified under the general exceptions listed in Articles XTV(a) and XTV(c).654. The AB, 
however, accepted that the measures qualified as ones “necessary to protect public morals or to 
maintain public order” but failed to satisfy the conditions o f the chapeau o f Article XTV.655
In analysing G ATS  Article XIV, the panel had found that the U.S. had failed to look for reasonable 
available alternatives to its restrictions. Essentially, the panel’s findings seemed to mean that for a 
measure to be “necessary,” WTO Members must demonstrate that they have explored and 
exhausted all reasonably available WTO-consistent alternatives. The AB did not agree. It stated 
that:
An alternative measure may be found not to be "reasonably available", however, 
where it is merely theoretical in nature, for instance, where the responding Member 
is not capable of taking it, or where the measure imposes an undue burden on that 
Member, such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties. Moreover, a 
"reasonably available" alternative measure must be a measure that would preserve 
for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection.. ,656
Furthermore, the respondent is not required to demonstrate that there are no other reasonable 
alternatives to its measure.657 As in the Korean Beef, the panel and AB also used a weighing and 
balancing test in determining the necessity of a measure. This question will be discussed in detail in 
section 5.2. Here, the AB’s more lenient test concerning reasonably available alternatives seems 
well-justified as one that leaves WTO Members leeway in choosing the most appropriate measures.
652 Ibid, para. 169.
653 Ibid., paras. 180-189.
654 Panel report, US-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply o f  Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS258/R, 
10 November 2004. (US-Gambling).
655 Appellate Body report, US-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply o f  Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS258/AB/R, 7 April 2005, para. 373.
656 Ibid., para. 308.
657 Ibid., paras. 309-310.
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In the Gambling dispute the AB did, however, uphold the panel’s conclusion that the measures 
violated the chapeau o f G ATS Article XTV, although on a narrower ground.658
In the recent Brazilian Tyres dispute, questions concerning necessity and reasonable alternatives 
surfaced again. The dispute is interesting as it is a case where an emerging economy, namely Brazil, 
is invoking health protection as a justification for a measure challenged by the EU.659 In its 
decision, the Brasilian Tyres panel agreed with the EU that the import ban on retreated tyres was 
inconsistent with G A T T  Articles XI and 111:4. Concerning Brazil’s defence under Article XX, the 
panel accepted that accumulation o f waste tyres was associated with serious health risks, including 
transmission of dengue, yellow fever and malaria, and exposure by human beings to toxic emissions 
from tyre fires.660 The seriousness o f these risks and the importance o f the policy objective lead the 
panel to accept that the measure was “necessary”661 and provisionally justified under Article 
XX(b).662 It concluded, however, that the ban failed to comply with the chapeau requirements 
given, inter alia, that large quantities of rethreaded tyres were imported to Brazil through court 
injunctions. The import ban was thus applied in a way that constituted unjustifiable discrimination 
and disguised restriction to trade.663
In its decision, the AB analysed the panel’s approach to determining “necessity” under Article 
XX(b). It explained that the methodology to assess a measure's contribution to the objective o f 
health protection is a function of the nature o f the risk, the objective pursued, and the level of 
protection sought.664 Referring to the Asbestos case, the AB stressed that risk to human health could 
be demonstrated either in quantitative or qualitative terms665 and the same applies to assessing the 
measure’s contribution to the policy objective.666 The panel’s qualitative analysis of health risks 
associated with the accumulation o f retreated tyres was therefore justified.667 The AB also stressed 
that certain complex public health or environmental problems “may be tackled only with a 
comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures,” and sometimes the 
impacts o f such measures can only be measured with the benefit of time.668 As an example, the AB 
mentioned measures to combat climate change.669
658 Ibid., paras. 369-372.
659 Panel report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports o f  Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/R, 12 June 2007. {Brazilian 
Tyres).
660 Ib id , para. 7.742.
661 Ibid., para. 7.746.
662 Ib id , paras. 7.842-850.
663 Ib id , para. 7.989.
664 Appellate Body report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports o f  Retreated Tyres, DS332/AB/R, 3 December 2007, 
para 145.
665 Appellate Body report, Asbestos, para. 167.
666 Appellate Body report, Brazilian Tyres, para. 146.
661 Ib id , paras. 147-149, 153.
668 Ibid., para. 151.
669 Ibid
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The AB appreciated that Brazil was implementing a comprehensive strategy to deal with waste tyres 
and that over time, the import ban on waste tyres was likely to make a material contribution to its 
objectives. 670The AB also upheld the panel’s finding that no less trade restrictive alternatives were 
reasonably available for Brazil. It stressed the Gambling decision and noted that the capacity of a 
country to implement remedial measures that would be particularly costly, or would require 
advanced technologies, may be relevant to the assessment o f whether such measures or practices 
are reasonably available alternatives to a preventive measure.671 Concerning the chapeau, however, 
the AB found that exempting MERCOSUR countries from the import ban amounted to arbitrary 
and unjustifiable discrimination as well as disguised restriction to international trade, even if the 
exemption was based on a ruling by a MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal.672 Furthermore, the imports 
of used tyres through court injunctions went “against the objective pursued” and therefore also 
amounted to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.673 Therefore, also the AB ultimately found 
that the Brazilian ban was not justifiable under Article XX.674
3.3.2 Disputes under the TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round to ensure that technical regulations 
and standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade.675 It was first considered in 
the Asbestos dispute. Contrary to the panel, the AB found that the French asbestos ban fell under 
the TBT Agreement.616 The TBT Agreement applies to technical regulations, defined as “documents, 
which lay down product characteristics.”677 While the panel concluded that a measure banning a 
product is not a measure specifying product characteristics, the AB ruled that an integral and 
essential aspect of the French asbestos decree was the regulation o f products containing asbestos 
fibres - namely that all products must not contain asbestos.678 Even if the measure was a technical 
regulation covered by the TBT Agreement, the AB decided that the legal and factual aspects o f the 
panel report did not give it an adequate basis to rule on the TBT Agreement.679 Nevertheless, the 
AB’s report offered some clarity concerning the relationship between the G A T T  and TBT
670 Ibid., paras. 154-155.
671 Appellate Body report, Brazilian Tyres, para. 171.
672 Ibid. paras. 228, 233 and 238.
673 Ibid. para. 246.
674 Ibid. para 252.
675 TBT Agreement, preamble.
676 Appellate Body report, Asbestos, paras. 75-76..
677 TBT Agreement, Annex 1.1.
678 Appellate Body report, Asbestos, para. 72.
679 Ibid., paras. 81-83. The AB has been criticised for violating the principle jura novit curia and even for effectively 
rendering a non liquet. J. Pauwelyn, “Cross-Agreement Complaints before the Appellate Body: A Case Study o f the 
EC-Asbestos Dispute,” World Trade Review 1(1) (2002), 63.
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Agreements by seemingly endorsing the view that the rights and obligations in these two agreements 
operate concurrently and both may apply to a single dispute.680
The TBT Agreement has subsequendy been applied in the EC-Sardines dispute whereby Peru 
challenged the EU’s regulation according to which only the species Sardina pilchardus Albaum could 
be marketed in the EU as ‘sardines.’681 The said species is largely fished by European vessels, while 
similar species caught in the Pacific Ocean could not be sold as sardines in Europe.682 However, 
according to an international standard by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the species found 
in the Pacific could be sold as sardines in most other markets.683 The AB’s decision emphasised the 
role of Codex standards and rejected the EU’s argument that only standards adopted by consensus 
could be “relevant” international standards under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.684 The AB also 
agreed with the panel that the EU’s regulation was not based on the Codex standard.685 It reversed, 
however, the burden o f proof from the EU to Peru to show that the Codex Standard is an effective 
and appropriate means to fulfil the “legitimate objectives” of market transparency, consumer 
protection, and fair competition pursued by the EU.686 The AB’s conclusion was that Peru had 
furnished adequate evidence of this. The EU’s trade description o f sardines thus violated the 
obligation in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement to base technical regulations on international 
standards except where such standards would be ineffective and inappropriate for the fulfilment of 
legitimate objectives pursued.6*7 The Sardines dispute is remarkable in that it is the first and only 
dispute thus far where the TBT Agreement has been applied, and that it emphasises the relevance of 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission and international standardisation bodies under the TBT  and 
SPS Agreements. The case has also been highlighted as one where a developing country took 
advantage of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law and won a WTO case concerning complex 
international standards against the “much more formidable legal services” o f the EU.688
3.3.3 Disputes under the SPS Agreement
Like the TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round. It covers 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, laying down the requirement that WTO Members must base
680 Howse & Tuerk, “The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations, A Case Study o f the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, “ 
308. See Trachtman & Marceau, “A Map o f WTO Law o f Domestic Regulation o f Goods,” 873 for the argument that 
AB considered the TBT Agreement as lex specialis.
681 Panel report, EC-Trade Description o f  Sardines WT/DS231/R, 29 May 2002.
682 G. Shaffer & V. Mosoti, “The EC-Sardines Case: How North-South NGO-Govemmental Links Benefited Peru,” 
Bridges Monthly 6(7), 15 October 2002.
™Ibid.
684 Appellate Body report, EC-Trade Description o f  Sardines WT/DS231/AB/R, 26 September 2002, para. 227.
685 Ibid., para. 258.
686 Ibid  para. 283.
687 Ib id  paras. 315-16.
688 Shaffer & Mosoti, “The EC-Sardines Case.”
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such measures on international standards or scientific risk assessment.689 Especially many NGO s 
felt that the built-in view of SPS measures as protectionist instruments and trade barriers 
undermined governments’ ability to control various health and environmental risks, and advance 
social objectives.690 And indeed, the Hormones and Biotech disputes have been some of the most 
controversial linkage disputes in the WTO dispute settlement system.
In the five disputes under the SPS Agreement, questions concerning international standards, scientific 
risk assessment and precaution have played an important role. In the Hormones case, the AB 
stressed that WTO Members can implement measures resulting in a higher level o f protection than 
that obtained by following international standards. However, such stricter measures must comply 
with the requirements of scientific justification and risk assessment under Articles 3 and 5 o f the 
SPS agreement. The AB also indicated that during the risk assessment process, risk can be defined in 
either quantitative or qualitative terms and governments could act also on the basis of minority 
scientific opinion.691 In a dispute concerning Australia’s import restrictions on salmon, the AB 
specified three steps for the risk assessment procedure, namely identifying the diseases that a W TO 
Member wishes to prevent, evaluating the likelihood o f the risk, and evaluating the likelihood of 
risk on the basis o f the contemplated SPS Measure.692 It also stated that in determining their desired 
level o f protection, WTO Members could choose a “zero risk.”693 Concerning the relationship 
between the SPS measure and risk assessment, the AB has ruled that there must be a “rational 
relationship.”694 In the Japan-Varietals, the AB ruled on Article 5.7 o f the SPS Agreement, which 
reflects a precautionary approach by allowing the provisional application o f SPS measures while a 
WTO Member seeks to obtain additional information for completing a risk assessment. Agreeing 
with the panel, the AB concluded that the Japanese measure was not compatible with Article 5.7 as 
it had not been reviewed within a reasonable period of time.695
The Japan-Apples focused scientific justification on measures applied on imported apples from the 
U.S. to prevent risks associated with the fire blight disease. Both the panel and AB found that the 
Japanese measure did not satisfy the definition o f risk assessment as Japan had not evaluated the 
likelihood of the disease or conducted an evaluation of the risk in light of the SPS measures to be
689 SPS Agreement, Articles 2.1 and 5.1.
690 Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism, 116.
691 Appellate Body report, EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R and 
WT/DS/48/AB/R, 16 January 1998, paras. 187, 195. (Hormones)
692 Appellate Body report, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation o f  Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, 20 October 
1998, para. 123. {Australian Salmon).
693 Ibid., para 125.
694 Appellate Body report, Hormones, para. 186.
695 Appellate Body report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, 22 February 1999. 
{Japan- Varietals).
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applied.696 While Japan subsequently modified its measures, a panel established under DSU  Article 
21.5 ruled that all aspects of the new measures violated the SPS Agreement.691 This ruling has been 
criticised for shifting the locus of the scientific justification test from Article 5.1 to Article 2.2 of the 
SPS Agreement, which would seem to envisage “detailed inquiry by a WTO panel into the underlying 
scientific basis and justification o f an SPS measure.”698 According to the same analysis, this 
highlights questions concerning the standard of review and the role o f panels in balancing political, 
legal and scientific complexities.699 All this is naturally relevant for the legitimacy of the WTO 
dispute settlement system and related issues will be examined in detail in Chapter 5. Here, the focus 
will be on the Hormones and Biotech cases, which have been instrumental in shaping the relationship 
between W TO law and other fields of international law, including the precautionary principle as 
well as MEAs.
3.3.2.1 The Hormones Case
The Hormones dispute originates from the 1980s when the European Community banned imports of 
beef produced with the aid of growth hormones due to concerns that such hormones had caused 
deformities in babies.700 After years of trans-Atlantic negotiations, the U.S. and Canada brought the 
dispute to the WTO. They argued that the EU was violating the SPS Agreement as it import ban on 
hormone beef was not based on scientific justification. Both the panel and the AB ruled in favour 
of the Canada and the U.S. This did nothing to convince the EU of the need to remove its ban on 
hormone meat. After enacting a new directive in 2003, the EU launched dispute setdement 
proceedings against Canada and the U.S. to argue that as a consequence of its new, WTO- 
compliant measure, suspension of concessions was no longer justified. After reviewing complex 
scientific evidence, the panel ruled, in March 2008, that also EU ’s new hormone ban violated the 
SPS Agreement.
The original Hormones panel found several violations the SPS Agreement: The EU had failed to base 
its SPS measure on international standards. It had also failed to conduct a scientific risk assessment 
and adopted arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the level of protection, for instance, by 
permitting the use of growth hormones in the swine industry. The Appellate Body, in turn, 
overturned the panel's strict interpretation of Article 3.3 requiring that that SPS measures must 
conform to international standards, guidelines and recommendations where these exist. According 
to the AB, Article 3.3 conferred the WTO Members the right to adopt a higher level of protection
696 Panel report, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation o f  Apples, WT/DS245/R, 15 July 2003, para. 8.920, and 
Appellate Body report in the same dispute, WT/DS245/AB/R, 26 November 2003, para. 216.
697 Article 21.5 panel report, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation o f  Apples, WT/DS245/RW, 23 June 2005.
698 G. Goh, “Tipping the Apple Cart: The Limits o f Science and Law in the SPS Agreement after Japan-Apples,” 
Journal o f  World Trade 40(4) (2006), 655 at 663, 668.
m  Ibid., 665 etseq, 671.
700 Esty, Greening the GATT, 270-271.
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than that obtained by observing international standards as long as such measures were based on a 
scientific evaluation. The AB also modified the panel's interpretations concerning the concept of 
risk assessment under Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. It broadened the scope o f factors 
that could be taken into account and noted that also matters “not susceptible o f quantitative 
analysis by the empirical or scientific laboratory methods commonly associated with the physical 
sciences” could be considered.701 Furthermore, the AB revised the panel's finding under Article 5.2 
on the existence o f a procedural obligation to demonstrate a relationship between the risk 
assessment and the SPS measure adopted. According to the Appellate Body, what was required was 
a substantive rather than a procedural obligation, namely a reasonable or rational relationship 
between the risk assessment and the measure.702 It concluded, however, that the EU had failed to 
conduct a scientific risk assessment and the hormone ban therefore violated the SPS Agreement. 
Chapter 4 will address in detail the arguments concerning the precautionary principle in the 
Hormones case as these are particularly interesting for the substantive limits of the WTO dispute 
setdement system.
On appeal, the EU also argued that the panel had applied an incorrect standard o f review, in other 
words, the panel should have deferred to the EU’s judgement on whether the ban on hormone beef 
was justified on scientific grounds.703 In response, the AB explained that the required standard was 
neither de novo nor deferential review, but “objective assessment.”704 As the standard o f review 
determines the extent to which the WTO dispute setdement system second guesses decisions by 
national authorities, it affects the delineation o f competences between the national and international 
levels and is therefore relevant for the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system (see 
section 5.2).
3.3.2.1.1 Dispute over the Continued Suspension of Concessions
After the original panel and AB reports, the Hormones dispute continued with arbitration under 
DSU  Article 21.3 to determine the reasonable period for EU to implement the rulings,705 and 
proceedings under DSU  Article 22.2 to authorise Canada and the U.S. to retaliate by suspending 
concessions against the EU.706 In 2003, the EU argued that the suspension of concessions was no 
longer justified since the new Directive 2003/74/EC, complying with the Hormones reports, had
701 Appellate Body report, Hormones, para 187.
702 Ibid.
703 Ibid., para. 111.
704 Ibid, para. 117.
705 Decision by the Arbitrators, EC-Hormones. Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) o f  the DSU, WT/DS26/15, 29 May 
1998.
706 Decision by the Arbitrators, EC-Hormones. Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities, 
WT/DS26/ARB, 12 July 1999.
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been notified to the DSB.707 The new Directive placed a definitive import prohibition on meat 
from animals treated with oestradiol-17|3 and a provisional ban on meat and meat products from 
animals treated with the five other hormones.708 At the request o f the EU, a panel was established 
in 2005 to examine the continued suspension of concessions by Canada and the U.S., and its report 
was circulated at the end o f March 2008. What is remarkable abut the process is that for the first 
time, the panel’s meetings with the disputing parties were opened to the public (see section 5.3).
The panel first found in favour of the EU that the U.S. had breached D SU  Articles 23.1 and 23.2(a) 
by determining that the new hormone meat ban violated covered agreements without having 
recourse to the WTO dispute setdement proceedings.709 It then addressed EU’s claims under DSU  
Article 22.8 providing that the suspension of concessions must be temporary and applied only until 
the inconsistent measure has been removed. The panel concluded that while the substantive 
provisions of the SPS Agreement were not covered by its terms o f reference, analysing them was the 
“immediate consequence” o f including DSU  Article 22.8 in the EU’s request to establish a panel.710 
The panel thus proceeded to analyse whether the EU’s new directive complied with the SPS 
Agreement.711 It noted that in doing so, it “performed functions similar to that o f an Article 21.5 
panel” but stressed that this was done “only in order to determine whether Article 22.8 had been 
breached” since it did not have jurisdiction to determine the compatibility o f the EU’s new measure 
with the covered agreements.712
The EU contended that its ban on oestradiol-17|3 complied with the SPS Agreement by virtue o f a 
comprehensive risk assessment, and the ban on five other growth hormones was justified Article
5.7 of the SPS Agreement permitting provisional measures due to insufficient scientific 
information.7^  The U.S. argued that the EU’s ban on hormone meat violated Article 3.3 o f the SPS 
Agreement as it was not based on the international standards developed by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission.714 Stricter measures were not justified as the EU had still not complied with the 
requirements for risk assessment and justification of provisional measures under Article 5.7 o f the 
SPS Agreement715
The panel began by examining whether the EU’s ban on oestradiol-17|3 complied with the risk 
assessment requirement under Article 5.1. Conscious o f the delicacy o f questions concerning the
707 Panel report, US-Continued Suspension o f  Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/R, 31 March 
2008, para. 7.151.
708 Ibid.. para. 7.157.
709 Ibid., paras. 7.232, 7.856.
710 Ibid., para. 769.
7,1 Ibid, para. 7.580.
712 Ibid., para 8.3.
713 Ibid., para. 7.841.
714 Ibid, paras. 7.838-840.
715 Ibid.
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standard of review, it stressed that it did not intend to conduct its own assessment or impose its 
scientific opinions on the EU.716 After reviewing complex scientific information, it found two 
defects: the EU had not complied with the requirements for risk assessment set out in Annex 4(a) 
of the SPS Agreement because its scientific assessment had not evaluated the possibility that the 
adverse health effects o f excess hormones result from the consumption of hormone meat.717 
Furthermore, scientific evidence on hormone meat did not support the conclusion that the EU had 
drawn from the risk assessment.718 Therefore, the EU’s new measure was not consistent with 
Article 5.1. o f the SPS Agreement.719
Concerning the five other hormones, the panel analysed whether scientific evidence was insufficient 
to justify a provisional ban in accordance with Article 5.7. The panel recalled the AB’s decision in 
Japan-Apples that scientific evidence is not sufficient if it does not, in quantitative or qualitative 
terms, allow a risk assessment under Article 5.1.720 It noted large amount o f evidence from parties 
and ruled that since the EU had the burden o f proof to demonstrate the lack of sufficient scientific 
evidence, its analysis focused on insufficiencies identified by the EU.721 Going through evidence on 
each o f the five hormones, the panel concluded that the EU had not established that scientific 
evidence was insufficient concerning any of them.722 The EU should have identified “critical mass” 
of new evidence to support its argument that since 1997, new evidence had identified important 
gaps in scientific knowledge concerning the five hormones.723
The conclusion was therefore that the EU’s ban violated Articles 5.1 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. 
On this basis, the panel refrained from making conclusions under Article 3.3.724 Returning to the 
EU’s complaint under the DSU, the panel concluded that since it had not been established that the 
EU had removed the measure inconsistent with the covered agreements, there was no basis for 
finding that the U.S. had violated DSU  Article 22.8 by continuing the suspension o f concession.725 
Instead, to implement its findings, the panel recommended the U.S. to “have recourse to the rules 
and procedures o f the D SU  without a delay.”726 Thus, the WTO dispute settlement found yet again 
that the EU’s ban on hormone meat lacked scientific foundation due to the lack o f evidence on 
specific risk - namely that adverse health effects associated with growth hormones are linked with 
the consumption of hormone meat. Furthermore, the panel contended that scientific evidence on
16 Ibid., para 7.443.
]1 Ibid, para. 7.537, 7.578.
18 I b i d para. 7.573, 7.587.
19 Ibid., para. 7.579.
20 Ibid., para. 7.24, and Appellate Body report, Japan-Apples, para. 179.
21 Panel report, US-Continued Suspension o f  Concessions, paras. 7.651-53.
22 Ibid, para. 7.834.
23 Ibid., para. 7.831-35.
24 Ibid., paras. 7.845-846.
25 Ibid, paras. 7.847-850.
26 Ib id , para 8.3
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the five other hormones was sufficient for the EU to conduct a proper risk assessment. For 
environmental NGOs, the outcome of the proceedings was a disappointment and they accused the 
WTO for continuing to push ahead a narrow-minded market-access agenda that completely 
overshadows non-trade concerns.727 Be as it may, the latest decision in the hormones controversy 
illustrates yet again trans-Adantic differences over trade in products of modern science, including 
hormone meat and genetically modified products. Together with the Biotech dispute, it also 
demonstrates that SPS disputes often require WTO panels to assess extremely complex scientific 
evidence, bringing to the fore questions concerning expertise and distribution o f competence 
between the WTO and its Member States (see section 5.2).
3.3.2.2_______ Biotech - the WTO and Modem Biotechnology
Another recent high profile linkage dispute in the WTO dispute setdement system is the Biotech 
dispute concerning the approval of genetically modified (GM) products by the EU.728 Given 
advances in the field o f biotechnology, it is possible to produce genetically engineered organisms in 
laboratories. These include transgenic crops, which contain a gene or genes transferred from 
different species by using recombinant DNA methods. Since the mid-1990s, GM crops have been 
introduced for cultivation in agricultural lands. Typically, their genome has been manipulated to 
increase yields, make them tolerant against herbicides or resistant against insects, or non-biological 
stresses such as droughts. However, several ecological concerns have been associated with biotech 
corps, including spread o f transgenes to related organisms, horizontal gene flow and effects on 
non-target organisms.729 These risks are both complex and uncertain.730 This is why many argue 
that more time and scientific analysis is necessary before releasing biotech crops into the 
environment at a larger scale.
The first GM crop, the FlavrSavr Tomato, was approved for sale n the U.S. in 1994. Since then, 
especially the cultivation o f genetically modified soy, maize and cotton has increased and become 
commercially viable. The cultivation of GM crops is still largely confined to a few countries, most 
notably the U.S., Argentina, Canada, Brazil, China and South Africa. In the early 1990s, the EU 
authorised the commercial release o f a number of GM products to be used for cultivation or as 
food or feed. Soon afterwards, several Member States started voicing concerns over the adequacy
727 Friends o f the Earth & al., “WTO Ruling Force-Feeds Hormones to Europe,” Press Release o f 31 March 2008. 
Available at: <http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2008/Mar3 l_WTO_ruling_force_feeds_hormones_to_Europe.html>
728 The terms biotech products, GMOs, GM products, GM plants and GM crops were used interchangeably in the 
Biotech panel report and they will also be used interchangeably in this work.
729 R. Hill & al., “Risk Assessment and Precaution in the Biosafety Protocol,” RECIEL 13(3) (2004), 263 at 263-265. 
Accordingly, ’’horizontal gene-flow” means non-sexual gene flow to related or unrelated species. Concerns have been 
expressed, in particular, relating to the transfer o f antibiotic-resistant genes to bacteria, including human bacteria.
730 Friends o f the Earth & Greenpeace, “Hidden Uncertainties: What the European Commission Does Not Want Us 
To Know About the Risks o f GMOs,” April 2006. Available at: 
<http://www.foeeurope.org/biteback/download/hidden_uncertainties.pdf>.
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of the European regulatory framework concerning risk assessment, labelling and traceability o f GM 
products. This was largely motivated by highly critical attitudes by European consumers towards 
GM products, probably influenced by European food scares such as the “mad cow disease” (i.e. the 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy, BSE) or outbreaks o f the food and mouth disease. Pending the 
formulation of its new regulations on the approval and labelling o f bioengineered products, the EU 
effectively suspended the approval o f new GM products from October 1998 to May 2004. Certain 
individual Member States also prohibited products already approved for the European market. The 
leading producers of biotech products, including the U.S., grew concerned about their access to the 
European market and the potential of the European actions to influence attitudes towards GM 
crops around the world.
From the beginning, the international community was conscious of challenges posed by modern
biotechnology to environmental protection. Between 1996 and 2000 negotiations thus took place
under the CBD for a specialised regime to protect biological diversity and control international
movements o f GM products. Participation in the process was extensive and the five main
negotiating groups also included the Miami Group in which Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the
U.S. and Uruguay participated. 731 The resulting Cartagena Protocol applies to transboundary
movements o f living modified organisms designed for voluntary introduction into the environment
(such as seeds and fish) as well as those destined for use as food, feed or in food processing
(despite the U.S opposition in the negotiations). The latter definition would cover most o f the
internationally traded biotech products, including soybeans, maize and cotton. The Protocol creates a
detailed regime for international movements o f such products. It establishes an Advance Informed
Agreement procedure to ensure that countries have all the necessary information before approving
imports o f living modified organisms into their territory. The Protocol also contains detailed
provisions on risk assessment related to living modified organisms. Its Article 26 highlights the role
of socio-economic considerations in the decision-making process and provides that parties:
... may take into account, consistent with their international obligations, socio­
economic considerations arising from the impact of living modified organisms on 
the conservation and sustainable use o f biological diversity, especially with regard to 
the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities.
Article 18 of the Protocol and related decisions by the Conference o f the Parties serving as the 
Meeting o f the Parties establish detailed requirements for the handling, transport, packaging and 
identification of living modified organisms. The Protocol also created the Biosafety Clearing House 
to facilitate the exchange o f information on living modified organisms.
731 USD, The Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 9(379), 26 February 2007.
126
Those negotiating the Cartagena Protocol were aware o f its close proximity with WTO rules, including 
the SPS Agreement and attempted addressing their potential conflicts.7^  The preamble o f the 
Cartagena Protocol thus emphasizes that the Protocol does not imply a change in the Parties’ rights 
and obligations under existing international agreements - but it also refers to the understanding that 
this “is not intended to subordinate” the Protocol to other international agreements. Through this 
ambiguous formulation the negotiators effectively deferred questions concerning the relationship 
between the Protocol and WTO rules for future resolution by those applying the rules. The 
Cartagena Protocol entered in force in September 2003, only a few months after Argentina, Canada 
and the U.S. launched the biotech proceedings against the EU at the WTO. The Protocol has over 
130 parties, including the European Community and its Member States. In addition, 60 countries 
have signed the Protocol — including Canada and Argentina. The U.S., in turn, is not party to either 
the Convention on biological Diversity or the Cartagena Protocol.
As Argentina, Canada and the U.S. commenced WTO dispute setdement proceedings against the
EU, many observers worried about the legitimacy implications o f a WTO ruling on such a sensitive
topic.733 They anticipated that a strong condemnation o f the EU ’s GM regime by the W TO would
lead to protests against the decision in Europe, thereby further challenging the legitimacy o f the
WTO. International lawyers also worried about the potential for an open conflict between the SPS
Agreement and the Cartagena Protocol. N ot surprisingly, the European Union regretted the decision by
the complainants to launch dispute settlement proceedings at the WTO:
There is a serious question as to whether the WTO is the appropriate international 
forum for resolving all the GMO issues that the Complainants have raised in these 
cases. The European Community can only regret that the Complainants have 
chosen to start a dispute settlement procedure based on flawed premises.. .734
The complainants chose to limit their legal challenge in a way that did not contest the existence or 
the substance of the EU’s regulatory framework but focused on its de facto application. Their first 
complaint thus concerned the EU’s practice for the approval o f biotech products, in other words, 
the de facto suspension o f their approval and product-specific delays.735 The complainants 
emphasized that while over 30 applications were pending in the pipeline, some of which had 
received a favourable risk assessment from the EU’s own scientific bodies, the EU had failed to 
approve any new biotech products since October 1998.736 The EU denied the existence o f a de facto 
moratorium and highlighted the scientific complexity of assessing the impacts of GMOs, limited
732 For criticism of the Cartagena Protocol, see A. L. Hobbs & al., “The Biosafety Protocol: Multilateral Agreement 
on Protecting the Environment or Protectionist Club,” Journal o f  World Trade, 39(2) (2005), 281.
733 Isaac & Kerr, “A Harvest for Trouble,” 1083-1095.
734 First written submission by the EU in EC -M easures Affecting the Approval and Marketing o f  Biotech Products, 
17 May 2004, para. 10.
735 Panel report, EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing o f  Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006, para. 7.98. {Biotech).
736 Ibid., paras. 4.10-11,4.418.
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experience on GMOs and the irreversibility o f introducing them into the environment given that 
they are able to reproduce autonomously.
The panel concluded that the EU had applied a de facto moratorium on the approval of GMO 
products from June 1999 until August 2003 when the panel was the established.737 Its legal analysis 
focused on the SPS Agreement, while the complainants had also invoked the G A TT  and the TBT  
Agreement. The panel found that the general moratorium and the product-specific delays were not 
themselves SPS measures but they were measures affecting the operation of SPS measures.738 As a 
consequence, the EU’s entire regulatory scheme on the environmental release of GM corps as well 
as substantial parts of its regulations on novel food authorisations were covered by the SPS 
Agreement. Several authors have criticised the panel for its broad interpretation o f the coverage o f 
the SPS Agreement, bringing a range of health and environmental risks fall within its scope.739 The 
panel ruled that by failing  to undertake and complete the approval procedures without “undue 
delay” the EU had violated Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement.74° The delays could not be 
justified by reference to evolving science or precaution as the EU could have adopted temporary 
measures or placed conditions on the final approval.741 The panel thus concluded that the EU must 
lift its general moratorium on GMO products, if still in place, and complete the delayed approval 
processes.742
The second category of challenged measures concerned actions by Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and Luxemburg prohibiting or restricting the marketing of biotech products. The 
panel found these to be SPS measures that were not based on a risk assessment in violation of 
Articles 2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.14,1 It explained that none o f the individual Member States 
had evaluated risks associated with the GM products that they banned.744 Furthermore, it was not 
possible for these countries to invoke risk assessments carried out at the Community level as the 
EU’s scientific bodies had assessed the risks favourably and the products had been approved in the 
EU as a whole.745 The panel also found that the bans imposed by the individual Member States 
could not be justified under Article 5.7 o f the SPS Agreement as sufficient scientific evidence was 
available for conducting a proper risk assessment.
737 Ibid., para. 7.1285. For a good summary o f the decision, see A. Palmer, “The WTO GMO Dispute: Implications 
for Developing Countries and the Need for an Appeal,” November 2006.
™ Ibid., para. 7.1318-1319.
739 J. Peel, “A GMO by Any Other Name... Might Be an SPS Risk! Implications o f Expanding the Scope o f the 
WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement,” European Journal o f  International Law 17(5) (2007), 1009 
at 1012-1013. See also Palmer, “The WTO GMO Dispute,” 6-7,10.
740 Panel report, Biotech, para. 8.6-7.
741 Ibid., para. 7.1529.
742 Ibid., para. 8.16,
743 Ibid, paras. 8.9-10.
744 Ibid., para. 8.10.
745 Ibid., para  8.9.
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It is clear that the Biotech dispute brings to the fore several questions relevant to the topic o f this 
study. The broad interpretation of the coverage o f the SPS Agreement seems problematic given that 
SPS measures are subject to the more stringent requirement o f scientific justification than the test 
of discriminatory trade effects under the G A TT  and TBT Agreement.146 The aspect of the dispute 
that will be criticised the most in Chapter 4 relates to the way in which the panel rejected the 
relevance of non-WTO rules of international law in the dispute. In response to arguments by the 
EU invoking international environmental law, the panel found that neither the precautionary 
principle nor any other rules o f international environmental law, including the Cartagena Protocol.’ 
were relevant to the dispute.747 As it will be seen in Section 4.3, both its legal reasoning and political 
wisdom were questionable in this regard. However, the panel report was not appealed. Instead, its 
flawed legal analysis on the relationship between WTO law and international environmental law 
thus stands to demonstrating that linkage issues continue to pose serious challenges to the 
legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system.
3.4 A Dilem m a betw een Substance and Form
This Chapter has described how the question o f linkages between trade and non-trade policy 
objectives acquired a prominent role in the late 1990s, both politically and in the context o f the 
WTO dispute settlement system. By reviewing the parallel but isolated evolution o f the 
international trade and environmental regimes, it illustrated the lack o f coordination between the 
two spheres o f international law and discrepancies in their level o f institutional development, 
especially concerning dispute settlement. It argued that due to the political prominence of the idea 
of sustainable development and the intimate practical linkages between trade and environmental 
policies, as well as the compulsory jurisdiction o f the WTO dispute setdement system, linkage 
disputes have become a regular feature at the WTO.
As we have also seen, some of the linkage disputes have posed enormous challenges to the
legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system. Chapter 2 highlighted the limited material
jurisdiction of the WTO dispute setdement system and showed how its competence to apply non-
WTO norms is subject to debate. Chapter 3 drew attention to the political tensions to broaden the
substantive scope of the international trade regime and incorporate, inter alia, environmental issues
into its realm. From the point of view of the WTO dispute setdement system, the situation appears
as a difficult dilemma. As summarised by Barfield,
... the new ‘judicative’ WTO dispute setdement system is substantively and politically 
unsustainable. It is not sustainable substantively because there is no real consensus among 
many WTO members on many of the complex regulatory issues that the panels and 
the Appellate Body will be asked to rule upon. In many instances, moreover, the
746 Peel, “A GMO by Any Other Name,” 1011-12.
147 Ibid, paras. 7.74-75.
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underlying treaty text contains gaps, ambiguities and contradictory language. The 
system is not sustainable politically because the imbalance between ineffective rule- 
making procedures and highly efficient judicial mechanisms will increasingly 
pressure panels and the AB to ‘create’ law, raising intractable questions of 
democratic legitimacy.748 (Emphasis added, KK)
This statement alludes to the tensions that form the focus of the second part of this study. The first 
three Chapters o f this work have laid the basis for analysing the legitimacy of the WTO dispute 
settlement system in light of the social, substantive, formal and procedural elements of legitimacy. 
They have demonstrated the growing relevance o f legitimacy in the field o f international law, and 
defined it as a notion consisting of several interlinked components. They have also explained how 
the WTO dispute settlement system functions and how its competence has been understood. The 
next two Chapters, then, focus on the questions raised by Barfield and many others, namely 
whether the WTO dispute setdement system is sustainable substantively’ and whether it is 
‘sustainable politically.’
748 Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy, 7.
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Part II
4. Social/Substantive Legitimacy and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System
Is the WTO dispute settlement system biased towards trade and economic interests? Are non-trade 
values and environmental norms marginalised in the course o f W TO dispute settlement 
proceedings? These questions have surfaced as the most prominent challenges to the social and 
substantive legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system. As we have seen, environmentalist 
critique of the WTO dispute settlement system has often proceeded from the argument that the 
WTO system is biased towards economic interests and does not adequately take into account non­
trade values and policy objectives. Many of these problems result from the limited substantive 
mandate o f the WTO dispute settlement system and its inability to consider claims based on 
international environmental law. According to Esty,
G A T T  procedures reflect a systemic bias toward trade concerns and fail to provide 
an appropriate (open, democratic, technically competent and fair) forum for setting 
the rules o f international economic interaction or for adjudicating disputes that 
affect environmental policies.749
Many argue, however, that there have been important changes since Esty made his argument in
1994 and the most significant hurdles have now been overcome.750 Pauwelyn, for instance,
contends that many of the old environmentalist myths about the GATT/W TO regime are no
longer relevant and invites everyone to:
... embrace and carefully examine the Appellate Body’s more nuanced approach in 
cases such as US-Shrimp Turtle and EC-Asbestos, as well as the W TO’s increasing 
openness to other regimes of international law, including MEAs.751
With a similar ethos Avafia argues that
An examination of Panel and Appellate Body Reports reveals a trend generally 
favourable to the pursuit of sustainable development goals. There are indications 
that the appreciation o f sustainable development objectives by WTO organs is 
widening to its broader socio-economic goals.752
However, this Chapter takes the opposite view and argues that there is no constant evolution in the 
jurisprudence of the WTO concerning environmental issues. While there have been important
749 Esty, Greening the GATT, 52-53.
750 D.A. Wirth, “Some Reflection on Turtles, Tuna, Dolphin and Shrimp,” Yearbook o f  International Environmental 
Law  (1998), 40.
751 Pauwelyn, “G ATTPhantoms Still Haunt the WTO,” 591.
752 T. Avafia, “Does the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding Promote Sustainable Development,” in M. W. 
Ghering & M.-C. Cordonier Segger, eds., Sustainable Development in World Trade Law  (Kluwer Law International, 
2005), 257 at 271.
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developments, it is impossible to detect a consistent practice towards a more careful and open 
approach to environmental norms in the WTO dispute settlement system.
To demonstrate this, the Chapter contains two levels of analysis concerning the relationship 
between WTO law and international environmental law. The first approaches the key linkage 
disputes from a perspective that is broader and different from one employed by many WTO 
scholars. Instead o f assessing the Shrimp-Turtle and Hormones cases ‘top down’ from the perspective 
of WTO norms, I will also examine them from the viewpoint o f international environmental law, 
asking whether their outcome could have been different if the facts were assessed in light of all 
relevant norms. Essentially, this analysis highlights some systemic differences between international 
trade law and international environmental law that, for their part, are challenging the 
social/substantive legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system. The conclusion is, however, 
that many of these problems are such that they cannot be remedied by the WTO dispute setdement 
system but their solution requires a more policy-oriented approach. The second analysis focuses on 
the WTO dispute setdement system and identifies ways in which its social/ substantive legitimacy 
could be improved while at the same time respecting its limited substantive mandate. It illustrates 
that the WTO dispute setdement system has been somewhat inconsistent and untransparent in its 
approach to international environmental norms. It has therefore missed important opportunities 
within the scope o f its mandate for enhancing its substantive legitimacy through constructive 
interaction with international environmental law. Finally, Section 4.3 contains a critical assessment 
of the recent Biotech decision and contends that the narrow approach to international environmental 
law seems to have taken the WTO dispute setdement system further from the proposed solution.
4.1 International Environmental Law in the WTO D ispute Settlement
System
The argument has often been made that the limits to the substantive competence o f WTO dispute 
setdement system prevent it from deciding linkage disputes in a way that is not biased towards 
international trade norms and economic interests. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, in its first Shrimp- 
Turtle decision, the AB was able to alleviate some of the most pressing concerns. It confirmed that 
the interpretation o f the G A TT  was evolutionary, taking into account the rise in environmental 
awareness and the importance attached to sustainable development. The meaning o f the expression 
“exhaustible natural resources” in Article XX(g) was therefore informed by various instruments of 
international environmental law. All this seemed to give a more concrete meaning to the famous 
statement by the AB that WTO law does not exist “in clinical isolation” from other rules o f
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international law.753 By involving “some kind of an engagement with the relevant MEAs,”754 the 
Shrimp-Turtle seemed to open the borders of the WTO system to international environmental law. 
My argument is, however, that even if the Appellate Body’s report contains some groundbreaking 
features, important problems remain. Some of them are legal technical in nature: On what legal 
grounds did the AB choose to refer to the various environmental instruments in the Shrimp-Turtle 
case? How did it conceive their legal status and relevance? Some of the remaining problems have a 
broader systemic dimension. By analysing the facts of the dispute from a broader perspective than 
that of the WTO dispute settlement system, this section aims to highlight how a dispute might be 
solved differently under WTO law and international environmental law. Could it have been 
convincingly argued that the U.S. trade ban was justified under international environmental law? 
And more importantly to the social/substantive legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system, 
did the limited mandate o f the WTO dispute settlement system distort the legal analysis and result 
in a substantive bias towards trade and economic interests?
4.1.1 The Shrimp-Turtle Dispute and MEAs
As the AB acknowledged, it is obvious that sea turtles are endangered species and several 
international instruments aimed at conserving biological diversity recognise their protection as a 
legitimate objective. All seven species o f sea turtles are listed as “critically endangered,” 
“endangered,” or “threatened” on the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Red List. These lists 
have been compiled since 1966 by the Species Survival Commission, which monitors and 
documents man-made risks to the survival o f wild fauna and flora.755 Sea turtles are protected under 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) to which all 
the disputing states are parties and which strictly prohibits international trade in sea turtles and 
turtle parts. All species o f sea turtles, except the Australian flatback, are also listed in Appendices I 
and II of the Bonn Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS) that prohibits, inter alia, the 
“taking” o f the protected migratory species.756 This can be interpreted to mean both direct and 
incidental takings.757 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also addresses the 
protection of living marine resources. Its Article 194(5) obligates states to take measures to protect 
and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat o f depleted, threatened or endangered 
species. Article 60(4) requires states to consider the effects o f fishing on species associated with the 
harvested species with a view to avoiding situations where “their reproduction may become 
seriously threatened.” Furthermore, the Agreement on Implementation of the Provisions of UNCLOS
753 Appellate Body report, US-Gasoline, 17.
754 Fiona Macmillan, WTO and the Environment (Sweet&Maxwell, 2001), 42.
755 P. H. Sand, “Commodity or Taboo? International Regulation o f Trade in Endangered Species,” Green Globe 
Yearbook (1997), 19 at 19.
756 Article 1.1 o f the CMS defines “taking” as: “taking, hunting, fishing, capturing, harassing, deliberate killing or 
attempting to engage in any such conduct.”
757 Kaczka, “Shrimp-Sea Turtle Controversy,” 173.
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relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the 
Straddling Stocks Agreement) obliges states to minimise bycatches o f non-target species.
During the Shrimp-Turtle proceedings, the U.S. argued that the use of Turtle Excluding Devices had:
...become a recognized multilateral environmental standard, fulfilling twin 
commitments on the part of the international community to conserve endangered 
species such as sea turtles, and to minimize their unintentional mortality in fishing 
operations.758
To support its arguments, the U.S. invoked the CITES as well as the UNCLOS, the Agenda 21 and
the Straddling Stocks Agreement.1^  An amicus curiae brief by the Center o f International Environmental
Law further developed the arguments based on international environmental law. The brief stressed
that the protection o f sea turtles was required by numerous instruments o f international
environmental law and by customary principles reflected in these instruments.760 It indicated that
customary rules codified in the UNCLOS obligate fishing states to protect the marine environment
by taking into account effects on other than target species.761 These general rules had been given a
more specific content in the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which emphasises the need
to ensure the conservation of species belonging to the same ecosystem as the target species.762 The
same argument was made based on the Straddling Stocks Agreement, requiring states to m inim ise
catches o f non-target species, especially endangered ones.763 The brief also invoked the Convention on
Biological Diversity, indicating that as the complainant states had ratified it, they were required to
identify threatened species and alter their commercial activities so as to minimise impacts on such
species and promote their recovery. 764 It further highlighted that the CMS, to which India and
Pakistan were parties, prohibits the “taking” o f protected species, including sea turtles apart from
for limited purposes.765 The amicus brief went as far as to argue that while the U.S. conservation
measures were based on international environmental obligations, the complainant nations were
violating international environmental law. In other words,
.. .by refusing to implement TED programs the Complainants have failed to meet 
their commitments and obligations under these agreements and principles, and 
failed to abide by broad international consensus regarding the goals and means of 
protecting endangered sea turtles.766
The amicus brief then outlined some more general international environmental standards, such as 
the requirement to control unsustainable consumption patterns under the Rio Declaration and Agenda
758 Panel report, Shrimp-Turtle, 54.
759 Ibid, 54-55.
760 CIEL & al., '''‘Amicus Curiae Brief to the WTO Appellate Body on United States-Import Prohibition o f  Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products.” Available at: <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/shrimpturtlebrief.pdf>.
761 Ibid.
762 Ibid, 22.
763 Ibid, 23.
764 Ibid.
765 Ibid, 24.
766 Ibid, 24.
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21, the duty to prevent harm to the environment of other states and global commons, and the 
precautionary principle.767 It also argued that by providing financial and technical support for the 
protection o f sea turtles, the U.S. was acting in accordance with principle o f common but 
differentiated responsibilities.768 Finally, the amicus brief stated that while international 
environmental law prefers multilateral solutions, it does not prohibit unilateral trade measures.769 In 
contrast, the complainant nations stricdy opposed any attempts to regard the U.S. import 
prohibition on shrimp as something justified or required by international environmental law.
Basing itself “on the current status o f the WTO rules and o f international law” the panel
emphasised that its reasoning was consistent with general international law:
Our findings with respect to international norms confirm our reasoning regarding 
the WTO Agreement and the GATT. General international law and international 
environmental law clearly favour the use of negotiated instruments rather than 
unilateral measures.. .770
According to the panel, the fact that both the complainants and third parties had objected to the 
use o f TEDs “made it difficult to conclude that the mandatory use of TEDs has been customarily 
accepted as a multilateral standard applicable to the com p lainants ”771 As will be explained in detail 
in section 4.2, the AB listed various environmental instruments to justify its conclusion that sea 
turtles were an “exhaustible natural resource” and that international environmental law preferred 
multilateralism to unilateral trade measures. But was this enough to show that the limited mandate 
WTO system does not lead to any alarming bias in its legal analysis in favour of free trade? Or 
could a judicial body with a broader mandate have done more?
O f the various international environmental instruments relevant to the Shrimp-Turtle dispute, the 
CITES seems to be most specific in addressing the protection of sea turtles. The CITES is designed 
to protect endangered species by preventing commercial international trade in wild species from 
driving them towards extinction. It classifies species into three categories based on the degree of 
protection needed and imposes controls on their transboundary movement. Species listed in 
Appendix II can be traded subject to strict controls whereas species listed in Appendix I cannot be 
traded at all. Sea turtles are included in the first Appendix of the CITES, in other words, the highest 
risk category. Consequendy, trade in both sea turtles and turtle parts is prohibited under the CITES 
and the international movement of sea turtles is subject to strict controls. As indicated in Article 
11(1) o f the CITES, trade in sea turtles must be subject to “particularly strict regulation in order not 
to endanger their survival and must be authorized only in exceptional circumstances.” All the
161 Ibid, 26-21.
768 Ibid, 29.
769 Ibid, 29-30.
770 Panel report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 7.50.
771 Ibid, para. 7.49.
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parties to the Shrimp-Turtle case are also Parties to the CITES and its applicability to the facts 
underlying the Shrimp-Turtle dispute is therefore clear.
Being an instrument that focuses on a single threat facing the wildlife, the CITES fails to specify
protection measures other than export controls. As the Shrimp-Turtle panel noted,
...CITES, even though its object is to contribute to the protection o f certain 
species, does not impose on its members specific methods o f conservations such as 
TEDs.772
Furthermore, even if the CITES aims to protect certain species by limiting their trade, it is silent 
concerning measures to be taken in situations where trade in other species threatens the survival o f 
these endangered species. As sea turtles are not threatened by trade in turtles themselves, but by 
trade in shrimps, the controls imposed by the CITES were not direcdy applicable. Trying to infer 
otherwise from the provisions of the CITES would have clearly amounted to an expansive 
interpretation of the Convention.
Similar problems also arise when attempting to justify the U.S. trade prohibition under the other
instruments o f international environmental law relevant to the Shrimp-Turtle case. International
environmental law indisputably recognises that sea turtles are a highly migratory, endangered
species and that protective measures should be taken at the global level to prevent them from
becoming extinct. In the words of the amicus brief to the Appellate Body,
...the sea turtle conservation measures flow from the fundamental principles o f 
sustainable development embodied in international environmental agreements and 
customary law principles. They are based on an international consensus that sea 
turtles are endangered, that endangered species should be protected, that by-catch 
should be eliminated, that selective fishing gear should be used, and that 
unsustainable consumption patterns should be eliminated.773
However, international environmental instruments fail to address explicidy the leading cause of sea 
turtle mortality, namely drowning in shrimp nests, or prescribe specific policies and measures to 
protect sea turtles from the threat. Thus, even if it is evident that the U.S. legislation contributes to 
a legitimate objective recognised under international environmental law, there seems to be no clear 
legal basis for the U.S. import prohibition in the instruments of international environmental law 
currendy in force. The analysis thus highlights that international environmental law is far less 
developed than the WTO regime.774 By its very nature, international environmental law is 
fragmented: It encompasses a multitude o f legal instruments addressing specific environmental 
threats that are often deeply intertwined with other, much broader ecological problems. While sea 
turtles are protected under several instruments, the achievement o f the underlying conservation
772 Ibid., para.7.58.
773 CIEL, “Amicus Curiae Brief to the AB,” 30.
774 See generally, Macmillan, WTO and the Environment, 266 et seq.
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objectives is held back by the fact that there is no overarching structure to ensure coordinated and 
comprehensive protection. International environmental law also relies more on principles and 
standards than on clearly written, specific rules.775 For these reasons, the contents o f international 
environmental law are at times hard to determine and the legality o f a measure that seeks to 
advance a widely recognized, legitimate environmental objective can be difficult to define. Given 
the ambiguous nature of the underlying norms, it seems that even an international environmental 
court would have struggled to do more than the WTO dispute settlement system in the Shrimp- 
Turtle dispute
However, it is not inconceivable that a body with a comprehensive jurisdiction would have 
accepted the argument put forward by environmental NGO s in their amicus brief — that the 
protection of sea turtles was required by international environmental law and therefore the U.S. 
condition cocnerning the use of TEDs was justifiable. Arguably, this would have been possible 
through a teleological interpretation highlighting the protection of sea turtles as the fundamental 
objective o f the CITES and the various other instruments of international environmental law. The 
decision could have emphasized that the endangered status o f sea turtles is clearly recognised under 
international environmental law and emphasised that states are required to take steps to protect 
them. As TEDs are one o f the most efficient means to address the leading cause of sea turtle 
mortality, the decision could have concluded that the U.S. measure was fully compatible with the 
objectives o f international environmental law. It could even have drawn interpretative support from 
G A TT  Article XX(g) to stress that the multilateral trade agreement does not prevent states from 
taking measures to protect exhaustible natural resources. Indeed, it can be asked whether such a 
decision emphasising the legitimate objectives of international environmental law would have been 
radically different from the statement by the first Shrimp-Turtle panel that all measures undermining 
the objectives of the multilateral trade system were inconsistent with the G ATT. While this 
controversial analysis was overturned by the AB, the Shrimp-Turtle panel decision was by no means 
the only example of a teleological interpretation in the history of the GATT/W TO dispute 
setdement but the regime has in other instances been successfully developed with the overarching 
goal o f trade liberation in mind.776 For under the CITES, a teleological interpretation seeking to 
advance its general objective of environmental conservation could be legitimate whereas under the
775 As Sands describes, international environmental norms are set forth “in literally thousands o f acts adopted at the 
national, bilateral, sub-regional, regional and global levels... The lack o f central legislative authority, or o f a coherent 
set o f international legislative arrangements, has resulted in a law-making process and a body o f rules which are ad  
hoc, piecemeal and fragmented.” P. Sands, Principles o f  International Environmental Law, Volume 1, Frameworks, 
Standards and Implementation (MUP, 1995), 136-137.
776 Howse, ’’Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law,” 54-55. According to 
Howse, especially many GATT panels have tended “to assume they understood the general purpose o f a provision, 
and to give sense to it in light o f that purpose, without regard to the individual words and phrases,” which “almost 
always resulted in rulings tilted towards on particular value among the competing values at stake, namely that of 
liberal trade.”
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G ATT, environmental protection constitutes an exception and similar conservationist emphasis 
would not seem justified.
Conscious o f problems related to fragmentation o f international law (see Chapter 6), it is not my
intention to argue that the Shrimp-Turtle dispute should have been decided by an international
environmental court and that such a court, if it existed, should go for ambitious teleological
interpretations. Clearly, such a decision would thus carry all the weaknesses usually associated with
an expansive, interpretation of the relevant legal norms (see Section 5.1). The objective of the
present analysis was different. Its intention was to examine the argument that the WTO dispute
settlement system is biased towards trade interests and study whether and to what extent the limited
mandate of the WTO dispute settlement system distorts the legal analysis in linkage disputes. In
that regard, two conclusions can be drawn. First, is conceivable that the Shrimp-Turtle case could
have been decided differently by a judicial body laying more emphasis on the environmental norms
that indisputably recognise the necessity o f protecting sea turtles from extinction. Hence, even in
the environmentally conscious Shrimp-Turtle decisions, there seems to be a certain bias towards
trade in the WTO dispute settlement system. The above analysis thus confirms that the limited
substantive mandate of the WTO dispute settlement system continues to pose challenges to its
legitimacy. The second - preliminary - conclusion is that the judicial techniques at the disposal of
the WTO dispute setdement system are not adequate to remedy the important institutional and
systemic problems. As the International Law Commission indicates, priorities between international
law’s different rules or rule-systems:
... cannot be justifiably attained by what is merely an elucidation o f the process of 
legal reasoning. They should reflect the (political) preferences o f international actors, 
above all States. Normative conflicts do not arise as technical “mistakes” that could 
be “avoided” by a more sophisticated way o f legal reasoning... They require a 
legislative, not a legal-technical response.777
In other words, while the fragmented and decentralised nature of international law continues to 
challenge the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system, the system itself seems incapable of 
addressing these problems given the limits of its judicial function. Instead, what would be required 
are legislative efforts within the WTO legal framework — and even beyond. The reasons for this will 
be elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6.
Finally, I wish to highlight that the limited mandate of the WTO dispute setdement system would 
seem to exclude from its ambit even considerations o f a more economic nature.778 There is an 
obvious and important development dimension in a dispute between the world’s economic
777 Ibid.
778 For a proposal to interpret WTO Agreements in light o f the development objective, see A. F. Qureshi, 
Interpreting the WTO Agreements (CUP, 2006), 114 etseq.
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superpower and a group of developing countries concerning technologically advanced fishing
methods and discrepancy in resources. Even though TEDs are often characterized as a “simple and
inexpensive innovation” striking the best balance between the competing economic and
environmental objectives, at the time of the dispute their price ranged between 75-500 U.S. dollars.
For developing country fishermen, this is a lot of money. As India and Pakistan indicated during
the Shrimp-Turtle proceedings, the average annual income of fishermen in India and Pakistan was
around 300 U.S. dollars and 60-700 U.S. dollars respectively. Furthermore, Thailand argued that the
consequential cost of TEDs, including installation and training, amounted to 3.200 U.S. dollars per
vessel. Thus, cheap as they may seem by the U.S. standards, TEDs were still too expensive to be
considered by the developing country fishermen affected by the U.S. shrimp embargo. Bhagwati
has criticized the Shrimp-Turtle case from this perspective asking whether the U.S. should have
bought and distributed TEDs:
...to  the several thousand, but still few, fishermen in the plaintiff countries, as a 
procedure that would be a fair-minded since the rich countries and their NGO s that 
feel strongly about this issue should provide enabling assistance to developing 
countries that do not.779
Considered in this light, the Shrimp-Turtle dispute clearly appears as something more than an 
environmental dispute. The fact that it is predominandy conceived as one thus illustrates the 
problems considered in Chapters 1 and 5, namely that not all relevant interest groups, such as 
developing country fisherman, have either the expertise or the means to effectively participate in 
the functioning of the WTO.
4.1.2 The Hormones Case and the Precautionary Principle
Another encounter between WTO rules and international environmental law occurred in the 
Hormones case. Here, the question concerned the relationship between the SPS Agreement and the 
precautionary principle, which the EU invoked as a justification for its ban on meat produced with 
the aid of growth hormones. As we saw in Chapter 3, the SPS Agreement requires that measures 
taken to protect human, animal or plant life or health are necessary and based on scientific 
justification. The precautionary principle, in turn, is a concept that has been developing in 
international environmental law to justify precautionary action in the face o f scientific 
uncertainty.780 Hence the potential tension between the SPS Agreement and the precautionary 
principle.
779 Bhagwati, “Afterword: The Question of Linkage,” 134.
780 It has been argued that the weakest version o f  the precautionary principle requires States to act with care and when 
taking decisions which may have an adverse impact on the environment. A stronger formulation urges them to 
regulate activities which may be harmful to the environment even if conclusive scientific evidence o f their 
harmfulness is not yet available,” J. Cameron & H. Ward, "The Multilateral Trade Organisation: A Revised 
Perspective" in J.Cameron & al., eds., Trade & the Environment: The Search fo r  Balance, Volume 1 (Cameron May, 
1994), 96 at 106.
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As we have already seen, international environmental law remains a relatively undeveloped field of 
international law, and the legal status o f several environmental principles still waits for 
confirmation. As o f today, this is very much true regarding to the precautionary principle. In the 
Hormones case, the panel and the AB did not take a stand on the controversial question as to 
whether the precautionary principle had evolved into a norm of customary international law. They 
both concluded that neither the principle nor its legal status were o f relevance since the SPS 
Agreement itself reflected precaution and laid down detailed requirements concerning scientific 
justification o f trade-restrictive SPS measures. Despite the fact that the relationship between the 
SPS Agreement and the precautionary principle have been subject to a lively discussion subsequent to 
the Hormones decision, the Biotech panel chose to apply the same logic and concluded that neither the 
precautionary principle nor its specific formulation in the Cartagena Protocol were relevant to the 
interpretation of the SPS Agreement in a dispute concerning genetically modified products.
4.1.2.2_______ Legal Status and Relevance o f the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle is a tool to mitigate risks to health and environment caused by the lack
of scientific certainty and to justify regulatory action in such situations. Its key elements are have
been elaborated in the Principle 15 o f Rio Declaration'.
Where there are threats o f serious or irreversible damage, lack o f full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.
Since the mid-1980s the precautionary principle has appeared in several international environmental 
treaties and instruments, including such key MEAs as the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the CBD. The customary law status of the precautionary principle has been 
debated in literature and before various international courts and tribunals. The International Court 
of Justice has come across the principle twice, in the attempted reactivation o f the Nuclear Tests case 
in 1995781 and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam dispute between Hungary and Slovakia in 1998.782 In 
1999, Australia and New Zealand requested interim measures o f protection from the International 
Law of the Sea Tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute, arguing that the precautionary principle 
was customary international law.783 All these decisions took a cautious approach to the legal status 
of the precautionary principle, in some cases hinting at the possibility that the precautionary 
principle is emerging as a rule of customary law.784 However, they also illustrated that a difference 
of opinion existed as to whether precaution was a legal principle or an “approach,” in other words,
781ICJ: Request fo r  an examination o f  the situation in accordance with paragraph 63 o f  the Court's Judgement o f20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports (1995), 288.
782 ICJ: Case concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) ICJ Reports (1997), 7.
783 ITLOS: Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Australia & New Zealand v. Japan) (Provisional Measures) Order o f 27 
August 1999.
784 For a thorough analysis, see Kulovesi, "Cautious about Precaution,” 8-27.
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something more flexible and obscure.785 The fact that the precautionary principle has been invoked 
before so many international courts and tribunals within such a short period of time is significant in 
its own right and serves to illustrate the growing relevance of the principle.
The precautionary principle enjoys a strong status in the EU where it has been incorporated into 
Article 174(2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. In the Hormones dispute, the EU 
argued that the precautionary principle would override the requirement in the SPS Agreement that a 
SPS measure must have a sound scientific basis.786 According to the EU, there was scientific 
uncertainty concerning the health effects o f hormone-treated meat. It argued that Article 3.3 of the 
SPS Agreement allowed each WTO Member State to determine its desirable level of sanitary and 
phytosanitary protection. Furthermore, Articles 5.1 and 5.2 requiring trade restrictions to be based 
on a scientific risk assessment did not prevent a state from being cautious when setting health 
standards in the face of conflicting scientific information and uncertainty. In support, the EU 
indicated that the precautionary principle was:
.. .already a general customary rule of international law or at least a general principle
of law, the essence o f which is that it applies not only in the management o f a risk,
but also in the assessment thereof.787
The implication of the precautionary principle in the Hormones dispute was that the risk assessment 
requirement in Articles 5.1 and 5.2 o f the SPS Agreement was flexible in the face o f scientific
uncertainty. WTO Members were thus allowed to restrict trade even where there was no
conclusive scientific evidence o f the risk. It is worth noting the EU refrained from invoking Article
5.7 of the SPS Agreement, which reflects a precautionary approach but only as a justification for 
temporary trade restrictions pending a scientific risk assessment. The EU was looking for a more 
permanent justification for its ban on hormone beef and based its argument rather on customary 
international law.788 According to the U.S. and Canada, however, precautionary principle was not a 
norm of customary international law.789 Rather, it was an “approach” the content of which could 
vary from context to context.790 According to Canada, the precautionary approach or concept was 
an emerging principle of international law that could, in the future, crystallize into general principle o f 
law.791 Presumably, the U.S. opposition relates to fears that as a definite legal concept, the 
precautionary principle would provide “the litigious American society with another tool to
785 Ibid., 26-27.
786 H. Mann & S. Porter, The State o f  Trade and Environment Law 2003, Implications fo r  Doha and Beyond. (IISD & 
CIEL, 2003), 36.
787 Appellate Body report, Hormones, para. 16.
788 Panel report, EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/R, WT/DS/48/R, 18 August 1997, 
para. 8.157.
789 Appellate Body report, Hormones, paras. 43 and 60.
790 Ibid.
791 Ib id , para. 60.
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challenge governmental decisions.”792 The U.S. and Canada also stressed that Article 5.7 o f the SPS 
Agreement permitted the adoption o f provisional sanitary measures where scientific evidence was 
uncertain and there was thus no need to invoke the precautionary principle.793
Both the panel and the AB were hesitant to define the legal status of the precautionary principle
According to the panel, to the extent that the precautionary principle:
...could be considered as part of customary international law and be used to 
interpret Articles 5.1 and 5.2 on the assessment of risks as a customary rule of 
interpretation of public international law ... (it, KK) would not override the explicit 
wording of Articles 5.1 and 5.2... in particular since the precautionary principle has 
been incorporated and given a specific meaning in Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement.794
The AB was more explicit:
The status o f the precautionary principle in international law continues to be the 
subject of debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators and judges. The 
precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallized into a general 
principle of customary international environmental law. Whether it has been widely 
accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international law appears less 
than clear.795
The AB did not go into the details of the uncertainty or attempt to solve it indicating that it was 
“unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on 
this important, but abstract, question.”796 It ruled that even if the principle was reflected in Article
5.7 as well as in other parts of the SPS Agreement, it had not been written into the SPS Agreement as a 
ground for justifying measures otherwise inconsistent the Agreement.797 In other words, the 
precautionary principle did not override Articles 5.1 and 5.2 o f the SPS Agreement requiring a WTO 
Member to base its SPS measures on scientific risk assessment.798 According to this logic, the 
customary law status of the precautionary principle was not relevant in determining o f the legality 
of the European ban on hormone beef. Many commentaries have endorsed the AB’s approach on 
the grounds that “there was no need to define the legal value of precaution because the SPS 
Agreement incorporated many of the necessary elements in its treaty language.”799
792 S. Shaw & R. Schwartz, “Trading Precaution: The Precautionary Principle and the WTO” United Nations 
University -  Institute o f  Advance Studies Report (United Nations University, 2005), 5.
793 Appellate Body report, Hormones, para. 43.
794 Panel report, Hormones, paras. 8.160-61.
795 Appellate Body report, Hormones, para. 123.
796 Ibid
791 Ibid, para. 124.
798 Ibid, para. 125.
799 M.-C.Cordonier Segger & M.W.Gehring, “The WTO and Precautions: Sustainable Development Implications of 
the WTO Asbestos Dispute,” Journal o f  Environmental Law 15(3) (2003), 289 at 306.
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In my view, however, this legal analysis is not correct. Contrary to what the AB argued, the legal 
status o f the precautionary principle really is not irrelevant and abstract question. As Marceau and 
Trachtman note:
.. .WTO Members are bound to respect all their obligations simultaneously (“the” 
or “a” the precautionary principle would be o f equal hierarchical value to the treaty 
provisions of the WTO). Under international law, WTO Members would be under 
an obligation to comply with both their WTO obligations and any general principle 
of law regarding the precautionary principle, although such a general principle could 
not be given direct effect as such by WTO adjudication bodies who would 
recogni2e its existence and appreciate its impact on WTO law.800
Also Pauwelyn indicates that although he agrees with the AB’s conclusion, the legal reasoning was 
not justified but the AB “was obliged to make a ruling on whether this principle is, indeed part of 
customary law binding on the disputing parties.”801 I agree with these comments. In my view, the 
AB erred in finding that the legal status of the precautionary principle was irrelevant to the Hormones 
decision. Instead, it should have appreciated the precautionary principle’s potential impact on WTO 
law - or, at least explained why the precautionary principle, even as a customary norm, would be 
irrelevant to the interpretation of the SPS Agreement.*02 Was this because states can adopt treaties 
that override other customary norms than those having an erga omnes nature?803 Does it meant that, 
according to the AB’s view, customary rules cannot override specific treaty obligations and do not 
have any impact on their interpretation?
It must not be forgotten, however, that determining the legal status and meaning o f the 
precautionary principle would have been challenging tasks for an international trade body. Indeed, 
it can be asked whether the WTO dispute settlement system should play a role in developing 
international environmental law, and whether it could have done what both the International Court 
o f Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea failed to do. As we saw, both of 
these courts would have had the opportunity to confirm the customary law status o f the 
precautionary principle and elaborate on its meaning around the same time that the Appellate Body 
rendered its Hormones decision. However, neither confirmed the legal status of the precautionary 
principle in unequivocal terms. The reluctance of the AB to engage in such an exercise is therefore 
perfectly understandable — but it does not remedy the consequent legal defects in the Hormones 
decision.
800 G. Marceau & J.P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. A Map o f World Trade Organization Law of 
Domestic Regulation o f Goods,” Journal o f  World Trade 36(5) (2002), 811 at 849.
801 Pauwelyn, Conflict o f  Norms, 482.
802 On relationship between treaties and customary law, P. Sands, "Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization o f 
International Law" Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 1 (1998), 85 at 95.
803 Mann & Porter, The State o f  Trade and Environment Law 2003, 29.
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What, then, could be the impact o f the precautionary principle on WTO law? One o f the counter­
arguments to the environmentalist critique is that the WTO jurisprudence and the precautionary 
principle are already fully compatible. This argument highlights the unclear meaning of the 
precautionary principle in the field of international environmental law and the fact that various 
MEAS use different definitions of its meaning.804 According to Motaal, differences in the definition 
of the precautionary principle relate to four main issues: (1) the level of scientific uncertainty (2) the 
nature o f the threat or risk (3) burden o f proof and (4) factors that may be considered when 
designing the precautionary measure.805 She argues that the SPS Agreement contains extensive space 
for precautionary action and would seem to accommodate at least one interpretation of the 
precautionary principle.806 In other words, the definition o f risk can be interpreted in a flexible 
manner and the evaluation of likelihood can be either quantitative or qualitative.807 Furthermore, 
the very nature o f risk assessment process is flexible:
The use of inference options (which, in the end, are policy decisions, and not 
necessarily scientific ones) creates tremendous flexibility in the conduct o f a risk 
assessment... Therefore, in requiring countries to base their measures on a risk 
assessment, the WTO provides them with tremendous flexibility for the use of the 
precautionary principle.808
Regarding the threshold for triggering precaution, Motaal argues that WTO Members have a “right
to react to events which have a very low probability of occurrence.” 809 She also indicates that like
the Cartagena Protocol’ also the SPS Agreement allows countries to reverse the burden o f proof is they
so desire — although here she admits that it is the importing country that has the burden o f proof
vis-a-vis the WTO.810 Furthermore, Motaal argues that the SPS Agreement does not differ to any great
extent from the different definitions of the precautionary principle embodied in MEAs: it mentions
cost-effectiveness and lays down the requirement that SPS measures must be transparent and not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory.811 In conclusion, Motaal thus argues that:
... WTO rules provide countries with extensive scope for exercising the 
precautionary principle, despite the fact that there is not a universal definition or 
interpretation of that principle.. .812
While it is true, as Mootal explained, that the current WTO practice would seem to be largely 
compatible at least with some understandings of the precautionary principle, this does not remedy all 
the flaws in the AB’s legal analysis. This is because in theory, several possibilities exist for interpreting 
the terms o f the SPS Agreement - such as the meaning o f risk assessment, factors that are relevant
804 D. Abdel Motaal, “Is the World Trade Organization Anti-Precaution?,” Journal o f  World Trade 39(3) (2005), 483 
at 484.
805 Ibid.
806 Ibid., 492.
Ibid., 493-94.
808 Ibid., 495.
809 Ibid, 497.
810 Ibid, 498.
8,1 Ibid, 498.
i n Ibid, 501.
144
during the process and the threshold risk that can justify SPS measures. Therefore, also different 
interpretations o f the SPS Agreement are possible. For instance, risk assessment could also be understood 
as a highly formalised process that is to the greatest extent possible based on quantitative data.813 If, 
however, the precautionary principle has acquired the status o f customary international law or general 
principle of law, the AB would, in my view, be legally bound to such interpretations of the SPS 
Agreement that reflect the precautionary principle. This could mean interpreting - as the AB has done - 
the SPS Agreement in such a way that allows risk to be assessed in either quantitative or qualitative 
terms,814 or that allows a very low threshold risk to trigger precautionary action.815 Thus, the key 
problem here is not that the current WTO practice is at odds with the precautionary principle but that 
it remains unclear whether the AB has chosen to adopt such interpretations at its own discretion. 
Given the refusal of the WTO dispute setdement system (and other judicial bodies) to define the 
legal status and meaning of the precautionary principle, this question is now awaiting authoritative 
answer.
4.1.3 Conclusions
The task here was to consider WTO norms and international environmental norms on an equal 
footing to examine whether and how the mandate of the WTO dispute settlement system affects 
the outcome of linkage disputes. Looking at the facts o f both the Shrimp-Turtle and Hormones cases, 
it is clear that international environmental law could have given more relevance. On the other hand, 
the fact remains that even for a judicial body with a comprehensive jurisdiction to consider WTO 
law and international environmental law, it would have been difficult to reach unequivocal 
conclusions based on the relevant environmental norms. International environmental law is far less 
developed than WTO law -  and the prospects for its further development are limited given the 
absence o f suitable judicial fora. As it will be emphasised in Chapter 6, these broader institutional 
problems are such that they cannot be remedied through WTO dispute settlement but should be 
considered by those making international law. From the perspective of the WTO dispute 
setdement system, the fact remains that it cannot fully consider claims made based on international 
environmental law. An ambitious approach to international environmental law by the WTO dispute 
would immediately bring to the fore the formal/procedural dimension of legitimacy and questions 
that will be considered in Chapter 5. However, the argument here is that the legal toolkit at the 
disposal o f the WTO dispute settlement system still holds some unexploited potential. The 
following section therefore revisits the two cases and makes some concrete proposals for ways in 
which the WTO dispute settlement system could improve its legitimacy.
813 Hill & al, “Risk Assessment and Precaution,”268.
814 Appellate Body report, Asbestos, para. 167.
815 According to the AB, the appropriate level o f protection could also be ‘zero risk.’ Appellate Body report, 
Australian Salmon, para. 126.
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4.2. References to International Environmental Law and Legitimacy
While the previous section addressed challenges to the social/substantive legitimacy of the WTO 
dispute setdement system from a broader perspective, the focus in this section is on areas where 
the WTO dispute setdement system itself could — and should — alleviate some of the remaining 
problems. One of the most compelling critiques against the WTO dispute setdement system is that 
it has been inconsistent and selective towards international environmental law. According to 
Dunoff,
The critical question is whether a move towards more permeable doctrinal borders 
[in the Shrimp-Turtle decision, KK] represents the wholesale incorporation of 
international environmental law into international trade law or the “selective 
incorporation.” More pointedly, will doctrinal borders be relatively permeable where 
international environmental law does not interfere with the trade regime’s goal o f 
market liberalisation, but relatively impermeable where international environmental law impedes 
this objective?816 [Emphasis added, KK]
Indeed, the following analysis demonstrates that the WTO dispute setdement system has not been
transparent and consistent in its approach to international environmental norms. For instance, it
has not adequately justified why certain environmental norms have been considered relevant to the
interpretation o f WTO law while others have not. This is unfortunate from the point o f view of its
legitimacy: Consistency and transparency o f legal reasoning contribute to the legitimacy of a judicial
body and these qualities are particularly important in politically sensitive disputes such as trade-
environment ones.817 As Howse has indicated:
Integrity and coherence in legal interpretation contribute to the legitimacy of a 
tribunal adjudicating competing values through providing assurance that the 
tribunal's decisions are not simply a product of its own personal choice of the values 
that should prevail in a given dispute.818
The argument here is that some of the challenges to the substantive legitimacy o f the WTO dispute 
setdement system could be remedied by a more transparent and careful approach to international 
environmental norms when applying the WTO Agreements. These conclusions apply even if  one 
interprets the mandate of the WTO dispute setdement system and argues — as Marceau and 
Trachtman have done — that it is never competent to direcdy apply non-WTO norms. It would of 
course be even more relevant if one agrees with Pauwelyn that the WTO dispute settlement system 
is competent to direcdy apply non-WTO norms in conflict situations. In any case, the WTO 
dispute setdement system should ensure that the references it makes to environmental norms are
816 J.L. Dunoff, “Border Patrol at the World Trade Organization,” Yearbook o f  International Environmental Law 9 
(1998), 20 at 24-25.
817 The following analysis has been published in slightly edited form in K. Kulovesi, ““A Link Between 
Interpretation, International Environmental Law and Legitimacy in the WTO Dispute Settlement,” International 
Trade Law and Regulation 11(6) (2005), 188.
818 Howse, ’’Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law,” 51.
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consistent and justified not only in terms of WTO law but also from the point o f view of 
international environmental law.
4.2.1 The Problem of Inconsistency
The AB’s first Shrimp-Turtle decision makes several significant statements concerning the 
interpretation of the GATT. In applying Article XX(g), the AB highlighted that the text had to be 
read “in the light o f contemporary environmental concerns,” and that its language was not “static” 
but rather “by definition, evolutionary.”819 Thus, the definition ‘exhaustible natural resources’ also 
encompassed living natural resources such as sea turtles.820 To support this evolutionary 
interpretation, the AB referred to several multilateral environmental agreements including the 
UNCLOS, CBD and CMS.S2X It also acknowledged that sea turtles were listed in the Appendix I of 
CITES which, according to the AB, meant that their exhaustibility “would in fact have been very 
difficult to controvert.”822 Again when applying the chapeau o f Article XX, the AB referred to the 
preamble o f the WTO Agreement, which demonstrated “a recognition by the W TO negotiators 
that optimal use of the world’s resources should be made in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development” — a fact that must “add colour, texture and shading" to the interpretation 
o f Article XX.”823 The AB also emphasised the establishment of the Committee on Trade and 
Environment as an example o f other developments “which help to elucidate the objectives of 
WTO members with respect to the relationship between trade and environment.”824
While significant, these references also bring to the fore some important questionmarks. Why were
certain environmental instruments relevant and exactly how did the AB conceive their legal status?
This is particularly true for the Convention on Biological Diversity, which, as Scott indicates:
N ot only is this not an instrument cited by the W TO Decision on Trade and 
Environment (it thus not being possible to infer indirect consent on the part o f all 
WTO Members), but the US is not a party and it predates the WTO.825
As we saw in Chapter 2, the majority of W TO scholars argue that at least all parties to the dispute 
need to be parties to a MEA in order for it to be considered a relevant rule that must be taken into 
account in accordance with Article 31.3(c) o f the VCLT. In section 4.3 we will see that the Biotech 
panel has subsequently referred to an even stricter interpretation, namely that it is possible that all 
WTO Members must be Parties to a treaty before its provisions become relevant rules of
819 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, paras.129-130.
820 Ibid., para. 131.
821 Ibid., para. 130.
822 Ibid., para. 132.
823 Ibid., para. 152.
824 Ibid., para. 153.
825 J. Scott, “International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the 
WTO,” European Journal o f  International Law 15(2) (2004), 307 at 339.
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international law under the V C L T  and the customary rules o f treaty interpretation. The Biotech 
panel explained, however, that non-WTO norms o f international law can also be taken into account 
not as legal rules but “for their informative character.”826 In other words, they can assist in defining 
the ‘ordinary meaning’ o f the treaty text in the same way as a dictionary. 827 Interestingly enough, 
while the AB deemed the CBD as relevant to the Shrimp-Turtle case, the Biotech panel went to rule 
that neither the CBD nor the Biosafety Protocol were relevant in a dispute dealing with the very subject 
matter of the Biosafety Protocol. This can be seen as a first indication that WTO jurisprudence has not 
been consistent in its approach to international environmental law.
Taking the consistency analysis further, the way that the AB emphasised the role o f multilateralism 
in solving international environmental problems offers a particularly fruitful object. The intensity of 
the U.S. efforts to negotiate a multilateral solution to the protection of sea turtles played an 
important role in determining whether its import prohibition constituted ‘unjustifiable’ and 
‘arbitrary’ discrimination inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XX. This aspect o f the case, 
touching upon the controversial issue o f unilateral trade measures, was also politically highly 
sensitive: on the one hand, categorically rejecting such measures is capable o f generating 
environmentalist criticism leading to such legitimacy challenges as illustrated by the Tuna-Dolphin 
disputes. On the other hand, the decision also had to account for powerful fears that if treated too 
lightly, unilateral trade measures and “green protectionism” could flourish inflicting serious harm 
on the multilateral trading system.
During the first phase o f the Shrimp-Turtle case, the AB found that the U.S measure fulfilled the 
requirements of Article XX(g), but ruled that the it was being applied in a manner that constituted 
‘unjustifiable discrimination’ in violation of the chapeau. In explaining this conclusion the AB 
stated that:
Another aspect.. .that bears heavily in any appraisal... is the failure o f the United 
States to engage the appellees... in serious, across-tht-boatd negotiations with the 
objective o f concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and 
conservation of sea turtles.828
The AB identified three defects in the U.S conduct in this regard. First, it noted that the U.S 
Congress had emphasized the importance of reaching an international agreement on sea turtles.829 
Second, the U.S. had only negotiated with some but not all relevant states, even though its success 
in concluding the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles demonstrated
826 Panel report, Biotech, para. 7.92.
827 Ibid., para. 7.92.
828 AB report on Shrimp-Turtle, para. 166.
829 Ibid., para 171.
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that an alternative to its unilateral import prohibition was reasonably available.830 From the point of 
view of the present analysis, the most interesting was the third one. According to the AB:
...the very policy objective of the measure, demands concerted and cooperative 
efforts on the part o f the many countries whose waters are traversed in the course 
of recurrent sea turtle migration. The need for, and the appropriateness of, such efforts have 
been recognised in the WTO itself as well as in a significant number of other international 
instruments and declarations,831 [Emphasis added, KK]
In support, the AB first referred to the Marrakech Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, noting
reference to both the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and Agenda 21 thereof.832 It then
listed relevant instalments of international environmental law, namely Principle 12 of the Rio
Declaration', Paragraph 2.22(i) of Agenda 21; Article 5 o f the CMS; and the Report o f the Committee
on Trade and Environment to the WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference.833 According to the AB,
the Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration was “of particular relevance” because it demonstrated the
need for “concerted and cooperative efforts” to address the protection o f sea turtles. The AB thus
cited the relevant part o f the Principle, which reads as follows:
Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction o f the 
importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing 
transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based 
on an international consensus. [Emphasis in the original AB report, KK.]
Welcoming the approach Howse argues that:
... unlike the Tuna-Dolphin panels, [the AB, KK] did not simply invent its own 
limitation on unilateralism as a means of protecting the environmental commons; 
instead, it referred to a baseline in actual international environmental law, that 
contained in Rio Declaration.834
According to Howse, the AB used such a baseline from international environmental law, not in 
order to incorporate into the chapeau a duty to negotiate, but “to determine whether, in the 
circumstances, the discriminatory behaviour o f the U.S. was also unjustifiable.”835 While convincing, 
this understanding o f the AB’s decision brings to the fore some pressing issues. Given that the 
current state of international environmental law can best be characterised as ‘rapidly evolving’ and 
much of the discussion thus tends to focus on the legal status of some of the key concepts,836 it is 
interesting to assess how the AB conceived the legal relevance o f Principle 12 o f the Rio
830 Ibid
831
832 Adopted by ministers at the meeting o f the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee in Marrakesh on 14
Ibid., para. 168.
f
83 AB report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 168.
834 Howse, ’’Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law,” 55.
835 Howse, ”A New Legal Baseline,” 506.
836 P. Bimie & A. Boyle, International Law & the Environment (2nd edition, OUP, 2002), 80.
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Declaration.837 Why did the AB regard the Principle as ‘particularly relevant’ to the interpretation of 
GATT? Was it because the AB saw it as a baseline established in international environmental law, 
as Howse has understood its decision, or was there some other reason, such as the fact that the 
WTO Ministerial Decision makes reference to the Principle? More importandy, how does this 
reference relate to the statement by the AB in the Hormones case on the precautionary principle?
As we saw above, one of the crucial issues in the Hormones dispute related to scientific uncertainty, 
thereby bringing into focus the legal status and relevance o f the precautionary principle. This 
question had been extensively debated both in literature as well as before various international 
courts and tribunals, which all took a cautious approach to the legal status of the precautionary 
principle, in some cases hinting at the possibility that it would at least be emerging under customary 
international law.838 However, the decisions and the individual opinions also illustrated that a 
difference of opinion existed as to whether precaution was a legal principle or an ‘approach,’ in 
other words, something more flexible and obscure.839 The stance that the AB took on the 
precautionary principle was that the status o f the precautionary principle in international law was 
“subject to debate.”840 In other words, it was not clear whether the precautionary principle had 
crystallised into a general principle of customary international environmental law, and it was even less 
clear whether it has become accepted as a principle o f general or customary international law.841 
However, according to the AB — and this is crucial for the present analysis —it was "unnecessary, and 
probably imprudenf for it “to take a position on this important, but abstract, question. "842
When comparing how the AB has approached and used different notions o f international 
environmental law in its Shrimp-Turtle and Hormones decisions, the crucial issue is not so much that 
the AB did not feel it was appropriate for it to take a position on the legal status o f the 
precautionary principle, but that it did refer to similar sources of international environmental law, in 
particular Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, in the Shrimp-Turtle decision. Why did the AB in Shrimp- 
Turtle note the ‘particular relevance’ of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration in assessing unilateral trade 
restrictions tinder the G A TT  while indicating in the Hormones case that the legal status o f the 
precautionary principle was irrelevant when considering scientific risk assessment and uncertainty 
under the SPS Agreement? Is there a solid legal justification for its approach, or can these differences 
be taken as evidence o f the validity o f environmentalist critique that the AB is selective with respect 
to environmental norms, only allowing international environmental law to penetrate the borders of
837 See I. Cheyne, “Trade and the Environment: Future o f Extraterritorial Unilateral Measures after the Shrimp 
Appellate Body,” 5 Web JCIL (2000); and P. Sands, “Unilateralism, Values and International Law,” European 
Journal o f  International Law 12(2) (2000) 291.
838 Kulovesi, “Cautious About Precaution,” 8-27.
839 Ibid., 26-27.
840 Appellate Body report, Hormones, para. 123.
841 Ibid.
™ Ibid.
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the WTO regime when it “does not interfere with the trade regime’s goal o f market 
liberalixation”?843
The first argument that lends support to the environmentalist critique that the WTO is selective
when allowing environmental norms to cross the borders of the trade regime concerns the political
interests underlying the precautionary principle and Principle 12. It would seem that it is
environmentalist in particular who support and advocate the precautionary principle, while
Principle 12 reflects some of the key concerns o f free trade advocates. But more interesting in this
regard is to assess the legal status o f these two notions tinder international environmental law. It is
not clear whether either of them can be considered anything more than ‘soft law’ but if one of them
can, then the precautionary principle would be a stronger candidate to have emerged into a
customary norm or general principle. Both Principle 12 and the precautionary principle are
included in the Rio Declaration (which is not, as such, a binding legal instrument).844 However, it is
obvious that Principle 12 has received far less attention from environmental scholars than some of
the other principles also contained in the Rio Declaration. When searching through the leading
textbooks o f international environmental law, one finds Principle 12 mentioned in passing when
lamenting the ‘aspirational’ language used in certain parts of the Rio Declaration,845 or noting that the
Principle “reflects the concerns of free trade advocates.”846 When comparing the language used in
the Rio Declaration, it is also evident that the precautionary principle has been worded in language
that is stronger and more binding than that used in Principle 12. According to Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration, precaution “shall be widely applied.” In contrast, unilateral trade measures under
Principle 12 “should be avoided,” and measures addressing transboundary environmental problems
“should as far as possible” be based on cooperation. Indeed, according to one o f the leading
environmental law textbooks, Principle 12 is:
.. .expressed in aspirational rather than obligatory terms, suggesting a rather weaker 
commitment on these economic issues than developed countries would have liked 
to see.847
The circumstances under which the Rio Declaration were negotiated further testify to the
controversial status of Principle 12. The talks were notably influenced by the disagreement
surrounding unilateral trade restrictions. As Sands describes, the controversy arising from the Tuna-
Dolphtn dispute influenced the atmosphere in Rio:
... the issue became one o f the most contentious topics at the Earth Summit in Rio 
in June 1992. It very nearly prevented agreement from being reached on Agenda 21
843 Dunoff, “Border Patrol at the WTO,” 24-25.
844 P. Sands, Principles o f  International Environmental Law (2nd edition, CUP 2003), 52.
845 Bimie & Boyle, International Law & the Environment, 84.
846 A. Boyle & D. Freestone, ’’Introduction,” in A. Boyle & D. Freestone, eds., International Law and Sustainable 
Development. Past Achievements and Future Challenges (OUP, 2001), 10.
847 Bimie & Boyle, International Law & the Environment, 84.
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and the Rio Declaration, the instruments which global leaders had gathered to
The solution was a compromise between Mexico and the U.S. to formulate Principle 12 in a 
language that would not totally close the door open from unilateral trade restrictions.849 Principle 12 
was thus adopted in Rio subject to a statement from the U.S. that trade measures might sometimes 
be effective to protect the environment.850 For this reason, neither the legal status o f the Rio 
Declaration itself, nor the language used in Principle 12 or even its travaux preparatoires support the 
Appellate Body’s understanding o f the relevance of Principle 12 under international environmental 
law. As we saw above, the Rio Declaration is not the only instrument where the precautionary 
principle and Principle 12 can be found but both notions are included in multilateral environmental 
agreements, including the CBD. However, the list o f MEAs containing some formulation of the 
precautionary principle is longer than that supporting Principle 12. During the past ten years states 
have also invoked the precautionary principle before various judicial bodies with a frequency that is 
quite rare in international law, a fact that also illustrates its emerging legal status.
From the perspective of international environmental law, it would be easier to justify the argument 
that the precautionary principle rather than the Principle 12 o f the Rio Declaration has obtained an 
independent legal status. In this light, one o f the most regrettable aspect o f the Shrimp-Turtle and 
Hormones decisions is the lack of detailed justifications concerning the relevance or otherwise of 
international environmental law.851 Trying to look for explanations, it might have been possible for 
the AB come up with an argument along the lines that Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration was 
“particularly relevant” to the interpretation of environmental exceptions under Article XX of the 
G A TT  as the WTO Ministerial Declaration on Trade and Environment makes specific reference to the 
principle. Its statement in the Hormones decision that the legal status o f the precautionary principle 
was an “abstract” question irrelevant to its decision seems harder to justify. But the AB should have 
at least tried, indicating, for instance, that even as a norm o f customary law, the precautionary 
principle or approach would not contradict the provisions o f the SPS Agreement, and that these 
provisions also reflecting a precautionary approach gave the general concept a more specific 
content. The argument has also been made that international environmental law is more relevant 
when interpreting the older and more ambiguous terms o f the G A T T  than the more recent and 
more specific SPS Agreement.852 Even though I would not have been persuaded by such arguments, 
in light o f such transparent reasoning, the validity o f the AB’s approach could then have been 
analysed and debated by legal scholars and other interested parties.
848 Sands, Lawless World, 108.
849 Ibid.
850 The Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2(13), 3-14 June 1992. Available at: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol02/0213032e.html>.
851 Similarly, Cheyne, “Trade and the Environment.”
852 Cordonier-Segger & Gehring, “The WTO and Precaution,” 306-307.
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However, as they now stand, the Shrimp-Turtle and Hormones decisions seem to lend some support 
the argument that the AB is biased in deciding which concepts of international environmental law 
were relevant to the interpretation of WTO law. When reading, for instance, the amicus curiae brief 
submitted by a coalition o f environmental N G O  in the Shrimp-Turtle case, it would seem that 
arguments supporting the view that the use of TEDs is required by international environmental law 
are at least as robust and backed by more convincing legal sources than the argument accepted by 
the AB that unilateral measures are not allowed under international environmental law. It is also 
true that from the perspective o f international environmental law, the precautionary principle 
would seem like a stronger candidate to have emerged into a norm of customary law, or general 
principle o f law. However, while the precautionary principle still “awaits authoritative formulation” 
as indicated by the Appellate Body,853 Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration has now, by virtue of the 
Shrimp-Turtle decision, been conceived as “actual baseline from international environmental law.”854 
In the future, to avoid claims that it is biased, or that it lacks adequate expertise in international 
environmental law, the AB should pay attention also to such aspects o f its decisions. It is clear that 
a consistent, transparent, and more detailed reasoning in approaching environmental instruments 
could further improve the substantive/social legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system 
when it has to deal with politically sensitive disputes.
4.3 Biotech — a M issed Opportunity for Constructive Interaction
The Biotech panel report provides an interesting opportunity to evaluate the current state-of-the-play 
regarding the relationship between WTO law and international environmental law. To me, it 
demonstrates the validity o f the argument that there is no continuous evolution towards more 
careful consideration o f environmental issues in the WTO. While G A TT  disputes such as the 
Asbestos and Shrimp-Turtle have somewhat expanded the borders o f the WTO regime, at least the 
interpretation of the SPS Agreement dedicatedly avoids interaction with international environmental 
law. The Biotech decision indicates that panels are reluctant to engage in constructive interaction 
with other fields of international law and demonstrates that concerns related to substantive 
legitimacy are far from overcome.
853 AB report on Hormones, para. 28.
854 Howse, “A New Legal Baseline,” 324.
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4.3.1 GM Products, the WTO and International Environmental Law
From the outset, the Biotech dispute was regarded as difficult, especially regarding the role of
international environmental law. According to some observers, the Cartagena Protocol was in fact the
implicit target o f the WTO proceedings because:
.. .it multilateralizes the EU regulatory approach, meaning that other countries might 
use the Protocol to justify adopting EU-style market access rules. The United States 
and Canada would like the WTO to implicidy determine whether or not the 
Cartagena Protocol is trade compliant, hence, sending a signal to all other countries 
that might attempt to use the protocol to ban G M O s.855
Yet others were worried about the legitimacy implications o f the dispute:
It is apparent that any legal finding on trade restrictions on GMOs that simply 
ignores the existence and operation of the protocol [Biosafety, KK} will result in 
amplified criticism of what is often felt to be excessively intrusive WTO law and a 
predominance of the trade paradigm, and this will erode further the legitimacy of 
the trading system in the view of public opinion.856
In defending its GMO regime, the EU stressed the need to interpret WTO Agreements in light of
other instruments of international law.857 Accordingly, the national safeguard measures applied by
its individual Member States had to be addressed in light o f Article 5.7 of the SPS.Agreement, which 
was one expression of the precautionary principle.858 The EU stressed that the precautionary 
principle had “by now become a fully-fledged and general principle o f international law.”859 For this 
reason, Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement constituted an autonomous right, one that was also 
recognised in the Cartagena ProtocolI860 According to the EU, the Protocol “has confirmed the key 
function of the precautionary principle” in the decision to restrict or prohibit imports of GMOs in 
the face of scientific uncertainty.861 The EU also stressed that the Cartagena Protocol was legally 
binding on the EU Member States, and, as signatories, Argentina and Canada had to refrain from 
acts that would defy the object and purpose o f the treaty.862 The EU also noted that the U.S. 
participates in the Clearing House Mechanism established by the Protocol and should therefore have 
no objection to the approach taken by the Protocol.663 It stressed the close connection between the 
Biosafety Protocol and the SPS Agreement, and the need to interpret and apply these instruments 
consistendy.864 The EU further explained that those negotiating the Cartagena Protocol were acutely
855 Isaac & Kerr, “A Harvest for Trouble,” 1083-1084.
856 T. Cottier, “Implications for Trade Law and Policy: Towards Convergence and Integration,” in C. Bail & al. eds., 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment and Development 
(RIIA, 2002), 473. See also M.L. Busch & R. Howse, “A (Genetically Modified) Food Fight. Canada’s WTO 
Challenge to Europe’s Ban on GM Products,” C.D.Howe Institute Commentary 186 (2003).
857 Panel report, Biotech, para. 4.518.
858 Ibid, paras. 4.522-523.
859 Ibid., para. 4.523.
860 Ibid.
861 Ibid, para. 4.524.
862 Ibid, para. 7.53.
863 Ibid.
864 Ibid, para. 7.55.
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aware of the 'Protocol's relationship with WTO Agreements and cannot have meant to create an 
inconsistent approach.865 According to the EU, the Cartagena Protocol and the W TO Agreements 
were fully compatible with each other and the Protocol's provisions on precaution and risk 
assessment should inform the interpretation of the relevant provisions in the WTO Agreements.866
The U.S. and others contested the relevance of these MEAs and the precautionary principle to the
dispute.867 According to the U.S., the Cartagena Protocol could not be applied between the EU and
itself as the U.S. was not a Party to the MEA.868 Canada specified that only such treaties were
relevant to the interpretation of the covered agreements that applied between all W TO Members.869
The U.S. also stressed text in the Protocol indicating that it does not change the rights and
obligations under any existing international agreement - nor does it “require or condone the
adoption o f moratoria or undue delays in decision-making concerning GM products.”870 Canada
argued that the Protocol was consistent with the WTO Agreements as it was premised on transparent
and scientifically-sound risk assessment but the EU’s measures were stark refutations o f this
premise.871 Concerning the precautionary principle, the U.S. contended that it was neither a
principle nor a customary rule o f international law.872 Even if the precautionary principle was a
relevant rule o f international law, it would not affect the interpretation of the SPS Agreement. This
was because the precautionary principle:
...would be useful only for interpreting particular treaty terms, and could not
override any part o f the SPS Agreement. So, for example, the notion o f precaution
could not excuse the European Communities from complying with the requirement 
under Article 5.1 that SPS measures be based on risk assessments. In addition, 
Article 5.7 o f the SPS Agreement already allows for the European Communities to 
adopt a precautionary approach to regulating biotech products.873
The Biotech panel responded to these arguments by first offering some general views on the role of 
international law in the interpretation o f WTO provision. Quoting Article 31 o f the VC LT, it stated 
that there was no doubt that international treaties and custom were such relevant rules of 
international law that a panel is mandated to take into account under Article 31.3(c).874 
Furthermore, the AB had confirmed in its Shrimp-Turtle decisions that also general principles of 
international law were to be taken into account when interpreting the WTO Agreements.875 The 
panel stressed that according to the VCLT, only such rules had to be considered that were
865 Ibid.
866 Ibid.
867Ibid., para. 7.56 etseq.
868 Ibid. para. 7.59.
869 Ibid, 7.60.
™Ibid.
871 Ibid, para. 7.61.
872 Ibid, para. 4.542.
873 Ibid, para. 4.540.
874 Ibid, para. 7.67 and 7.69.
615 Ibid.
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“applicable in relations between the parties.”876 In its view, this meant rules applicable in the relations 
between the WTO Members. 877 As a consequence, the panel was not required to take into account rules 
that are not applicable to one of the parties to the dispute878 Given that the case was not one where 
relevant rules of international law were applicable between all Parties to the dispute but not between 
all WTO Members, it did not need to decide whether, in such a situation, it would be entitled to take 
the relevant rules of international law into account.879
Proceeding form this basis, the panel concluded that neither the CBD nor the Cartagena Protocol were 
relevant to the interpretation of the WTO Agreements in the present case.880 The same was true for 
the precautionary principle: the legal debate about the status o f the precautionary principle was still 
ongoing.881 Notably, there had been no decision by an international court or tribunal recognising 
the precautionary principle as either a customary rule or general principle o f law.882 The panel 
noted, however, that the principle had been incorporated in several international instruments and 
several authors had argued that it has become a general principle o f law. 883 In conclusion, the panel 
stated that:
Since the legal status of the precautionary principle remains unsettled, like the 
Appellate Body before us, we consider that prudence suggests that we not attempt 
to resolve this complex issue particularly if it is not necessary to do so. O ur analysis 
below makes clear that for the purposes of disposing o f the legal claims before us, 
we do not need to take a position on whether the or not the precautionary principle is a recognised 
principle of general or customary international law. Therefore, we refrain from expressing a 
view on this issue.884 (Emphasis added, KK).
Finally, the panel responded to the interesting arguments raised by the EU that the Appellate Body
had in the Shrimp-Turtle decision referred to such MEAs as the CBD to which the U.S. was not a
party. 885 It explained that under Article 31.1 of the VCLT, a treaty must be interpreted with
“ordinary meaning” given its terms of the treaty in their context and in the light o f its object and
purpose.886 According to the panel,
.. .in addition to dictionaries, other relevant rules of international law may in some cases aid a 
treaty interpreter in establishing or confirming, the ordinary meaning of treaty terms in the specific 
context in which they are used. Such rules would not be considered because they are legal rules, but 
rather because they may provide evidence of the ordinary meaning o f terms in the same way 
that dictionaries do. They would be considered for their informative character. It
876 Ibid, para. 7.68.
877 Ibid. Emphasis added.
878 Ibid, para. 7.71.
879 Ibid.
880 Ibid, para. 7.74-7.75.
881 Ibid, para. 7.88.
882 Ibid.
883 Ibid, para. 7.88.
884 Ibid, para. 7.89.
885 Ibid, para. 7.91.
886 Ibid, para. 7.92.
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follows that when a treaty interpreter does not consider another rule of international law to be 
informative, he or she need not rely on it.m  (Emphasis added, KK).
While the Appellate Body had considered the CBD and the other environmental instruments as 
informative for the interpretation of Article XX(g) in the Shrimp-Turtle case, the Biotech panel came 
to the contrary conclusion. Noting that it had “carefully considered the provisions” o f the Biosafety 
Protocol and the CBD but without explaining this analytical process any further, the panel ruled that 
it “did not find it necessary or appropriate to rely on these particular provisions in interpreting the 
WTO Agreements at issue in this dispute.”888
4.3.2 The Biotech Panel: Cautious and Conservative
The Biotech panel report is interesting in that it brings to the fore many of the questions concerning 
the relationship between WTO law and other rules of international law discussed in this study. As 
the panel quoted the AB’s Hormones ruling concerning legal status and relevance o f the 
precautionary principle, it is easy to voice the same criticism against its report as above. 
Interestingly, the panel itself stressed that Article 31 o f the V C L T  covers both customary norms 
and general principles of law - and that their consideration is mandatory.889 Given this obligation it 
was exceedingly deferential, even flawed, for the panel to rule that “prudence suggests we not 
attempt to resolve” the legal status of the precautionary principle.890 My argument is that even if the 
provisions of the SPS Agreement leave room for precautionary measures, it is not irrelevant whether 
the precautionary principle is a customary norm or a general principle o f law. As a customary norm 
or general principle of law, the principle can and should guide the interpretation o f the relevant 
provisions of the SPS Agreement. In practice, this means that it should guide the choice between 
several possible interpretations o f the SPS Agreement towards a reading that is consistent with the 
precautionary principle - whatever that may be. From a legal point o f view, it is not adequate to 
highlight that the WTO dispute settlement practice has de facto adopted interpretations that leave 
ample room for national discretion and precautionary action, such as accepting that the likelihood 
of risk can be expressed in either quantitative or qualitative terms, and indicating that governments 
can adopt a high level of protection. If  the precautionary principle is a norm of customary law, then 
the WTO dispute setdement bodies are legally mandated to apply the WTO Agreements in a way 
that takes into account the precautionary principle and they cannot, for instance, decide to change 
its practice in a way that would not be consistent with the precautionary principle.
The panel also took an extremely narrow view of Article 31.3(c) of the V C L T  and the role of other 
rules of international law in the WTO dispute settlement system. Its finding has been interpreted to
Ibid, para. 7.95.
889 Ibid., paras. 7.67 and 7.69
890 Ibid., para. 7.89.
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mean that only such relevant rules can be taken into account that are applicable to all WTO 
Members.891 As a consequence, it is unlikely that conventional international law could have any use 
in interpreting the WTO covered agreements.892 According to the ILC, a better solution would have 
been to permit references to another treaty in cases where the parties to the dispute are also parties 
to the other treaty - otherwise, the coherence o f the WTO regime comes at the expense o f the 
coherence of the multilateral treaty system as a whole.893 1 agree with the ILC and those who argue 
that the Biotech panel erred in failing  to consider the potential relevance o f the CBD in the 
dispute.894 Given that Biotech dispute essentially entails three separate complaints, the panel should 
have examined the relevance of the CBD in the dispute between the EC and Argentina, and the EC 
and Canada. The fact that the U.S. is not a Party to the CBD does not affect the applicability o f the 
treaty between the EU, Canada and Argentina.
Finally, the Biotech panel can be criticised for completely discarding the relevance o f the Cartagena
Protocol In my view, the Protocol - designed to address international trade in biotech products - could
and should have be used as supporting material in defining the ordinary meaning o f the SPS
Agreement.9®'* This argument surfaces the tricky question of how the consideration o f the Cartagena
Protocol would have affected the rights and obligations of non-Parties.896 First, I wish to emphasise
that the panel was right in finding that in light o f Article 31.3(c) of the VCLT, the Protocol was not a
relevant rule that had to be taken into account in interpreting the covered agreements. Thus, there
was no legal obligation to consider it, and the question of its direct application does not even arise
here. All this illustrates the limits o f the V C L T  and conflict norms in solving collisions between
multilateral treaty regimes such as the WTO and MEAs. As the ILC has indicated,
The relationship between treaties that belong to different regimes is a general 
problem. Its most acute manifestations has concerned relations between 
instruments forming part o f trade and environment regimes.897
The arguments supporting the consideration o f the Cartagena Protocol in the Biotech dispute include 
the need to avoid fragmentation o f international law and to ensure that the W TO system does not 
become isolated from other treaty regimes, and is consistent and constructive in the way it refers to 
international environmental instruments. As we have seen, the AB’s Shrimp-Turtle decision referred 
to a host of environmental instruments, including the CBD to which the U.S. was not a Party. As 
the Biotech panel explained, this was because the AB used the CBD as interpretative material to
891 ILC, The Fragmentation o f  International Law, 237 and 227-228.
i92Ibid
893 Ibid., 238.
894 A. Palmer, The WTO GMO Dispute. Implications fo r  Developing Countries and the Need fo r  an Appeal, 
GeneWatch UK, Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security & GM Freeze, November 2006.
895 Panel report, Biotech, para. 7.92.
896 For analysis, see J. Scott, “International Trade and Environmental Governance,” 340 et seq. According to Scott, 
the dilemma “poses formalist nightmare against realist dystopia; the system disabled against the system abused,” 
ibid, 343.
897 ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law, 138
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define the “ordinary meaning” o f the WTO agreements in the same way as it might use a 
dictionary. This demonstrated that MEAs could play a role in disputes involving non-Parties to 
ensure that W TO law does not become isolated from other rules o f international law.
While, this is still “a rather contrived way” of preventing the isolation of WTO law,898 it respects 
state sovereignty and the fundamental doctrine that treaties cannot create obligations on non- 
Parties. Certainly, given these notions, it would not be possible for the W TO dispute settlement 
system to rule that a MEA places any obligations on non-Parties. However, what the Biotech panel 
could have examined is whether any such definitions or practices had been developed by the 
Parties to the Cartagena Protocol concerning trade in biotech products that could be useful in the 
dispute. The Protocol contains detailed provisions on issues such as risk assessment, the 
precautionary principle and prior informed consent.899 Regarding risk assessment, for instance, 
Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol gives comprehensive guidance, including some general principles 
and methodologies. Palmer argues that the Protocol could have provided evidence o f the shared 
values of the international community regarding the careful consideration o f risks associated with 
GMOs, thus supporting the legitimacy o f the delay in the approval o f GM products.900 All this is 
not to say that the panel should have deferred to the practices and definitions adopted but the 
Protocol's Parties - but given the panel’s lack o f expertise on the novel and complex topic of GMOs, 
as well as concerns about the overall consistency o f international law, openly examining them and 
spelling out the justifications would have been an appropriate move. Interestingly, de facto the Biotech 
panel seems to have agreed with these arguments: it requested several international organizations, 
such as Codex, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the 
UNEP and the CBD Secretariat to identify relevant materials, such as “reference works, glossaries, 
official documents o f the relevant international organizations, including conventions, standards and 
guidelines etc.”901 Without any more elaborate justifications, the panel then concluded that the 
materials obtained “have been taken into account by us, as appropriate.”902 As Currie indicates, it 
would have been interesting to know what these materials were and how they were taken into 
account.903 From the point of view of the legitimacy of the W TO dispute settlement system, it 
would certainly have been better to openly admit the relevance o f the CBD and the Protocol' and 
explain how they were taken into account instead of the obscure reference o f information obtained 
from the CBD Secretariat.
898 Ibid., 228.
899 On the relevant parts o f the Protocol, see Hill & al., “Risk Assessment and Precaution,” 266. On comparison 
between the WTO approach and the Protocol, see Boisson de Chazoumes & Mbengue, “GMOs and Trade,” 301-303.
900 Palmer, “The WTO GMO Dispute,” 5-6, 8.
901 Panel report, Biotech, para. 7.96.
902 Ibid.
903 D. Currie, Genetic Engineering and the WTO: An Analysis o f  the Report in the EC-Biotech Case, Greenpeace 
International (2006), 12.
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Overall, the Protocol seems far more relevant for the Biotech dispute than the CBD in the Shrimp-Turtle 
case: as we saw in Chapter 3, the negotiating history of the Cartagena Protocol shows that the 
international community was acutely aware o f the potential overlap between the Cartagena Protocol 
and the SPS Agreement, and were ultimately unable to agree on a provision clarifying their 
relationship. Given that the Protocol was negotiated after the entry into force o f the SPS Agreement, in 
a dispute between W TO Members Parties to the Protocol, either would be able to invoke the lex 
posterior rule to argue that the Cartagena Protocol should prevail. Also arguments based on lex specials 
would seem plausible. In light o f all this, the panel’s hazy dismissal o f the Protocol’s potential 
relevance seems absurd. It is effectively sending a message that a recent multilateral agreement with 
147 Parties, negotiated to regulate the unprecedented challenges arising from transboundary 
movements of biotech products is totally irrelevant in a dispute that concerns transboundary 
movements of biotech products. Furthermore, while the non-Party question is formally and 
doctrinally compelling and my intention is not to challenge it, it is also useful note that at present, 
the distinction between MEA Parties and non-Parties is perhaps not as stern as those drafting the 
V C LT  had in mind. Even as non-Parties to the CBD, the U.S. and other GM producers played an 
influential role in the negotiations for the Cartagena Protocol and they still participate in the work 
done under the Protocol, including the Biosafety Clearing House and negotiations for the liability and 
redress regime under Article 27 o f the Cartagena Protocol.
Overall, the Biotech dispute would have entailed ample opportunities for constructive interaction 
between WTO law and international environmental law. Regrettably, the Biotech panel report shows 
that the WTO dispute settlement system is reluctant to engage progressively with international 
environmental instruments and explain its reasons for doing so. All this highlights concerns relating 
to the fragmentation o f international law and the potential of inconsistencies between institutionally 
separate but materially overlapping legal regimes. Chapter 6 will return to this problematique. The 
conclusion from this analysis is that tensions persist in the borderline between WTO law and 
international environmental law in a way that continues to challenge the legitimacy of the WTO 
dispute settlement system.
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5. Formal/Procedural Legitimacy and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System
For an environmentalist criticising the WTO, it would seem only logical to argue that the WTO
dispute setdement system should take a more active role in balancing trade and environmental
issues. For an international legal scholar concerned about the fragmentation of international law
and the separation o f its contents into different 130X68’ labelled ‘trade’, ‘environment’ and so on, it
would seem just as natural to contend that the WTO dispute settlement system should start
unwrapping the boxes and mixing their contents.904 Indeed, it is not difficult to find proposals for
improving the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system in a way that would effectively
expand its substantive borders. As we saw in Chapter 3, a member o f the Appellate Body
questioned in the Asbestos decision the appropriateness o f the economic focus o f the WTO dispute
settlement. Scholars have interpreted his statement as a possible step towards:
...a  more ‘rule-based’ or even ‘principle-based’ international trading regime, 
allowing more comprehensive judgements which encompass richer consideration of 
the plurality of the issues.905
Also Pere2 has proposed that the WTO dispute settlement system should follow a more pluralistic 
deliberative process, especially in risk disputes, and recognise different types o f knowledge 
claims.906 This would mean, for instance, that the WTO dispute settlement bodies would listen not 
only to scientific experts but also consider other bodies of knowledge, such as sociology and 
anthropology.907
Having concluded in the previous Chapter that the limited substantive competence o f the WTO 
dispute settlement system challenges its legitimacy, and that the system has been both inconsistent 
in its approach to international environmental law, and reluctant to imagine a more constructive 
and interactive relationship between the two spheres o f international law, it should be easy to agree 
with those proposing to expand the substantive scope of the WTO dispute settlement system. But 
instead, in this Chapter I shall emphasise that this route has only limited potential to improve the 
legitimacy o f the W TO dispute settlement system. In fact, it appears that the legitimacy dilemma 
facing the WTO dispute settlement system looks like a two-headed dragon: any attempts to tame 
the substantive legitimacy challenges immediately alerts the second head, which guards the formal
904 The image o f international law as separate boxes is borrowed from M. Koskenniemi, “International Law: Between 
Fragmentation and Constitutionalism,” presentation in Canberra, Australia, 27 November 2006. Available at: 
<http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/MCanberra-06c.pdf>.
905 Cordonier Segger & Gehring, “The WTO and Precaution,” 320.
906 Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism, 152.
907 Ibid.
161
dimension of legitimacy. For this reason, I do not believe that the many of the problems identified 
in the previous Chapters could be solved with the WTO dispute settlement system simply 
‘importing’ substantive legitimacy and injecting a dose o f international environmental law or 
ecological sensitivity into the domain o f trade rules where appropriate. My argument is that when 
tackling its substantive legitimacy challenges, the WTO dispute settlement system must pay careful 
attention to the web o f institutional and procedural factors underpinning the notion of formal 
legitimacy. Without balancing the different components of legitimacy, it is clear that any attempts to 
remedy one set o f problems will only give rise to new, equally compelling criticism.
What, then, are the considerations relating to the formal and procedural aspects o f legitimacy that 
the WTO dispute settlement system should be aware of? As explained in Chapter 1, formal 
legitimacy is akin to the concept o f formal legal validity, which, in turn, highlights the need to 
observe all requirements o f law in the creation and operation o f an institution or system.908 
Furthermore, especially in Western political systems formal legitimacy is strongly associated with 
democracy, and fair and participatory procedures.909 This Chapter can be seen as an attempt to 
visualize how these ideas translate in the context of the WTO dispute settlement, focusing on three 
particular questions. Section 5.1 examines the institutional limits o f the WTO dispute settlement 
system through the lenses o f the fundamental doctrine concerning the separation o f powers and the 
ensuing distinction between judicial and legislative functions. Section 5.2 concentrates on questions 
concerning the distribution o f competencies in the vertical relationship between the WTO dispute 
settlement system and the national authorities of the WTO Member States both institutionally and 
through the notion o f standard o f review. This dimension is particularly interesting bearing in mind 
the context in which the WTO dispute settlement system functions, characterised by globalisation 
and shifting perceptions concerning the role o f international institutions on the one hand, and state 
sovereignty on the other. In theory, any powers not explicidy transferred to the international level 
are retained by the state. However, many decisions by the WTO dispute settlement system are de 
facto having the impact of modifying the boundaries between the international and national spheres, 
in other words, they have been said to be realigning constitutional relationships between the WTO 
and its Member States.910 Finally, in section 5.3, the focus will be on the WTO dispute settlement 
procedures and questions o f transparency, access to information and participation.
908 Weiler, The Constitution o f  Europe, 80.
909 Ibid.
910 Cass, The Constitutionalization o f  the WTO, 187-191.
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5.1 Limits of the Judicial Function
The function and institutional limits of the W TO dispute setdement system have been enshrined in
Article 3.2 o f the D SU  according to which:
Recommendations and rulings o f the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.
This provision can be associated with one o f the fundamental doctrines of modern political and
legal theory concerning the separation o f powers and the distinction between the legislative,
adjudicative and executive branches o f government.911 Accordingly, a distinction is made between
the legislative and judicial institutions, and between legislation and adjudication as methods of
decision-making.912 These are closely related to a number of other distinctions such as that between
law and politics, objective and subjective questions, rights and powers, as well as professionally and
electorally accountable officials.913 These distinctions reflect the conception that making the law
necessitates value judgements, which are subjective and therefore political.914 Adjudication, in turn,
is a process whereby the abstract laws are applied to the facts o f  a concrete dispute. The idea is that
the political and subjective elements have been resolved by the democratically accountable legislator
during the rule-making process, and what is left for the adjudicator is to apply these rules and
principles in an impartial and objective fashion. As explained by Lauterpacht,
.. .courts have to apply the law and that they have to apply the law in force. They have 
to apply — and no more than that — the law. It is not within their province to 
speculate on the law or to explore the possibilities of its development.915
While the distinction between law-making and law-application is a fundamental component of
modern political theory and analytically compelling, the challenge is that the line between these two
forms of decision-making is difficult to draw. Certainly, legal theory has long struggled with the
question. The distinction between adjudication and legislation has thus been characterised as,
... one of the ‘great dichotomies’ o f political theory. It leads to profound theoretical 
debates about the nature o f judicial decision-making, whether it is ideological or 
personal.916
Without going to the details of this theoretical debate, the problems relate to the nature of judicial 
decision-making, determinacy/indeterminacy o f legal materials and the amount of creativity in their 
interpretation.917 The starting point of every contemporary legal doctrine is that legal decision-
911 Pauwelyn, “How to Win a WTO Dispute Based on Non-WTO Law?,” 1003.
912 D. Kennedy, A Critique o f Adjudication (Harvard University Press, 1997), 26.
913 Ib id , 7.
914 Ibid, 27.
915 H. Lauterpacht, The Development o f  International Law by the International Court (Frederick A. Praeger 
Publisher, 1958), 75.
916 Kennedy, A Critique o f  Adjudication, 23-25.
917 K. Kulovesi, “Legality or Otherwise: Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy o f Non Liquet,” Finnish Yearbook o f
International Law  X (1999), 55 at 73.
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making always involves interpretation.918 The meaning o f the existing law must be determined and 
the abstract rule adjusted to the requirements of the concrete situation.919 According to one 
understanding,
As long as the process o f reformulation is understood to be ‘semantic’ or 
‘deductive,’ in the sense of looking for the ‘meaning’ of the words that compose the 
rule to be applied, it is not, in this understanding, rule making, even if the case is a 
hard one.920
However, as Kennedy indicates, judges constantly do something that can be better described as 
making rather than applying the law.921 At minimum, they must resolve gaps, conflicts or 
ambiguities in the legal system and by doing so, they make new rules rather than merely apply the 
existing ones.922 The question then arises concerning the limits of such judicial creativity.
In the field o f international legal theory, one important and classical part of this debate is focused 
on the question whether the international legal system is materially complete or whether it is 
possible that international courts might have to reach a decision o f non liquet. 923 Like the formal 
and substantive components of legitimacy, these theoretical views can ultimately be traced to the 
divide between the naturalist and positivist theories. A naturalist would highlight the role o f general 
principles in remedying the inevitable substantive deficiencies o f the legal system, whereas a 
positivist would lay emphasis on formal rules and the need to avoid judicial legislation. In other 
words, constructivist theories, such as those of Lauterpacht924 conceive the international legal 
system as materially complete: in case legal rules are inadequate for solving a case, recourse must be 
had to the general principles of law.925 This way, a judge is always able to decide a case while 
remaining within the limits of her judicial function. On the other hand, political realists, such as 
Stone, have accepted the idea of the international legally system being materially incomplete, and 
highlighted the possibility of a decision of non liquet. In his view, a decision based on general 
principles is already involves a law-creating choice: general principles o f law are so ambiguous and 
indeterminate that selecting the relevant principle or interpretation o f the principle is essentially ‘a 
law-creating choice, however much it be concealed by the form of logical deduction from the 
principle finally chosen.”926 The Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice in the
918 Ibid.
919 Ibid.
920 Kennedy, .4 Critique o f  Adjudication, 26-27. 
Ibid, 28.
Ibid, 28
921
922
923 Kulovesi, “Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy o f Non L i q u e t 74.
924 Lauterpacht constructed his theory against a doctrine delimiting the scope o f international law with the distinction 
between legal and political questions and justifiable and non-justifiable disputes. See H. Lauterpacht, The Function o f  
Law in the International Community (Oxford, Clarendon, 1966). 70-76. For a review o f Lauterpacht’s thesis, see M. 
Koskenniemi, “Lauterpacht: the Victorian Tradition in International Law,” European Journal o f  International Law 
8(2) (1997), 215 at 223 etseq.
925 Kulovesi, “Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy o f Non Liquet, ” 74.
926 J. Stone, “Non Liquet and the Function o f Law in the International Community,” British Yearbook o f  International 
Law  XXV (1959), 133.
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Nuclear Weapons case where the Court ultimately refused to define the legality o f the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons under such circumstances where the very existence o f a state is at stake has often 
been characterised as a decision o f non liquet?11 While there are also contrary interpretations o f the 
Nuclear Weapons decision and the applicability of the same legal logic under the ICJ’s contentious 
jurisdiction is unclear, the example shows how highly political dispute bring to the fore the limits of 
the international judicial function.
How do these insights apply to the WTO dispute settlement system? In light of the DSU, it is clear
that the negotiators intended the WTO dispute setdement system to be a judicial (or quasi-judicial)
institution the role of which would be confined to applying the law. The Appellate Body has
described this function in the following terms:
Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, the task o f panels and the Appellate Body in the 
dispute setdement system of the WTO is ‘to preserve the rights and obligations of 
Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rule o f interpretation of international law. 
Determining what the rules of the DSU  ought to be is not our responsibility nor the 
responsibility of panels, it is clearly the responsibility solely o f  the Members o f the 
WTO.928 (emphasis in the original)
However, in the international sphere, the problem of drawing the boundary between law-making
and law-application has been characterised as being even more difficult than in the national legal
systems. According to Lauterpacht,
.. .the problem is complicated, on the one hand, by the requirement o f caution and 
restraint called for by the sovereignty of the States and by the voluntary, and 
therefore precarious nature of the jurisdiction o f international tribunals. It is 
intensified, on the other hand, by the strong inducements to supplement and 
remedy the deficiencies and inconsistencies o f an imperfect system of law .929
Even though several decades have passed since Lauterpacht wrote these words and even if the 
remark about the Voluntary and therefore precarious nature o f the jurisdiction o f international 
tribunals’ does not apply to the WTO, similar challenges can nevertheless be identified concerning 
the functioning o f the WTO dispute settlement system. Clearly, the development o f WTO rules by 
the legislative branch is slower and more difficult than at the national level. Therefore, the pressure 
on the WTO dispute settlement system to play a constructive and active role is greater than in the 
domestic context. However, many fear that the involvement o f the WTO dispute settlement system 
in politically controversial issues will erode not only the legitimacy of the dispute settlement 
mechanism itself, but that o f the entire organization.930 Recently, such fears seem to have escalated 
as the lack o f progress with the Doha Round o f trade negotiations has lead several observers to
927 Kulovesi, “Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy o f Non L i q u e t 60-61.
928 Appellate Body report on United States -  Import Measures on Certain Products from  the European Communities, 
WT/DS165/AB/R, 10 January 2001, para. 92.
929 Lauterpacht, The Development o f  International Law, 155.
930 Ricubero ’’The Paradoxes and Contradictions o f World Trade,” 3
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note that countries may seek to exploit the dispute settlement system in order to achieve through 
litigation what they are unable to achieve through negotiation.931 This is somewhat paradoxical, of 
course, given that such attitudes can also be interpreted as signs o f fate on the dispute setdement 
mechanism as “the only viable, functioning part o f the WTO.” 932
As was seen in Chapter 1, the WTO dispute setdement system operates in an international reality 
where many important doctrines and ideas concerning legitimacy and democracy are in a flux. The 
distance between the WTO dispute setdement system and any democratically accountable body is 
larger than usually is the case in the national context. These seem like compelling reasons for the 
WTO dispute setdement system to be mindful the limits o f its judicial function. N ot surprisingly, 
linkage disputes, involving a variety of important values and interests as well as several different 
groups of stakeholders, have been particularly challenging in this regard. The following section 
discusses practical examples of instances where the WTO dispute setdement system has come close 
to the frontiers o f its judicial function and draws attention to the ensuing legitimacy concerns.
5.1.1 Political Balancing vs. Legal Interpretation
Several factors highlight the role of the WTO dispute setdement system in solving politically 
sensitive disputes. As we saw in Chapter 3, due to its compulsory jurisdiction, it is often the only 
judicial forum available for solving linkage disputes. Furthermore, many provisions in the covered 
agreements are vague, even out-of-date, leaving the law-applier abundant room for construing their 
meaning. From the point of view of linkage disputes, these difficulties culminate in Article XX of 
the G ATT, which was drafted more than sixty years ago by negotiators preoccupied by the 
problems of the post-Worid War era, and largely unaware o f global environmental problems such 
as climate change or depletion of the o2one layer. Conscious of this, the Appellate Body indicated 
in its first Shrimp-Turtle report that the G A TT  “must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of 
contemporary concerns o f the community of nations about the protection and conservation o f the 
environment.”933 Reaching agreement on new rules through international negotiations is slow and 
the Doha mandate concerning environmental issues is limited (see Chapter 3). The combination of 
these factors easily leads to situations where the WTO dispute settlement system must balance 
conflicting values and interests in such a way that flirts with the boundary between the law-making 
and law-applying functions. From the point o f view o f the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute 
settlement system this is a dilemma: applying broad balancing tests in linkage disputes allows it to 
take into account non-trade interests - but such tests also brings to the fore questions concerning
931 B. McGivem, ”WTO Dispute Settlement After Doha: A Risk o f ’Imbalance?,” 
Bridges Monthly Review, 10(5), August 2006,10.
932 Ibid.
933 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 129.
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the formal limits o f its judicial function. As Marceau and Trachtman have explained, this is 
problematic in particular because it involves an international court intervening in the domain of 
national regulatory autonomy.934 In the following, these pressures will be illustrated by analysing the 
in Shrimp-Turtle, the Korean Beef the Brazilian Tyres decisions. The conclusion o f this analysis is that a 
degree of political balancing in linkage disputes is inevitable, there are broader and narrower 
options - and the WTO dispute settlement system, given its institutional role and international 
situation, should opt for the narrower ones.
The Shrimp-Turtle dispute is a classic example o f a linkage dispute in that it involves a range of 
divergent interests related to trade, environmental protection, livelihoods of developing country 
fishermen, technology transfer and unilateralism. The Appellate Body’s report explicidy 
acknowledges that applying G A TT  Article XX to these facts requires political balancing. 
Essentially, it explains that applying the chapeau o f Article XX requires balancing between the 
right o f a WTO Member State to invoke an exception under Article XX, and its obligation to
respect the rights o f other WTO Member States under the multilateral trading system. In other
words,
The task o f interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate 
one o f locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a 
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights o f other Members 
under varying substantive provisions... The location of the line of equilibrium ... is 
not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape o f measures at 
stake vary and as facts making up specific cases differ.935
When comparing the AB’s report, for instance, to the Shrimp-Turtle panel, it is clear that the AB
chose to give environmental interests a relatively high priority: the decision has therefore “become
emblematic o f change in the global trade rules. It pointed to the WTO adopting a more holistic
approach, placing trade interests in a broader social context.”936 While many environmentally-
minded scholars, myself included, regarded this as a welcome development, some others - quite
unsurprisingly - disagreed. While appreciating that the AB tries to be fair-minded in its decisions,
Bhagwati indicated that,
...it would be more prudent if it did not to let earlier findings be replaced so 
drastically as in the shift from the Tuna-Dolphin to the Shrimp-Turtle decisions, which 
was doubdess influenced to some degree by the environmental lobbies o f the 
North.937
934 Marceau & Trachtman, “A Map o f the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation o f Goods,” 851.
935 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 159.
936 Sands, Lawless World, 113.
937 Bhagwati, “Afterword: The Question o f Linkage,” 133-134.
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Oxley, in turn, accused the AB of “judicial hyper-activism” in permitting unilateral environmental
trade restrictions, which many WTO Members do not support.938 Therefore, this,
...dramatic change in WTO jurisprudence ... creates the conditions for a new era 
of global governance, in which the economically powerful nations, principally the 
US, the EU, but soon probably China, will be able to impose their political will 
upon countries which are economically dependant on uninterrupted access to these 
metropolitan markets." 939
Nevertheless, the majority of observers conceive the Shrimp-Turtle decision as a balanced and
justifiable approach to the difficult issue.940 According to Cheyne, the virtue o f the balancing test is
that the underlying arguments and conflicting values inherent in the trade-environment conflict
must be presented in a public and reasoned manner,
However, a case-by-case approach, drawing from sometimes conflicting and partial 
evidence of Members' intentions, and the inherendy mobile nature of the line itself, 
all place the Appellate Body in a central role which blurs the division between law and politics, 
adjudication and polity-making.941 (Emphasis added, KK)
Appreciating the AB’s dilemma and the tensions between law-application and law-making, Howse 
emphasises that:
... the Appellate Body was required to decide the appeal, and however the appeal was 
decided, it is hard to imagine that the A B  would not find itself on one side of the controversy or 
the other, merely by virtue o f having to make a legal ruling... the Appellate Body was 
not institutionally situated such as to be neutral or completely deferential to a 
political determination o f the problem posed by the Shrimp-Turtle dispute.942 
(Emphasis added, KK)
What these reactions demonstrate is how the political balancing required to decide multifaceted 
linkage disputes challenges the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system and how they 
bring to the fore the limits of its judicial function. In the subsequent dispute settlement practice, 
however, the WTO dispute setdement system seems to have even further expanded the scope of 
the balancing involved in applying Article XX of the GATT.
In the Korean Beef case, the U.S and Australia challenged measures by the Republic o f Korea 
affecting the imports of beef. They included government support for the domestic beef industry, 
and separate retail distribution channels for domestic and imported beef. During the proceedings, 
the dual retail system was found to violate the national treatment requirement under G A T T  Article 
III:4.943 In defence, the Republic of Korea invoked Article XX(d) to justify that the measures were
938 A. Oxley, Implications o f  the Decisions in the WTO Shrimp Turtle Dispute, International Trade Strategies, 
February 2002.
939 Ibid., 8.
940 J. Atik, “Two Hopeful Readings o f the Shrim p-TurtleYearbook o f  International Environmental Law  (1998), 6 at 
6. Similarly, Schoenbaum, “The Decision in the Shrimp-Turtle Case,” 39.
941 Cheyne, “The Future o f Unilateral Extraterritorial Measures After the Shrimp Appellate Body.”
942 Howse, “A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate,” 517.
943 Panel report, Korean Beef, para. 639.
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“necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations” which are not inconsistent with the
GATT. In its decision, the Appellate Body introduced a very open form of balancing into the
interpretation of the word “necessary” in Article XX. It stated that:
... a treaty interpreter assessing a measure claimed to be necessary... may, in 
appropriate cases, take into account the relative importance of the common interests or values 
that the law or regulation to be enforced is intended to protect. The more vital or 
important the common values are, the easier it would be accept as ‘necessary ’ a measure designed as 
an enforcement instrum ents [Emphasis added, KK.]
The AB then elaborated that the determination of whether a measure is ‘necessary:’
...involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which 
prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the 
enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common 
interest or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact 
of the law or regulation on imports or exports.945
The necessity test in the Korean Beef was different from the previous practice. During the G A TT  era,
to justify a measure as “necessary,” countries were required to demonstrate that no G ATT-
consistent and less trade restrictive alternative was reasonably available.946 Essentially, this necessity
test would consider the costs of the alternative regulation but it would not evaluate the degree to
which the alternative regulation contributed to the domestic policy objective.947 In other words, it
“would truncate cost-benefit analysis by not examining the benefits o f the regulatory measure, or
compare those benefits with the trade restriction.”948 In contrast, according to Trachtman and
Marceau, the balancing test in the Korean Beef constitutes a “significant shift” toward a greater role
of the WTO dispute settlement system in weighing regulatory values against trade values as it is,
... less deferential to national regulatory goals than a test that would simply seek to 
confirm whether those goals are met, rather than assessing the degree to which they 
are met. It actually purports to examine the importance of those national goals. 
These are to be balanced against the impact on trade.949
This test seems broader than in the Shrimp-Turtle decision, where AB balanced the right o f one 
WTO Member State to rely on the substantive obligations o f the G A TT  and the right o f another 
Member State to advance legitimate non-trade policy objectives listed in reliance of the exceptions 
listed under Article XX. While this test also requires balancing between competing policy 
objectives, it seems to build on the structure of the G A TT  based on rules and exceptions. In the 
Korean Beef however, the AB openly weighs and balances the relative value o f domestic regulatory
944 Appellate Body report, Korea- Measures Affecting Imports o f  Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 December 2000, para. 162.
945 Ibid., para. 164.
946 GATT  panel report, US-Section 337 o f  the Tariff Act o f 1930, 7 November 1982, BISD 36S/345.
947 Marceau & Trachtman, “A Map o f the World Trade Organization Law o f Domestic Regulation o f Goods,” 826.
9AtIbid.
949 Ibid., 852-53.
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goals and decides which of them are as important as to be considered necessary to deviate from 
trading obligations.
The subsequent WTO dispute setdement practice has built on the Korean Beef approach. In the US-
Gambling dispute the question was whether the U.S. prohibition on online gambling was
“necessary” to protect public morals or to maintain public order under Article XIV of the GATS.
The AB explained the analytical process that it had developed to assess necessity. Accordingly, one
must first assess the ‘relative importance’ of the interests and values furthered by the challenged
measure.”950 After the importance of the particular interests has been ascertained, panels should
weigh and balance other factors.951 In most cases, there will be at least two relevant factors, namely
the contribution o f the measure to the realisation of the ends pursued by it; and its restrictive
impact on international commerce.952 What then follows is the comparison between the challenged
measure and possible alternatives, with the results “considered in light of the importance o f the
interests at issue.”953 Thus,
It is on the basis o f this ‘weighing and balancing’ and comparison of measures, 
taking into account the interests or values at stake, that a panel determines whether 
a measure is ‘necessary’ or, alternatively, whether another, WTO-consistent measure 
is ‘reasonably available.’954
The AB also indicated that necessity was an objective standard in the sense that panels are not
bound by the characterisation of the measure’s objectives and effectiveness by the WTO Member
State.955
On the other hand, the AB has emphasised the WTO Members’ right to determine their desired
level o f protection. In the recent Brazilian Tyres, the AB pointed to tensions “that may exist
between, on the one hand, international trade and, on the other hand, public health and
environmental concerns,” and highlighted that,
... the fundamental principle is the right that WTO Members have to determine the level of 
protection that they consider appropriate in a given context. Another key element o f the 
analysis o f the necessity o f a measure under Article XX(b) is the contribution it 
brings to the achievement o f its objective. A contribution exists when there is a
genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued and the
measure at issue. To be characterized as necessary, a measure does not have to be 
indispensable. However, its contribution to the achievement o f the objective must be 
material, not merely marginal or insignificant, especially if the measure at issue is as 
trade restrictive as an import ban. Thus, the contribution of the measure has to be weighed
950 Appellate Body report, US-Gambling, para. 306.
951 Ibid.
952 Ibid. According to the AB, the list may not be exhaustive.
953 Ibid., para 307.
95AIbid.
955 Ibid., para 304.
170
against its trade restrictiveness, taking into account the importance of the interests or the values 
underlying the objective pursued by it.956 (Emphasis added, KK)
Thus, to determine whether a measure is “necessary,” the WTO dispute setdement system assess
whether the measure protects important values, whether it is sufficiendy effective in promoting
them and whether this seems to justify limitations to international trade. Based on the WTO
dispute setdement practice, it seems that this broad test is well-established. The Brazilian Tyres panel
was thus able to note that:
...both  parties agreed that the elements identified by the Appellate Body were 
relevant to the case (including the assessment o f the three factors, i.e. the trade 
impact o f the measure, importance of the interests protected and contribution of 
the measure to the realization of the end pursued).957
To me, however, this approach holds the potential of rather radical intrusions into the domain of 
national legal and political systems, and highlights why linkage questions constitute a challenge to 
the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system. Clearly, the Appellate Body is not an 
institution equipped to weigh and balance “the importance o f the common interests or values” and 
decide whether objectives defined through national legislative processes are important and 
sufficiendy met through the disputed legislation. As we have seen, the WTO dispute setdement 
operates in an environment where it is more powerful than most other international institutions, 
and where fundamental questions have been raised concerning the need to rethink the legitimacy of 
international law and organizations. To me, factors such as remoteness from democratically 
accountable institutions and closed procedures constitute powerful reasons for the WTO dispute 
setdement system to exercise caution when adjudicating competing values and interests.
In Asbestos and Brazilian Tyres, the AB also stressed that certain complex public health or 
environmental problems “may be tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising a 
multiplicity o f interacting measures,” and sometimes the impacts o f such measures can only be 
measured with the benefit of time.958 As an example, the AB mentioned measures to combat 
climate change.959 The point about the complexity o f measures necessary to address complex 
environmental problems, such as climate change, is certainly valid. However, my argument is that 
following the AB’s necessity test in relation to such complex environmental problems would be 
highly likely to challenge the limits of WTO dispute setdement system’s judicial function. As it will 
be seen in Chapter 6, there are several possible ways in which the WTO regime could conflict with 
the Kyoto Protocol to the U N  Framework Convention on Climate Change. In anticipation o f such conflicts, 
Green has analysed the prospects to justify measures taken to mitigate climate change under G A TT
956 Appellate Body report, Brazilian Tyres, para. 210.
957 Panel report, Brazilian Tyres, para. 7.738.
958 Appellate Body report, Brazilian Tyres, para. 151.
959 Ibid.
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Article XX(b). He has proposed that in deciding whether such measures are necessary, the WTO 
dispute settlement bodies would weigh and balance the scientific evidence on climate change, the 
need for and timing o f climate change mitigation and the potential impact o f climate change on the 
environment and human health.960 Green concludes that during such balancing, the risks posed by 
climate change:
... may not be viewed as sufficiently strong to warrant a strong presumption in 
favour the regulating country... A panel or the Appellate Body may view climate 
change as an important issue but be influenced by the lack o f consensus around the 
timing o f required action or the potential impact of climate change on the 
environment or human health. To the extent there is some uncertainty, the panel or 
the Appellate Body may be less willing to find a particular measure to be 
‘necessary.’961
In my view, however, weighing and balancing these extremely difficult and complex questions
could easily become an exercise that breaks the boundaries o f the WTO dispute settlement system’s
judicial role. Health risks associated with climate change depend on the level at which atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases are stabilised. On what is at stake in making a decision on the
appropriate mitigation level, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, indicates that it:
...involves iterative risk management process that includes mitigation and 
adaptation, taking into account actual and avoided climate damages, co-benefits, 
sustainability, equity, and attitudes to risk. Choices about the scale and timing of 
GHG  mitigation involve balancing the economic costs o f more rapid emission 
reductions now against the corresponding medium-term and long-term climate 
risks of delay.962
Furthermore, determining the level of protection in the context o f climate change would assume 
interesting global dimensions. The impacts o f climate change are estimated to vary considerably 
depending on the region, and are certainly not limited to the territory of the country whose 
measures would be challenged. Could the EU, which is considered relatively safe in comparison to 
Africa or small island states,963 justify strict controls and trade measures to achieve a high level of 
global protection? The relationship between the WTO and climate change mitigation will be 
analysed in more detail in Chapter 6. My conclusions from this analysis is that the WTO dispute 
settlement system would be wise to exercise caution when evaluating the necessity o f exceptions 
under Article XX. In particular, it should omit or considerably restrict the inquiry into the 
importance o f national policy objectives in relation to international trade. While the necessity test
960 A. Green, “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO,” Journal o f  International Economic Law 8(1) 
(2005), 134 at 184.
96]Ibid.
962 IPCC, Climate Change 2007. Mitigation o f  Climate Change. Working Group III Contribution to the Fourth 
Assessment Report o f  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Summary fo r  Policymakers and Technical 
Summary (IPCC, 2007), 18.
963 IPCC, Climate Change 2007. Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Working Group II Contribution to the 
Fourth Assessment Report o f  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Summary fo r  Policymakers and  
Technical Summary (IPCC, 2007), 12-14.
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should not be made redundant, the WTO dispute settlement system should show a high degree of 
deference to national value judgements in this regard.
The climate change example also sheds light to the differences between approach proposed in 
Section 4.2 and the criticism voiced here. In other words, what I proposed in the previous Chapter, 
and continue to stress here, is the need for a transparent, consistent and constructive interaction 
between the WTO law and international environmental law: the WTO dispute setdement system 
should take into account international environmental norms in accordance with an appropriate legal 
standard under Article 31 of the VCLT. As discussed in Chapters 2, 4 and 6, this involves several 
complex legal questions concerning, for example, whether international environmental norms can 
sometimes be applied direcdy, when they should be taken into account in the interpretation of 
WTO law as relevant rules of international law under the VC LT, when they could play a role as 
factual evidence in defining the ordinary meaning of WTO Agreements and how all this affects 
interests o f states that are not Parties to the MEA in question. What is important here, however, is 
that such interaction would take place using formal legal devices and be guided by the attitude of 
‘judicial caution.’ In contrast, what this section has criticised is the kind o f balancing contained in 
the Korean Beef decision and frequently applied in the subsequent practice that purports to decide 
the relative importance o f national regulatory objectives and their relationship to international trade 
objectives. Such an analysis easily brings to the fore important questions concerning the 
institutional role o f the WTO dispute settlement system and the formal dimension of legitimacy. 
The distinction between law-making and law-application may be notoriously difficult to draw, but it 
exists, and should be borne in mind when the WTO dispute settlement system is required to decide 
politically sensitive disputes by reference to rather dated and obscure norms.
5.2 On the Border between the N ational and International Spheres
Questions concerning competence and separation of powers also arise in the vertical relationship 
between the WTO dispute settlement system and national authorities o f the WTO Member States. 
This section examines the frontier between the WTO dispute settlement system and national 
authorities from two perspectives. Paragraph 5.2 describes the relationship between the WTO 
dispute settlement system and national institutions, using the French Asbestos dispute as an example. 
The second section takes a detailed look at how the WTO jurisprudence has approached the 
question concerning delimitation of powers by defining the applicable standard of review, which is 
a judicial tool impacting the delimitation of competencies between the national and international 
levels.
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5.2.1 The WTO Dispute Settlement System and National Political Processes
The Asbestos case is a good example of tensions at the border between WTO dispute settlement 
system and national political institutions. It is a dispute where the challenged trade measures 
pertains to a question o f immense public interest and is based on the balancing o f competing 
interests by democratically accountable national institutions. As explained in Chapter 3, the Asbestos 
dispute between Canada and the EU concerned a comprehensive prohibition on asbestos and 
products containing asbestos by France. Here, the facts of the dispute will be recounted to illustrate 
how the WTO dispute settlement system affects the functioning o f the national political system. 
The analysis demonstrates how the WTO dispute settlement system is often tasked with assessing a 
political compromise reached in accordance with national constitutional processes even if it first 
reconceptualises the problem and translates it in the language o f international trade law. It also 
illustrates how the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system de facto affects the possibilities 
for public participation and the transparency and accountability of decision-making as questions of 
public interest are transferred to an alien international institution and rephrased in a jargon that is 
extremely difficult for non-trade lawyers to understand. These issues are closely linked to the debate 
about globalisation and the need to rethink the legitimacy o f international law and institutions 
discussed in Chapter 1.
The subject matter o f the Asbestos case relates to a problem of great public interest and one that had 
already been subject to a lively national debate in France before adopting the contested prohibition 
on asbestos. When looking from the perspective of the WTO dispute settlement system, the 
French asbestos regulation appears as a trade measure that must be assessed against the national 
treatment principle set out in the Article III of the GATT. From the point o f view of French 
national politics, however, the asbestos regulation can be characterised in manifestly different 
terms. It can be regarded as an act by a democratically accountable government responding to 
elevated public concerns and national political debate concerning the use o f asbestos and asbestos 
containing products. The French decision to prohibit all types o f asbestos was influenced by 
widespread public anxiety in the mid-1990s caused by several reports in the media showing the 
increase of diseases caused by occupational exposure to asbestos.964 In October 1994, a scandal 
broke out concerning asbestos exposure at the University o f Jussieu in Paris. As o f September 
1995, fifteen cases o f asbestos-related disease had been discovered at the University o f Jussieu.965 In 
addition, reports o f several teachers dying of lung cancer after working in other buildings 
containing asbestos were made public.966 Families o f some of these teachers pressed charges
964 Panel report, Asbestos, para. 3.26.
965 “France: A Call to Arms,” British Asbestos Newsletter 22, Winter (1996). Available at: 
<http://www.lkaz.demon.co.uk/ban22.htm>.
966 “Chronology o f Events Leading to the Ban o f Asbestos in France,” the Canadian Asbestos Institute, 22 July 1996. 
Available at: <http://www.asbestos-institute.ca/media/france/annex 1 .html>.
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against the French Government, manufacturers of asbestos-containing products as well as building 
managers.967 To respond to the growing public concerns, the French Government commissioned a 
report on the health risks posed by asbestos from the Institut National de la Sante et de la 
Recherche Sciendfique (INSEREM) and adopted a plan of action for dealing with asbestos-related 
hazards.968 The summary of the INSEREM report was made public in the summer o f 1996. Within 
days of its publication the French Government announced that it was planning to introduce a 
regulation completely banning all types o f asbestos and asbestos-containing products.969
At the time of the adoption of the asbestos legislation, a lively public debate thus took place in 
France concerning the risks of asbestos. The views expressed were far from unanimous. French 
industries using asbestos opposed the ban, trying to convince the public as well as the decision­
makers that a comprehensive ban was not necessary. They campaigned for the controlled use of 
asbestos and emphasised the costs o f banning asbestos.970 A French institution called Comite 
Permanent Amiante argued that the controlled use of asbestos would be relatively safe and that a 
ban on asbestos was thus unnecessary.971 Also the French Minister for Education, Research and 
Technology argued that “some kind o f mass psychosis had transformed a minor problem into a 
major hazard.”972 He tried to convince the public that asbestos is not a poison, but a mineral that 
normally only posed minimal risks.973 Their arguments were attacked from various sources. Several 
NGOs were actively campaigning against the use o f asbestos with the objective of a comprehensive 
ban.974 Also the media published reports on the deadly dangers of asbestos.975 All this was sufficient 
to eventually turn the political scale on the side o f a total prohibition on asbestos.
Looking form the perspective of national politics, the origins o f the French asbestos legislation do 
not look alarming. As a body accountable to the electorate, the French government responded to 
public concerns over health risks caused by asbestos exposure. It commissioned a scientific study 
on its health effects and when the study indicated that there indeed was a reason for concern, the 
government acted by prohibiting the substance that was likely to cause serious health hazards and 
be expensive for the national health care system. However, during the W TO proceedings, Canada 
invoked the political background of the asbestos legislation as an argument against France. It 
questioned whether it was possible for the French Government to sufficiently study and analyse the 
INSEREM report in such a short period of time, arguing that “the ban was politically motivated
967 Ibid.
968 Ibid.
Ibid.
“France: A Call to Arms,” British Asbestos Newsletter 22, Winter (1996).
“The Asbestos Conspiracy," Le Monde Diplomatique, July 2000. Available at: 
<http://mondediplo.com/2000/Q7/15asbestos>.
972 Ibid
Amiante: Oil Est le Scandale?” Le Point, 19 October 1996.
‘France: A Call to Arms,” British Asbestos Newsletter 22, Winter (1996).
975 “Chronology o f Events Leading to the Ban o f  Asbestos in France,” the Canadian Asbestos Institute, 22 July 1996.
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and that the INSEREM report merely provided the ex postfacto scientific rationale.”976 According to 
Canada, the French political leaders were under tremendous pressure to take action and to be seen 
to be remedying a situation blown out of all proportion by the media, a fact that the French 
parliamentarians had themselves acknowledged.977 What Canada was trying to demonstrate was that 
the French asbestos ban was not based on sound scientific justification but responded to an 
irrational public hysteria and that French politicians were also motivated by the desire to avoid legal 
proceedings questioning their liability. As explained in Chapter 3, the Asbestos panel accepted that 
the French measure rested on a sound scientific foundation and was justifiable under G A T T  Article 
XX(b), and the AB went even further, indicating that the measure did not violate G A T T  Article 
111:4, and that the toxicity of asbestos had to be taken into account when assessing its likeness with 
other substances used for similar purposes and therefore.
Certainly, it can be argued that in the Asbestos dispute, the WTO dispute setdement system found a
reasonable way out of a sensitive situation. However, all this goes to show the tensions at the
border between the WTO bodies and its Member States. From the point of view of a national
political system, the decision to ban asbestos by the French government is a classic example of
action taken by a democratically accountable institution in the face o f pressure from the electorate.
From a strictly formal perspective, the W TO dispute settlement system fits into the picture to the
extent that the WTO Agreements have been enforced in the WTO Member States in accordance
with their national constitutional requirements. However, discarding the overdy formalist stance,
the competence of the WTO dispute setdement system to assess the compatibility of such national
regulations with international trade rules adds a new dimension to the classic image o f a national
democratic system in a way that draws attention to its legitimacy implications:
If the DSB's decision does not call into question the French decision to ban 
asbestos, the very proceedings are bringing human health and workplace safety 
within the remit o f the W TO although they had hitherto been matters for national 
sovereignty.978 [Emphasis added, KK.]
In other words, due to the jurisdiction the WTO dispute setdement system, the democratically 
accountable government no longer has the exclusive competence to implement protective measures 
that it deems necessary — either for political or scientific reasons. The Asbestos case thus illustrates 
the challenges that the WTO dispute setdement proceedings pose to the functioning of democratic 
processes at the national level. In my view, these tensions are a good reason for the WTO dispute 
setdement system to exercise caution and be mindful o f the tensions inherent in its relationship 
with domestic institutions.
976 Panel report, Asbestos, para. 3.27.
977 Ibid.
978 “The Asbestos Conspiracy," Le Monde Diplomatique, July 2000.
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5.2.2 Standard of Review and Deference to National Authorities
From legal perspective, the standard o f judicial review plays an important role in drawing the line
between the domain of the WTO dispute settlement system and the national authorities o f the
WTO Member States. As Oesch has indicated, the standard of review:
... is nothing other than the embodiment o f a carefully drawn balance between the 
jurisdictional and institutional competencies of the actors. In substance, standards of 
review express a deliberate allocation of power to decide upon factual and legal 
issues.979
The standard o f review determines the extent to which a judicial body ‘second guesses’ decisions 
taken by other institutions, in other words, it defines the intensity o f the judicial review. The two 
extremes o f a standard of review are de novo review and total deference. The former means that the 
judicial body undertakes an independent review and may completely replace the findings o f another 
authority. When applying a deferential standard, the judicial body takes substantive findings as 
given and confines itself to “the formal examination of whether the relevant procedural 
requirements for the adoption o f the measure in question were complied with.”980
Due to its impact on the power-relations between the WTO dispute settlement system and the
Member States, standard o f review became one o f the issues risking to fail the entire Uruguay
Round negotiations.981 As a result, the D SU  contains no general provision on the standard of
review. The most relevant provisions is Article 11 of the DSU,962 according to which:
... a panel should make an objective assessment o f the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment o f the facts o f the case and the applicability of and the 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements...
The only provision in the WTO Agreements specifically addressing the standard o f review is Article 
17.6(i) of the Antidumping Agreement. Accordingly, a panel must not overturn the evaluation by the 
national antidumping authority if the establishment o f the facts was proper and their evolution 
“unbiased and objective.” Taking into account the mood prevailing during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations and the treaty texts, it would seem that Article 17 o f the Antidumping Agreement is a 
special provision requiring a more deferential standard in anti-dumping disputes than the general 
rule in Article 11 o f the DSU. However, the WTO dispute setdement practice seems to have
979 Oesch, Standards o f  Review, 23. Footnote omitted. Similarly, J. H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence o f  GATT and the 
WTO. Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations (CUP, 2000), 159.
980 Oesch, Standards o f  Review, 15.
981 Jackson, The Jurisprudence o f  GATT and the WTO, 135.
982 S. P. Croely & J. H. Jackson, “WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Deference to National Government Decisions: the 
Misplaced Analogy to the U.S. Cheveron Standard-of-Review Doctrine” in E.-U. Petersmann, ed., International 
Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (Kluwer Law International, 1997), 187 at 195. See also 
Oesch, Standards o f  Review, 83, 87.
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adopted a different approach whereby Article 17.6(i) is supplementary to Article 11 o f the DJU.983
According to Ehlermann, the standard of review depends on the Agreement, the type o f issue, the
type of measure and obligations:
The standard o f review in trade remedy cases... leaves a certain margin o f discretion 
to the competent national authorities. But it appears to be rather strict in spite o f the 
fact that the panels and the Appellate Body pay deference to the investigatory 
process... With respect to non-trade remedy cases, particularly G ATT, GATS and 
TBS cases, panels and the Appellate Body are not restrained in the same way 
through a prior national investigatory process. Therefore the standard o f review is 
less restrained and could be stricter.984
In the WTO practice, the standard o f review was first addressed in by the panel in the US-
Undenvear, where it indicated that “total deference to findings of the national authorities would not
ensure an ‘objective assessment”’ under DSU  Article l l . m  In the Hormones case, the AB elaborated
on the standard of review. It first noted the absence o f a specific provision concerning the standard
of review, emphasising, however, that DSU  Article 11 articulates “with sufficient clarity” the
appropriate standard of review for panels.986 It ruled that the applicable standard was neither de novo
review nor total deference but “the objective assessment of facts.”987 In other words, the applicable
standard stands in the middle of a full review and a reasonableness or procedural review.988 The
AB stressed that the standard of review:
... must reflect the balance established in that Agreement between the jurisdictional 
competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional 
competences retained by the Members for themselves989
According to Cass, this shows that the AB was “acutely aware o f the sensitivities raised by the 
decision.”990 Had the AB decided on full de novo review, this would have meant “a much deeper 
level o f integration.”991 Nevertheless, the decision “is constitutionalizing because it suggests that, 
even in the exercise of mere treaty interpretation by a central tribunal, the legal system under 
interpretation can be construed in a particular way.”992 The decision affects the extent o f  Member 
State power within the WTO legal system, and the relationship between the two levels o f control -
983 Oesch, Standards o f  Review, 97 et seq.
984 C.-D.Ehlermann, “Speech delivered at the Fourth Annual WTO Conference,” in Andenas & Ortino (2006), 394 at 
397.
985 Panel report, US - Restrictions on Imports o f  Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/R, 8 November 
1996, paras. 7.9-7.13. There are currently several disputes addressing the standard o f review including: Panel report, 
US -Measures Affecting Imports o f  Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from  India, WT/DS33/R, 6 January 1997, para. 
7.16; panel report, Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R, 14 March 1997, paras. 5.25- 
5.26; and the Appellate Body report on the same case, WT/DS31/AB/R, 30 June 1997, part V.A, p. 22.
986 Appellate Body report, Hormones, para. 114 et seq.
987 Ibid., para. 117.
988 For analysis, see Cass, “The 'Constitutionalization' o f International Trade Law,” 57 et seq.
989 Ibid., para. 115.
990 Cass, Constitutionalizatin o f  the World Trade Organization, 189-190
991Ibid.
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national authorities can no longer make decisions without them being subject to international 
judicial oversight at the WTO.993
As in many other legal traditions, also in the WTO context the standard of review is divided into
issues o f fact and issues o f law. This distinction is explicit in Article 17.6(i) of the Antidumping
Agreement and also reflected in Article 17.6 of the DSU  that limits the appeal procedure to “issues of
law”.994 A comprehensive analysis by Oesch shows that the standard of review in the WTO dispute
setdement system has been fairly intrusive both in relation to facts and even more so in relation to
law.995 When it comes to the interpretation of WTO law, a de novo standard seems perfecdy
justifiable in light of the role of the WTO as the principle judicial organ interpreting and applying
the WTO Agreement. When it comes to the evaluation o f facts, however, the situation is more
sensitive and the legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system to exercise a similar intrusive
standard is questionable. As Ehelrmann has indicated:
That is probably the most critical, the most delicate business a panel and the 
Appellate Body have to perform.996
Regardless o f this delicacy, the comprehensive analysis by Oesch shows that the standard o f review 
applied to the evaluation o f facts has also been fairly intrusive. He concludes that in assessing the 
‘raw’ evidence,
...panels usually did not discernibly defer to factual records as presented by the 
defendants. Panels examined the scope and appropriateness o f the relevant facts 
searchingly and thoroughly.997
Nevertheless, in assessing the conclusions drawn by the national authorities from the ‘raw’ evidence,
panels have tended to avoid a de novo examination. In other words,
As long as a member state’s conclusion is ‘justifiable’ in the light of all facts, and in 
the case o f scientific assessments based on a ‘qualified and respected opinion’, it 
may not be reversed by a panel although another conclusion would be perfectly 
possible to arrive at as well.998
Scott, in turn, has pointed to a trade-off between substance and process in terms of the standard of 
review, meaning:
... a higher level of scrutiny of procedural requirements in the course o f adoption of 
decisions, contested decisions, and lower level o f scrutiny of the substantive 
compatibility of those decisions with the agreements.999
993 Ibid., 188.
994 Ibid, 17 et seq.
995 Oesch, Standards o f  Review, 239.
996 C.-D.Ehlermann, “Speech delivered at the Fourth Annual WTO Conference,” in Andenas & Ortino (2006), 394 at 
397.
997 Oesch, Standards o f  Review, 236.
998 Ibid
999 J. Scott, “Speech delivered at the Fourth Annual WTO Conference,” in Andenas & Ortino (2006), 410 at 410.
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She refers, inter alia, to the EC-Preferences case where a procedural discipline was “used as a means of 
allowing greater deference in terms of substance,” in other words, “transparency and adaptability 
type criteria are being deployed by the Appellate Body” in evaluating the legitimacy o f the EU’s 
GSP scheme.1000 She then raises the question as to what extent such trade-offs between process and 
substance are appropriate especially in areas where the WTO Agreements do not lay down binding 
procedural requirements.1001
In the US-Cotton Yam , the AB specified, in the context o f the Agreement on Safeguards, that:
.. .panels must examine whether the competent authority has evaluated all relevant 
factors;... whether the competent authority has examined all pertinent factors and
assessed whether an adequate explanation has been provided as to how those
factors support the determination; and they must also consider whether the... 
explanation addresses fially the nature and complexities of the data and response to 
other plausible interpretations of the data. However, panels must no conduct a de 
novo review ... nor substitute their judgement for that o f the competent 
authority.1002
According to Becroft, this “casts a high onus on panels to thoroughly review member measures”
and suggests that “the approach required of panels is close to a de novo standard of review in
relation to the assessment of facts.”1003 In an illustration o f the “fine line” that the panel must tread
between de now review and objective assessment,1004 the AB overturned some o f the panel’s
findings on in the D RAM S dispute under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures the
basis that it had failed to apply the proper standard of review. Accordingly,
.. .the Panel went beyond its role as the reviewer o f the investigating authority’s decision, 
and instead, it conducted its own assessment, relying on its own judgement, o f much o f the 
evidence.1005
Questions concerning standard of review have also emerged in several disputes under the SPS 
Agreement. In the Hormones case the AB made several statements that seemed to highlight the 
Member States’ discretion to implement SPS Measures. It stressed that risk does not necessarily 
need to be expressed in quantitative terms,1006 SPS measures do not need to be based on majority 
scientific opinion,1007 and the requirement that SPS measures must be “based on” risk assessment 
means there must be a rational relationship between the measure and the risk assessment.1008 Goh 
stresses that the “line between a panel conducting an objective assessment o f the scientific evidence
1 Ibid.1000
m 'Ibid.
1002 Appellate Body report, US- Cotton Yam, para. 74.
1003 R. Becroft, “The Standard o f Review Strikes Back: The US-Korea Drams Appeal,” Journal o f  International 
Economic Law 9(1) (2006), 207 at 211.
1004 Ibid., 214.
1005 Appellate Body report, US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMS) from  Korea, WT/DS296/AB/R, 20 July 2005, para. 190.
1006 Appellate Body report, Hormones, para. 187.
1007 Ibid, para. 194.
1008 Ibid, para. 193.
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and a de novo risk assessment is however a fine one.”1009 He criticises the subsequent Japan-Apples 
decision, which, in his view, shifted the emphasis from Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement to Article 
2.2, and notes that the latter Article “envisages detailed inquiry by a WTO panel into the underlying 
scientific basis and justification of an SPS measure.”1010 He indicates that disputes such as Hormones, 
Biotech and Japan-Apples relate more to “different national cultural approaches to certain perceived 
risk” than scientific uncertainty.1011 Science is but one factor “in a complex political matrix 
confronted by national authorities” as bans on hormone meet or GM products “constitute a 
political response to legitimate consumer concerns about life and health.”1012 It is therefore more 
difficult for domestic audiences to accept a WTO ruling that strikes down the national measure.1013 
These questions will be discussed in more detail in the section below.
From this brief overview it is clear that the standard of review is relevant for the legitimacy of the 
WTO dispute settlement system especially because it modifies the relationship between the WTO 
and the Member States. On the face o f it, the “objective assessment” standard under the DSU  
grants a certain degree o f deference to the Member State. However, in practice, “objective 
assessment” of complex science by WTO panels can lead to rigorous review of the factual decision 
by national authorities. From the perspective o f the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement 
system, there are valid reasons against applying a standard of review that is too intrusive. This is 
especially true for politically sensitive linkage disputes involving value judgements, and where the 
WTO dispute settlement system is entering the sensitive territory of matters previously under 
exclusive national jurisdiction.
5.2.3 Opening the Borders and ‘Importing’ Substantive Legitimacy?
Having examined the broader context in which the WTO dispute setdement system operates and 
relates to the national authorities o f the WTO Member States, we can now return to the argument 
that the WTO dispute settlement system should ‘import substantive legitimacy’ and broaden its 
horizons to better accommodate the values and interests at stake in linkage disputes. To that effect, 
I shall use the debate about the role of science and other knowledge claims in risk disputes as an 
example.
The way in which the WTO dispute settlement system has relied on science in risk disputes 
adjudicated under the SPS Agreement, such as the Hormones, has been challenged by several scholars. 
The main critique is that the WTO is placing too much faith on the ability o f science to both
1009 Goh, “Tipping the Apple Cart,” 666. 
Ibid., 668.
1011 T. • »l U l U u u o10,1 Ib id , 676
1012 Ibid.
1013 Ibid.
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predict and manage potential risks and leaves too litde room for the inevitable political balancing
involved in such disputes. According to Scott,
Context, as well as culture, is silenced in this uni-dimensional world o f scientific 
rationality. This is a world in which law is the servant o f science in the name o f free 
trade; a world in which law as an instrument o f other values — social order, public 
confidence, trust, community, rights, democracy or deliberation — has no role.1014
According to Perez, the WTO is harbouring “a naive conception of science.”1015 Elaborating on 
the philosophical idea o f ’’incompletable universe,”1016 Perez argues that none o f the scientific 
techniques used by the W TO dispute setdement bodies to confront problems of indeterminacy in 
risk disputes are able to provide a guarantee against surprises.1017 Against this background, the 
privileged role bestowed to science in resolving the dilemma of distinguishing between legitimate 
and protectionist trade measures does not seem to be warranted.1018 Perez describes how the AB 
rejected in its Hormones decision the several general studies and opinions submitted by the EU 
demonstrating the risk o f cancer associated with growth hormones, requiring instead a specific study 
addressing the particular risk, namely “the carcinogenic or genotoxic potential o f the residues of 
those hormones found in meat derived from catde to which the hormones had been administered 
for growth purposes.”1019 The AB thus assumed that more specific studies could have removed the 
indeterminacy characterised by the general studies invoked by the EU. 1020 However, in Perez’s 
view, the AB overestimates the capacity of regulatory sciences such as toxicology and epidemiology 
to cope with uncertainty around SPS measures - “a new study could not have been ‘clean’ of 
extrapolatory (and inherendy uncertain) inferences.”1021 On the contrary, given that both the 
general and more specific on hormones studies apply the same intrinsic logic of extrapolation, the 
essential question is in ‘reasonableness’ of the extrapolation1022 It is clear that answer to the 
question what is ‘reasonable’ cannot be found from the field o f toxicology itself, but “one can argue 
that the law has more experience in making judgements about ‘reasonableness’ than science.”1023
1014 J. Scott, "On Kith and Khine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO," Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 3/1999. Available at: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990301.html.>
1015 Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism, 127.
1016 Ibid., 127-128. According to Perez, the idea of ‘incompletable universe’, derives from two aspects of 
indeterminacy: ontological indeterminacy (i.e. uncertainty about our description o f reality) and time indeterminacy 
(uncertainty about the future). It “requires us to consider our understanding o f the world as inherently transient -  
there is always the risk that discovering new data will force us to revise our theories o f the world.”
1017 Ibid., 128-129
1018 Ibid., 129
1019 Ibid., 136-137. See also Appellate Body report, Hormones, para 200.
1020 Ibid., 137.
1021 Ibid, 137
1022 Ibid., 137.
1023 Ibid., 137. Against this background, he also criticises the AB’s approach to the precautionary principle and 
Article 5.7 o f the SPS Agreement: if  uncertainty is the norm rather than the exception, then the distinction is not 
really one between ‘full knowledge’ and ‘insufficient knowledge’ but between different levels o f  insufficiency. Under 
these conditions, the precautionary principle would be an instrument that allows more risky inferences (i.e. ones that 
are more likely to prove wrong) -  however, these questions cannot be answered through science.
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As non-scientific factors thus form an inherent part of the risk assessment process, Perez is 
proposing a more pluralistic deliberative process based on the recognition that the process o f risk 
assessment is an inherently incomplete process that can be informed by different types of 
knowledge claims.1024 In more concrete terms, this would mean that in SPS disputes expert 
testimonies should not be confined to epidemiology and toxicology but they should also cover 
sociological and anthropological studies of communities closely related to the risks in question.1025 
According to Perez,
This pluralistic vision should be seen as a positive step by the democratic critiques 
of the WTO and could thus contribute to its overall legitimacy. It should also 
extend the ability o f the WTO to cope with the complex challenges generated by 
SPS/TBT domains.1026
While it is easy to concur with the insight that science is ultimately incapable o f providing all the 
answers in risk disputes, what would be the consequences of the proposed pluralistic approach and 
how would it really have such positive implications on the legitimacy o f the WTO as Perez 
suggests? To my mind, the answer is influenced by two consideration. Accepting that 
considerations other than scientific rationality play a role in the risk assessment process,1027 openly 
acknowledging the relevance o f non-scientific arguments and openly discussing the relevance such 
factors would seem a justified step. Increasing the transparency of the decision-making process 
could, as such, improve the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system.
The second consideration, however, relates to my arguments concerning the dangers of weighing 
and balancing values and interests, and the need to pay due regard to the limits o f the judicial 
function as well as to the tensions at the frontier between the WTO dispute settlement system and 
the national domain. Is it the role o f the WTO dispute setdement system to develop a pluralistic 
vision of the risk assessment process and balance the various and possibly competing knowledge 
claims? O r would it, again, be better to defer these questions to negotiations and national 
authorities? Clearly, to answer this question one would need to strike a balance not only between 
the different values and interests at stake, but also between the different components 
that be pointing towards somewhat opposing directions. My argument is that in 
concerns over the formal dimension of legitimacy pose important constraints on the 
WTO dispute settlement system to broaden its substantive horizons.
1024 Ibid., 152-155.
1025 Ibid., 153.
1026 Ibid.
1027 While Perez’s arguments seem logical and well-founded, it must be noted, however, that the role o f value 
judgements in the risk assessment process is subject to debate. Hill & al., “Risk Assessment and Precaution,” 268.
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5.3 The WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings and Legitimacy
When discussing the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system from the procedural point
of view, one frequendy runs into explanations referring to the closed and secretive ‘Club’ o f trade
experts that is said to have dominated the G A T T  era. Accordingly, people working with the
international trade regime grew accustomed to a culture o f secrecy and inter-state diplomacy and
are therefore finding it difficult to adjust to the new situation and respond to the pressures to make
the WTO more transparent. Also some of the problems concerning the WTO dispute setdement
procedures are traced to the ‘ethos’ of the G A TT  era trade diplomats, which, according to Weiler,
“tenaciously persists despite the much transformed juridified WTO.”1028 In terms o f trade disputes,
Within this ethos, there was an institutional goal to prevent trade disputes from 
spilling over or, indeed, spilling out into the wider circles of international relations: a 
trade dispute was an “internal” affair which had, as far as possible, to be resolved 
(“setded”) as quickly and smoothly as possible within the organi2ation.1029
However, as we have seen in Chapter 1 and elsewhere, this ‘trade ethos’ created problems when 
those outside the trade circles first came to realise that the G A TT  rules could have important 
implications on substantive issues close to their hearts, and then learned of the unprecedented 
powers o f the new WTO dispute setdement system. The aim of this section is to present an 
overview of questions concerning the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement procedures, in 
particular concerning transparency, access to information and participation, including the question 
concerning the admissibility of amicus curiae briefs. These themes are crucial to the legitimacy o f the 
WTO dispute setdement system — not least because of the challenges brought to the fore by 
globalisation discussed in Chapter 1. It can be argued that procedural guarantees are even more 
important when decision-making takes place in a forum that is distant from those affected by its 
decisions and direct democratic control.1030 Furthermore, these themes have also been highly 
relevant in linkage disputes. Many of the controversies concerning legitimacy of the W TO dispute 
setdement procedures have culminated in such high-profile linkage disputes as the Asbestos, Shrimp- 
Turtle or Biotech cases where the public has had a keen interest in the proceedings but several 
constituencies have felt that their opportunities to participate, influence or be informed o f the 
proceedings have been modest.
5.3.1 Transparency and Access to Information
One o f the most common critiques against the G A TT  and WTO dispute setdement panels is one 
referring to the ‘three faceless bureaucrats’ or ‘gnomes’ in Geneva deciding important issues o f the
1028 J. H. H. Weiler, “The Rule o f Lawyers and the Ethos o f Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External 
Legitimacy o f the WTO Dispute Settlement,” Journal o f  World Trade 35(2) (2001), 191 at 193.
1029 Ibid., 195.
1030 Howse, “Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation,” 42.
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world and domestic socio-political and economic policy. 1031 This accusation has been voiced so
frequently that it has provoked some less understanding reactions from inside the WTO:
The dispute settlement system has given rise to charges that WTO decisions are 
made by ‘faceless bureaucrats,’ but when I hear this I often wonder what these 
critics would rather have: a system where decisions are made by well-known 
politicians? A coin toss? A system where might makes right? No dispute settlement 
system at all? The system may not operate perfectly but no one has yet been able to 
prescribe something better with respect to its basic fundamentals.1032
While it is probably easy for the ‘insiders’ to grow tired of the accusations made towards the WTO 
and dispute setdement system, it is not difficult to see how the legitimacy of the WTO dispute 
setdement procedures could be improved.
In general terms, access to the WTO dispute setdement system is restricted to WTO Member
States. While provisions on third party participation by WTO Member States appear to be
functioning relatively well, some concerns have been raised also in that regard, for example over
short time-limits and resources of developing countries to participate. 1033 From that perspective, a
significant decision was made by the AB made in the Bananas dispute to allow parties to be
presented by private lawyers:1034
Many times a smaller Member might not have the resources alone to pursue WTO 
disputes effectively, particulady against large WTO Members like the United States 
or the EC. Private sector involvement.. .can help even out the asymmetry.1035
According to Howse, the use of private lawyers may improve procedural legitimacy also because 
private lawyers are more used to such procedural rights than are government officials.1036 From the 
perspective of developing countries, the problem with private law firms is that they tend to be 
expensive to hire for legally and technically complex WTO disputes. The creation o f the Advisory 
Centre on WTO Law has therefore been hailed as an important advance for developing 
countries.1037 Its rates vary based on the developing country’s membership status, and in the EC- 
Sardines case, for example, it provided legal advise to Peru for only 100 U.S. dollars per hour.1038
From the point o f view of the general public, the WTO dispute settlement proceedings take place 
in secret. At least, there is no legal basis for members o f the public to access the written or oral 
proceedings. During the written phase, submissions by the disputing parties are not made public -
1031 Weiler, “The Rule o f Lawyers and the Ethos o f  Diplomats,” 202.
1032 Yerxa, “The Power o f the WTO Dispute Settlement System,” 5.
1033 J.P. Durling, “Rights o f Access to WTO Dispute Settlement,” in P. Ruttley & al, eds., Due Process in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement (Cameron May, 2000), 141 at 146-147.
1034 Appellate Body report, EC-Bananas III, paras. 4-12.
1035 Durling, “Rights o f Access to WTO Dispute Settlement,” 155.
1036 Howse, “Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation,” 47.
1037 Shaffer & Mosoti, “The EC-Sardines Case,” 3.
1038 Ibid.
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unless the participants decide to do so. According to the panels’ Working Procedures contained in 
Appendix 3 o f the DSU, WTO Members “must treat as confidential information submitted by 
another Member to the panel which that Member has designated as confidential.”1039 However, at 
the request o f its counterpart in a dispute, a WTO Member must provide a non-confidential 
summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public.1040 
Some WTO Members, such as the EU, the U.S. and Australia, have developed a practice of 
publishing their own written submissions on their websites.1041
In principle, oral proceedings before the panels and the Appellate Body are conducted in secret 
behind closed doors. There has been some discussion as to whether it would be possible to open 
panel hearings through agreement of the parties.1042 And indeed, during the proceedings concerning 
the Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, the disputing parties joindy 
requested that the panel’s meetings be opened for public observation.1043 The panel decided to 
accept the parties’ joint request on the basis that DSU  Article 12 allows panels to deviate from the 
working procedures in Appendix III of the DSU.1044 It also interpreted DSU  Article 14.1 providing 
that “panel deliberations shall be confidential” in such a way that “deliberations” only covered the 
panel’s internal discussions in reaching its conclusions.1045 Several third parties, including Brazil, 
China, India, Taiwan and Mexico, disagreed and the panel decided that its session with third parties 
remained closed.1046 Countries opposing open panel hearings highlighted that questions of 
transparency are being discussed in the ongoing negotiations concerning the review o f the D SU  and 
an agreement has yet to be reached.1047 This is true and highlights tensions between the dispute 
settlement system and the slow political arm of the WTO. On the other hand, a solid legal basis for 
open panel proceedings exist under the DSU, and the argument here is that the panel was thus right 
in complying with the joint request by all the disputing parties. From the point of view of further 
improving the procedural legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system, it is useful to highlight 
that most national and international courts and tribunal are open to public and there are thus strong 
arguments to apply the same principle at the W TO.1048
1039 DSU, Appendix 3, para.3.
1040 Ibid
1041 See, for instance, the European Commission’s website at: 
< http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/dispute/index_en.htm>.
1042 1. Gracia-Bercero, “Speech Delivered at the Fourth Annual WTO Conference” in Andenas & Ortino (2006), 433 
at 436.
1043 Panel report, US-Continued Suspension o f  Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, para. 7.1
1044 Ibid., paras. 7.45-47.
1045 Ibid., para. 7.49.
1046 Ibid., para. 7.53.
1047 Ibid., paras. 7.21-7.39.
1048 W. Davey, “Proposals for Improving the Working Procedures o f the WTO Dispute Settlement Panels,” in F. 
Ortino & E-U Petersmann, eds., The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2005 (Kluwer Law International, 2004), 
19 at 21.
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Concerning access to the actual panel and Appellate Body reports the current situation is already
fairly satisfactory. All dispute setdement reports are made publicly available after their adoption by
the DSB, and can be downloaded from the W TO’s website.1049 The website also provides plenty of
other high-quality information relevant to the WTO dispute setdement system, including short
summaries by the WTO Legal Service on most disputes. However, this applies only to adopted
panel reports. In contrast, the interim panel reports are distributed solely to the disputing WTO
Member States for comments and not made available for even other WTO Members. This practice
seems justifiable given that in most judicial bodies, even the disputing parties are not given the
opportunity to comment on the outcome before the decision is finalised. In the Biotech case, an
interesting incident occurred concerning the interim panel report. Unsurprisingly, the civil society
had been both following the case as closely as possible and complaining about the lack of
transparency o f the proceedings. The amount o f scientific information reviewed by the panel was
enormous and its deadline for finalising the report was postponed several times. In February 2006,
the interim panel report was finally given to the parties. It did not take long until first the findings
and conclusions were published, and then also the descriptive part o f the report was made available
online through the website o f the Friends o f the Earth.1050 What is interesting is the sharp tone that
the final Biotech panel report uses to criticise the NGOs involved in this incident:
... it is surprising and disturbing that the same N GO s which claimed to act as amid, 
or friends, o f the Panel when seeking the convince the Panel to accept their 
unsolicited briefs subsequently found it appropriate to disclose, on their own 
websites, interim findings and conclusions o f the Panel, which were clearly 
designated as confidential.1051
Why was it necessary for the Biotech panel to criticise the NGOs - in all likelihood, it was one o f the 
disputing parties that leaked the report? It is also a commonly known fact that most interim panel 
reports are leaked.1052 As the former WTO Director-General Ruggiero stated, “almost all interim 
reports have been leaked, sometimes within hours, usually within a matter o f a few days.”1053 While 
concerns voiced by the Biotech panel and Ruggiero over confidential information contained in the 
interim reports are valid, it is hardly surprising that the report was leaked in such a high-profile 
linkage dispute as the Biotech. While bringing the matter to the disputing parties’ attention seems 
appropriate, it certainly seems unnecessary for the panel to criticise the relevant NGOs in such 
harsh terms.
1049 The WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway. Found at: 
<http://www.wto.Org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#disputes>.
1050 Panel report, Biotech, paras. 6.183-6.185.
1051 Ibid, para. 6.196.
1052 Currie, Genetic Engineering and the WTO, 8-9.
1053 Statement by the Director-General to the General Council, 24 April 1998. Found at: < 
http://trade.wtosh.com/english/news_e/sprr_e/statl7_e.htm>.
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There is little doubt that having access to the final panel and Appellate Body reports is 
fundamentally important for the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system. While they are 
readily available online in several languages the situation is unfortunately still not ideal. The sheer 
size and length of some panel reports is bound to deter many who would have been interested in 
knowing more about the dispute and the outcome but are not obliged to do so for professional 
reasons. In the Biotech case, for instance, the panel’s report without the annexes is almost 1.100 
pages long and the entire report is contained in 12 separate Microsoft Word documents. After 
having overcome technical hurdle of downloading and reading the multiple documents, the fact 
remains that the panel and Appellate Body reports are “increasingly difficult to understand.”1054 
While the daunting flood o f information, its enormous complexity and difficult jargon is by no 
means confined to the WTO, the problem still merits attention. This is because the WTO and 
especially its dispute setdement system are notorious for producing lengthy and complicated 
documents. All this very much affects the ability of those interested in the issues before the WTO 
dispute settlement system to follow and understand what is going on. While laymen will never be 
able to understand WTO dispute settlement documents perfectly (and few will read them), certain 
measures would still improve the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This is 
because both, lack of information and a flood of information that is too daunting to understand 
are prone to inspiring misconceptions and negative rumours. The conclusion here is that the 
legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system could be improved by allowing the public to 
access written submissions and observe hearings, as well as by producing short, easily accessible 
summaries o f all disputes.
5.3.2 Public Participation and Amicus Briefs
The question concerning public participation in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings has been
even more difficult and controversial than that o f access to information and transparency. Since the
D SU  contains no provisions on rights of access by any other actors apart from the WTO Member
States, possibilities for private actors and NGOs to participate in the WTO dispute settlement
proceedings depend on the national regulation and practices of each individual WTO Member
State. In reality, the situation has been described in the following terms:
When private parties have interests that align completely with one of the Members, 
private parties can play a very active role in the conduct of the case. However, this 
access is completely subject to the limits set by that Member.1055
In practice, private actors have played an important role in high-profile disputes such as the 
Hormones, Bananas and Photographic Film1056 (revealingly known as the Fuji-Kodak case). For this
1054 T. Cottier, “Speech Delivered at the Fourth Annual WTO Conference,” in Andenas & Ortino (2006), 451.
1055 Durling, “Rights o f  Access to WTO Dispute Settlement,” 147.
1056 Ibid., 153.
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reason, the problems can be characterised as “subtler than the lack o f any access” 1057 — and perhaps
even more difficult. In other words, while the involvement of private actors can in many case be
suspected, their exact role is often not publicly known.1058 For this reason, it is often difficult “to
single out those private sector interests that deserve to be exposed and evaluated.”1059 It has been
argued — convincingly — that transparency “is going to be politically more important rather than
less.”1060 It has also been estimated that the question will be “difficult to resolve because it brings
forward very different political perspectives.” 1061 However, a strong and convincing argument can
be made for improving the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement proceedings in this regard:
When a process is open, when all stakeholders feel they have some chance to 
influence the process, the entire process has more credibility and legitimacy... The 
current, frequendy non-transparent, forms o f access do not as much to build and 
reinforce legitimacy as might be the case.1062
The following discussion focuses on a particular form of participation, namely amicus curiae briefs, 
that have been particularly controversial at the WTO dispute setdement system.
Amicus curiae, ‘friends o f the court’, is a legal institution dating back to Roman law when oral history 
was the principal means for transmitting jurisprudence and wisdom. 1063 The role of the amid was 
to draw a court’s attention to precedents and crucial facts that had been overlooked.1064 Currendy, 
the concept is used in several legal systems but predominandy in common law ones in the form of 
amicus curiae briefs submitted by groups or individuals seeking to influence the outcome of the 
judicial process and stressing facts and legal arguments favourable to their interests.1065 At the 
WTO, the question o f amicus briefs has been highly controversial. Their admissibility is not 
regulated by the D SU  but their status has evolved through the WTO dispute setdement practice. 
The current situation is that amicus briefs have been accepted at all stages o f the dispute setdement 
process, in other words, during panel, appeal and Article 21.5 implementation proceedings. 
However, the practice has been widely criticised both by those opposing the admissibility o f amicus 
briefs at the WTO and by those accusing the WTO dispute setdement system for not properly 
considering the amicus briefs that it has accepted.
The first important decision concerning the admissibility o f amicus briefs at the WTO was made in 
the Shrimp-Turtle dispute. Highlighting their interest in the dispute, two NGOs, namely the World
1057 Ibid., 154.
1058 Ibid.
1059 Ibid.
1060 Gracia-Bercero, “The Fourth Annual WTO Conference," 435.
1061 Ibid, 436.
1062 Durling, “Rights o f Access to WTO Dispute Settlement,” 155.
1063 G. C. Umbricht, “An ‘Amicus Curiae B rief on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO,” Journal o f  International 
Economic Law (2001), 773 at 778.
]064Ibid.
]065 Ibid.
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Wildlife Fund and the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), submitted amicus briefs
to the Shrimp-Turtle panel. According to the WWF, its aim was to:
.. .ensure that the W TO Dispute Settlement System has before it both the scientific 
and other technical facts relevant to the conservation o f se turdes; and the relevant 
international, regional and national law and policy governing the conservation of sea 
turtles.1066
The Shrimp-Turtle panel, however, rejected the amicus briefs. It explained that:
We note that, pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU, the initiative to seek information 
and to select the source o f information rests with the Panel. In any other situations, 
only parties and third parties are allowed to submit information direcdy to the Panel. 
Accepting non-requested information from non-governmental sources would be, in 
our opinion, incompatible with the provisions of the DSU  as currendy applied.1067
The panel went on to indicate that the parties had the option of attaching amicus briefs as a part of 
their own submissions and noted that the U.S. had done so with regard to the brief submitted by 
the CIEL.1068 The AB, however, adopted a different approach to the admissibility o f amicus briefs. It 
underscored the “comprehensive nature” o f the panel’s right to ‘seek information’ under Article 13 
of the DSU.m9 It also emphasized that Article 12.1 of the D SU  made it possible for panels to 
depart from the Working Procedures annexed to the DSU  and develop their own Working 
Procedures after consulting with the disputing parties.1070 Thus, Articles 12 and 13 of the DSU  
taken together gave panels “ample and extensive authority” to undertake and control the fact­
finding process.1071 The AB stated that the panel’s reading of the word ‘seek’ was “unnecessarily 
formal and technical” and indicated that
A panel has the discretionary authority either to accept and consider or to reject 
information and advice submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or not.1072
Subsequently, panels have both accepted and rejected amicus briefs. In the Australia-Salmon dispute a 
panel established under Article 21.5 of the D SU  accepted an amicus brief1073 whereas in the Carbon 
Steel dispute the panel, referring to Articles 12 and 13 of the D SU  and the Shrimp-Turtle decision, 
used its discretion and decided to reject an amicus brief.1074 The Asbestos panel accepted two amicus 
briefs attached by the EC to its submission, rejected two briefs as not relevant and one because it
1066 “Amicus Brief to WTO: Shrimp-Turtle Dispute,” (WWF, September 1997.). Available at: 
<http://www.field.org.uk/files/shrimpbrief.pdf>.
1067 Panel report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 7.8
1068 Ibid.
1069 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 104.
1070 Ibid, para. 105.
1071 Ibid, para. 106.
1072 Ibid, paras. 107-108.
1073 Panel report, Australia —Measures Affecting Importation o f  Salmon -  Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada,, 
WT/DS18/RW, 18 Februaiy 2000, paras. 7.8-7.9.
1074 Panel report, US -  Imposition o f  Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel 
Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/R, 23 December 1999, para. 6.3.
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had arrived too late. During the Article 21.5 proceedings in the Shrimp-Turtle case, the panel also 
considered one brief attached to the U.S. submission and rejected another one.
The admissibility of amicus briefs during the appeal phase has been legally more controversial than
at the panel phase. In its first Shrimp-Turtle decision in 1998, the AB accepted amicus curiae briefs
“attached to the appellant’s submission as a part o f the appellant’s submission.”1075 In addition, it
issued a preliminary ruling accepting an amicus brief submitted directly to it by the CIEL and
promised to give reasoning for this in the final report. However, it was not until the Carbon Steel
dispute that the AB elaborated on the legal basis for its authority to accept amicus briefs. In its
justification, the AB referred to Article 17.9 of the DSU  providing the AB the competence to draw
up its own working procedures in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director
General of the WTO.1076 In a footnote, it also referred to Rule 16(1) o f its Working Procedures
authorising the AB to create an appropriate procedure when a question arises not covered by the
Working Procedures.1077 According to the AB, Article 17.9 of the DSU  provides it with “broad
authority to adopt procedural rules” which do not conflict with the DSU.'l01s On this basis, the AB
took the position that:
...as long as we act consistently with the provisions o f the DSU  and the covered 
agreements, we have the legal authority to decide whether or not to accept and 
consider any information that is pertinent and useful in an appeal.1079
The AB’s legal reasoning has been subject to criticism. The scope o f the appellate review is limited 
to questions of law, and the DSU  contains no explicit provision providing the AB with a similar 
right to seek information and technical advice as the panels have under Article 13. According to 
Appleton, the AB:
...chose not to draw the obvious conclusion, that the Members did not grant the 
Appellate Body the right to seek information and technical advice with respect to 
questions of law falling within its purview.1080
In his view, the AB’s conviction that by accepting amicus briefs, it is not adding or diminishing the 
rights and obligations of WTO Members is “somewhat hard to reconcile” with Article 13 of the 
DSU. 1081 He also laments that while the AB has normally “placed great emphasis” on textual 
interpretation of WTO instruments, in the Carbon Steel dispute it “may have strayed from a text of 
its own creation,” namely the provisions o f the Working Procedure. 1082
1075 Appellate Body report, Shrimp-Turtle, para. 91.
1076 Appellate Body report, US-lmposition o f  Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon 
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R, 7 June 2000, para 39.
1077 Ibid
1078  / w d ;
1079 ibid.
1080 A.E.Appleton, “Amicus Curieae Submissions in the Carbon Steel Case: Another Rabbit from the Appellate 
Body’s Hat?,” Journal o f  International Economic Law  3(4) (2000), 691 at 696.
1081 Ibid., 698.
1082 Ibid., 699.
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In the Asbestos dispute the AB attempted to respond to some o f this criticism — but ironically it did
so in a way that infuriated virtually all stakeholders in the amicus controversy, thereby marking in
many ways the culmination o f the situation. During the appeal phase o f this dispute relating to a
subject matter o f enormous public interest, the AB created a special procedure under Article 16(1)
of its Working Procedures for dealing with amicus curiae briefs for the purposes o f this single appeal.
Accordingly, those interested in filing an amicus brief were first required to apply for ‘leave to file’
and comply with certain procedural requirements.1083 Some W TO Members, however, did not
appreciate the Appellate Body’s initiative and called for an extraordinary meeting o f the General
Council. Several delegates accused the AB for exceeding its mandate and competence.1084
Meanwhile, the AB received 17 applications for ‘leave to file’ but decided to reject every single one
of them either because they had been filed too late or did not comply with other procedural
requirements.1085 It is commonly understood, however, that it was because o f the negative reaction
by the WTO Member States to the adoption o f the special procedure rather than serious procedural
flaws in all 17 applications that the AB decided to categorically reject all the applications. This series
of decisions caused what has been characterised as “the most virulent backlash yet seen against the
WTO.”1086 In addition to upsetting several developing country W TO Members, those who had
submitted an application were appalled by the ‘comedy o f errors.’:
This was very clumsily handled — for me at least, it was an insult to be told that I 
could not follow a set o f simple instructions.1087
Thus, as Mavroidis observes:
.. .the Appellate Body managed to alienate all o f the WTO constituency: the WTO 
Members, the NGOs and some of us who continue to write on WTO issues.1088
Since the Asbestos episode, the situation has calmed down somewhat and the current legal situation 
can be summarised as follows: parties are free to attach amicus briefs to their written submission. 
Otherwise, panels have the authority to accept unsolicited amicus briefs on the basis of Article 13 of 
the DSU. The Appellate Body has also accepted amicus briefs, but the exact legal basis for its 
authority to accept unsolicited amicus briefs remains unclear.1089 O n the other hand, the AB has an 
authority to request amicus briefs under Article 16(1) of its Working Procedures as an ad hoc 
solution. One possible interpretation suggested by Mavroidis is thus to interpret Article 16(1) in the 
same way as Article 13 o f the DSU, namely that since the AB has the authority to request amicus
1083 Appellate Body report, Asbestos, paras. 51-52.
1084 WTO Minutes o f General Council Meeting (22 November 2000), WT/GC/M/60, 23 January 2001.
1085 Appellate Body report, Asbestos, paras. 55-56.
1086 R. Howse, “Membership and its Privileges: the WTO, Civil Society and the Amicus Brief Controversy” European 
Law Journal 9(4) (2003), 496 at 505.
m 7 Ibid
1088 P. C. Mavroidis, '’'’Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing,” Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 2/2001.
1089 Ibid., 5.
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briefs, it also has the authority to accept unsolicited briefs. In any case, the fact that the DSU  is 
silent concerning the admissibility of amicus briefs should not automatically mean that they are 
inadmissible. The DSU  does not explicitly address numerous other procedural matters either, but 
this does not prevent the W TO dispute setdement system from drawing the obvious conclusions. 
As Mavroidis also observes, the D SU  contains no provision concerning the AB similar to Article 11 
of the DSU  obligating panels to make ‘an objective assessment’ of matters before it. Furthermore, 
the D SU  makes no mention of due process — yet few would disagree that due process has to be 
complied with and “WTO Members, in their submissions, whenever they raise a procedural 
concern, almost always refer to due process.”1090 It is useful to note that some WTO Members have 
proposed clarifying the status of amicus briefs during the negotiations to review the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding and adopt appropriate procedures.1091 However, these proposals did not receive 
sufficient support to be included in the Chair’s texts used as a basis for the negotiations.1092
What, then, are the main stakes in the amicus debate? The admissibility of amicus briefs has been
contested based on the view that the WTO is an intergovernmental organization and therefore, its
procedures should be open for WTO Members only. Other stakeholders should approach their
respective WTO Member States and make their contribution through national processes. Chapter 1
already took a strong position against this type o f argumentation. International law is undergoing a
profound change and the old view is no longer plausible. This does not mean, however, that amicus
briefs should necessarily be accepted, but if not, then this is not the right argument. Furthermore,
as already indicated above, those with powerful economic interest already have means of securing
their interests in the WTO dispute setdement proceedings:
They have access to politicians, and therefore to the servants o f politicians, delegates 
and ambassadors; they also have access, or the resources that buy access to lawyers, 
consultants, and lobbyists who can make their views effectively known in the 
Geneva community... All the howls o f the trade ‘Club’ about amicus practice when 
NGOs are involved should be interpreted in the light o f their utter silence about the 
due process issues raised by the long-standing practice o f lawyers, lobbyists etc. 
speaking to delegates or even legal officials of the Secretariat.1093
Even more interestingly -  and probably accurately — Howse also indicates that while he is not
arguing that the lobbying extends to the Appellate Body itself,
... there are routine third-party (government) interveners in disputes who will 
sometimes make systemic arguments that have been suggested by the trade 
community and have litde to do in any case with the specific interests of that 
country at stake in the dispute, if indeed there are any.1094
1091 Davey, “Proposals for Improving the Working Procedures o f  the WTO Dispute Settlement Panels,” 22-23.
1092 E-U. Petersmann, “The Doha Development Round Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications o f the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding 2001-2003: An Overview,” in Ortino &Petersmann, eds., (2004), 3 at 3.
1093 Howse, “Amicus Brief Controversy,” 509.
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In light of such realities where powerful economic interests find their way to the WTO in any case,
allowing amicus briefs from NGOs would be a way of ensuring that the WTO dispute setdement
system is aware o f all the relevant interests and viewpoints. If industry groups were interested in
submitting amicus briefs, this would only make the situation more transparent. In my view, it is
important for informed and responsible decision-makers to be aware o f all the relevant facts, views,
interests and interpretations. And while it is true that those authoring amicus briefs tend to have a
substantive bias and be interested ‘in selling a message,’
...this is not an argument against accepting amicus curiae briefs. This is an argument in 
favour of selecting properly the members of a court.1095
The key and most challenging argument against the admissibility of amicus briefs relates to
developing countries and discrepancy o f resources. The concern here is that since developing
countries are already at an disadvantage given their limited resources to participate in the WTO and
its dispute setdement, allowing amicus briefs from NGOs would make the situation worse. The
reality is that most NGOs are situated in the North and their resources to prepare for a W TO case
are sometimes better than those o f the poorest WTO Members. The argument has thus been made
that amicus briefs are systematically biased in favour o f developed countries. However, Howse and
others argue — convincingly in my view — that this view is increasingly difficult to sustain.1096 This is
because also developing country NGOs are taking advantage o f the practice. 1097 For example, in
the Shrimp-Turtle case NGOs from developing countries had collaborated with Northern ones to
submit an amicus brief to the panel.1098 Howse also indicates that developed and developing country
NGOs are cooperating on questions concerning access to medicines.1099 Interestingly, the only
WTO Member that has ever filed an amicus brief — successfully— was also a developing country,
namely Morocco in the Sardines dispute.1100 Howse states that this example illustrates that:
.. .amicus participation can be cost-effective way for a country with limited resources 
to participate in WTO proceedings in which it has some interest, but where formal 
third-party participation may be more cost-intensive.1101
As I have indicated before, the discrepancy of resources to participate in the functioning o f the 
WTO is a real and serious problem. And indeed, drafting and submitting an amicus brief to the 
WTO requires familiarity with the institution and the subject matter o f the dispute. But in my view, 
it is not an adequate reason for denying the admissibility of amicus briefs. Other — more proactive - 
ways should be sought to address concerns related to the lack o f capacity and resources in 
developing countries. It is not plausible to argue that the world’s most powerful court should not
1095 Mavroidis, “Much Ado About Nothing,” 7.
1096 Howse, ''''Amicus Brief Controversy,” 509.
1097 Ibid.
1098 Ibid.
1099 Ibid.
1100 Appellate Body report, EC-Sardines, paras. 164-169.
1101 Howse, “Amicus Brief Controversy,” 509.
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have the opportunity to hear all arguments because o f the lack o f intellectual and financial
resources. And in any case, the information contained in the amicus briefs is out there anyway:
What if NGOs, instead o f submitting their briefs to the Appellate Body, publish it 
in the Financial Times, the Economist or make it available in the Internet? And 
what if Appellate Body judges (as hopefully is the case) read the Financial Times, the 
Economist and keep in track with what is going on?1102
This comes to back to the point raised above concerning the hidden influence of the private sector 
and powerful economic interests. At the end o f the day, is it not a lesser evil for the developing 
countries participating in the W TO proceedings to be aware o f arguments that presumably go 
against them, and whether and how the WTO dispute settlement system has considered them when 
making their decision? Being aware of various arguments — legal or factual — does not mean that the 
WTO dispute settlement system would immediately jump across the barriers limiting its 
competence that have been carefully analysed in this and the previous Chapters. On the contrary, 
the analysis in the previous Chapters would rather seem to point towards a completely different 
direction.
There are also other, weaker, arguments against the admissibility o f amicus briefs. Another argument
against amicus briers relates to the clash o f legal cultures: amicus curiae are mosdy used in common
law systems and some lawyers with a civil law background thus tend to view them suspiciously. In
the field of international law, the practice o f the growing number o f international courts and
tribunals remains divergent. Amicus briefs have been accepted in some courts and tribunals but not
all of them. From a more pragmatic procedural perspective, it is being argued that amicus briefs
would overwhelm the W TO dispute setdement system and that the disputing parties may not have
enough time to respond to them.1103 It has also been questioned whether amicus briefs can be useful
-  but there is an easy reply to this argument:
The panel remains free to use or ignore the amicus submission as it sees fit. Those 
making such submissions have a compelling incentive to make them as useful as 
possible, thereby maximising the likelihood that the panel will consider the 
submission.1104
The usefulness argument also has another side to it. While panels and the Appellate Body have 
accepted amicus briefs, they have not been taken necessarily too much into account.1105 A recent 
example of this trend is the Biotech panel, which accepted three unsolicited amicus curiae briefs but 
then ruled that it did not find it necessary to take them into account.1106 This would not be a 
problem as long as it is done bona fide — in other legal system where amicus briefs are admissible the
1102 Mavroidis, “Much Ado About Nothing,” 9.
1103 Durling, “Rights o f  Access to WTO Dispute Settlement,” 152. Durling later rejects both these arguments.
1104 Ibid.
1105 Gracia-Bercero, “The Fourth Annual WTO Conference,” 435.
1106 Panel report, Biotech, para. 7.11.
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conclusion has been drawn that it is seldom that they actually affect the decision-making in any 
radical way.1107 However, all this would not be acceptable if it was done to give NGO s and those 
outside the immediate WTO community a false sense of transparency and openness while 
ultimately (but not explicitly) deferring back to WTO Members and the lack of clear mandate to 
consider amicus briefs to balance the dilemma caused by a situation where the judicial branch must 
compensate for the difficulties of the legislative branch.
1107 Mavroidis, “Much Ado About Nothing,” 1044, 7. Mavroidis refers to a study on an influence o f  amicus briefs in 
the U.S. Supreme Court by Kearney and Merrill (2000).
6. Legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
and Fragmentation of International Law
This is the background to the concern about fragmentation o f international law: the 
rise o f specialized rules and rule-systems that have no clear relationship to each
other. Answers to legal questions become dependent on whom you ask, what rules 
you focus on.1108
The previous Chapters have approached the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system 
mosdy from the perspective o f one specialised rule-system o f international law - WTO law - and 
were mainly guided by its internal logic and normative structures. This Chapter seeks to highlight 
the evolution of international law, indeed its fragmentation, during the past couple o f decades. 
Using climate change law as an example, it argues that while focusing on international trade law and 
the WTO dispute settlement system may seem perfectly logical, it may also lead to a bias that 
undermines other specialised areas o f international law in such a way that challenges the legitimacy 
of the WTO dispute setdement system At first, this Chapter may seem like out o f context in this 
study - why start a new substantive discussion and address the relationship between the W TO and 
the international climate change regime only in the penultimate Chapter? Why not include this 
analysis and climate change examples in the earlier Chapters? The justification is methodological. If 
the placement of this Chapter seems like fragmentation — then this is intentional and serves to 
illustrate the current fragmented state o f international law and its possible implications for the
legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system. As the WTO Director-General Lamy has
indicated,
The effectiveness and legitimacy o f the WTO depend on how it relates to norms of 
other legal system and on the nature and quality o f its relationship with other 
international organizations.1109
The previous Chapters have explained how the international trade regime has evolved from the 
1940s to 1995 and beyond, and how the WTO dispute setdement system has been faced with a 
number o f substantive and procedural legitimacy challenges arising from disputes where non-trade 
interests play an important role. Certainly, these Chapters have tried to broaden the readers’ 
horizons and highlight pressures and opportunities at the border between WTO law and 
international environmental law by asking, inter alia, how some of the classic WTO disputes should 
be assessed from the point of view of international environmental law. The aim here, however, is to 
draw attention to the this tension at a more profound level. In the overall structure o f this study, 
the following climate change narrative aims to demonstrate why all the problems challenging the
1108ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law, 245.
1109 P. Lamy, “The Place of the WTO and Its Law in the International Legal Order,” European Journal o f  
International Law 17(5) (2007), 969 at 977.
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legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system are not capable of being solved by focusing on its 
institutional constraints — or even by the WTO negotiators alone.
To do this, it is necessary to first demonstrate what the fragmentation of international law means in 
practice. Before returning to the WTO dispute settlement system, this Chapter jumps from one 
international legal regime to another. By discussing in detail the evolution of the UN climate change 
regime, it seeks to illustrate how other specialised systems o f international law have developed 
simultaneously with, but very much in isolation o f the WTO system. It emphasises how they, like 
the WTO system, are motivated by a compelling internal logic and sense o f a urgent mission to 
protect and promote the interests of the international community. Even more importandy, 
specialised regimes such as the UN climate change regime are also composed o f binding norms of 
international law and impose sanctions on those in non-compliance. In sum, the objective here is 
to paint a clear picture o f the somewhat competing claim to legitimacy by WTO law on the one 
hand, and the UN climate change regime on the other, and, with that image in mind, broaden the 
conclusions that have been drawn from the analysis focusing on the WTO dispute settiement 
system in the previous Chapters.
To stress the importance o f a perspective not determined by WTO law, this Chapter will first 
provide basic information on climate change and the international legal and policy response to what 
is increasingly characterised as one of the most important global security challenges. Section 6.1 
reviews the current understanding of anthropogenic climate change and its impacts. Section 6.2 
explains the evolution and current status o f the international legal framework to address climate 
change. Section 6.3 discusses some of the most common policy options for mitigating greenhouse 
gas emission and, at the same time, identifies four potential conflict scenarios between WTO law 
and the UN Climate Change regime. Section 6.4 analyses imaginary but not unrealistic scenarios 
whereby the WTO dispute settlement system would be requested to decide a dispute involving 
measures aimed at mitigating climate change.
6.1 Another N ob el Cause: Fighting Anthropogenic Climate Change
Recently, climate change has become the centrepiece of public attention. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) finalised its Fourth Assessment Report in November 2007. 
Throughout the year, findings by each o f the IPCC’s three Working Groups were widely reported 
in the world media. The enormous publicity culminated in the award o f the Nobel Peace Prize to 
the IPCC and the former U.S. Vice President A1 Gore for their work to raise awareness o f the 
dangers o f anthropogenic climate change. As a result, public pressure mounted on climate 
negotiators to provide a political response to the threats identified by the IPCC and expectations
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from the Bali Climate Change Conference in December 2007 were high. In an unprecedented 
move, the UN Secretary General Ban-ki Moon flew to Bali twice to urge an agreement. Also the 
Nobel Prize winners A1 Gore and IPCC Chair Rajendra Pachauri attended the meeting. For several 
days, the BBC and CNN treated climate change negotiations as their main story, broadcasting 
drastic images of the U.S. delegation being booed at and harshly criticised before joining the 
consensus to launch a two-year negotiation process to improve international climate change 
cooperation.1110
For those focusing exclusively on the WTO and international trade issues, the recent emphasis on 
climate change and the emotional media spectacles such as the Bali negotiations may be somewhat 
confusing. For many years, loud voices questioned scientific evidence on anthropogenic climate 
change and rendered the prospects for any meaningful global action extremely unlikely. High- 
profile critiques such as the U.S. President George W. Bush and the Danish ‘sceptical 
environmentalist’ Bjorn Lomborg stressed that mitigating climate change was extremely costly and 
its benefits so few and uncertain that international climate change policies were simply not 
feasible.1111 Economists, international trade lawyers and the global business community could feel 
quite safe in either ignoring climate change or downplaying the need for, and the effectiveness o f 
international climate change mitigation efforts. For the mainstream international economic 
community, trade was one thing and environmental problems were another. While the political 
emphasis on ‘sustainable development’ meant there had to be some shared territory, this was rather 
small and unimportant. Hence, during the 1990s and early 2000s, the two international legal regimes 
dealing with trade and climate change respectively could evolve and exist in a relatively comfortable 
isolation from each other.
But recently the battle against anthropogenic climate change seems to have received wind beneath 
its wings and is rapidly beginning to invade the global economic reality. Despite the U.S. 
opposition, the Kyoto Protocol with its legally binding emissions reduction obligations entered into 
force in 2005 and currently has 180 Parties. The same year, the European Union launched an 
emissions trading scheme putting a price on the carbon dioxide emissions of more than 10,000 
companies. For many, the rapidly expanding carbon markets, with an estimated value of 16 billion 
euros in 2006, hold the key to climate change mitigation. In 2006, the high-profile Stem Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change argued that also from the economic perspective it makes sense to start 
urgendy and seriously mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions.1112 In other words, it estimated
1110 For a detailed description, see B. Mueller, “Bali 2007: On the Road Again. Impressions from the UN Climate 
Change Conference,” online paper from the Oxford Climate Policy. Available at:< 
http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/mueller.html>.
1111 B. Lomborg, Cool It. The Skeptical Environmentalist's Guide to Global Warming (Alfred A. Knop, 2007). See 
section 6.2 for references to statements by President Bush.
1112 N. S. Stem & al., Stern Review: The Economics o f  Climate Change, (HM Treasury, 2006).
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that the economic cost of inaction would be higher than that of climate change mitigation. Also the 
influential The Economist magazine began stressing the dangers of anthropogenic climate change and 
calling for appropriate action.1113 Even the Bush Administration launched the Major Economies’ 
Initiative aimed at reducing emissions by the world’s largest economies. With the nascent consensus 
that a price needs to be set for carbon dioxide emissions, the consideration of climate change 
related border tax adjustments and other trade measures received a boost on both sides o f the 
Atlantic Ocean to offset the negative impacts on domestic economies. At the same time, countries 
such as Brazil, Argentina and Thailand are rapidly developing their biofuels industries, calling for 
the removal o f related trade barriers in the hope o f supplying the growing markets in the U.S. and 
the EU. The EU, in turn, is contemplating strict rules and sustainability standards for biofuels to 
ensure that they do not result in the loss of biodiversity and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at 
least 35 per cent.1114 All in all, the relationship between climate change, economic interests and 
international trade is becoming too intimate to ignore — putting the legal segregation of the two 
international legal regimes under increasing strain.
Before examining in detail the legal relationship between the WTO and UN climate change regime 
and their possible implications on the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system, it is useful 
to shift for a few moments the perspective from the WTO to the UN climate change regime and 
assess the situation through lenses that do not immediately categorise things with the intrinsic logic 
and terminology o f WTO law. The natural starting point for such an exercise is the latest climate 
science, which is responsible for much o f the recent publicity and calls for urgent action against 
climate change. The aim of the following overview of the key findings in the Fourth Assessment 
Report by the IPCC and their policy implications is to highlight that the debate about 
anthropogenic climate change seems to be over and the calls for international action rest on a solid 
and convincing basis. All this serves to build the argument that questions concerning climate 
change mitigation are here to stay, and the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement could be 
seriously challenged if it had to decide a related dispute.
Even for those sceptical of climate change, the comprehensive and authoritative evaluation of the 
latest research in the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) conveys a striking image. The report was 
drafted by several hundreds of government-appointed scientists and experts, and hundreds o f more 
scientists and experts participated in the peer-review process.1115 The findings paint a clear and 
threatening image of anthropogenic climate change and its impacts. The IPCC indicates that
1113 See, for instance, “The Heat is On,” the Economist, 7 September 2006.
1114 European Commission, Proposal fo r  a Directive o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council on the 
Promotion o f  the Use o f  Energy from Renewable Sources, COM(2008) yyy, 23 January 2008.
1115 The Earth Negotiation Bulletin 12(341), 12 November 2007.
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“warming of the climate system is unequivocal”1116 and “very likely” to be caused by human 
activities.1117 The “very likely” statement corresponds with a 90 per cent or more likelihood and is 
thus considerably higher than the 66 per cent probability used in the previous IPCC assessment in 
2001. Evidence is also mounting that global warming is already well underway. The IPCC indicates 
the global mean surface temperatures have increased with a linear trend over the last 100 years1118 
and the curve showing the mean temperature increase is steepening exponentially. Eleven o f the 
past twelve years to 2006 rank among the warmest twelve on record.1119 Because o f this, the linear 
trend o f 0.74°C, illustrating temperature increase from 1850 to 2005, is already higher than the 
corresponding trend o f 0.6°C given in 2001. Further warming and other changes in the global 
climate system are predicted for the 21st century.1120 The best estimates for temperature increases 
for the next century range from 1.8 to 4.0°C depending on the level of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere.1121 The lower the level at which greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere are stabilised, the lower the temperature increase.
Another crucial finding in the AR4 is that the impacts o f warming are already being felt across the 
globe. In contrast to the previous IPCC reports, which focused on future projections, the AR4 
contains plenty of data on observed impacts of climate change from all around the world. 
Accordingly, mountain glaciers and snow cover are declining in both hemispheres.1122 The global 
average sea level has risen at a growing rate.1123 Other observed changes include changes in arctic 
temperatures and ice, precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and extreme weather 
events including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and intensity o f tropical cyclones.1124 
Some of the projected impacts of climate change are alarming. Up to 30 per cent of known animal 
and plant species are likely to be at risk of extinction if the global average warming exceeds 1.5- 
2.5°C1125 — in other words, this could happen within the next century. Climate change is also 
predicted to have serious social impacts. The Arctic, sub-Saharan Africa, small islands and the 
African and Asian mega-deltas have been identified as particular vulnerable regions.1126 Hundreds 
of millions people, especially in developing countries, are estimated to suffer increasing droughts,
1116 IPCC, Climate Change 2007. Synthesis Report. A Report o f  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) 1.
1117 Ibid, 5.
1118 IPCC, Climate Change 2007. The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I  Contribution to the Fourth 
Assessment Report o f  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Summary fo r  Policymakers and Technical 
Summary (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007), 5.
" 3 Ibid.1119
1120 Ibid.
1,21 Ibid., 13.
1122 Ibid., 5.
1123 Ibid.
1,24 Ibid., 5-9.
1125 IPCC, Climate Change 2007. Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Working Group II  Contribution to the 
Fourth Assessment Report o f  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Summary fo r  Policymakers and  
Technical Summary (IPCC, 2007), 11.
1,26 Ib id , 12.
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water shortages, annual flooding, and storm surges.1127 While not necessarily caused by climate
change, recent events such as the Hurricane Katrina, European heat wave o f 2003 and flooding in
the United Kingdom in the summer o f 2007 have demonstrated how even the wealthy North is
vulnerable to extreme weather events. In the South, however, adaptive capacity is significantly
lower1128 but extreme weather events are estimated to be far more severe and frequent than in the
North . The IPCC thus indicates that:
New studies confirm that Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate 
variability and change because o f multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity.1129
Climate change is also projected to impact the health o f millions o f people due to malnutrition, 
increased risk of malaria, deaths and disease associated with heat waves, floods, storms and 
droughts, as well as cardio-respiratory diseases due to higher concentrations o f ground level ozone 
related to climate change.1130
From the IPCC assessment it is evident that climate change is not only a serious environmental
problem but also an economic and social one. Mitigating climate change, adapting to its
consequences while at the same time achieving the economic and development objectives
promoted by the WTO regime appears as an enormous challenge. In light o f the IPCC projections,
it looks like the benefits of international trade liberalization, even after a successful conclusion of
the Doha Development Round, could easily be outweighed by climate change. In fact, the widely
discussed Stem Review on the Economics of Climate Change classifies climate change as “the greatest and
widest-ranging market failure ever seen.”1131 According to Stern,
The evidence shows that ignoring climate change will eventually damage economic 
growth. Our actions over the coming few decades could create risks for major 
disruption to economic and social activity, later in this century and in the next, on a scale similar to 
those associated with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half o f the 20th 
century. And it will be difficult or impossible to reverse these changes.1132 (Emphasis added, 
KK)
Stern also highlights the need for urgent action against climate change:
Unfortunately, this opportunity to stabilise the atmospheric concentrations o f 
GHGs (greenhouse gases, KK) will not wait for us. Because the stock o f GHGs 
continues to grow, the cost o f attaining a given stabilisation level increases with 
time.1133
1127 Ibid., 13-15.
U2*Ibid., 12.
1129 Ibid., 13.
1,30 Ibid., 12.
1131 Stem & al., The Economics o f  Climate Change, i.
1132 Ibid.
1133 S. Dietz & al., “Reflections o f the Stem Review: A Robust Case for Strong Action to Reduce the Risk o f Climate 
Change,” World Economics 8(1) (2007), 121 at 126.
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One of the most remarkable — and controversial — aspects o f the Stem Review has been its finding 
that the economic costs o f inaction would clearly outweigh the costs of action against climate 
change. Without measures to mitigate climate change, Stem estimates the ‘social cost o f carbon’ 
would amount to around 85 U.S. dollars per tonne o f carbon dioxide.1134 However, if measures are 
taken to reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would avoid the most 
extreme negative impacts o f climate change, Stern indicates that the ‘social cost of carbon’ would 
be only around a third of it - 25 to 30 U.S. dollars per tonne.1135
While the scientific and economic case for taking action against climate change seems to rest on an 
increasingly solid foundation, it does not solve the key question o f how and how much to mitigate 
climate change. Essentially, climate change mitigation would involve stabilising greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere. Their current level is estimated at 379 parts per millimetre (ppm), 
up from 280 ppm in the pre-industrial times.1136 The lowest scenario analysed by the IPCC would 
stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 ppm, a scenario estimated to result in a 
global average o f 2°Celcius warming from pre-industrial times. However, choosing the stabilisation 
level and the degree o f acceptable warming is an extremely complicated and politically sensitive 
task. For many years, international climate change negotiators did not even seriously attempted to 
define their objective in numerical terms - and their recent decision in Bali to try to find a “shared 
vision” o f global emissions is considered an important breakthrough.1137 The EU has chosen the 
two-degree target as its benchmark, arguing that this target would be compatible with the ultimate 
objective o f the UNFCCC  to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”1138 Some, including Stem, argue, that the 450 ppm  stabilisation scenario is already 
unachievable:
It is still possible to follow a path to stabilise at 550 ppm CChe... Ten or twenty 
years ago, a similarly smooth and affordable path might have been available for a 
corridor consistent with stabilising below 450 ppm. But it is now too late — the kind 
of retrenchment required to stabilise below 450 ppm CCbe is likely to be extremely 
cosdy.1139
For countries like small island developing states in turn, already the 450 ppm and two-degree 
scenario are projected have dramatic and irreversible ecological and social consequences whereas 
the 550 ppm scenario is projected to have serious consequences also in many other places. Overall, 
the fact remains that the impacts o f climate change will not be equally distributed across the globe, 
but some regions are manifesdy more vulnerable while others are estimated to even benefit from
1134 Stem & al., The Economics o f  Climate Change, xvi-xvii.
1135 Ibid.
1136 IPCC, Climate Change 2007. The Physical Science Basis, 25,115.
1.37 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13 (FCCC/CP/2007/6.Add.l, 14 March 2008).
1.38 UNFCCC, Article 2.
1139 Dietz & al, “Reflections on the Stem Review,” 126-127.
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moderate temperature increases. Given the complexity of the underlying problem - how has the 
international climate regime evolved so far and what are the prospects for its further development?
6.2 The Specialised Legal R egim e for Climate Change
Given their formal insulation from each other, it is interesting that the body of international legal 
rules applicable to climate change has evolved largely in parallel with the creation of the WTO and 
strengthening of the international trade regime. While the history o f the UN climate regime has 
been told several times elsewhere, it seems useful to recount some of the details here in order to 
distance, for a while, the focus from the WTO regime. Indeed, one o f the key legitimacy challenges 
that this Chapter seeks to highlight is that at the WTO dispute settlement system, the dominant 
perspective is that of international trade law. The relevance o f international environmental norms is 
often reduced to examining whether they are helpful in defining the ordinary meaning of the terms 
of the WTO Agreements. As we have seen in the Biotech case, the threshold for their ‘usefulness’ 
seems exceedingly high. For those involved in the construction of the international climate regime, 
similar treatment o f the Kyoto Protocol would be outrageous and they would be highly unlikely to 
accept the authority of the WTO dispute settlement system to reach such a decision. To better 
understand this challenge, it is therefore useful to paint a somewhat detailed picture of another 
specialised international legal regime and, more importandy, convey a sense o f its internal logic and 
sense of mission.
The process leading to the adoption of the U N  Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
was initiated in 1990 after the IPCC published its First Assessment Report. Even though there was
no consensus or certainty on anthropogenic climate change, negotiations were launched on a global
climate change treaty. From the beginning, the process has been incredibly complex. The question
of monitoring, accounting and controlling greenhouse gas emissions involves all major economic
sectors from industry, energy production, transport and construction to agriculture and forestry.
Describing the negotiation process leading to the adoption o f the UNFCCC, Sands indicates that:
...it seemed that no human activity was left untouched. American gas-guzzlers, 
Vietnamese rice-fields, Amazonian forest fires -  everything came under the same 
spotlight o f global warming. Apart from these daunting economic and lifestyle 
issues, there were also complex political, legal and cultural factors.. ,1140
Having been singed at the Rio Conference in 1992, the UNFCCC  came into force in 1994 and 
currendy has 189 Parties. According to Article 2 of the Convention, its ultimate objective is to 
achieve:
1140 Sands, Lawless World, 83.
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..stabili2ation o f greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such 
a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to 
adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened 
and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.1141
However, the UNFCCC does not prescribe any legally binding emission reduction objectives. 
During the first Conference of the Parties (COP) organized in Berlin in early 1995, governments 
agreed that this would not be sufficient to prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change and 
decided to launch negotiations for additional commitments for industrialised countries.1142 In 1996, 
the IPCC finalised its Second Assessment Report reinforcing its earlier warning on anthropogenic 
impact on the climate system. This speed up the ongoing negotiations and delegates adopted the 
Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. The most notable feature o f the Protocol were individual, legally 
binding targets for industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by an average 
of 5.2 per cent from 1990 levels during the first commitment period between 2008 and 2012.1143
However, at the time the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, it was already known that the modest emissions
cuts it prescribed would be manifestly inadequate to effectively mitigate climate change.
Recognising that centuries of fossil-fuel based economic growth cannot be turned overnight, the
supporters o f the Kyoto Protocol and the UN climate regime had put their hope on the process
eventually leading to deeper emissions cuts, technological change and a gradual transition towards a
low-carbon economy:
International law is process-driven and incremental in meeting its aims and 
objectives. No one claims that the Kyoto Protocol can, as it stands, prevent global 
warming or be fully effective in that sense. It is a wake-up call, a preliminary step, 
complex but im portant.1144
The process-oriented view suffered a serious blow when, in March 2001, the U.S. effectively 
abandoned its participation in international cooperation to cut greenhouse gas emissions.1145 While 
the Clinton Administration had signed the Kyoto Protocol committing the U.S to reducing its 
greenhouse gas emissions by seven per cent from the 1990 levels, President George W. Bush stated 
that U.S. would not be ratifying the agreement. His stance captured the sentiments o f the majority 
of the U.S. Senate that would have been unlikely to ratify the Protocol even during the Clinton era. 
President Bush explained that he did not support the Kyoto Protocol “because it exempts 80 per cent 
o f the world, including major population centres such as China and India, from compliance, and
1,41 UNFCCC, Article 2.
1142 Decision 1/CP.l, The Berlin Mandate: Review of the Adequacy o f Article 4, Paragraph 2(a) and (b), o f the 
Convention, Including Proposals Related to a Protocol and Decisions on Follow-Up, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.l, June 
6, 1995.
1143 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3 and Annex B.
1144 Sands, Lawless World, 91.
U4S Ibid., 70.
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would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy.”1146 He was correct in indicating that developing 
countries are not subject to any emission controls under the Kyoto Protocol and their greenhouse gas 
emissions are growing rapidly. However, his explanation overlooks the scientific, legal, political and 
ethical factors that have had a profound impact on the evolution o f international climate policy and 
the Kyoto architecture. These include the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities,’ 
strongly reflected in the structure of the UN climate regime1147 as well as the controversial but 
morally challenging argument that emissions rights should be distributed on per capita basis.
For this reason, the U.S. decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol sent a shockwave amongst those
involved in the development o f the global climate regime. It was:
... seen as an arrogant step aimed at refashioning the global order, putting American 
lifestyles above foreign lives, American economic well-being above all other 
interests, and manifesting a refusal to be constrained by new international rules.1148
The widespread opposition to the U.S. climate policy explains proposals to tax imports from the 
U.S. based on their carbon content that will be discussed in section 6.4 from the point o f view of 
WTO law. Many also feared that the U.S. decision would signal the death o f the Kyoto Protocol as its 
entry into force had been made conditional o f ratification by industrialised countries representing at 
least 55 per cent of the total greenhouse gas emissions o f those countries in the year 1990.1149 
Given that the U.S. accounts for 34 per cent o f such emissions, the 55 per cent threshold would 
not have been crossed without the Russian Federation. The Russian ratification at the end o f 2004 
was preceded by heavy lobbying by the EU, and a rumour has it that the deal was reached in 
exchange of the EU accepting certain conditions o f the Russian WTO Membership.1150 Having 
secured the necessary number of ratifications, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 
2005. Its 180 current Parties include all major emitters and economies apart from the U.S.
The combined effect of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is to set up a complex and 
comprehensive regime for international cooperation on climate change, covering both mitigation 
and adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. Since the entry into force o f the UNFCCC, 
the Conference of the Parties has met 13 times and a adopted hundreds o f decisions laying down 
the details of the regime. These decisions have included politically significant ones, such as the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol and the detailed rule-book for its implementation known as the 
Marrakech Accords. But most COP decisions can be characterised as technical ones, concerning, for 
instance, guidelines for the preparation o f national greenhouse gas inventories and
1146 Sands, Lawless World, 70.
1147 UNFCCC, Article 3.1.
1148 Sands, Lawless World, 70.
1149 Kyoto Protocol, Article 25.1.
1150 K. Kulovesi, “How to Prevent Babies from Being Thrown Away with the Bathwater: Perspectives on the 
International Climate Change Regime from Buenos Aires to the Future,” in The Future o f  Environmental Law: 
International and European Perspective. EUI Working Papers, Law, 2006/01 (EUI, 2006).
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communications, or political ones on technology transfer and capacity building.1151 Especially 
decisions concerning the implementation of the market-based Kyoto Mechanisms have important 
implications on the states Parties as well as the private sector, which plays an important role in the 
implementation o f the Protocol.1152 Most of the rules and details have taken years to negotiate - and 
are quite daunting in their detail. While their complexity may well be criticised given the modest 
impact that the regime has had so far on climate change mitigation, the rationale lies in the belief 
that complexity and bureaucracy are necessary to build trust in the process and create the regulatory 
framework for more ambitious future commitments.
In the year 2008, international climate change cooperation is at an interesting place where questions 
concerning its long-term development occupy a large space. The Kyoto Protocol has been in force 
since 2005 and its legally binding emission targets took full effect in January 2008. As a 
consequence, the international carbon market is growing steadily, creating a new service industry o f 
carbon brokers and various technical experts in its wake. The fact remains, however, that the 
world’s largest emitters are not participating in mitigation efforts under the Protocol. Furthermore, 
the current commitments expire at the end o f 2012 - hence the need to agree on a legal framework 
beyond that period. In addition, the IPCC AR4 and the Stem Review have increased political 
pressures for enhanced climate change cooperation. Negotiations on the long-term perspective are 
thus steadily gathering pace.1153 A crucial milestone was the decisions by the Bali Climate Change 
Conference to launch a two-year negotiations process with a view to finalising the new regime by 
the end o f 2009. The so-called “Bali Roadmap” contains seeds for extremely complicated 
negotiations — while also holding the potential for important breakthroughs leading to mitigation 
action by the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters.1154 After years in the sidelines, also the U.S. 
has shown signs o f re-engagement. This is partly due to popular pressure generated by high-profile 
awareness raising campaigns such as Al Gore’s book and movie ‘the Inconvenient Truth.’ Another 
important factor is that in the absence of meaningful federal regulation, various individual states 
have launched their own climate initiatives leading to fragmentation and complexity. With the U.S. 
comes increased pressure on emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India to participate in 
the efforts to mitigate climate change - a political compromise that will certainly not be difficult to 
achieve.
1,51 The Climate Change Secretariat, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Handbook 
(UNFCCC, 2006).
1152 K. Kulovesi, ’’The Private Sector and the Implementation o f the Kyoto Protocol: Experiences, Challenges and 
Prospects,” RECIEL 16(2) (2007), 145 at 146-147.
1,53 K. Kulovesi, M. Gutierrez, M. Munoz & P. Doran, “UN 2006 Climate Change Conference: A Confidence 
Building Step,” Journal o f  Climate Policy 7(3) (2007), 255 at 257 et seq.
1154 C. Spence, K. Kulovesi, M. Munoz & M. Gutierrez, “Great Expectations: Understanding Bali and the Climate 
Change Negotiations Process,” forthcoming in RECIEL 17(2) (2008).
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This is the picture as it appears from the perspective of those involved in the development o f
international climate-policy. In that world o f experts, there is little doubt that urgent action must be
taken to prevent a social and ecological disaster. But when one looks at the same image through the
lenses o f the WTO regime, it suddenly looks very different. Some of the most common
instruments of climate policy have been identified as potentially problematic from the perspective
of WTO law and many WTO scholars have tended to see the whole climate change debate from a
rather sceptical perspective.1155 Attitudes seem to be changing rapidly, however. After the Stem
Review, the Economist magazine, for instance, has changed its approach to climate change and
instead of its earlier focus on questioning climate science, it now often supports the mitigation of
greenhouse gas emissions.1156 Nevertheless, many still conceive the linkage between trade and
environment as a controversy and argue along the lines that:
The debate over climate change hinges on values — how we value the environment, 
how we value the relationship of humans and nature, how important we feel are the 
advantages o f free trade. The institutional framework will determine whose values 
prevail. 1157
The argument here is, however, that climate change is no longer about different values and 
preferences. Economic, social and ecological interests are merging into a complex web and 
becoming virtually impossible to separate. Furthermore, the current institutional framework, 
including the WTO dispute settlement system, do not seem well equipped to deal with the 
challenge. Letting the narrow mandate of the WTO dispute settlement, for instance, to determine 
“whose values will prevail” would hardly be a sustainable solution — for neither the substantive nor 
the formal legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system. But what are the potential links 
between the WTO and climate regimes, and how could they be dealt with by the WTO dispute 
settlement system?
6.3 Interaction between Tw o Fragments: Climate Change and the WTO
According to the AR4, global greenhouse gas emissions grew by 70 per cent between 1970 and 
2004.1158 Without new mitigation efforts, they are projected to grow by a further 25 to 90 per cent 
between 2000 and 2030.1159 If  one takes the latest climate science seriously, the need for mitigating 
climate change and reducing greenhouse gas emissions appears as urgent. The window of
1155 See, for instance, J. Bhagwati, In Defence o f  Globalisation.
1,56 See, for instance, “The Heat is On,” The Economist, 7 September 2006.
1157 Green, “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining Are Trade Rules?,” 189.
1158 IPCC, Climate Change 2007. Mitigation o f  Climate Change. Working Group III Contribution to the Fourth 
Assessment Report o f  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Summary fo r  Policymakers and Technical
Summary (IPCC, 2007), 3.
U59 Ibid., 4.
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opportunity to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at the ‘relatively safe’ level o f
450 ppm is closing rapidly, or is closed. As Stern explains,
...demand for energy and transportation is growing rapidly in many developing 
countries, and many developed countries are also due to renew a significant 
proportion of capital stock. The investments made in the next 10-20 years could 
lock in very high emissions for the next half-century, or present an opportunity to 
move the world onto a more sustainable path.1160
However, in light of the AR4, reversing the growth o f emissions would still seem possible. The
IPCC has identified “substantive economic potential” for mitigating global greenhouse gas
emissions over the coming decades that could offset the growth projections and reduce emissions
below current levels.1161 The IPCC’s has analysed various mitigation options both in the short and
medium term (up to 2030) and longer term (beyond 2030). It concludes that:
A wide variety of national policies and instruments are available to governments to 
create the incentives for mitigation action. Their applicability depends on national 
circumstances and on understanding their interactions, but experience from 
implementation in various countries and sectors shows there are advantages and 
disadvantages for any given instrument.1162
The options analysed by the IPCC include regulations and standards (which provide “some 
certainty about emission levels” and “may be preferable to other instruments”),1163 taxes and 
charges (which set a price for carbon “but cannot guarantee a particular level of emissions”),1164 
tradable permits (which “will establish a price for carbon”),1165 financial incentives such as subsidies 
and tax credits (which “are often critical to overcome barriers”),1166 voluntary agreements between 
the government and industry (the majority of which “has not achieved significant emissions 
reductions beyond business as usual”),1167 information instruments (“the impact o f which on actual 
emissions remains unclear”)1168 and research, development and deployment (to “stimulate 
technological advances”).1169
In discussing these options, the IPCC makes no mention o f the WTO or potential conflicts 
between climate change mitigation measures and international trade law. For some WTO scholars, 
however, the problematic territory between the WTO and greenhouse gas mitigation appears as 
surprisingly large. Green, for instance, has analysed how WTO rules constrain countries’ ability to 
adopt:
1160
1161
Stem, The Stern Review, xxii.
IPCC, Climate Change 2007. Mitigation o f  Climate Change, 9.
1162 Ibid., 19.
1163 Ibid.
U64Ibid.
m 5 Ibid.
U66 Ibid.
" 61Ibid.
U6*Ibid.
U69Ibid.
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... emission and energy efficiency standards, eco-labeling, voluntary measures 
(including voluntary measures between governments and industry) and domestic 
emissions trading programmes.1170
It is difficult to see what (effective) climate policy options remain in addition to those listed and
identified by Green as potentially problematic from the point o f view of WTO law. There are,
however, also far more optimistic assessments. According to Doelle,
The bottom line in the relationship between the WTO and the climate change 
regime would appear to be that, as long as the WTO dispute settlement bodies 
continue to make decisions based on legal principles and precedents, there will be 
opportunities to develop climate change measures in a way to protect domestic 
industries from the impact o f having to meet more stringent GH G (greenhouse gas, 
KK) emission-reduction requirements, motivate other States to take action; and 
protect those that do against competition from those that do not.1171
In sum, a wide range o f potential climate change mitigation policies and measures is available - all 
of which can be “designed well or poorly, be stringent or lax” as the IPCC points out.1172 
Depending on the perspective, they can be seen as a problem from the point of view of WTO law 
— or WTO law can be seen as a problem from the point o f view of the climate policies. Given the 
range o f policy options and the broad scale o f conceivable interpretations of the relevant but rather 
abstract legal rules in the G A TT  and TBT Agreements, a heavy responsibility falls on the shoulders of 
the institution charged with a task deciding a possible conflict. As the WTO dispute settlement 
system looks like the most probable forum for settling such a dispute, what are the prospects of a 
successful outcome? And what would be the likely implications for the legitimacy o f the WTO 
dispute setdement system?
6.3.1 Four Conflict Scenarios between the WTO and the UN Climate Regime
The current relationship between the WTO and the UN climate regime testifies more to the trend
of specialization and isolation than cooperation and coordination between the two prominent
international regimes. While their insulation is pardy intentional and preferred by many o f those
working with either regime, it seems to bring to the fore most o f the challenges associated with the
fragmentation o f international law discussed by the International Law Commission:
The problem... is that such specialized law-making and institution-building tends to 
take place with relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the 
adjoining fields and o f the general principles and practices o f international law. The 
result is conflicts between rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices, and, 
possibly, the loss o f an overall perspective on the law.1173
1170 Green, “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining Are Trade Rules?,” 146.
1171 Doelle, “Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Motivate State Action on Climate change through the 
World Trade Organization,” 103.
1172 IPCC, Climate Change 2007. Mitigation o f  Climate Change, 19.
1173ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law, 11.
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The only provision that explicitly addresses the relationship between climate change mitigation and
international trade is Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC, which provides that:
Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction 
on international trade.
On the other hand, the Kyoto Protocol does not contemplate the use o f trade sanctions and its trade- 
related provisions are not specific enough to be considered under the Doha mandate on multilateral 
environmental agreements. The argument has thus been made that the provisions of the Kyoto 
Protocol “do not conflict direcdy with the WTO regime.”1174 This is, however, only a part o f  the 
story. While the Protocol does not explicitly restrict international trade, the implementation o f its 
quantitative emission reduction targets could easily have some important trade implications.
The question thus arises what would happen in case of a legal dispute surfaced involving the 
UNFCCC and WTO regimes. Institutionally, the WTO system appears stronger than the 
combined force of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol\ neither o f which contains provisions on 
legally binding dispute settlement. The Compliance Committee established under the Kyoto Protocol 
is mandated to facilitate implementation and address questions concerning enforcement. However, 
the legally binding nature o f its decisions has been highly controversial and is still open to 
negotiation.1175 Furthermore, the mandate o f the Compliance Committee appears to be even 
narrower than that of the WTO dispute settlement system.1176 It would be thus extremely difficult, 
or outright impossible to argue that it is competent to assess the compatibility of measures taken to 
implement the Kyoto targets with international trade rules. Against this background, in case a legal 
dispute arises involving the Kyoto Protocol and WTO rules, the W TO dispute settlement system, with 
its compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction on matters related to W TO law, would be the likely to 
forum to setde the controversy.
In my view, however, bringing the trade and climate communities at loggerheads through a dispute 
involving the Kyoto Protocol could be explosive in terms of the legitimacy of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Clearly, such a dispute would be far more challenging than the Tuna-Dolphin or 
Shrimp-Turtle cases. The political sensitivities involved in balancing the protection o f dolphins and 
sea turtles with the economic implications of trade bans on shrimp or tuna seem much easier than 
the task of judging the compatibility of WTO rules with an international regime that has (also) 
taken years of painful negotiations to produce and is designed to address a global problem with
1174 M. Wemaere & C. Streck, “Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and EU Allowances,” in D. Freestone & 
C. Streck, eds., Legal Aspects o f  Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms. Making Kyoto Work (OUP, 2005) 35 
at 46.
1175 Kyoto Protocol, Article 18.
1176 Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 24/CP.7. 
(FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3, 21 January 2002).
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unprecedented ecological, economic and social dimensions. The climate community is also larger, 
much more diverse and business-oriented than the average environmental movement. There are 
many more of those dealing with climate change issues than there are those, for instance, working 
with GMOs. It is exactly for these reasons that the interface between the W TO and the UN 
climate change regime offers such an interesting framework for reflecting the findings o f  this study. 
How could the WTO dispute settlement system respond to such enormous challenges?
In principle, three different types of conflict scenarios between the WTO regime and the Kyoto 
Protocol can be imagined. The first is such where specific provisions o f the Kyoto Protocol,’ such as 
those concerning its market-based flexible mechanisms, are challenged under the WTO. The 
second scenario is one where measures not explicitly prescribed by the Kyoto Protocol but related to 
the implementation o f its legally binding emission targets are contested. The third situation in one 
where a country attempts to offset the negative effects of measures taken to implement its Kyoto 
emission target on its competitiveness, for instance, through taxing imports from countries that 
have not ratified the Protocol and are not implementing similar climate change mitigation policies. I 
shall address this scenario together with a fourth, increasingly likely, scenario that a dispute would 
arise concerning national or regional climate policies that are not direcdy related to the 
implementation o f the Kyoto Protocol or any other multilateral environmental agreement.
There are plenty of initiatives that could be relevant in this regard. Several countries have adopted 
unilateral and voluntary targets to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The EU, for instance, has 
pledged to cut its greenhouse gas emissions unilaterally by 20 per cent from 1990 levels by the year 
2020 (compared with its legally binding Kyoto reduction target of eight per cent from 1990 levels 
between 2008 and 2012)1177 and Norway has decided to become completely carbon neutral by the 
year 2050. The Russian Federation has been advocating a system for voluntary emissions targets for 
developing countries under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. In the U.S., Senators Bingaman and 
Specter recendy proposed a new “Low Carbon Economy Act” that would create a U.S. federal cap 
and trade system for greenhouse gas emissions. This proposal made in July 2007 was followed by 
another one in December 2007 by Senators Lieberman and Warner. As it will be seen below, 
especially the Bingman-Specter proposal could have fundamental implications for the WTO regime. 
The analysis is structured as follows. The three sub-sections identify the four potential conflict 
scenarios and outline the key legal and political challenges that they would entail. Section 6.4 
discusses each of the scenarios and the challenges that they would pose to the W TO dispute 
setdement system.
1,77 According to the Conclusions adopted by the European Environment Council in March 2007, the EU would be 
willing to cut its emissions by a further 10 per cent by the year 2020 (i.e. 30 per cent) in the context o f global 
mitigation efforts.
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6.3.1.1 The WTO and the Kyoto Mechanisms
The first potential conflict between the WTO and Kyoto regimes is one where measures based on 
specific provisions o f the Kyoto Protocol were challenged from the point of view of W TO law. Some 
of the most potential candidates for such a conflict are the Kyoto Protocol's market-based flexible 
mechanisms. The combined effect o f Kyoto mechanisms and the EU ’s Emissions Trading Scheme 
has been a significant boost to the global carbon market, the estimated value o f which was 16 
billion euros in 2006.1178 It is only logical to suspect that there is a connection between the 
international trade regime and international carbon trading — hence the question concerning the 
relationship between WTO law and the Kyoto mechanisms.
The Kyoto Protocol creates a system for trading emissions allowances among industrialised countries 
bound by the emission reduction targets. It also established what are known as project-based 
mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).1179 They 
are based on the idea that industrialised countries can meet a part o f their Kyoto commitments by 
purchasing carbon credits from a project that reduces emissions in a foreign country. Their key 
difference is that JI projects are implemented in industrialised countries bound by the Protocol's 
quantitative emissions reduction targets, while CDM projects take place in developing countries 
that do not have any emissions commitments. The dual objective o f the CDM was to ensure low- 
cost mitigation opportunities for industrialised countries, and promote sustainable development in 
developing countries, most notably, by facilitating the transfer o f cleaner energy technologies.1180 It 
appears that the CDM has largely failed to deliver on the latter two objectives.1181 Nevertheless, it 
continues to be hailed as one of the most successful features o f the Kyoto Protocol — and without a 
doubt, it has helped to mobilise various actors to participate in climate change mitigation efforts.
When it comes to the compatibility o f the Kyoto mechanisms and WTO rules, it can be 
convincingly argued that emissions trading between two governments does not interact with WTO 
rules: it should rather be seen as a exchange of commitments between two sovereign states and 
their agreement to reallocate the overall ‘emissions cap’ (assigned amount) established by the Kyoto 
Protocol!1182 However, the situation is more complicated when it comes the CDM and JI, the 
implementation o f which relies largely on the private sector and involves trade in privately 
generated emission credits.1183 One of the key uncertainties is that the Kyoto Protocol itself does not 
contain a definition of the legal nature of the carbon credits. In terms o f the Protocol, what is being
1178 K. Roine & E.M. Tvinneeim, “The Global Carbon Market in 2007,” in Greenhouse Gas Market 2007. Building 
upon a Solid Foundation: the Emergence o f  a Global Emissions Trading System (IETA, 2007), 42 at 42.
1179 Kulovesi, “The Private Sector and the implementation o f the Kyoto Protocol,” 148.
1180 Ibid., 153-154.
1,81 Ibid.
1182 Wemaere & Streck, “Legal Ownership and Nature o f Kyoto Units,” 46.
' m  Ibid., 43.
213
transferred are registry units corresponding to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. In the Kyoto 
jargon, these units are known Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) and Removal Units (RMUs) for 
emission trading, Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) for Joint Implementation and Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) for the CDM.1184 Those negotiating the rules for carbon trading 
under the Protocol shun away from any more sophisticated definitions as they would have surfaced 
the politically and philosophically difficult questions concerning emissions rights and the rationale 
for distributing such rights between countries.1185 To highlight that they had not attempted to solve 
such principled issues, the rules for implementing the Kyoto Mechanisms thus stress that “the 
Kyoto Protocol has not created or bestowed any right, tide or entidement to emissions of any kind 
on Parties included in Annex I.”1^
Given the uncertainty concerning the legal nature o f the Kyoto units, “it is not evident which part 
o f the international trade law would be applicable for the trade in emission rights.”1187 As trading 
under the Kyoto Protocol is limited to Protocol Parties, it has been argued that this could violate the 
Most Favoured Nation principle.1,88 Most scholars agree, however, that as they are not material 
things with intrinsic value, emission allowances cannot be defined as ‘goods’ or ‘products’ covered 
by the G A TT.1189 As to the GATS, while the Agreement itself does not define ‘services,’ the leading 
legal authorities in the field of carbon trading have argued that Kyoto units are not covered by the 
G ATS  “mainly because they do not represent activities with an economic value.”1190 Furthermore, 
Kyoto units or emission allowances are not listed as services in the W TO’s Services Sectoral 
Classification List or the United Nations Provisional Central Product Classification System.1191 
Thus, while trade in Kyoto units will “eventually involve services, such as exchange services by 
brokers or trustee services by banks and financial managers”1192 the most pressing WTO concerns 
do not relate to the Kyoto mechanisms as such, but “to the domestic implementation of measures 
related to the Kyoto Protocol and secondary markets on derivatives (financial services).”1193 
However, there are also other views. According to Green:
... a conflict may arise under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
if emission reduction units are viewed as ‘securities’ and trading rules only permit
1184 Modalities for Accounting o f Assigned Amounts under Article 7, Paragraph 4 o f the Kyoto Protocol. Decision 
13/CMP. 1 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, 30 March 2006).
1185 Wemaere & Streck, “Legal Ownership and Nature o f Kyoto Units,” 44-45.
1186 Principles, Nature and Scope o f the Mechanisms Pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 o f the Kyoto Protocol, 
Decision 2/CMP. 1 (FCCC/CmP/2005/8/Add.l, 30 March 2006), preamble.
1187 Wemaere & Streck, “Legal Ownership and Nature o f Kyoto Units,” 46.
1188 A. Cosby, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO. A Seminar Note, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development. Available at: <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/kyoto.pdf>.
1189 Wemaere & Streck, “Legal Ownership and Nature o f Kyoto Units,” 46. See also, J. Werksman, “Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading and the WTO,” RECIEL 8(3) (1999), 1 at 3.
1190 Wemaere & Streck, “Legal Ownership and Nature o f Kyoto Units,” 47.
1191 Ibid.
U92Ibid., 46.
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service producers from countries listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol 
(industrialised countries) to participate in the trading regime.1194
In this context, it is interesting to note that uncertainties concerning the legal nature o f the
emissions allowances is not limited to the WTO-Kyoto context:
As the development and implementation o f different emissions trading schemes 
progresses, questions are increasingly raised on the legal nature and appropriate legal 
treatment of the various types o f units traded under these regimes. These questions 
include the treatment of these units under property law, contract law, taxation law, 
accounting rules, competition law, public procurement and state aid rules, and 
financial services and securities laws, at the domestic and EU levels, and under 
international trade rules.1195
These legal questions have been particularly pertinent for private legal entities participating in the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme, struggling with incoherent and often unclear definitions of 
emissions allowances in national legal systems. Also for European governments purchasing carbon 
credits, some problems have been generated concerning the classification o f the Kyoto units under 
the European regulations on government procurement and state aid.1196 In a similar vein, the 
question has been raised whether W TO’s procurement rules would apply to a situation where an 
industrialised country invests in a CDM project and obtains CERs in return,1197 or whether funding 
for CDM and JI projects could constitute actionable subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.1198A ll this goes to show that defining the legal nature o f something like the 
Kyoto units for the purposes o f W TO law is not a straightforward exercise. Some uncertainty 
concerning the relationship between the W TO and Kyoto mechanisms thus persists - even if  the 
rapidly evolving carbon market seems to operate on the assumption that WTO rules do not pose 
any constraints on the Kyoto mechanisms, and no threats have been made by non-Kyoto countries 
to challenge the system at the WTO.
To highlight the potential challenges to the legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system that a 
clash between the trade and climate communities could entail, it is interesting to consider the 
political implications o f a dispute concerning the compatibility o f the Kyoto mechanisms and WTO 
rules. In other words, the aim of this analysis is not to solve the legal puzzle as to how the Kyoto 
mechanisms should be classified and what would be the most feasible option of challenging the 
Kyoto Mechanisms under WTO law, but to highlight that requesting the WTO dispute setdement 
system to do so would be likely to surface severe legitimacy challenges. As we have seen, the 
international carbon market has been growing rapidly. A large share of this can be attributed to the
1194 Green, “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining Are Trade Rules?,” 145
1195 Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), Workshop Report: Legal Nature o f  
GHG Emission Reductions. An International Workshop May 24-25 2004, London (FIELD, 2004).
1196 Ibid., 8.
1,97 Ibid., 11.
1198 T. L. Brewer, “The WTO and Kyoto Protocol: Interaction Issues,” Journal o f  Climate Policy 4 (2004), 3 at 9.
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EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) involving some 11,500 installations and representing almost 
50 per cent o f the total carbon dioxide emissions of the EU.1199 Through the so-called Linking 
Directive these installations can also use, with relatively minor restrictions, credits from CDM and 
JI projects to comply with their emission allocations.1200 In fact, private companies have taken over 
the markets for CDM and JI credits with a 80-90 per cent share of all transactions between 2005 
and 2006.1201 The carbon market has also given birth to a new service industry of carbon brokers, 
carbon funds, experts and consultants involved in the implementation o f CDM and JI projects. All 
this goes to show that anything that affects the carbon market and the CDM and JI will 
immediately affect the economic interests o f thousands of private actors all over the world. An 
(unlikely) decision by the WTO dispute settlement system that the Kyoto mechanisms are not 
compatible with WTO rules could therefore have some fundamental implications. The ensuring 
lack o f legal certainty could even undermine the legitimacy o f international law itself due to the lack 
of coordination between its different fragments.
There are also important differences between the professional cultures in which the WTO dispute 
settlement system and the Kyoto mechanisms operate. The private sector and environmental 
NGOs have actively participated in the creation and implementation of the Kyoto mechanisms. For 
many private actors in both the developed and developing world, the way that the CDM and JI are 
governed has direct economic consequences. For NGOs, their interests range from ensuring the 
environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol to monitoring the social and ecological impacts o f CDM 
and JI projects in their host countries. Given the considerable public and private interest in the 
CDM and JI, elaborate procedures have been created to ensure their transparent operation and 
provide possibilities for public participation and input. For instance, the rules for the CDM make it 
possible for anyone (individual or organi2ation) to review the design o f each individual CDM 
project and make comments before the project is registered under the Kyoto Protocol\1202 After the 
project has been implemented, anyone can also raise concerns over the quality of emission 
reductions that seek certification under the Kyoto Protocol. These and other practical details 
concerning the implementation o f the CDM are resolved by an international body known as the 
CDM Executive Board (the equivalent body created for the JI is called JI Supervisory Committee.) 
The CDM Executive Board and the JI Supervisory Committee consist o f representatives appointed 
by the Parties to Kyoto Protocol and report to the COP/M OP. The private sector as well as
1199 Directive 2003/87/EC o f the European Parliament and Council o f 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, Official Journal o f  the European Union 275, 
25.10.2003, 32.
1200 Directive 2004/101/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community, in respect o f the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms, Official Journal o f  
the European Union L338, 13.11.2004, 18.
1201 K. Capoor & P. Ambrosi, State and Trends o f  the Carbon Market 2006 (IETA/WB, 2006), 23.
1202 Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism as Defined in Article 12 o f the Kyoto Protocol, 
Decision 3/CMP.l (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/Add.l, 30 March 2006).
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environmental N G O s and academics meticulously follow their meetings that are open to observers 
and webcast, and communicate with their members during regular question and answer sessions. 
They are also present at international climate change negotiations, making interventions at plenary 
sessions and observing deliberations in contact groups. During a dispute involving the CDM or JI, 
important questions concerning the transparency o f the WTO dispute settlement procedures and 
participation would be bound to arise. Determining the compatibility o f WTO law and the Kyoto 
"Protocol mechanisms during closed WTO dispute setdement proceedings would deviate dramatically 
from this fairly transparent and participatory culture in which the Kyoto mechanisms currendy 
operate and could hardly be deemed as a legitimate outcome.
6.3.1.2_______ The WTO and Climate Change Mitigation Polices and Measures
One of the most difficult dilemmas involving the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO rules concerns the
question o f specificity — or rather the lack o f it under the Kyoto Protocol. What is clear is that the
Protocol contains legally binding targets for industrialised countries to reduce their emissions by a
given percentage between the years 2008 and 2012. However, it leaves it entirely up to each
individual country to decide how to comply with this target, including how much o f the emission
reductions are achieved through domestic means and how much of them will be achieved through
the flexibility mechanisms. The only requirement imposed by the C O P/M O P is that domestic
measures must constitute a ‘significant’ element of a Party’s efforts to meet its commitments. The
expression ‘significant’ has not been defined in quantitative terms, and the Netherlands, for
instance, has decided to implement half o f its Kyoto target through the flexible mechanisms.
According to Cosby, the conflict scenario arising from policies and measures designed to
implement the Kyoto Protocol.
.. .is troubling because it is likely, and because it might precipitate a damaging clash 
between trade and environment objectives, were the rules and institutions no more 
evolved than those we have today. It is almost certain that some parties will 
eventually implement policies and measures in a protectionist manner... the 
defendant would probably claim it was acting within its mandated obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol (though they would not be specifically mandated), and the stage 
would be set for a titanic clash of trade and environment rules, with fallout that 
would be damaging for both communities regardless o f the outcome.1203
Some WTO scholars have argued that measures designed to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions 
would be easier to justify under WTO rules if they were specifically prescribed by the Kyoto 
Protocol,!1204 The argument has even been made that measures to implement the Kyoto Protocol should 
be placed in the same category as any unilateral trade measures:
1203 Cosby, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO, 5-6.
1204 Green, “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining Are Trade Rules?,” 187.
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The regulatory measures under the Kyoto Protocol are unilateral measures since the 
Kyoto Protocol does not specify any required content for the domestic measures or 
even which measures to use.1205
However, while the argument that the Kyoto Protocol should be more specific concerning the means 
for its implementation sounds may reasonable from the perspective o f WTO law, it sounds rather 
unrealistic to those familiar with the political realities and evolution o f the international climate 
regime. From the point of view of the UN climate regime, the vagueness o f the UNFCCC  and the 
Kyoto Protocol in terms of policies and measures for their implementation is - again - anything but an 
accident. As the IPCC AR4 indicates, the suitability of the various greenhouse gas mitigation 
options depends largely on national circumstances (see 6.3 above). No two countries are identical in 
terms of their emissions profiles and mitigation potential. Options that are readily available in some 
countries could be completely excluded in others. At the very least, specific options would be far 
less efficient in some countries and politically controversial in others. Conscious of these problems, 
international climate negotiators chose to defer to national decisions on how to reduce greenhouse 
gas emission and which economic sectors to involve to the national level.
The wide variety o f possible ways o f implementing the Kyoto Protocol explains the vast landscape of 
potential conflicts between the implementation o f the Kyoto Protocol and WTO law. Evidendy, much 
would also depend on the detailed design o f the measure. Potential conflicts have thus been 
envisaged between the Kyoto Protocol and the G ATT, GATS, TBT Agreement as well as the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Highlighting the complexity o f the situation, such 
controversies have surfaced even between the EU and Japan, both prominent supporters o f the 
Kyoto Protocol. For example, Japan indicated that it considered introducing fuel efficiency standards 
for motor vehicles to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and meet its Kyoto target.1206 Accordingly, 
vehicles with smaller and more fuel efficient engines would be subject to lower tax rates.1207 The 
EU, however, raised a possibility o f a WTO challenge stressing that such measures would 
discriminate against European car imports as Japanese car models tended to be generally smaller 
than the European ones.1208 The EU, in turn, has adopted an ambitious ten per cent target for 
biofuels by 2020 as a part of its efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A critical part o f the 
plan is to introduce strict sustainability criteria for both domestically produced and imported 
biofuels to ensure that they do not result in the loss of biodiversity and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 35 per cent.1209
1205 Ibid., 146.
1206 Brewer, “The WTO and Kyoto Protocol: Interaction Issues,” 14.
U01Ibid.
1208 Ibid.
1209 European Commission, Proposal fo r  a Directive on the Promotion o f  the Use o f  Energy from  Renewable Sources, 
January 2008.
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From the point o f view of WTO law, possible conflicts with the Kyoto Protocol bring to the fore, 
among other things, the classic questions concerning ‘likeness’ o f products: can, for example, 
products be subjected to a differential treatment based on their energy efficiency or greenhouse gas 
emissions produced during the manufacturing process? The latter question highlights lively and 
long-standing debates concerning measured targeting processes and production methods, as well as 
the question whether the regulatory objective would be acceptable grounds for justifying ‘less 
favourable treatment’ o f like products. Questions could also arise concerning the justifiability 
climate change mitigation measures under either subparagraph (b) or (g) o f G A T T  Article XX. This 
would raise questions similar to those discussed in Chapter 4 including whether climate protection 
qualifies as “exhaustible natural resource”1210 under Article XX(g) and how the measure would 
qualify in terms o f the ‘necessity’ test under Article XX(b) that was discussed in Chapter 5.12,1 
Complex and technical as these legal questions are from the point o f view of WTO law, they easily 
distract attention from the broader legal universe in which the conflict would be situated — which is 
the key focus o f the present analysis. Seen from the perspective of the UN climate change regime, 
the fact that the Kyoto Protocol does not specify the policies and measures required for its 
implementation, does not mean that it is neither silent nor irrelevant in this regard.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the relevant provision dealing with policies and measures is its Article 2. 
Accordingly, “in achieving its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment” each 
Annex I country “shall implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance 
with its national circumstances.” Article 2.1 o f the Kyoto Protocol contains a non-exhaustive and non­
binding list o f policies and measures that its implementation could entail, including: enhancement 
of energy efficiency; protection and enhancement of carbon sinks; promotion o f sustainable forms 
of agriculture; taking measures related to renewable energy and carbon dioxide sequestration; 
addressing market imperfections (such as tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in greenhouse gas 
emitting sectors); encouraging appropriate reforms to promote policies and measures that limit or 
reduce emissions in relevant sectors; addressing emissions in the transport sector; and addressing 
methane emissions. This is as close to specification as international climate negotiators have been 
able to come.
The text of the Kyoto Protocol also gives some guidance on the relationship between climate change 
mitigation and other policy objectives. According to Article 2.3, Annex I parties “shall strive to 
implement” their policies and measures “in such a way as to minimi2e adverse effects, including 
adverse effects o f climate change, effects on international trade, and social, environmental and 
economic impacts on other Parties,” especially developing countries. From the legal perspective,
1210 Green, “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining Are Trade Rules?,” 176.
1211 Ibid., 177-178.
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the language used in the Kyoto Protocol, especially the expression that industrialised countries should 
“strive to implement” their policies and measures “in such a ways as to minimize” their adverse 
effects could easily be interpreted so that the negotiators were willing to accept certain ‘adverse 
effects’ on international trade — listed in Article 2.3 as one o f the several any social spheres 
potentially affected by the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Looking at the text o f the Kyoto 
Protocol, the same sentence mentions ‘adverse impacts of climate change’ as one o f the relevant 
considerations that needs to be balanced with international trade and other adverse social, 
environmental and economic impacts of climate change mitigation. The argument could also be 
made that in a dispute between two Parties, the Kyoto Protocol, adopted after the entry into force of 
the WTO Agreements, should be considered as lex posterior and prevail in case it conflicts with 
WTO rules. Legally justified as such arguments are from the perspective of the Kyoto Protocol, would 
they be compatible with WTO law and what would be their prospects in the WTO dispute 
settlement system?
6.3.1.3_______ Border Tax Adjustments and Other Trade Measures
The third and final conflict scenario discussed here involving the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO regime
relates to border tax adjustments and other measures applied on imports from countries where the
price o f carbon is not reflected in the production costs.1212 This possibility received a fair amount of
scholarly attention and at the height of the EU-U.S. climate change controversy and it also solicited
some political support in Europe. After the U.S. announced that it would not ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, the argument surfaced that the EU should impose a carbon tax on imports from the U.S. to
put their economies on an equal footing — especially as many saw that the Shrimp-Turtle decision had
opened a doorway for designing such trade measures in a way that is compatible with WTO law.
Essentially, the rationale o f border tax adjustments is to offset the negative environmental and
competitiveness effects caused by national climate policies. In other words,
Price differentials caused by different taxation schemes between the Kyoto coalition 
and the anti-Kyoto coalition could also thwart the environmental purpose for which 
the Kyoto countries have introduced the tax in the first place.1213
According to the EU’s Trade Commissioner Mandelson, however, taxing imports from countries
that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol is,
... highly problematic under current WTO rules and almost impossible to 
implement in practice... N ot participating in the Kyoto process is not illegal. N or is 
it a subsidy under WTO rules. How would we choose what goods to target? China 
has ratified the Kyoto but has no Kyoto targets because o f its developing country
1212 M. Lodefalk & M. Storey, “Climate Measures and WTO Rules on Subsidies,” Journal o f  World Trade 39(1) 
(2005), 23-44 at 27.
1213 F. Biermann & R. Brohm, “Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the United States: The Strategic Role of 
Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border,” Global Governance Working Paper No 5. (2003). Available at: 
<www.glogov.org>.
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status. The US has not, but states like California have ambitious climate change 
policies.1214
Nevertheless, the idea of border tax adjustments by the EU has not disappeared. On the contrary,
the proposed new Directive to improve and extend the EU ETS during 2013-2020 contemplates
“an effective carbon equalisation system” to put European and foreign installations on a
comparable footing in case there is no international climate change agreement on the post-2012
period.1215 Accordingly,
Such a system could apply requirements to importers that could be no less 
favourable than those applicable to installations within the EU, for example, by 
requiring the surrender o f allowances.1216
Interestingly enough, also the U.S. itself is currendy contemplating trade measures on imports 
based on their carbon content. In July 2007, Senators Bingman and Specter introduced a ‘Low 
Carbon Economy Act’ that would create a federal cap and trade system for greenhouse gas 
emissions in the U.S. An important element of that system would be a requirement for importers of 
greenhouse gas intensive goods to purchase carbon credits (‘international reserve allowances’) 
reflecting the U.S. price for carbon if their countries were not taking ‘comparable action’ to the U.S. 
to limit greenhouse gas emissions.1217 This possibility would apply from the year 2020 onwards if 
other countries, including developing ones, were deemed by the President to be making inadequate 
efforts to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.1218 Having the U.S. President determine what 
constitutes ‘adequate efforts’ to mitigate climate change in developing countries and elsewhere 
would naturally bring to the fore fundamentally controversies. While the fate of the Low Carbon 
Economy Act is still unclear, it is evident is that the proposed legal act would have huge 
implications not only for the WTO regime, but also for international climate change cooperation. 
In the worst case, the U.S. system could circumvent some of the key principles that have been 
guiding international climate change cooperation for almost two decades, including the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and the leadership role o f industrialised countries. This 
is exacdy the reason why the European Commission’s proposal for a carbon equalisation system 
stresses that:
Any action would need to be in conformity with the principles of the UNFCCC, in 
particular the principle o f common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, taking into account the particular situation of Least Developed
1214 “How Trade Can Be Part o f the Climate Change Solution, “ Comment by EU Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson, Brussels, 18 December 2006.
Available at: < http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_2006_en.htm>.
1215 European Commission, Proposal fo r  a new directive o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system o f  the 
Community, COM(2008)16. 23 January 2008, 8.
1216 Ibid.
1217 The Bingaman-Specter Low Carbon Economy Act o f2007, Section 502. S 1766 IS. Introduced to the 1 lOthe 
Congress on 11 July 2007. Found at: <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sll0-1766>.
1218 Ibid.
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Countries. It would also need to be in conformity of the international obligations of 
the Community including the WTO agreement.1219
Given their close proximity with the W TO regime and the still somewhat unclear legal situation 
concerning processes and production methods, the U.S. Low Carbon Economy Act (and other 
similar proposals) as well as the European carbon equalisation system would seem like likely 
candidates for high-profile and sensitive W TO dispute. Clearly, such disputes could pose important 
challenges to the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system.
6.4. The Conflict Scenarios and the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Attempting to anticipate the outcome of the three conflict scenarios brings us back to the realm of
WTO law. Here, the relevance of the detailed rules of the UN climate change regime is no longer
self-evident. In stark contrast, one o f the most pressing legal questions in the WTO dispute
setdement system would concern the role o f the Kyoto Protocol in the WTO dispute setdement
proceedings: Could it sometimes be direcdy applied as Pauwelyn has suggested? Would it count as a
relevant rule o f international law that should inform the interpretation of WTO law in accordance
with the customary rules o f treaty interpretation? Under what conditions would this be the case
given that not all WTO Member States have ratified the Kyoto Protocol? If  it did not qualify as
‘relevant rule,’ should it be referred to as factual evidence? Or would it be —as happened to the
Cartagena Protocol in the Biotech dispute — ignored completely? The uncertainties surrounding these
questions are the rather absurd consequence o f fragmentation o f international law and the lack of
institutional coordination. True, the International Law Commission has indicated that “even as
international law’s diversification may threaten its coherence, it does this by increasing its
responsiveness to the regulatory context.”1220 Furthermore,
... no homogenous, hierarchical meta-system is realistically available to do away with such 
problems. International law will need to operate within an area where the demands o f 
coherence and reasonable pluralism will point in different directions.1221
However, all this highlights the role o f institutions tasked with solving problems generated by the 
incoherence o f the international legal system. The International Law Commission did not examine 
such questions in its report1222 - but the question of institutions and the impacts o f the 
fragmentation of international law on their legitimacy are highly relevant for the WTO dispute
1219 European Commission, Proposal to amend the EU ETS, 8.
1220 ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law, 248.
1221 Ibid., 249.
1222 According to the ILC, certain institutional and substantive problems “have to do with the competence o f  various 
institutions applying international legal rules and their hierarchical relations inter se. The Commission decided to 
leave this question aside.” Ibid., 13.
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settlement and this study. How could the WTO dispute setdement system deal with a dispute 
involving the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO regime? And how would this affect it legitimacy?
Literature has identified discrimination o f non-Kyoto parties as one of the likely reasons for 
challenging the Kyoto mechanisms under WTO law. The first of the four conflicts could therefore 
arise between two countries one o f which is not a Party to the Kyoto Protocol and one that is. In 
event that the compatibility of the Kyoto trading system with the Most Favoured Nation principle 
was challenged on the grounds that trading excludes others than industrialised countries parties to 
the Protocol' there would be a clear legal basis in a multilateral environmental agreement for limiting 
market access to countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Under the detailed rules for the CDM 
and JI, being a party to the Kyoto Protocol is an unequivocal and explicit condition for participating in 
the two flexible mechanisms. The compelling rationale of this restriction is that allowing carbon 
credits from non-parties would inflate the carbon markets, thereby introducing an important 
loophole into the system and jeopardising the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol.
In such a dispute, what would be the legal relevance of the Kyoto Protocol? While ignoring the Protocol
in a dispute that relates to its specific provisions could hardly be seen as a legitimate outcome, the
possibility remains that the WTO dispute setdement system would end up using the same narrow
logic as the Biotech panel. In other words, the Kyoto Protocol would not be considered as a relevant
rule o f international law that should guide the interpretation o f WTO law because both disputing
countries would not have not ratified it. In the Biotech case, the panel also hinted at the possibility
that only agreements that have been ratified by all WTO Member States might qualify as relevant
rules of international law within the meaning of the VCLT. The WTO dispute setdement system
could also choose to refer to the Kyoto Protocol as factual evidence —although the Biotech panel
refused to do even this with regard to the Cartagena Protocol in a dispute that related to its very
subject matter of transboundary movement o f living modified organisms. Even if the WTO dispute
setdement system would accept to consider the Kyoto Protocol as factual evidence, this would be
problematic. As the International Law Commission has indicated:
...taking “other treaties” into account as evidence of the “ordinary meaning” 
appears a rather contrived way o f preventing the “clinical isolation” as emphasized 
by the Appellate Body.1223
Overall, the situation seems far from satisfactory in the sense that the legal relevance o f the Kyoto 
Protocol in the WTO dispute setdement proceedings remains unclear with the options ranging from 
its direct application to complete ignorance.
1223 ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law, 228.
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While this example servers extremely well to illustrate the potential legitimacy challenges arising 
from a conflict between the Kyoto Protocol and WTO law, I wish to emphasise the legal analysis 
above showing that trade in Kyoto registry units is unlikely to lead to serious challenges under the 
other W TO Agreements per se. A more likely target for a WTO challenge would be the rapidly 
evolving service industry of carbon brokers and experts or WTO rules on subsidies and investment. 
In this context, it is also useful to keep in mind that it would not be possible for a country that has 
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol to use the WTO dispute settlement system to claim that it must be 
allowed to participate in the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms per se. It is not possible for a country to 
make claims based on a treaty that it has not ratified, and the W TO dispute settlement system 
would definitely not be a forum competent to make a decision concerning the eligibility to 
participate in the Kyoto mechanisms as such. In my view, the only thing that the WTO dispute 
settlement system could decide is that all WTO Members, independent o f their status under the 
Kyoto Protocol' should be allowed to import products ‘like’ the Kyoto units or produce services 
similar to those related the CDM and JI. And it is true that also the ‘voluntary carbon market’ is 
growing both in the form of companies purchasing Kyoto units voluntarily as a marketing strategy 
or corporate social responsibility campaign and in terms o f ‘unofficial’ carbon credits generated 
outside the strict rules and controls o f the Kyoto Protocol1224 However, in the event of hitherto 
unreported trade restrictions on the sale o f voluntary carbon credits or on purchases o f Kyoto units 
by companies from non-Parties, the economic value of such transactions is unlikely to exceed the 
threshold for bringing a dispute to the WTO. At the end o f the day, what is being traded under the 
Kyoto Protocol is ‘thin air’ and the air is mainly valuable to participating governments and private 
companies affected by government measures such as the EU ETS designed to implement the 
Kyoto emissions reduction targets.
Thus, while a conflict between the Kyoto mechanisms and the W TO system does not seem likely 
to candidate to actualise in real life, imagining a clash between the businessmen involved in carbon 
trading and businessmen involved in the WTO provides a delicious opportunity to highlight the 
somewhat competing claims to legitimacy of these two international regimes, and their very 
different cultures of transparency and participation. Clearly, the W TO dispute setdement system 
would struggle in deciding this unlikely dispute, not only because o f the pressures to improve the 
legitimacy of its operating procedures but also because it would come under immense pressure to 
clearly define the legal relevance of the Kyoto Protocol and other multilateral environmental 
agreements at the WTO.
Concerning the second scenario, a lot would depend on the exact design of the disputed measure 
and whether all countries involved in the proceeding were Parties to the Kyoto Protocol or not. Given
1224 M. Wider & L. Day, “Voluntary Carbon M arket- A Legal Perspective,” in IETA (2007), 121 at 121.
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the wide range o f conceivable climate policies, it is possible that a W TO dispute could also be 
initiated by a country that is not a Party to the Kyoto Protocol but also by one that has ratified the 
Protocol. Even in the ‘easier’ situation where all disputing W TO Members were also Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol and invoked it during the proceedings, the W TO dispute settlement system would 
come to face some challenging questions. Could it make a finding based on the Kyoto Protocol? If  it 
decided to follow Pauwelyn’s argument and travel that difficult road (as it probably should) — then 
what would happen? How should the WTO dispute settlement system deal with the fact that the 
Kyoto Protocol does not prescribe any specific measures, yet it obliges countries to implement a 
‘significant’ part of their legally binding emission targets through domestic mitigation measures?
Clearly, the door would not be open for the WTO dispute settlement system to argue that any 
policies that have not been specifically prescribed by the Kyoto Protocol are incompatible with WTO 
rules. As we saw above, Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol lays down an obligation that industrialised 
countries must implement national policies and measures to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. 
To a certain degree, its Article 2.3 also seemed to accept the possibility that such policies and 
measures have adverse effects on other social spheres, including international trade. Could this 
provision be interpreted in a way that is compatible with WTO rules, or would it result in a norm 
conflict necessitating the use o f conflict norms such as lex posterior or lex specialis? What then? The 
WTO dispute setdement system might also have to engage in some rather politically sensitive 
analysis, for instance, under Article XX(b) of the G A TT  when determining the ‘necessity’ o f a 
certain climate policy. This could happen even leaving aside such explosive lines o f inquiry as the 
overall ‘necessity’ of taking action against climate change1225 or balancing the importance o f climate 
change mitigation in relation to international trade. Even defining the ‘necessity’ of particular 
domestic policy in terms o f the availability of other, less trade restrictive options could have 
important economic implications and highlight tensions in the borderline between the WTO 
dispute setdement system and national authorities. If  a measure genuinely intended to contribute to 
the achievement of a country’s Kyoto target was found to be incompatible with WTO rules, the 
country would be obliged to identify alternative policies and measures to reduce its emissions to the 
required level. Such a decision would have important implications the balance struck when 
formulating the national Kyoto compliance strategy and allocating the burden between economic 
sectors and actors, including the decision whether and how much to spend tax payers’ money to 
purchase credits through the Kyoto mechanisms. All this highlights the fact that the WTO dispute 
setdement system affects the relations between the WTO and its Member States.
Challenging as the first two scenarios would be for the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement 
system, it is really the third scenario that could generate the most serious problems. From a broader
1225 As proposed by Green, see Chapter 5.
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policy perspective, a measure like the proposed U.S. ‘Low Carbon Economy Act’ could easily 
undermine multilateral cooperation under both the WTO and UN climate regimes. A carbon levy 
on most imports to the U.S. or the EU would have huge economic implications and immediately 
surface all the familiar criticism about imposing one country’s environmental values and policies on 
others. And indeed, unless the regulation was carefully designed, it would circumvent the 
fundamentals that have been guiding the development of the UN climate change regime, most 
notably, the idea of the historical responsibility of industrialised countries and the common but 
differentiated responsibilities of developing countries to participate in climate change mitigation 
efforts.
Could the WTO dispute settlement system be reasonably expected to determine whether something 
with such enormous political implications is possible? The WTO dispute settlement system would 
also be confronted with interesting legal challenges. Those drafting ‘the Low Carbon Economy Act’ 
have clearly read the Shrimp-Turtk decision and worded some of its most crucial provisions in 
language that is similar to that used by the Appellate Body in the 1998 Shrimp-Turtk decision. 
Clearly, the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement could suffer a serious blow if a country (like 
the U.S.) designed a national regulatory scheme that takes into account earlier WTO dispute 
settlement practice - and then the scheme was found to be incompatible with W TO rules. At the 
very least, the WTO dispute settlement system would struggle to make an analytical distinction 
between the Shrimp-Turtk dispute and the one involving the Low Carbon Economy Act. According 
to one observer,
Under Article XX of the G A TT  and judicial precedent, the US may likely defend 
this duty on the grounds o f environmental protection, as long as the response does 
not discriminate against other countries.1226
Difficult as the question o f unilateral trade measures is, an interpretation that fluctuates every few 
years is hardly a solution that could improve the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system. 
From the perspective of environmental policy, however, the merits o f the International Reserve 
Allocation requirement are questionable and — interestingly enough - it could thus become a dispute 
where the international environmental community finds itself taking a stance against the U.S. 
environmental trade measure.
In real life, such a situation may or may not arise. In the end, the U.S regulation may not even be 
adopted — there are several other climate bills currently in the Congress. A new treaty on post-2012 
climate change cooperation is set to be concluded by the end o f 2009 also involving the U.S in 
multilateral efforts to mitigate climate change. Even if it is unlikely that the new treaty will be much
1226 P. Breselin, “Guest Commentary: Caveat Emptor: Trade Policy’s Role under Cap-and-Trade,” Point Carbon’s 
Carbon Market North America, 12 September 2007.
226
more specific than the Kyoto Protocol in terms of the measures for its implementation, it could 
provide a legal basis for finding regulations such as the Low Carbon Economy Act incompatible 
with WTO rules interpreted in light of the new climate treaty. However, what the new post-2012 
climate treaty is likely to do is to define more ambitious emission targets than the Kyoto Protocol did — 
and possibly for an even larger number of countries. Given that almost everyone agrees that the 
flexible mechanisms and the carbon markets are the most successful features of the Kyoto Protocol’ 
the new treaty is likely to also incorporate and even expand the use o f market-based mechanisms, 
thereby enhancing link between the trade and climate regimes. What seems clear is that the four 
conflict scenarios bring to the fore difficult legal and political problems and their solution could 
have fundamental implications for the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Considering everything that is at stake, the institutional skills and capabilities of the WTO dispute 
settlement could be stretched to the breaking point. To phrase it differendy, the ‘rule o f lawyers’ 
brought about by the judicialisation of the WTO dispute setdement procedures1227 may be reaching 
its limits in such a situation.
1227 The phrase is borrowed from Weiler, “The Rule o f Lawyers.”
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7. Conclusion: Striking the Right Balances?
When beginning this study in the summer of 2003, the legitimacy of the W TO dispute setdement 
system was a highly relevant topic. The panel and Appellate Body decisions during the 
implementation phase of the Shrimp-Turtle case had recendy crystallised what only few had 
understood when reading its first decision in the case back in 1998: that environmentally motivated 
trade measures can be designed so as to make them compatible with WTO law. However, from the 
environmentalist perspective, the boost to the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system 
seemed short-lived. Argentina, Canada and the U.S. had just formally commenced dispute 
setdement proceedings against the EU’s treatment o f imports of genetically modified products in 
the Biotech case. Given the highly critical attitudes of European consumers towards GMOs, the 
complexity of the EU’s regime and its proximity with the Cartagena Protocol, many predicted that the 
dispute would pose another great challenge to the WTO dispute setdement system. While the 
Biotech report, focusing on the de facto suspension o f approval procedures rather than the EU’s legal 
regime for GMOs, was narrower than many had feared, the past four years have demonstrated that 
concerns related to the legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system are far from setded. For 
instance, the WTO dispute setdement system has yet to develop a consistent, coherent and 
predictable approach to international environmental norms and engage in a constructive interaction 
with the field.
The reality is, however, that environmental disputes find their way to the WTO at almost regular 
intervals. In October 2007, Canada requested consultations with the EU concerning a ban imposed 
by Belgium and the Netherlands on seal products.1228 Animal rights groups are currendy putting 
pressure on other EU countries and the European Commission to adopt similar regulations. 
Canada, in turn, argues that the Belgian and Dutch bans violate the TBT Agreement as well as the 
G A TT1229 and stresses that seal hunting represents an important source o f livelihood for Canadians, 
including indigenous communities. If consultations between the EU and Canada are unsuccessful, 
the dispute concerning Certain Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products might 
eventually lead to the establishment o f a panel -  and bring to the W TO yet another linkage dispute, 
also involving the question of indigenous rights. It is thus clear that many o f the legal and political 
challenges that originally inspired this study are still highly relevant. Furthermore, Chapter 6 
identified several potential candidates for new environmental disputes at the WTO in the context of 
climate change mitigation.
1228 Request for consultations by Canada on European Communities-Certain Measures Prohibiting the Importation
and Marketing o f  Seal Products, WT/DS/369/1, 1 October 2007.
m 9 Ibid.
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In the scholarly field, the past four years have seen several significant developments in areas 
relevant to the topic o f this study. Many o f the debates bom  around the WTO and its dispute 
settlement system have matured and moved forward. Highly accomplished works have been 
published concerning the legitimacy, democratic deficit, constitutionalisation o f the WTO;1230 
fragmentation of international law;1231 the relationship between WTO law and other rules of 
international law;1232 the standard o f review applicable in the WTO dispute settlement;1233 the SPS 
Agreement;1234 and the involvement of WTO dispute settlement system in environmental 
disputes.1235 Needless to say, this research has gready benefited from such developments. The 
rapidly moving discussion has also posed some challenges in terms o f keeping up to date on the 
latest developments. While academic understanding concerning questions relevant to the topic if 
this study has evolved, many important question marks and divergences remain.
This study began by arguing in Chapter 1 that the relevance of legitimacy in the context of 
international law and international institutions has increased significandy as a result o f intellectual 
developments related to globalisation and the end o f the Cold War. Chapter 1 thus discussed the 
key definitions and understandings o f legitimacy. It introduced the distinction between the 
substantive/social and procedural/formal components of legitimacy as a basis for structuring this 
study and categorising legitimacy challenges at the WTO dispute setdement system. Reviewing the 
Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtk disputes, Chapter 2 explained how legitimacy challenges have 
surfaced in the WTO dispute setdement system, especially concerning disputes where 
environmental interests play an important role. It argued that one of the key reasons is the 
substantive scope and mandate o f the W TO dispute setdement system. The fact that the WTO 
dispute setdement cannot consider claims based on non-WTO norms and, according to the 
mainstream scholarly view, is not competent to direcdy apply non-WTO norms of international 
law, has been an important motivation for arguments that the WTO dispute setdement system is 
systemically biased towards trade and economic interests. Chapter 2 also argued that in its first 
Shrimp-Turtk decision in 1998, the Appellate Body was able to alleviate some of the most immediate 
problems by demonstrating that WTO law does not exist ‘in clinical isolation’ from other rules of 
international law and opening the borders of the WTO regime to international environmental 
norms.
Chapter 2 then reviewed in detail the debate and WTO dispute setdement practice concerning the 
role o f non-WTO norms in the WTO dispute setdement system. Essentially, it identified two main
1230 See for instance, Howse, “Democratic Deficit” and” Legitimacy o f the WTO”; Cass, The Constitutionalization o f  
the WTO', and Petersmann, ““Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism.”
1231 See most notably, ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law.
1232 See, for instance, Pauwelyn, Conflict o f  Norms.
1233 See, for instance, Oesch, Standards o f  Review.
1234 J. Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A  Commentary (OUP, 2007).
1235 See, for instance, Macmillan, WTO and the Environment.
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scholarly positions. According to Pauwelyn, the WTO regime was not born in a vacuum: unless a 
treaty explicitly contracts out o f general international law, it continues to apply to a regime and fills 
gaps left by the treaty.1236 Furthermore, the D SU  does not limit the competence o f the WTO 
dispute settlement system in terms of applicable law.1237 However, in cases where it is not possible 
to apply a WTO rule and other relevant rule of international law by interpreting the norms in such a 
way so as to make them compatible, recourse must be had to conflict norms to determine which 
norm should prevail. If a non-WTO norm is found to be the prevailing one, the WTO dispute 
settlement system is competent to apply it but it cannot enforce it.1238 The second position, 
supported by scholars such as Trachtman and Marceau, was that the WTO dispute settlement 
system is never competent to apply non-WTO norms o f international law directly. Again, the 
primary method for dealing with norm conflicts is interpretation: according to the customary norms 
of treaty interpretation, codified in the Vienna Convention on the JLaw of Treaties, the WTO dispute 
settlement system must take into account any relevant rules of international law when it interprets 
the WTO Agreements. However, in case the conflict cannot be solved through interpretation, the 
WTO dispute settlement system cannot make a finding based on a non-WTO norm. Finally, a 
third and less formal approach to non-WTO norms was identified in Chapters 2 and 4 that could 
also broaden the substantive horizons o f the WTO dispute settlement system Accordingly, non- 
WTO norms could play a role in WTO dispute settlement proceedings as factual evidence. In other 
words, they could be used not as legal norms but as interpretative material to assist in defining the 
meaning of words used in the WTO Agreements in the same way that the WTO dispute settlement 
organs might use a dictionary to guide their textual interpretation. This possibility was discussed by 
the Biotech panel, and according to its interpretation, the Appellate Body used this method in the 
Shrimp-Turtle case when referring to environmental instruments such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity to support its interpretation of the GATT.
Based on the WTO dispute settlement practice, it remains somewhat unclear as to what extent the 
WTO dispute settlement system has directly applied non-WTO norms, to what extent it has 
referred to them as relevant rules of international law that guide the interpretation o f WTO law and 
to what extent it has used non-WTO norms as factual evidence rather than as legal norms. As it 
was seen in Chapters 3 and 4, in its first Shrimp-Turtle decision, the Appellate Body generously listed 
various binding and non-binding sources o f international environmental law but ultimately left their 
legal status and relevance undefined. In contrast, in the Hormones decision the AB did not see any 
potential role for the precautionary principle to influence the interpretation of W TO law, and the 
Biotech panel explicitly refused to consider the Cartagena Protocol either as a relevant rule of 
international law or as factual evidence. The Biotech report also highlighted an important grey area
1236 Pauwelyn, “The Role o f Public International Law in the WTO,” 577.
1237 Ibid.
1238 Ibid., 566.
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that would seem to diminish the potential o f using non-WTO norms to increase coherence in 
international law by interpreting WTO law in light o f other rules of international law. While the 
fact that the Appellate Body referred to the Convention on Biological Diversity in the Shrimp-Turtle case 
lead some to believe that there might be some more flexibility in the Biotech panel argued that the 
Cartagena Protocol was not a relevant rule of international law because not all W TO Members are not 
Parties to it. It then refused to answer the question as to whether it would be relevant in case all 
disputing parties had ratified it — as in the Biotech case, the EU was the only one having done so.
Going deeper into the legitimacy dilemma, Chapter 4 identified two sets o f challenges to the 
substantive/social legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system originating from the mandate 
of the WTO dispute settlement system that restricts its ability to consider international 
environmental norms. To illustrate the relevant but limited potential o f conflict norms and norm 
conflicts, it questioned whether an international judicial body mandated to consider all relevant 
international norms on an equal footing might have reached a different conclusion in the Shrimp- 
Turtle and Hormones cases. This inquiry demonstrated that in addition to the limited mandate of the 
WTO dispute setdement system, differences in regulatory techniques and levels o f development 
influence the interaction between WTO law and international environmental law in a way that is 
often unfavourable to legitimate interests protected by international environmental law. In other 
words, Chapter 4 explained that international environmental norms are scattered in various 
different instruments and the legal status o f several key concepts remains unclear. Furthermore, the 
progressive development o f international environmental law is not possible due to the absence of 
an appropriate judicial forum. For all these reasons, the existence o f relevant and conflicting norms 
is often difficult to determine. While these systemic problems continue to challenge the 
substantive/social legitimacy o f the WTO dispute setdement system, for reasons highlighted in 
Chapter 5, they cannot all be resolved by the WTO dispute setdement system itself. Rather, they 
should be addressed by those in a position to improve the interaction between the fragmented and 
increasingly specialised sub-system of international law and relevant institutions.
Turning to the second level of analysis, namely that confined to the WTO dispute setdement 
system, Chapter 4 then argued that the WTO dispute setdement system has not exploited the full 
potential o f the legal methods at its disposal to improve its legitimacy. It highlighted the link 
between legitimacy, consistency and transparent, well-reasoned justifications and argued that the 
legitimacy o f an international judicial body can easily be challenged if there are faults in its legal 
reasoning. Chapter 4 emphasised that the existing WTO jurisprudence leaves some important and 
troubling questionmarks. Why, for example, was it that the Appellate Body found Principle 12 o f 
the non-binding Rio Declaration to be particulady relevant to the interpretation o f the G A TT  in the 
Shrimp-Turtle case, but argued in the Hormones case that the legal status o f the seemingly more
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established the precautionary principle was an abstract and academic question, completely irrelevant 
to the interpretation o f the SPS Agreement? And how can it be justified that the AB in the Shrimp- 
Turtk case referred to the Convention on Biological Diversity, to which the U.S. is not a party, and the 
substance of which is relevant but rather remote from the subject matter o f the dispute? But in 
Biotech dispute, the panel found that the Cartagena Protocol — intimately related to the question of 
GMOs - was not at all relevant to the dispute either as a relevant mle o f international law within the 
meaning o f the VCL.T or as factual evidence? In light of this analysis, Chapter 4 stressed that the 
WTO dispute setdement system could improve its legitimacy by being consistent in its approach to 
international environmental norms, and giving adequate justifications for its decisions concerning 
such norms. The last part o f Chapter 4 lamented that the recent Biotech panel decisions seems to 
have taken the WTO further from this proposed approach. In fact, the decision is so modest and 
conservative that it seems to ignore the intellectual effort that has been put to clarifying the 
relationship between W TO law and other norms o f international environmental law, and to 
identifying problems arising from the fragmentation o f international law. From that perspective, it 
is unfortunate that the Biotech decision was not appealed as it would have been interesting to see 
how the AB -  whose legal analysis is usually more rigorous than that o f the panels - would have 
approached these issues ten years after the Shrimp-Turtle case.
Chapter 5 turned to the formal and procedural dimension o f legitimacy and argued that the 
legitimacy o f an international judicial body will also suffer if it gets involved in policy-making and 
exceeds the boundaries o f its judicial function. Drawing on legal theory, Chapter 5 admitted that 
while fundamental, the distinctions between law-making and law-application, law and politics, court 
and legislature are notoriously difficult to draw. It argued, however, that these distinctions do exist 
and that they must be drawn in such a way that takes into account the institutional framework in 
which the WTO dispute settlement system operates. Given that many ideas concerning legitimacy, 
democracy and accountability in the international sphere are in a flux, the WTO dispute setdement 
system should be mindful o f factors influencing its formal legitimacy. For this reason, Chapter 5 
challenged arguments calling for more open balancing of trade objectives and environmental 
interests in the WTO dispute setdement system to the extent that such arguments were not based 
on international environmental law but seemed to be more politically and ideologically motivated. 
To distinguish, what Chapter 4 suggested was legally justified and transparent application of 
international environmental norms when relevant to WTO disputes and what Chapter 5 opposed 
was extensively balancing the conflicting values and interests at stake inherent in the Korean Beef 
approach o f balancing the relative importance o f the national regulatory objective and international 
trade interests. In other words, Chapter 5 sought to emphasise the limits o f the judicial function 
and the need to respect other institutional boundaries, including appropriate deference to national 
authorities and other international institutions. Finally, Chapter 5 also stressed the importance of
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transparency, access to information and inclusiveness in terms o f procedures as factors that also 
have important implications to the legitimacy o f the WTO dispute settlement system.
Having analysed the WTO dispute setdement system and the different elements o f legitimacy, it 
seems that much of the legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system depends on finding the 
right balances — not only between the various norms and interests, but also between the different 
components o f legitimacy. At the beginning, I conceived my research question as a dilemma 
between the formal and substantive dimensions o f legitimacy. From the environmental perspective, 
I found aspects of the WTO jurisprudence highly disappointing and saw a clear need for improving 
the situation. However, it initially seemed that any significant substantive improvements would not 
be possible without exceeding the mandate of the WTO dispute setdement system. But the rapidly 
evolving debate concerning conflict norms and interaction between international treaty regimes 
showed that some tools were available for improving the substance while respecting the formal 
mandate o f the WTO dispute setdement system. Indeed, it lead me to realise that the substance can 
be improved by following the legal form — although the size o f this window depends on whether one 
agrees with the more progressive arguments concerning the interaction between WTO norms and 
non-WTO norms made by Pauwelyn, or the more reserved arguments by Marceau and Trachtman. 
While both arguments are convincing, I have felt more inclined to lean towards Pauwelyn as his 
approach would mean placing international environmental law on a more equal footing with WTO 
norms, thereby acknowledging the competing claims to legitimacy by these specialised fragments of 
international law. Still, given formal constraints, the substance cannot ultimately be perfection 
through the legal tools available for the W TO dispute setdement system but it must ultimately be 
deferred elsewhere. To justify this conclusion, Chapter 6 focused on fragmentation o f international 
law and possible conflicts between the WTO regime and climate change mitigation measures. In 
particular, it demonstrated how legal analysis based on the internal logic and assumptions o f the 
WTO regime can easily lead to a bias that is unacceptable to those following the internal logic of 
the international climate change regime.
It seems that the debate about the treatment of environmental issues in the GATT/W TO dispute 
setdement began as something very political — partly because the relevant actors had not yet 
internalised each other’s vocabulary and logic and could not formulate their frustration in such 
sophisticated terms as they do nowadays. Later on, however, the debate took a highly legalistic turn 
highlighting the potential o f customary rules o f treaty interpretation, conflict norms and other legal 
devices in solving the problems that linkage disputes created in the WTO dispute settlement 
system. Certainly, the legal technical solutions offered by W TO scholars examined and elaborated 
in this study have offered some relief. It has also been shown that there is still unused potential for 
constructive interaction between WTO law and international environmental law, even if adopting a
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narrow view on the mandate of the WTO dispute settlement system. To start with, the role of 
international environmental law in the WTO dispute setdement system should be clarified: when 
can it be referred to as a relevant rule of international law under VC LT, when should it be 
considered as factual evidence? In case of a norm conflict that cannot be solved through 
interpretation, can non-WTO norms be direcdy applied, as Pauwelyn argues, or not? In any case, 
when the WTO dispute setdement system does refer to international environmental law in any 
form or shape, its reasoning should be transparent and adequately justified. But ultimately, even the 
most sophisticated legal techniques do not seem to offer an escape that would guarantee the 
legitimacy of the WTO dispute setdement system. The only way o f doing so would stretch the 
mandate in such a way that would bring to the fore the formal components o f legitimacy discussed 
in Chapter 5.
From the institutional perspective, settling highly political disputes through the W TO dispute 
setdement system would not be an ideal solution. Again, I agree with the International Law 
Commission:
...when conflicts emerge between treaty provisions that have their home in 
different regimes, care should be taken so as to guarantee that any setdement is not 
dictated by organs exclusively linked with one o f the other o f the conflicting 
regimes.1239
Certainly, a lot of the criticism against the WTO dispute setdement system as an institution where 
‘faceless bureaucrats’ determine the fate o f the world while hiding in Geneva is based on lack of 
information and unfounded fears -  and could be improved through increased transparency and 
awareness raising. However, what either better information or rule-oriented and judidalised dispute 
setdement system cannot really address is the clash o f two professional cultures such as those 
created by the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol, each of which is able to stake a valid and persuasive 
claim to legitimacy. Both involve highly competent and responsible international experts who 
genuinely believe that they are advancing the world’s best interest and common good. Both regimes 
are so complex that the respective experts are somewhat blinded by their internal logic, which is, 
however, compelling only to those who have internalised the basic assumptions o f the regime in 
question. Solving such conflicts through the WTO dispute setdement system would be far from the 
ideal institutional framework for the fruitful cooperation and interaction of such regimes.
At the end o f the day, the WTO dispute setdement system is therefore not equipped to deal with all 
the problems relating to the increasing specialisation within international law - indeed its 
fragmentation - and the need to clarify and define political priorities. While in the international 
institutional reality the WTO dispute setdement system is uniquely powerful, the logical conclusion
1239 ILC, Fragmentation o f  International Law, 252.
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should not be that international trade law should become uniquely powerful in comparison with 
other areas of international law. Throughout the study I have thus attempted to draw attention to 
the linkages between WTO law and international environmental law in a way that highlights the 
somewhat competing claims to legitimacy by these two increasingly specialised sub-systems of 
international law and professional cultures. The previous Chapter sought to demonstrate through 
concrete examples that the WTO dispute setdement system alone is ultimately unequipped to 
handle the kind of controversies that could arise from a conflict between two powerful spheres of 
international law, such as the WTO regime and the Kyoto Protocol. It remains to be seen whether 
the validity of these arguments will eventually need to be demonstrated through a concrete dispute 
that makes the problems so explicit that it leaves no doubt that the situation needs to be addressed, 
whether states manage to avoid surfacing such an open legal conflict, or whether they gradually 
negotiate a more suitable institutional arrangement. But as the latent tension between the WTO and 
the Kyoto Protocol illustrates, it is an illusion to think that all the major challenges to the legitimacy 
of the WTO dispute setdement system have been overcome.
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